The POSIX.1 draft spec for futimens()/utimensat() says:
Only a process with the effective user ID equal to the
user ID of the file, *or with write access to the file*,
or with appropriate privileges may use futimens() or
utimensat() with a null pointer as the times argument
or with both tv_nsec fields set to the special value
UTIME_NOW.
The important piece here is "with write access to the file", and
this matters for futimens(), which deals with an argument that
is a file descriptor referring to the file whose timestamps are
being updated, The standard is saying that the "writability"
check is based on the file permissions, not the access mode with
which the file is opened. (This behavior is consistent with the
semantics of FreeBSD's futimes().) However, Linux is currently
doing the latter -- futimens(fd, times) is a library
function implemented as
utimensat(fd, NULL, times, 0)
and within the utimensat() implementation we have the code:
f = fget(dfd); // dfd is 'fd'
...
if (f) {
if (!(f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
goto mnt_drop_write_and_out;
The check should instead be based on the file permissions.
Thanks to Miklos for pointing out how to do this check.
Miklos also pointed out a simplification that could be
made to my first version of this patch, since the checks
for the pathname and file descriptor cases can now be
conflated.
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The POSIX.1 draft spec for utimensat() says:
Only a process with the effective user ID equal to the
user ID of the file or with appropriate privileges may use
futimens() or utimensat() with a non-null times argument
that does not have both tv_nsec fields set to UTIME_NOW
and does not have both tv_nsec fields set to UTIME_OMIT.
If this condition is violated, then the error EPERM should result.
However, the current implementation does not generate EPERM if
one tv_nsec field is UTIME_NOW while the other is UTIME_OMIT.
It should give this error for that case.
This patch:
a) Repairs that problem.
b) Removes the now unneeded nsec_special() helper function.
c) Adds some comments to explain the checks that are being
performed.
Thanks to Miklos, who provided comments on the previous iteration
of this patch. As a result, this version is a little simpler and
and its logic is better structured.
Miklos suggested an alternative idea, migrating the
is_owner_or_cap() checks into fs/attr.c:inode_change_ok() via
the use of an ATTR_OWNER_CHECK flag. Maybe we could do that
later, but for now I've gone with this version, which is
IMO simpler, and can be more easily read as being correct.
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The POSIX.1 draft spec for utimensat() says that if a times[n].tv_nsec
field is UTIME_OMIT or UTIME_NOW, then the value in the corresponding
tv_sec field is ignored. See the last sentence of this para, from
the spec:
If the tv_nsec field of a timespec structure has
the special value UTIME_NOW, the file's relevant
timestamp shall be set to the greatest value
supported by the file system that is not greater than
the current time. If the tv_nsec field has the
special value UTIME_OMIT, the file's relevant
timestamp shall not be changed. In either case,
the tv_sec field shall be ignored.
However the current Linux implementation requires the tv_sec value to be
zero (or the EINVAL error results). This requirement should be removed.
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch fixes utimensat() to make its behavior consistent
with that of utime()/utimes() when dealing with files marked
immutable and append-only.
The current utimensat() implementation also returns EPERM if
'times' is non-NULL and the tv_nsec fields are both UTIME_NOW.
For consistency, the
(times != NULL && times[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW &&
times[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW)
case should be treated like the traditional utimes() case where
'times' is NULL. That is, the call should succeed for a file
marked append-only and should give the error EACCES if the file
is marked as immutable.
The simple way to do this is to set 'times' to NULL
if (times[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW && times[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW).
This is also the natural approach, since POSIX.1 semantics consider the
times == {{x, UTIME_NOW}, {y, UTIME_NOW}}
to be exactly equivalent to the case for
times == NULL.
(Thanks to Miklos for pointing this out.)
Patch 3 in this series relies on the simplification provided
by this patch.
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If utimensat() is called with both times set to UTIME_NOW or one of them to
UTIME_NOW and the other to UTIME_OMIT, then it will update the file time
without any permission checking.
I don't think this can be used for anything other than a local DoS, but could
be quite bewildering at that (e.g. "Why was that large source tree rebuilt
when I didn't modify anything???")
This affects all kernels from 2.6.22, when the utimensat() syscall was
introduced.
Fix by doing the same permission checking as for the "times == NULL" case.
Thanks to Michael Kerrisk, whose utimensat-non-conformances-and-fixes.patch in
-mm also fixes this (and breaks other stuff), only he didn't realize the
security implications of this bug.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now includes fix for oops seen by akpm.
