Граф коммитов

7 Коммитов

Автор SHA1 Сообщение Дата
Al Viro 31605debdf vfio: grab vfio_device reference *before* exposing the sucker via fd_install()
It's not critical (anymore) since another thread closing the file will block
on ->device_lock before it gets to dropping the final reference, but it's
definitely cleaner that way...

Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-22 10:26:42 -04:00
Al Viro 90b1253e41 vfio: get rid of vfio_device_put()/vfio_group_get_device* races
we really need to make sure that dropping the last reference happens
under the group->device_lock; otherwise a loop (under device_lock)
might find vfio_device instance that is being freed right now, has
already dropped the last reference and waits on device_lock to exclude
the sucker from the list.

Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-22 10:26:13 -04:00
Al Viro 6d2cd3ce81 vfio: get rid of open-coding kref_put_mutex
Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-22 10:25:19 -04:00
Al Viro 934ad4c235 vfio: don't dereference after kfree...
Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-08-22 10:23:04 -04:00
Alex Williamson 89e1f7d4c6 vfio: Add PCI device driver
Add PCI device support for VFIO.  PCI devices expose regions
for accessing config space, I/O port space, and MMIO areas
of the device.  PCI config access is virtualized in the kernel,
allowing us to ensure the integrity of the system, by preventing
various accesses while reducing duplicate support across various
userspace drivers.  I/O port supports read/write access while
MMIO also supports mmap of sufficiently sized regions.  Support
for INTx, MSI, and MSI-X interrupts are provided using eventfds to
userspace.

Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
2012-07-31 08:16:24 -06:00
Alex Williamson 73fa0d10d0 vfio: Type1 IOMMU implementation
This VFIO IOMMU backend is designed primarily for AMD-Vi and Intel
VT-d hardware, but is potentially usable by anything supporting
similar mapping functionality.  We arbitrarily call this a Type1
backend for lack of a better name.  This backend has no IOVA
or host memory mapping restrictions for the user and is optimized
for relatively static mappings.  Mapped areas are pinned into system
memory.

Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
2012-07-31 08:16:23 -06:00
Alex Williamson cba3345cc4 vfio: VFIO core
VFIO is a secure user level driver for use with both virtual machines
and user level drivers.  VFIO makes use of IOMMU groups to ensure the
isolation of devices in use, allowing unprivileged user access.  It's
intended that VFIO will replace KVM device assignment and UIO drivers
(in cases where the target platform includes a sufficiently capable
IOMMU).

New in this version of VFIO is support for IOMMU groups managed
through the IOMMU core as well as a rework of the API, removing the
group merge interface.  We now go back to a model more similar to
original VFIO with UIOMMU support where the file descriptor obtained
from /dev/vfio/vfio allows access to the IOMMU, but only after a
group is added, avoiding the previous privilege issues with this type
of model.  IOMMU support is also now fully modular as IOMMUs have
vastly different interface requirements on different platforms.  VFIO
users are able to query and initialize the IOMMU model of their
choice.

Please see the follow-on Documentation commit for further description
and usage example.

Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
2012-07-31 08:16:22 -06:00