[ Upstream commit 66eae85033 ]
The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags
argument and always relies on the flags from the original request
when starting its sub-request.
This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be
set when it shouldn't.
Fixes: 92d95ba917 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The flag CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is "inherited" in the sense that when a
template is instantiated, the template will have CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set if
any of the algorithms it uses has CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set.
We'd like to add a second flag (CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY) that gets
"inherited" in the same way. This is difficult because the handling of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is hardcoded everywhere. Address this by:
- Add CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS, which contains the set of flags that
have these inheritance semantics.
- Add crypto_algt_inherited_mask(), for use by template ->create()
methods. It returns any of these flags that the user asked to be
unset and thus must be passed in the 'mask' to crypto_grab_*().
- Also modify crypto_check_attr_type() to handle computing the 'mask'
so that most templates can just use this.
- Make crypto_grab_*() propagate these flags to the template instance
being created so that templates don't have to do this themselves.
Make crypto/simd.c propagate these flags too, since it "wraps" another
algorithm, similar to a template.
Based on a patch by Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2006301414580.30526@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Make the authenc template use the new function crypto_grab_ahash() to
initialize its ahash spawn.
This is needed to make all spawns be initialized in a consistent way.
Also simplify the error handling by taking advantage of crypto_drop_*()
now accepting (as a no-op) spawns that haven't been initialized yet, and
by taking advantage of crypto_grab_*() now handling ERR_PTR() names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Initializing a crypto_skcipher_spawn currently requires:
1. Set spawn->base.inst to point to the instance.
2. Call crypto_grab_skcipher().
But there's no reason for these steps to be separate, and in fact this
unneeded complication has caused at least one bug, the one fixed by
commit 6db4341017 ("crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst")
So just make crypto_grab_skcipher() take the instance as an argument.
To keep the function calls from getting too unwieldy due to this extra
argument, also introduce a 'mask' variable into the affected places
which weren't already using one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway. So they've now been removed.
Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
->setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use subsys_initcall for registration of all templates and generic
algorithm implementations, rather than module_init. Then change
cryptomgr to use arch_initcall, to place it before the subsys_initcalls.
This is needed so that when both a generic and optimized implementation
of an algorithm are built into the kernel (not loadable modules), the
generic implementation is registered before the optimized one.
Otherwise, the self-tests for the optimized implementation are unable to
allocate the generic implementation for the new comparison fuzz tests.
Note that on arm, a side effect of this change is that self-tests for
generic implementations may run before the unaligned access handler has
been installed. So, unaligned accesses will crash the kernel. This is
arguably a good thing as it makes it easier to detect that type of bug.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.
However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().
Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.
Reproducer using AF_ALG:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "aead",
.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
};
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
__be32 enckeylen;
char keys[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
};
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key));
}
It caused:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
[...]
Call Trace:
sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
__sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: e236d4a89a ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In crypto_authenc_setkey we save pointers to the authenc keys in
a local variable of type struct crypto_authenc_keys and we don't
zeroize it after use. Fix this and don't leak pointers to the
authenc keys.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since commit 499a66e6b6 ("crypto: null - Remove default null
blkcipher"), crypto_get_default_null_skcipher2() and
crypto_put_default_null_skcipher2() are the same as their non-2
equivalents. So switch callers of the "2" versions over to the original
versions and remove the "2" versions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since commit 3a01d0ee2b ("crypto: skcipher - Remove top-level
givcipher interface"), crypto_spawn_skcipher2() and
crypto_spawn_skcipher() are equivalent. So switch callers of
crypto_spawn_skcipher2() to crypto_spawn_skcipher() and remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since commit 3a01d0ee2b ("crypto: skcipher - Remove top-level
givcipher interface"), crypto_grab_skcipher2() and
crypto_grab_skcipher() are equivalent. So switch callers of
crypto_grab_skcipher2() to crypto_grab_skcipher() and remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch converts authenc to use the new skcipher interface as
opposed to ablkcipher.
