* Use struct path in fs_struct.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Disabling audit at runtime by auditctl doesn't mean that we can
stop allocating contexts for new processes; we don't want to miss them
when that sucker is reenabled.
(based on work from Al Viro in the RHEL kernel series)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
execve arguments can be quite large. There is no limit on the number of
arguments and a 4G limit on the size of an argument.
this patch prints those aruguments in bite sized pieces. a userspace size
limitation of 8k was discovered so this keeps messages around 7.5k
single arguments larger than 7.5k in length are split into multiple records
and can be identified as aX[Y]=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
If we fail to get an ab in audit_log_pid_context this may be due to an exclude
rule rather than a memory allocation failure. If it was due to a memory
allocation failue we would have already paniced and no need to do it again.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This patch adds an end of event record type. It will be sent by the kernel as
the last record when a multi-record event is triggered. This will aid realtime
analysis programs since they will now reliably know they have the last record
to complete an event. The audit daemon filters this and will not write it to
disk.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb redhat com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is
labeled ses= or oses=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add uid, loginuid, and comm collection to OBJ_PID records. This just
gives users a little more information about the task that received a
signal. pid is rather meaningless after the fact, and even though comm
isn't great we can't collect exe reasonably on this code path for
performance reasons.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The syscall exit code will change ERESTART* kernel internal return codes
to EINTR if it does not restart the syscall. Since we collect the audit
info before that point we should fix those in the audit log as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Keeping loginuid in audit_context is racy and results in messier
code. Taken to task_struct, out of the way of ->audit_context
changes.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix kernel-doc for auditsc parameter changes.
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1623): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1666): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
kernel/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This will allow rpc.gssd to use inotify instead of dnotify in order to
locate new rpc upcall pipes.
This also requires the exporting of __audit_inode_child(), which is used by
fsnotify_create() and fsnotify_mkdir(). Ccing David Woodhouse.
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This patch fixes an off-by-one in a BUG_ON() spotted by the Coverity
checker.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Cc: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The check for audit_signals is misplaced and the check for
audit_dummy_context() is missing; as the result, if we send a signal to
auditd from task with NULL ->audit_context while we have audit_signals
!= 0 we end up with an oops.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied, hence 0 is the
expected output.
axi->mm might not be valid anymore when not equal to current->mm, do not
dereference before checking that - thanks to Al for spotting that.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Tested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled. I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.
Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem. IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record. It's trivial to do.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The mode fields for IPC records are not consistent. Some are hex, others are
octal. This patch makes them all octal.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Remove the arg+env limit of MAX_ARG_PAGES by copying the strings directly from
the old mm into the new mm.
We create the new mm before the binfmt code runs, and place the new stack at
the very top of the address space. Once the binfmt code runs and figures out
where the stack should be, we move it downwards.
It is a bit peculiar in that we have one task with two mm's, one of which is
inactive.
[a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl: limit stack size]
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
[bunk@stusta.de: unexport bprm_mm_init]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The purpose of audit_bprm() is to log the argv array to a userspace daemon at
the end of the execve system call. Since user-space hasn't had time to run,
this array is still in pristine state on the process' stack; so no need to
copy it, we can just grab it from there.
In order to minimize the damage to audit_log_*() copy each string into a
temporary kernel buffer first.
Currently the audit code requires that the full argument vector fits in a
single packet. So currently it does clip the argv size to a (sysctl) limit,
but only when execve auditing is enabled.
If the audit protocol gets extended to allow for multiple packets this check
can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Cc: <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix parameter name in audit_core_dumps for kerneldoc.
Signed-off-by: Henrik Kretzschmar <henne@nachtwindheim.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Hi,
I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make more effort to detect previously collected names, so we don't log
multiple PATH records for a single filesystem object. Add
audit_inc_name_count() to reduce duplicate code.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Audit contexts can be reused, so initialize a name's osid to the
default in audit_getname(). This ensures we don't log a bogus object
label when no inode data is collected for a name.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
GFP_KERNEL allocations in non-blocking context; fixed by killing
an idiotic use of security_getprocattr().
