When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets
a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the
panic:
fd = memfd_secret();
ftruncate(fd, 10);
ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
strcpy(ptr, "123456789");
munmap(ptr, 10);
ftruncate(fd, 20);
The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down
into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually
we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this
via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to
memset()).
For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the
direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every
fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and
when we try to memset() with it we panic.
This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for
memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for
the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try
to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL.
One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will
require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal
fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend
memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch.
[1]:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10
Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8
RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028
RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028
R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0
R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8
FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830
truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80
simple_setattr+0x37/0x60
notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0
do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0
__x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet
CR2: ffffa0a889277028
[lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static]
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
[axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is a mechanical change.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Acked-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Tested-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> # orangefs
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> # afs
Quoting Dmitry:
"refcount_inc() needs to be done before fd_install(). After
fd_install() finishes, the fd can be used by userspace and
we can have secret data in memory before the refcount_inc().
A straightforward misuse where a user will predict the returned
fd in another thread before the syscall returns and will use it
to store secret data is somewhat dubious because such a user just
shoots themself in the foot.
But a more interesting misuse would be to close the predicted fd
and decrement the refcount before the corresponding refcount_inc,
this way one can briefly drop the refcount to zero while there are
other users of secretmem."
Move fd_install() after refcount_inc().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021154046.880251-1-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CACT4Y+b1sW6-Hkn8HQYw_SsT7X3tp-CJNh2ci0wG3ZnQz9jjig@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 9a436f8ff6 ("PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 110860541f ("mm/secretmem: use refcount_t instead of atomic_t")
attempted to fix the problem of secretmem_users wrapping to zero and
allowing suspend once again.
But it was reverted in commit 87066fdd2e ("Revert 'mm/secretmem: use
refcount_t instead of atomic_t'") because of the problems it caused - a
refcount_t was not semantically the right type to use.
Instead prevent secretmem_users from wrapping to zero by forbidding new
users if the number of users has wrapped from positive to negative.
This stops a long way short of reaching the necessary 4 billion users
where it wraps to zero again, so there's no need to be clever with
special anti-wrap types or checking the return value from atomic_inc().
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit 110860541f.
Converting the "secretmem_users" counter to a refcount is incorrect,
because a refcount is special in zero and can't just be incremented (but
a count of users is not, and "no users" is actually perfectly valid and
not a sign of a free'd resource).
Reported-by: syzbot+75639e6a0331cd61d3e2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@jordyzomer.github.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a secret memory region is active, memfd_secret disables hibernation.
One of the goals is to keep the secret data from being written to
persistent-storage.
It accomplishes this by maintaining a reference count to
`secretmem_users`. Once this reference is held your system can not be
hibernated due to the check in `hibernation_available()`. However,
because `secretmem_users` is of type `atomic_t`, reference counter
overflows are possible.
As you can see there's an `atomic_inc` for each `memfd` that is opened in
the `memfd_secret` syscall. If a local attacker succeeds to open 2^32
memfd's, the counter will wrap around to 0. This implies that you may
hibernate again, even though there are still regions of this secret
memory, thereby bypassing the security check.
In an attempt to fix this I have used `refcount_t` instead of `atomic_t`
which prevents reference counter overflows.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210820043339.2151352-1-jordy@pwning.systems
Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@jordyzomer.github.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make secretmem up to date with the changes done in commit 0af573780b
("mm: require ->set_page_dirty to be explicitly wired up") so that
unconditional call to this method won't cause crashes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210716063933.31633-1-rppt@kernel.org
Fixes: 0af573780b ("mm: require ->set_page_dirty to be explicitly wired up")
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly
enable it at the boot time.
Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file
descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created
by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel
direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes
that have access to the file descriptor.
Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections:
* Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel
attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes
"simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the
required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like
the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which
make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive
for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work.
Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing
mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert
a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That
takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most
standard attacks.
* Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the
secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be
accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.
* Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem,
a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and
create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform
secrets exfiltration using ptrace.
The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the
"traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File
descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory
areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based
memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the
userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says:
"Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major
work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without
mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse."
memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to
memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more
secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to
the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way
simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a
multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial
implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from
memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to
begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these
implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user
visible APIs.
The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess
primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory
areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the
follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that
belongs to the secret memory area.
Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the
kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user
would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel.
Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on
architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which
affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for
CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can
improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e057
("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "...
although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling
evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to
have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system
administrator to enable it at boot time.
Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid
accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page
migration.
Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently
from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail
and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings.
However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like
long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed
by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of
secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with
ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow
balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA.
A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is
freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page.
The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error
handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(0);
ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Axel Rasmussen
Kees Cook
Linus Torvalds
Jordy Zomer
Mike Rapoport