Jakub Kicinski says:

====================
net/tls: fix W=1 build warnings

This small series cleans up two outstanding W=1 build
warnings in tls code.  Both are set but not used variables.
The first case looks fairly straightforward.  In the second
I think it's better to propagate the error code, even if
not doing some does not lead to a crash with current code.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
David S. Miller 2019-05-09 16:37:40 -07:00
Родитель 15192f253e b53f4976fb
Коммит f50c8a019b
2 изменённых файлов: 23 добавлений и 12 удалений

Просмотреть файл

@ -541,14 +541,11 @@ static int tls_device_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
void tls_device_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
{
int rc = 0;
if (!sk->sk_write_pending && tls_is_partially_sent_record(ctx)) {
gfp_t sk_allocation = sk->sk_allocation;
sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC;
rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, ctx,
MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL);
tls_push_partial_record(sk, ctx, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL);
sk->sk_allocation = sk_allocation;
}
}

Просмотреть файл

@ -119,23 +119,25 @@ static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
}
static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
int sub = 0;
/* Determine zero-padding length */
if (tls_ctx->prot_info.version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
char content_type = 0;
int err;
int back = 17;
while (content_type == 0) {
if (back > rxm->full_len)
if (back > rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size)
return -EBADMSG;
err = skb_copy_bits(skb,
rxm->offset + rxm->full_len - back,
&content_type, 1);
if (err)
return err;
if (content_type)
break;
sub++;
@ -170,9 +172,17 @@ static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
} else {
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
rxm->full_len -= padding_length(ctx, tls_ctx, skb);
rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
int pad;
pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
if (pad < 0) {
ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
} else {
rxm->full_len -= pad;
rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
}
}
/* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
@ -1478,7 +1488,7 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
int version = prot->version;
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
int err = 0;
int pad, err = 0;
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
@ -1501,7 +1511,11 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
*zc = false;
}
rxm->full_len -= padding_length(ctx, tls_ctx, skb);
pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
if (pad < 0)
return pad;
rxm->full_len -= pad;
rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->rx, version);