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Provide an audit record of the descriptor pair returned by pipe() and
socketpair(). Rewritten from the original posted to linux-audit by
John D. Ramsdell <ramsdell@mitre.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix the locking of signal->tty.
Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway.
(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules)
Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access).
It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.
(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
invocations)
[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Hi,
This patch removes the rdev logging from the previous patch
The below patch closes an unbounded use of name_count. This can lead to oopses
in some new file systems.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
On Thu, Sep 28, 2006 at 04:03:06PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> After some looking I did not see a way to get into audit_log_exit
> without having set the ppid. So I am dropping the set from there and
> only doing it at the beginning.
>
> Please comment/ack/nak as soon as possible.
Ehh... That's one hell of an overhead to be had ;-/ Let's be lazy.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add tty locking around the audit and accounting code.
The whole current->signal-> locking is all deeply strange but it's for
someone else to sort out. Add rather than replace the lock for acct.c
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
When an object is created via a symlink into an audited directory, audit misses
the event due to not having collected the inode data for the directory. Modify
__audit_inode_child() to copy the parent inode data if a parent wasn't found in
audit_names[].
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When the specified path is an existing file or when it is a symlink, audit
collects the wrong inode number, which causes it to miss the open() event.
Adding a second hook to the open() path fixes this.
Also add audit_copy_inode() to consolidate some code.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add support for a rule key, which can be used to tie audit records to audit
rules. This is useful when a watched file is accessed through a link or
symlink, as well as for general audit log analysis.
Because this patch uses a string key instead of an integer key, there is a bit
of extra overhead to do the kstrdup() when a rule fires. However, we're also
allocating memory for the audit record buffer, so it's probably not that
significant. I went ahead with a string key because it seems more
user-friendly.
Note that the user must ensure that filterkeys are unique. The kernel only
checks for duplicate rules.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hpd.com>
Fix kernel-doc parameters in kernel/
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/auditsc.c:1376): No description found for parameter 'u_abs_timeout'
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/auditsc.c:1420): No description found for parameter 'u_msg_prio'
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/auditsc.c:1420): No description found for parameter 'u_abs_timeout'
Warning(/var/linsrc/linux-2617-g9//kernel/acct.c:526): No description found for parameter 'pacct'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Hi,
I was doing some testing and noticed that when the audit system was disabled,
I was still getting messages about the loginuid being set. The following patch
makes audit_set_loginuid look at in_syscall to determine if it should create
an audit event. The loginuid will continue to be set as long as there is a context.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In this implementation, audit registers inotify watches on the parent
directories of paths specified in audit rules. When audit's inotify
event handler is called, it updates any affected rules based on the
filesystem event. If the parent directory is renamed, removed, or its
filesystem is unmounted, audit removes all rules referencing that
inotify watch.
To keep things simple, this implementation limits location-based
auditing to the directory entries in an existing directory. Given
a path-based rule for /foo/bar/passwd, the following table applies:
passwd modified -- audit event logged
passwd replaced -- audit event logged, rules list updated
bar renamed -- rule removed
foo renamed -- untracked, meaning that the rule now applies to
the new location
Audit users typically want to have many rules referencing filesystem
objects, which can significantly impact filtering performance. This
patch also adds an inode-number-based rule hash to mitigate this
situation.
The patch is relative to the audit git tree:
http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current.git;a=summary
and uses the inotify kernel API:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/6/1/145
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch adds audit support to POSIX message queues. It applies cleanly to
the lspp.b15 branch of Al Viro's git tree. There are new auxiliary data
structures, and collection and emission routines in kernel/auditsc.c. New hooks
in ipc/mqueue.c collect arguments from the syscalls.
I tested the patch by building the examples from the POSIX MQ library tarball.