"never let a libc developer write your kernel code" - hch
"nor, apparently, a kernel developer" - akpm
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order
* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Every file should include the headers containing the prototypes for its global
functions.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
utimensat() (and possibly other callers of do_utimes()) didn't check if the
nanosecond value was within the allowed range.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce is_owner_or_cap() macro in fs.h, and convert over relevant
users to it. This is done because we want to avoid bugs in the future
where we check for only effective fsuid of the current task against a
file's owning uid, without simultaneously checking for CAP_FOWNER as
well, thus violating its semantics.
[ XFS uses special macros and structures, and in general looked ...
untouchable, so we leave it alone -- but it has been looked over. ]
The (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) check in generic_permission() and
exec_permission_lite() is left alone, because those operations are
covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. Similarly operations
falling under the purview of CAP_CHOWN and CAP_LEASE are also left alone.
Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
do_utimes() does not honour CAP_FOWNER when times==NULL.
Trivial and obvious one-line fix.
Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 1c710c896e added the utimensat()
system call, but didn't handle the case of checking for the writability
of the target right, when the target was a file descriptor, not a
filename.
We cannot use vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) for that case, and need to
simply check whether the file descriptor is writable. The oops from
using the wrong function was noticed and narrowed down by Markus
Trippelsdorf.
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement utimensat(2) which is an extension to futimesat(2) in that it
a) supports nano-second resolution for the timestamps
b) allows to selectively ignore the atime/mtime value
c) allows to selectively use the current time for either atime or mtime
d) supports changing the atime/mtime of a symlink itself along the lines
of the BSD lutimes(3) functions
For this change the internally used do_utimes() functions was changed to
accept a timespec time value and an additional flags parameter.
Additionally the sys_utime function was changed to match compat_sys_utime
which already use do_utimes instead of duplicating the work.
Also, the completely missing futimensat() functionality is added. We have
such a function in glibc but we have to resort to using /proc/self/fd/* which
not everybody likes (chroot etc).
Test application (the syscall number will need per-arch editing):
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <syscall.h>
#define __NR_utimensat 280
#define UTIME_NOW ((1l << 30) - 1l)
#define UTIME_OMIT ((1l << 30) - 2l)
int
main(void)
{
int status = 0;
int fd = open("ttt", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666);
if (fd == -1)
error (1, errno, "failed to create test file \"ttt\"");
struct stat64 st1;
if (fstat64 (fd, &st1) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
struct timespec t[2];
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = 0;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
struct stat64 st2;
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("atim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("mtim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
t[0] = st1.st_atim;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != st1.st_atim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != st1.st_atim.tv_nsec)
{
puts ("atim not set");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("mtim changed from zero");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
t[1] = st1.st_mtim;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != st1.st_atim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != st1.st_atim.tv_nsec)
{
puts ("mtim changed from original time");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != st1.st_mtim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != st1.st_mtim.tv_nsec)
{
puts ("mtim not set");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
sleep (2);
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "ttt", t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv,NULL);
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec <= st1.st_atim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_atim.tv_sec > tv.tv_sec)
{
puts ("atim not set to NOW");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec <= st1.st_mtim.tv_sec
|| st2.st_mtim.tv_sec > tv.tv_sec)
{
puts ("mtim not set to NOW");
status = 1;
}
if (symlink ("ttt", "tttsym") != 0)
error (1, errno, "cannot create symlink");
t[0].tv_sec = 0;
t[0].tv_nsec = 0;
t[1].tv_sec = 0;
t[1].tv_nsec = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, AT_FDCWD, "tttsym", t, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (lstat64 ("tttsym", &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "lstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("symlink atim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 0 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("symlink mtim not reset to zero");
status = 1;
}
if (status != 0)
goto out;
t[0].tv_sec = 1;
t[0].tv_nsec = 0;
t[1].tv_sec = 1;
t[1].tv_nsec = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_utimensat, fd, NULL, t, 0) != 0)
error (1, errno, "utimensat failed");
if (fstat64 (fd, &st2) != 0)
error (1, errno, "fstat failed");
if (st2.st_atim.tv_sec != 1 || st2.st_atim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("atim not reset to one");
status = 1;
}
if (st2.st_mtim.tv_sec != 1 || st2.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 0)
{
puts ("mtim not reset to one");
status = 1;
}
if (status == 0)
puts ("all OK");
out:
close (fd);
unlink ("ttt");
unlink ("tttsym");
return status;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add missing i386 syscall table entry]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Michael Kerrisk
Miklos Szeredi
Dave Hansen
Jan Blunck
Adrian Bunk
Satyam Sharma
Linus Torvalds
Ulrich Drepper
Al Viro
Alexey Dobriyan