From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Fix unsafe nesting of sb_lock inside sb_security_lock in
selinux_complete_init. Detected by the kernel locking validator.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Check for NULL kmalloc return value before writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace,
and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is
not enabled in configuration.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: Jon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches.
This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match
the inode and ipc patches since its similar.
[updated:
> Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the
> user sid patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context
string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the
inode audit change patch already being applied.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch,
we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being
output.
This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23%
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix an off-by-one error in the MLS compatibility code that was causing
contexts with a MLS suffix to be rejected, preventing sharing partitions
between FC4 and FC5. Bug reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=188068
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove an unnecessary memory barrier (implicit in rcu_dereference()) from
install_session_keyring().
install_session_keyring() is also rearranged a little to make it slightly
more efficient.
As install_*_keyring() may schedule (in synchronize_rcu() or
keyring_alloc()), they may not be entered with interrupts disabled - and so
there's no point saving the interrupt disablement state over the critical
section.
exec_keys() will also be invoked with interrupts enabled, and so that doesn't
need to save the interrupt state either.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a
key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522].
The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the
keyring it's been given is actually a keyring.
I've fixed this problem by:
(1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that
the keyring is a keyring; and
(2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring,
and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't.
This can be tested by:
keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s`
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram':
security/selinux/xfrm.c:284: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x'
security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb':
security/selinux/xfrm.c:317: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x'
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
[PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
[PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
[PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
[PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
[PATCH] Fix audit operators
[PATCH] promiscuous mode
[PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
[PATCH] add/remove rule update
[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
[PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
[PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
[PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
[PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
[PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
...
Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is
less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta
<ram.gupta5@gmail.com>.
Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI
change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows
parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does
PTRACE_TRACEME).
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate
implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for
capabiilty of any process.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause an attempt to add a duplicate non-updateable key (such as a keyring) to
a keyring to discard the extant copy in favour of the new one rather than
failing with EEXIST:
# do the test in an empty session
keyctl session
# create a new keyring called "a" and attach to session
keyctl newring a @s
# create another new keyring called "a" and attach to session,
# displacing the keyring added by the second command:
keyctl newring a @s
Without this patch, the third command will fail.
For updateable keys (such as those of "user" type), the update method will
still be called rather than a new key being created.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make key quota detection generate an error if either quota is exceeded rather
than only if both quotas are exceeded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string
duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the
type.)
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch address several issues in the current BSD Secure Levels code:
o plaintext_to_sha1: Missing check for a NULL return from __get_free_page
o passwd_write_file: A page is leaked if the password is wrong.
o fix securityfs registration order
o seclvl_init is a mess and can't properly tolerate failures, failure
path is upside down (deldif and delf should be switched)
Cleanups:
o plaintext_to_sha1: Use buffers passed in
o passwd_write_file: Use kmalloc() instead of get_zeroed_page()
o passwd_write_file: hashedPassword comparison is just memcmp
o s/ENOSYS/EINVAL/
o misc
(akpm: after some discussion it appears that the BSD secure levels feature
should be scheduled for removal. But for now, let's fix these problems up).
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is
allocated for every inode instantiated by the system.
The memory savings are considerable.
On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96
bytes, saving 32 bytes per object. After booting, I see about 4000 of
these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile. With this patch, we
save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case. On 32-bit, the
savings are about half of this.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
A further fix is needed for selinuxfs link count management, to ensure that
the count is correct for the parent directory when a subdirectory is
created. This is only required for the root directory currently, but the
code has been updated for the general case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix copy & paste error in sel_make_avc_files(), removing a supurious call to
d_genocide() in the error path. All of this will be cleaned up by
kill_litter_super().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the call to sel_make_bools() from sel_fill_super(), as policy needs to
be loaded before the boolean files can be created. Policy will never be
loaded during sel_fill_super() as selinuxfs is kernel mounted during init and
the only means to load policy is via selinuxfs.
