Fix gcc warnings:
In file included from fs/f2fs/dir.c:15:0:
fs/f2fs/xattr.h:157:13: warning: 'f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static void f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) { }
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/f2fs/xattr.h:156:12: warning: 'f2fs_init_xattr_caches' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static int f2fs_init_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) { return 0; }
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: a999150f4f ("f2fs: use kmem_cache pool during inline xattr lookups")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo array[];
};
By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.
Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:
"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
It's been observed that kzalloc() on lookup_all_xattrs() are called millions
of times on Android, quickly becoming the top abuser of slub memory allocator.
Use a dedicated kmem cache pool for xattr lookups to mitigate this.
Signed-off-by: Park Ju Hyung <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that
enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only
files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle
tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It
is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation.
The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of:
- Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity.
- Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an
inode and reading/writing the verity metadata.
- Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files
and to support reading verity metadata pages.
- Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support
writing verity metadata pages.
- Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl().
Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K
boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files
are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to
userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some
relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used
because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to
4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree
block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity
metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes
of the plaintext data.
Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
As Paul Bandha reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202709
When I run the poc on the mounted f2fs img I get a buffer overflow in
read_inline_xattr due to there being no sanity check on the value of
i_inline_xattr_size.
I created the img by just modifying the value of i_inline_xattr_size
in the inode:
i_name [test1.txt]
i_ext: fofs:0 blkaddr:0 len:0
i_extra_isize [0x 18 : 24]
i_inline_xattr_size [0x ffff : 65535]
i_addr[ofs] [0x 0 : 0]
mkdir /mnt/f2fs
mount ./f2fs1.img /mnt/f2fs
gcc poc.c -o poc
./poc
int main() {
int y = syscall(SYS_listxattr, "/mnt/f2fs/test1.txt", NULL, 0);
printf("ret %d", y);
printf("errno: %d\n", errno);
}
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_inline_xattr+0x18f/0x260
Read of size 262140 at addr ffff88011035efd8 by task f2fs1poc/3263
CPU: 0 PID: 3263 Comm: f2fs1poc Not tainted 4.18.0-custom #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.1-0-g0551a4be2c-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x71/0xab
print_address_description+0x83/0x250
kasan_report+0x213/0x350
memcpy+0x1f/0x50
read_inline_xattr+0x18f/0x260
read_all_xattrs+0xba/0x190
f2fs_listxattr+0x9d/0x3f0
listxattr+0xb2/0xd0
path_listxattr+0x93/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x9d/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Let's add sanity check for inode.i_inline_xattr_size during f2fs_iget()
to avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Remove the verbose license text from f2fs files and replace them with
SPDX tags. This does not change the license of any of the code.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Add braces around variables used within macros for those make sense
to do it. Many of the macros in f2fs already do this. What this commit
doesn't do is anything that changes line# as a result of adding braces,
which usually affects the binary via __LINE__.
Confirmed no diff in fs/f2fs/f2fs.ko before/after this commit on x86_64,
to make sure this has no functional change as well as there's been no
unexpected side effect due to callers' arithmetics within the existing
code.
Signed-off-by: Tomohiro Kusumi <tkusumi@tuxera.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Previously, in getxattr we will load all entries both in inline xattr and
xattr node block, and then do the lookup in all entries, but our lookup
flow shows low efficiency, since if we can lookup and hit in inline xattr
of inode page cache first, we don't need to load and lookup xattr node
block, which can obviously save cpu time and IO latency.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: initialize NULL to avoid warning]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
The f2fs_setxattr() prototype for CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=n has
been wrong for a long time, since 8ae8f1627f ("f2fs: support
xattr security labels"), but there have never been any callers,
so it did not matter.
Now, the function gets called from f2fs_ioc_keyctl(), which
causes a build failure:
fs/f2fs/file.c: In function 'f2fs_ioc_keyctl':
include/linux/stddef.h:7:14: error: passing argument 6 of 'f2fs_setxattr' makes integer from pointer without a cast [-Werror=int-conversion]
#define NULL ((void *)0)
^
fs/f2fs/file.c:1599:27: note: in expansion of macro 'NULL'
value, F2FS_KEY_SIZE, NULL, type);
^
In file included from ../fs/f2fs/file.c:29:0:
fs/f2fs/xattr.h:129:19: note: expected 'int' but argument is of type 'void *'
static inline int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
^
fs/f2fs/file.c:1597:9: error: too many arguments to function 'f2fs_setxattr'
return f2fs_setxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_KEY,
^
In file included from ../fs/f2fs/file.c:29:0:
fs/f2fs/xattr.h:129:19: note: declared here
static inline int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
Thsi changes the prototype of the empty stub function to match
that of the actual implementation. This will not make the key
management work when F2FS_FS_XATTR is disabled, but it gets it
to build at least.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Add an additional "name" field to struct xattr_handler. When the name
is set, the handler matches attributes with exactly that name. When the
prefix is set instead, the handler matches attributes with the given
prefix and with a non-empty suffix.