It also fixes a little bug where if a sync version of authenc
is requested we may still end up using an async ahash. This should
have no effect as none of the authenc users can request for a
sync authenc.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it is, if you get an async ahash with a sync skcipher you'll
end up with a sync authenc, which is wrong.
This patch fixes it by considering the ASYNC bit from ahash as
well.
It also fixes a little bug where if a sync version of authenc
is requested we may still end up using an async ahash.
Neither of them should have any effect as none of the authenc
users can request for a sync authenc.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch uses the crypto_aead_set_reqsize helper to avoid directly
touching the internals of aead.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When performing an asynchronous ablkcipher operation the authenc
completion callback routine is invoked, but it does not locate and use
the proper IV.
The callback routine, crypto_authenc_encrypt_done, is updated to use
the same method of calculating the address of the IV as is done in
crypto_authenc_encrypt function which sets up the callback.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
AEAD key parsing is duplicated to multiple places in the kernel. Add a
common helper function to consolidate that functionality.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <mathias.krause@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When comparing MAC hashes, AEAD authentication tags, or other hash
values in the context of authentication or integrity checking, it
is important not to leak timing information to a potential attacker,
i.e. when communication happens over a network.
Bytewise memory comparisons (such as memcmp) are usually optimized so
that they return a nonzero value as soon as a mismatch is found. E.g,
on x86_64/i5 for 512 bytes this can be ~50 cyc for a full mismatch
and up to ~850 cyc for a full match (cold). This early-return behavior
can leak timing information as a side channel, allowing an attacker to
iteratively guess the correct result.
This patch adds a new method crypto_memneq ("memory not equal to each
other") to the crypto API that compares memory areas of the same length
in roughly "constant time" (cache misses could change the timing, but
since they don't reveal information about the content of the strings
being compared, they are effectively benign). Iow, best and worst case
behaviour take the same amount of time to complete (in contrast to
memcmp).
Note that crypto_memneq (unlike memcmp) can only be used to test for
equality or inequality, NOT for lexicographical order. This, however,
is not an issue for its use-cases within the crypto API.
We tried to locate all of the places in the crypto API where memcmp was
being used for authentication or integrity checking, and convert them
over to crypto_memneq.
crypto_memneq is declared noinline, placed in its own source file,
and compiled with optimizations that might increase code size disabled
("Os") because a smart compiler (or LTO) might notice that the return
value is always compared against zero/nonzero, and might then
reintroduce the same early-return optimization that we are trying to
avoid.
Using #pragma or __attribute__ optimization annotations of the code
for disabling optimization was avoided as it seems to be considered
broken or unmaintained for long time in GCC [1]. Therefore, we work
around that by specifying the compile flag for memneq.o directly in
the Makefile. We found that this seems to be most appropriate.
As we use ("Os"), this patch also provides a loop-free "fast-path" for
frequently used 16 byte digests. Similarly to kernel library string
functions, leave an option for future even further optimized architecture
specific assembler implementations.
This was a joint work of James Yonan and Daniel Borkmann. Also thanks
for feedback from Florian Weimer on this and earlier proposals [2].
[1] http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc/2012-07/msg00211.html
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/2/10/131
Signed-off-by: James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Replace PTR_ERR followed by ERR_PTR by ERR_CAST, to be more concise.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
expression err,x;
@@
- err = PTR_ERR(x);
if (IS_ERR(x))
- return ERR_PTR(err);
+ return ERR_CAST(x);
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The authenc code doesn't deal with zero-length associated data
correctly and ends up constructing a zero-length sg entry which
causes a crash when it's fed into the crypto system.
This patch fixes this by avoiding the code-path that triggers
the SG construction if we have no associated data.
This isn't the most optimal fix as it means that we'll end up
using the fallback code-path even when we could still execute
the digest function. However, this isn't a big deal as nobody
but the test path would supply zero-length associated data.
Reported-by: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>
Use scatterwalk_crypto_chain in favor of locally defined chaining functions.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use ERR_CAST(x) rather than ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x)). The former makes more
clear what is the purpose of the operation, which otherwise looks like a
no-op.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
type T;
T x;
identifier f;
@@
T f (...) { <+...
- ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x))
+ x
...+> }
@@
expression x;
@@
- ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x))
+ ERR_CAST(x)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch (applied against 2.6.34) fixes the calculation of the
length of the ABLKCIPHER decrypt request ("cryptlen") after an
asynchronous hash request has been completed in the AUTHENC interface.
Signed-off-by: Shikhar Khattar <shikhark@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When Steffen originally wrote the authenc async hash patch, he
correctly had EINPROGRESS checks in place so that we did not invoke
the original completion handler with it.
Unfortuantely I told him to remove it before the patch was applied.
As only MAY_BACKLOG request completion handlers are required to
handle EINPROGRESS completions, those checks are really needed.
This patch restores them.
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In crypto_authenc_encrypt() we save the IV behind the ablkcipher
request. To save space on the request, we overwrite the ablkcipher
request with a ahash request after encryption. So the IV may be
overwritten by the ahash request. This patch fixes this by placing
the IV in front of the ablkcipher/ahash request.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
We accidentally assigned the ahash update complete function to
the wrong function pointer in crypto_authenc_verify.
This patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch converts authenc to the new ahash interface.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that there are no more legacy hash implementations we can
remove the reference to crypto_hash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it is if an algorithm with a zero-length IV is used (e.g.,
NULL encryption) with authenc, authenc may generate an SG entry
of length zero, which will trigger a BUG check in the hash layer.
This patch fixes it by skipping the IV SG generation if the IV
size is zero.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch allows shash algorithms to be used through the old hash
interface. This is a transitional measure so we can convert the
underlying algorithms to shash before converting the users across.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Authenc works in two stages for encryption, it first encrypts and
then computes an ICV. The context memory of the request is used
by both operations. The problem is that when an asynchronous
encryption completes, we will compute the ICV and then reread the
context memory of the encryption to get the original request.
It just happens that we have a buffer of 16 bytes in front of the
request pointer, so ICVs of 16 bytes (such as SHA1) do not trigger
the bug. However, any attempt to uses a larger ICV instantly kills
the machine when the first asynchronous encryption is completed.
This patch fixes this by saving the request pointer before we start
the ICV computation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch implements the givencrypt function for authenc. It simply
calls the givencrypt operation on the underlying cipher instead of encrypt.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch converts the authenc algorithm over to crypto_grab_skcipher
which is a prerequisite for IV generation.
This patch also changes authenc to set its ASYNC status depending on
the ASYNC status of the underlying skcipher.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The scatterwalk infrastructure is used by algorithms so it needs to
move out of crypto for future users that may live in drivers/crypto
or asm/*/crypto.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch changes gcm/authenc to return EBADMSG instead of EINVAL for
ICV mismatches. This convention has already been adopted by IPsec.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The previous code incorrectly included the hash in the verification which
also meant that we'd crash and burn when it comes to actually verifying
the hash since we'd go past the end of the SG list.
This patch fixes that by subtracting authsize from cryptlen at the start.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Having enckeylen as a template parameter makes it a pain for hardware
devices that implement ciphers with many key sizes since each one would
have to be registered separately.
Since the authenc algorithm is mainly used for legacy purposes where its
key is going to be constructed out of two separate keys, we can in fact
embed this value into the key itself.
This patch does this by prepending an rtnetlink header to the key that
contains the encryption key length.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it is authsize is an algorithm paramter which cannot be changed at
run-time. This is inconvenient because hardware that implements such
algorithms would have to register each authsize that they support
separately.
Since authsize is a property common to all AEAD algorithms, we can add
a function setauthsize that sets it at run-time, just like setkey.
This patch does exactly that and also changes authenc so that authsize
is no longer a parameter of its template.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Herbert Xu
Eric Biggers
Thomas Gleixner
Kees Cook
Tudor-Dan Ambarus
Harsh Jain
Tom Lendacky
Mathias Krause
James Yonan
Julia Lawall
Steffen Klassert
Julia Lawall
Shikhar Khattar
Richard Hartmann
Patrick McHardy