netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_routing_control
[ Upstream commit b5dffcb8f71bdd02a4e5799985b51b12f4eeaf76 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3
("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Родитель
4eacb242e2
Коммит
f9c4d42464
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@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
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return ret;
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}
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if (!sysctl_netrom_routing_control && ax25 != NULL)
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if (!READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_routing_control) && ax25 != NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Its Time-To-Live has expired */
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