This patch should avoid bugs like the one fixed in commit c361016a in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously, init_inode_metadata does not hold any parent directory's inode
page. So, f2fs_init_acl can grab its parent inode page without any problem.
But, when we use inline_dentry, that page is grabbed during f2fs_add_link,
so that we can fall into deadlock condition like below.
INFO: task mknod:11006 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G OE 3.17.0-rc1+ #13
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
mknod D ffff88003fc94580 0 11006 11004 0x00000000
ffff880007717b10 0000000000000002 ffff88003c323220 ffff880007717fd8
0000000000014580 0000000000014580 ffff88003daecb30 ffff88003c323220
ffff88003fc94e80 ffff88003ffbb4e8 ffff880007717ba0 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8173dc40>] ? bit_wait+0x50/0x50
[<ffffffff8173d4cd>] io_schedule+0x9d/0x130
[<ffffffff8173dc6c>] bit_wait_io+0x2c/0x50
[<ffffffff8173da3b>] __wait_on_bit_lock+0x4b/0xb0
[<ffffffff811640a7>] __lock_page+0x67/0x70
[<ffffffff810acf50>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff811652cc>] pagecache_get_page+0x14c/0x1e0
[<ffffffffa029afa9>] get_node_page+0x59/0x130 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa02a63ad>] read_all_xattrs+0x24d/0x430 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa02a6ca2>] f2fs_getxattr+0x52/0xe0 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa02a7481>] f2fs_get_acl+0x41/0x2d0 [f2fs]
[<ffffffff8122d847>] get_acl+0x47/0x70
[<ffffffff8122db5a>] posix_acl_create+0x5a/0x150
[<ffffffffa02a7759>] f2fs_init_acl+0x29/0xcb [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa0286a8d>] init_inode_metadata+0x5d/0x340 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa029253a>] f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x12a/0x2e0 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa0286ea5>] __f2fs_add_link+0x45/0x4a0 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa028b5b6>] ? f2fs_new_inode+0x146/0x220 [f2fs]
[<ffffffffa028b816>] f2fs_mknod+0x86/0xf0 [f2fs]
[<ffffffff811e3ec1>] vfs_mknod+0xe1/0x160
[<ffffffff811e4b26>] SyS_mknod+0x1f6/0x200
[<ffffffff81741d7f>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
This patch passes the "flags" field to the low level setxattr functions
to use XATTR_REPLACE in the following patches.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
f2fs has some weird mode bit handling, so still using the old
chmod code for now.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
0. modified inode structure
--------------------------------------
metadata (e.g., i_mtime, i_ctime, etc)
--------------------------------------
direct pointers [0 ~ 873]
inline xattrs (200 bytes by default)
indirect pointers [0 ~ 4]
--------------------------------------
node footer
--------------------------------------
1. setxattr flow
- read_all_xattrs copies all the xattrs from inline and xattr node block.
- handle xattr entries
- write_all_xattrs copies modified xattrs into inline and xattr node block.
2. getxattr flow
- read_all_xattrs copies all the xattrs from inline and xattr node block.
- check target entries
3. Usage
# mount -t f2fs -o inline_xattr $DEV $MNT
Once mounted with the inline_xattr option, f2fs marks all the newly created
files to reserve an amount of inline xattr space explicitly inside the inode
block. Without the mount option, f2fs will not touch any existing files and
newly created files as well.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
The __find_xattr is to search the wanted xattr entry starting from the
base_addr.
If not found, the returned entry is the last empty xattr entry that can be
allocated newly.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
This patch adds the support of security labels for f2fs, which will be used
by Linus Security Models (LSMs).
Quote from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Security_Modules:
"Linux Security Modules (LSM) is a framework that allows the Linux kernel to
support a variety of computer security models while avoiding favoritism toward
any single security implementation. The framework is licensed under the terms of
the GNU General Public License and is standard part of the Linux kernel since
Linux 2.6. AppArmor, SELinux, Smack and TOMOYO Linux are the currently accepted
modules in the official kernel.".
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
As pointed out by Randy Dunlap, this patch removes all usage of "/**" for comment
blocks. Instead, just use "/*".
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
This implements xattr and acl functionalities.
- F2FS uses a node page to contain use extended attributes.
Signed-off-by: Changman Lee <cm224.lee@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
YueHaibing
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Chao Yu
Eric Biggers
Randall Huang
Tomohiro Kusumi
Arnd Bergmann
Andreas Gruenbacher
Jaegeuk Kim
Jaegeuk Kim
Christoph Hellwig