Not all VMAs allocated with vm_area_alloc(). Some of them allocated on
stack or in data segment.
The new helper can be use to initialize VMA properly regardless where it
was allocated.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180724121139.62570-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Like vm_area_dup(), it initializes the anon_vma_chain head, and the
basic mm pointer.
The rest of the fields end up being different for different users,
although the plan is to also initialize the 'vm_ops' field to a dummy
entry.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
.. and re-initialize th eanon_vma_chain head.
This removes some boiler-plate from the users, and also makes it clear
why it didn't need use the 'zalloc()' version.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The vm_area_struct is one of the most fundamental memory management
objects, but the management of it is entirely open-coded evertwhere,
ranging from allocation and freeing (using kmem_cache_[z]alloc and
kmem_cache_free) to initializing all the fields.
We want to unify this in order to end up having some unified
initialization of the vmas, and the first step to this is to at least
have basic allocation functions.
Right now those functions are literally just wrappers around the
kmem_cache_*() calls. This is a purely mechanical conversion:
# new vma:
kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) -> vm_area_alloc()
# copy old vma
kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) -> vm_area_dup(old)
# free vma
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma) -> vm_area_free(vma)
to the point where the old vma passed in to the vm_area_dup() function
isn't even used yet (because I've left all the old manual initialization
alone).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As a theoretical problem, dup_mmap() of an mm_struct with 60000+ vmas
can loop while potentially allocating memory, with mm->mmap_sem held for
write by current thread. This is bad if current thread was selected as
an OOM victim, for current thread will continue allocations using memory
reserves while OOM reaper is unable to reclaim memory.
As an actually observable problem, it is not difficult to make OOM
reaper unable to reclaim memory if the OOM victim is blocked at
i_mmap_lock_write() in this loop. Unfortunately, since nobody can
explain whether it is safe to use killable wait there, let's check for
SIGKILL before trying to allocate memory. Even without an OOM event,
there is no point with continuing the loop from the beginning if current
thread is killed.
I tested with debug printk(). This patch should be safe because we
already fail if security_vm_enough_memory_mm() or
kmem_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL) fails and exit_mmap() handles it.
***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
***** Aborting exit_mmap() due to NULL mmap *****
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201804071938.CDE04681.SOFVQJFtMHOOLF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner:
"The restartable sequences syscall (finally):
After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by
the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of
restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus.
It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with
support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests
It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully
comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no
point to drag it out for yet another cycle"
* 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore
rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests
rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test
rseq/selftests: Provide basic test
rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library
selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS
powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call
powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences
x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call
x86: Add support for restartable sequences
arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call
arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
arm: Add restartable sequences support
rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h
mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.
And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:
INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004
Call Trace:
schedule+0x36/0x80
rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
down_read+0x20/0x40
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
__vfs_read+0x37/0x150
vfs_read+0x96/0x130
SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5
Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.
So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.
This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.
[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches
in total.
The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four
categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state
stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable
names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the
audit subsystem.
The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the
changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers,
but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would
be good to get them in now.
The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging
improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging;
starting with this patchset the changes in
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the
standard kernel logging and audit.
As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to
merge cleanly with your tree"
[ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that
also came in from Paul - Linus ]
* tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID
audit: use existing session info function
audit: normalize loginuid read access
audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged
audit: use inline function to set audit context
audit: use inline function to get audit context
audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro
seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl
seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string
seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl
audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable
audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace
memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two
purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the
current CPU number value from user-space.
* Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics)
Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on
per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations.
The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started
by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of
critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a
few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other
architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path.
Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases.
Test hardware:
arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core
x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading
The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread.
* Per-CPU statistic counter increment
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0
x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7
* LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer
per-cpu buffer
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1
x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2
* liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8
x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9
* jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq
Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on
rseq 2016 implementation):
The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and
the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%.
* Reading the current CPU number
Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is
running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the
cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done
by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the
current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler
updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory
area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from
memory.
Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and
user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read
the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over
alternative approaches:
- 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc
- 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso
executing a "lsl" instruction,
- 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction,
- Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline
assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable
sequences.
