microsoft
/
WSL2-Linux-Kernel
зеркало из https://github.com/microsoft/WSL2-Linux-Kernel.git
1
0
Форкнуть 0
Код Задачи Пакеты Проекты Релизы Вики Активность

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next

This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2017-04-19 22:00:15 +10:00
Родитель 6859e21e81 3dd0c8d065
Коммит f65cc104c4
2 изменённых файлов: 94 добавлений и 34 удалений
Показать статистику Скачать Patch файл Скачать Diff файл Показать все файлы Свернуть все файлы

5
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
Просмотреть файл

@ -207,10 +207,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
cause = "missing-hash";
status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
if (opened & FILE_CREATED) {
if (opened & FILE_CREATED)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
goto out;
}

123
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
Просмотреть файл

@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
u8 fsuuid[16];
kuid_t uid;
kuid_t fowner;
bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
* normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
* and running executables.
*/
static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@ -97,32 +99,35 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
};
static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@ -139,10 +144,11 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
#else
/* force signature */
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
.flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
#endif
};
@ -240,19 +246,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
return false;
if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
&& !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
&& !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
&& !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
&& !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
return false;
} else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
} else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
return false;
}
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
!rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
@ -486,7 +493,9 @@ enum {
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
Opt_pcr
};
@ -507,9 +516,15 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"},
{Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"},
{Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"},
{Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"},
{Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"},
{Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
@ -541,24 +556,37 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
return result;
}
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
{
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
}
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
{
ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL);
}
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *from;
char *p;
bool uid_token;
int result = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq;
entry->action = UNKNOWN;
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@ -694,11 +722,21 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
break;
case Opt_uid:
ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
case Opt_euid:
if (token == Opt_euid)
ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
case Opt_uid_gt:
case Opt_euid_gt:
entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
case Opt_uid_lt:
case Opt_euid_lt:
if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
case Opt_uid_eq:
case Opt_euid_eq:
uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
(token == Opt_uid_gt) ||
(token == Opt_uid_lt);
ima_log_string_op(ab, uid_token ? "uid" : "euid",
args[0].from, entry->uid_op);
if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
result = -EINVAL;
@ -713,12 +751,18 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
(uid_t)lnum != lnum)
result = -EINVAL;
else
entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
entry->flags |= uid_token
? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
}
break;
case Opt_fowner:
ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
case Opt_fowner_gt:
entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
case Opt_fowner_lt:
if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
case Opt_fowner_eq:
ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
entry->fowner_op);
if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
result = -EINVAL;
@ -1049,19 +1093,34 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf);
if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf);
else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf);
else
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf);
if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf);
else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf);
else
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf);
if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_gt)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf);
else if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_lt)
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf);
else
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}