Input: joydev - prevent use of not validated data in JSIOCSBTNMAP ioctl
Even though we validate user-provided inputs we then traverse past validated data when applying the new map. The issue was originally discovered by Murray McAllister with this simple POC (if the following is executed by an unprivileged user it will instantly panic the system): int main(void) { int fd, ret; unsigned int buffer[10000]; fd = open("/dev/input/js0", O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) printf("Error opening file\n"); ret = ioctl(fd, JSIOCSBTNMAP & ~IOCSIZE_MASK, &buffer); printf("%d\n", ret); } The solution is to traverse internal buffer which is guaranteed to only contain valid date when constructing the map. Fixes:182d679b22
("Input: joydev - prevent potential read overflow in ioctl") Fixes:999b874f4a
("Input: joydev - validate axis/button maps before clobbering current ones") Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Larkin <avlarkin82@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210620120030.1513655-1-avlarkin82@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
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@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static int joydev_handle_JSIOCSBTNMAP(struct joydev *joydev,
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memcpy(joydev->keypam, keypam, len);
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for (i = 0; i < joydev->nkey; i++)
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joydev->keymap[keypam[i] - BTN_MISC] = i;
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joydev->keymap[joydev->keypam[i] - BTN_MISC] = i;
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out:
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kfree(keypam);
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