Build them -lrt, not against the old MQ library in the tarball. Here's the URL:
http://www.geocities.com/wronski12/posix_ipc/libmqueue-4.41.tar.gz
Do auditctl -a exit,always -S for mq_open, mq_timedsend, mq_timedreceive,
mq_notify, mq_getsetattr. mq_unlink has no new hooks. Please see the
corresponding userspace patch to get correct output from auditd for the new
record types.
[fixes folded]
Signed-off-by: George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The following patch addresses most of the issues with the IPC_SET_PERM
records as described in:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2006-May/msg00010.html
and addresses the comments I received on the record field names.
To summarize, I made the following changes:
1. Changed sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() so that an IPC_SET_PERM
record is emitted in the failure case as well as the success case.
This matches the behavior in sys_shmctl(). I could simplify the
code in sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() slightly but it would mean
that in some error cases we could get an IPC_SET_PERM record
without an IPC record and that seemed odd.
2. No change to the IPC record type, given no feedback on the backward
compatibility question.
3. Removed the qbytes field from the IPC record. It wasn't being
set and when audit_ipc_obj() is called from ipcperms(), the
information isn't available. If we want the information in the IPC
record, more extensive changes will be necessary. Since it only
applies to message queues and it isn't really permission related, it
doesn't seem worth it.
4. Removed the obj field from the IPC_SET_PERM record. This means that
the kern_ipc_perm argument is no longer needed.
5. Removed the spaces and renamed the IPC_SET_PERM field names. Replaced iuid and
igid fields with ouid and ogid in the IPC record.
I tested this with the lspp.22 kernel on an x86_64 box. I believe it
applies cleanly on the latest kernel.
-- ljk
Signed-off-by: Linda Knippers <linda.knippers@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
While testing the watch performance, I noticed that selinux_task_ctxid()
was creeping into the results more than it should. Investigation showed
that the function call was being called whether it was needed or not. The
below patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different
functions:
- audit_ipc_obj()
- audit_ipc_set_perm()
There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid,
mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This
audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it
is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the
ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places
where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being
performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby
ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to
ensure that the information is captured by the audit system.
The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on
the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded
(and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before
each instance).
2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows
for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC
object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct
audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate
audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally,
the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle
aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below builds upon the patch sent earlier and adds subject label to
all audit events generated via the netlink interface. It also cleans up a few
other minor things.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context
string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the
inode audit change patch already being applied.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch,
we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being
output.
This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23%
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch provides the ability to filter audit messages based on the
elements of the process' SELinux context (user, role, type, mls sensitivity,
and mls clearance). It uses the new interfaces from selinux to opaquely
store information related to the selinux context and to filter based on that
information. It also uses the callback mechanism provided by selinux to
refresh the information when a new policy is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
[PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
[PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
[PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
[PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
[PATCH] Fix audit operators
[PATCH] promiscuous mode
[PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
[PATCH] add/remove rule update
[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
[PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
[PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
[PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
[PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
[PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
...
Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
Simplify audit_free()'s locking: no need to lock a task that we are tearing
down. [the extra locking also caused false positives in the lock
validator]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
>From the RBAC specs:
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide the set of authorized
RBAC administrators with the capability to read the following
audit information from the audit records:
<snip>
(e) The User Session Identifier or Terminal Type
A patch adding the tty for all syscalls is included in this email.
Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This fixes the per-user and per-message-type filtering when syscall
auditing isn't enabled.
[AV: folded followup fix from the same author]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently
added to -mm1:
* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode
* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off
due to a missing function in security/dummy.c
* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing
return just before an error_path label
* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),
audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.
These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.
This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).
[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
- Add a new, 5th filter called "exclude".
- And add a new field AUDIT_MSGTYPE.
- Define a new function audit_filter_exclude() that takes a message type
as input and examines all rules in the filter. It returns '1' if the
message is to be excluded, and '0' otherwise.
- Call the audit_filter_exclude() function near the top of
audit_log_start() just after asserting audit_initialized. If the
message type is not to be audited, return NULL very early, before
doing a lot of work.