Also, the call to d_genocide() on the error path of sel_make_bools() is
incorrect and replaced with sel_remove_bools().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Unify the error path of sel_fill_super() so that all errors pass through the
same point and generate an error message. Also, removes a spurious dput() in
the error path which breaks the refcounting for the filesystem
(litter_kill_super() will correctly clean things up itself on error).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use existing sel_make_dir() helper to create booleans directory rather than
duplicating the logic.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix the hard link count for selinuxfs directories, which are currently one
short.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Simplify sel_read_bool to use the simple_read_from_buffer helper, like the
other selinuxfs functions.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Semaphore to mutex conversion.
The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch disables the automatic labeling of new inodes on disk
when no policy is loaded.
Discussion is here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=180296
In short, we're changing the behavior so that when no policy is loaded,
SELinux does not label files at all. Currently it does add an 'unlabeled'
label in this case, which we've found causes problems later.
SELinux always maintains a safe internal label if there is none, so with this
patch, we just stick with that and wait until a policy is loaded before adding
a persistent label on disk.
The effect is simply that if you boot with SELinux enabled but no policy
loaded and create a file in that state, SELinux won't try to set a security
extended attribute on the new inode on the disk. This is the only sane
behavior for SELinux in that state, as it cannot determine the right label to
assign in the absence of a policy. That state usually doesn't occur, but the
rawhide installer seemed to be misbehaving temporarily so it happened to show
up on a test install.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
A recent changeset removes dummy_socket_getpeersec, replacing it with
two new functions, but still references the removed function in the
security_fixup_ops table, fix it by doing the replacement operation in
the fixup table too.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet. An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.
Patch design approach:
- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association. The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.
- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.
The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).
Patch implementation details:
- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error
checking):
getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);
The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.
getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.
- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for UDP should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.
When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space. The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently
added to -mm1:
* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode
* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off
due to a missing function in security/dummy.c
* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing
return just before an error_path label
* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),
audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.
These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.
This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).
[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The attached patch updates various items for the new user space
messages. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Fix SELinux to not reset the tracer SID when the child is already being
traced, since selinux_ptrace is also called by proc for access checking
outside of the context of a ptrace attach.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make SELinux depend on AUDIT as it requires the basic audit support to log
permission denials at all. Note that AUDITSYSCALL remains optional for
SELinux, although it can be useful in providing further information upon
denials.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In the small window between strnlen_user() and copy_from_user() userspace
could alter the terminating `\0' character.
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along
with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers. These fields and
tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a
loadable module during LSM development.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch changes the SELinux file_alloc_security function to use
GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_ATOMIC; the use of GFP_ATOMIC appears to be a
remnant of when this function was being called with the files_lock spinlock
held, and is no longer necessary. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix the SELinux mprotect checks on executable mappings so that they are not
re-applied when the mapping is already executable as well as cleaning up
the code. This avoids a situation where e.g. an application is prevented
from removing PROT_WRITE on an already executable mapping previously
authorized via execmem permission due to an execmod denial.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the "inline" keyword from a bunch of big functions in the kernel with
the goal of shrinking it by 30kb to 40kb
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIP6 strings.
ie: net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIPQUAD strings too.
ie: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c
This patch:
adds NIP6_FMT to kernel.h
changes all code to use NIP6_FMT
fixes net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
adds NIPQUAD_FMT to kernel.h
fixes net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c
changes a few uses of "%u.%u.%u.%u" to NIPQUAD_FMT for symmetry to NIP6_FMT
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;
- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
mm/, security/, & sound/;
many more drivers/ to go)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Stephen Smalley
Alexey Dobriyan
Serge E. Hallyn
Steve Grubb
Darrel Goeddel
Ron Yorston
David Howells
Dave Jones
Linus Torvalds
Chris Wright
Davi Arnaut
James Morris
Ingo Molnar
Catherine Zhang
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Jamal Hadi Salim
Amy Griffis
Dustin Kirkland
Arjan van de Ven
Joe Perches
Randy.Dunlap