[combined with followup fix for bug in original patch, Nov 4, same author]
[combined with later renaming AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE->AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE
and audit_filter_exclude() -> audit_filter_type()]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch augments the collection of inode info during syscall
processing. It represents part of the functionality that was provided
by the auditfs patch included in RHEL4.
Specifically, it:
- Collects information for target inodes created or removed during
syscalls. Previous code only collects information for the target
inode's parent.
- Adds the audit_inode() hook to syscalls that operate on a file
descriptor (e.g. fchown), enabling audit to do inode filtering for
these calls.
- Modifies filtering code to check audit context for either an inode #
or a parent inode # matching a given rule.
- Modifies logging to provide inode # for both parent and child.
- Protect debug info from NULL audit_names.name.
[AV: folded a later typo fix from the same author]
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The audit hooks (to be added shortly) will want to see dentry->d_inode
too, not just the name.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
- add kerneldoc for non-static functions;
- don't init static data to 0;
- limit lines to < 80 columns;
- fix long-format style;
- delete whitespace at end of some lines;
(chrisw: resend and update to current audit-2.6 tree)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
hi,
The motivation behind the patch below was to address messages in
/var/log/messages such as:
Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=252 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (1)
Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=113 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (2)
I can reproduce by running 'get-edid' from:
http://john.fremlin.de/programs/linux/read-edid/.
These messages come about in the log b/c the vm86 calls do not exit via
the normal system call exit paths and thus do not call
'audit_syscall_exit'. The next system call will then free the context for
itself and for the vm86 context, thus generating the above messages. This
patch addresses the issue by simply adding a call to 'audit_syscall_exit'
from the vm86 code.
Besides fixing the above error messages the patch also now allows vm86
system calls to become auditable. This is useful since strace does not
appear to properly record the return values from sys_vm86.
I think this patch is also a step in the right direction in terms of
cleaning up some core auditing code. If we can correct any other paths
that do not properly call the audit exit and entries points, then we can
also eliminate the notion of context chaining.
I've tested this patch by verifying that the log messages no longer
appear, and that the audit records for sys_vm86 appear to be correct.
Also, 'read_edid' produces itentical output.
thanks,
-Jason
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
audit_log_exit() is called from atomic contexts and gets explicit
gfp_mask argument; it should use it for all allocations rather
than doing some with gfp_mask and some with GFP_KERNEL.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch removes all self references and fixes references to files
in the now defunct arch/ppc64 tree. I think this accomplises
everything wanted, though there might be a few references I missed.
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
EDAC requires a way to scrub memory if an ECC error is found and the chipset
does not do the work automatically. That means rewriting memory locations
atomically with respect to all CPUs _and_ bus masters. That means we can't
use atomic_add(foo, 0) as it gets optimised for non-SMP
This adds a function to include/asm-foo/atomic.h for the platforms currently
supported which implements a scrub of a mapped block.
It also adjusts a few other files include order where atomic.h is included
before types.h as this now causes an error as atomic_scrub uses u32.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The following patch against audit.81 prevents duplicate syscall rules in
a given filter list by walking the list on each rule add.
I also removed the unused struct audit_entry in audit.c and made the
static inlines in auditsc.c consistent.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
It was showing up fairly high on profiles even when no rules were set.
Make sure the common path stays as fast as possible.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
... by generating serial numbers only if an audit context is actually
_used_, rather than doing so at syscall entry even when the context
isn't necessarily marked auditable.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Jan Blunck
Eric Paris
Al Viro
Randy Dunlap
Daniel Walker
Jesper Juhl
Trond Myklebust
Adrian Bunk
Al Viro
Peter Zijlstra
Steve Grubb
Ollie Wild
Henrik Kretzschmar
Miloslav Trmac
Amy Griffis
Josef Sipek
Joy Latten
Alexander Viro
Alan Cox
Stephen Smalley
Darrel Goeddel
Randy Dunlap
George C. Wilson
Linda Knippers
Linus Torvalds
Ingo Molnar
David Woodhouse
Dustin Kirkland
Jason Baron
Paul Mackerras
Jon Mason
David Woodhouse