- The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared
between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the
case for the lsl-based x86 vdso.
On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment
selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs
similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is
not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already
using the gs segment selector for other purposes.
Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number:
ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l)
Machine model: Cubietruck
- Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns
- getcpu system call: 234.9 ns
x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz:
- Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns
- Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns
- "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns
- getcpu system call: 53.9 ns
- Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset)
Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to
expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the
scheduler:
Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @
2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy
saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1
kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig,
restartable sequences series applied.
* CONFIG_RSEQ=n
avg.: 41.37 s
std.dev.: 0.36 s
* CONFIG_RSEQ=y
avg.: 40.46 s
std.dev.: 0.33 s
- Size
On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is
567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/
[2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to set the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to set it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit.h]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated. Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place. In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.
Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.
Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
Mean: 159.12
Std Dev: 1.54
and after:
Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
Mean: 158.46
Std Dev: 1.46
Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.
[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak
I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.
before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean: 221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47
after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean: 217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99
It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy. I'm
open to ideas!
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KASAN splats indicate that in some cases we free a live mm, then
continue to access it, with potentially disastrous results. This is
likely due to a mismatched mmdrop() somewhere in the kernel, but so far
the culprit remains elusive.
Let's have __mmdrop() verify that the mm isn't live for the current
task, similar to the existing check for init_mm. This way, we can catch
this class of issue earlier, and without requiring KASAN.
Currently, idle_task_exit() leaves active_mm stale after it switches to
init_mm. This isn't harmful, but will trigger the new assertions, so we
must adjust idle_task_exit() to update active_mm.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180312140103.19235-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to the
sys_unshare() syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant
as a drop-in replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same
calling convention as sys_unshare().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
sys_futex() is a wrapper to do_futex() which does not modify any
values here:
- uaddr, val and val3 are kept the same
- op is masked with FUTEX_CMD_MASK, but is always set to FUTEX_WAKE.
Therefore, val2 is always 0.
- as utime is set to NULL, *timeout is NULL
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
As Peter points out, Doing a CALL+RET for just the decrement is a bit silly.
Fixes: d70f2a14b7 ("include/linux/sched/mm.h: uninline mmdrop_async(), etc")
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infraded.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
All other places that deals with namespaces have an explanation of why
the restriction is there.
The description added in this commit was based on commit e66eded830
("userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171112151637.13258-1-marcos.souza.org@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <marcos.souza.org@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Thus reducing one indentation level while maintaining the same rationale.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171117002929.5155-1-marcos.souza.org@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <marcos.souza.org@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the
next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage
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Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
"Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.
To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
control.
Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
...
mmdrop_async() is only used in fork.c. Move that and its support
functions into fork.c, uninline it all.
Quite a lot of code gets moved around to avoid forward declarations.
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to
userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always
copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)).
The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and
may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct
at the end of task_struct.
cache object allocation:
kernel/fork.c:
alloc_task_struct_node(...):
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...);
dup_task_struct(...):
...
tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node);
copy_process(...):
...
dup_task_struct(...)
_do_fork(...):
...
copy_process(...)
example usage trace:
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:
__fpu__restore_sig(...):
...
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
...
__copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size);
fpu__restore_sig(...):
...
return __fpu__restore_sig(...);
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:
restore_sigcontext(...):
...
fpu__restore_sig(...)
This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture
declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct.
If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the
entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread
stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and
!CONFIG_VMAP_STACK.
cache object allocation:
kernel/fork.c:
alloc_thread_stack_node(...):
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...)
dup_task_struct(...):
...
stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...)
...
tsk->stack = stack;
copy_process(...):
...
dup_task_struct(...)
_do_fork(...):
...
copy_process(...)
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
mm_struct slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Only the auxv field is copied to userspace.
cache object allocation:
kernel/fork.c:
#define allocate_mm() (kmem_cache_alloc(mm_cachep, GFP_KERNEL))
dup_mm():
...
mm = allocate_mm();
copy_mm(...):
...
dup_mm();
copy_process(...):
...
copy_mm(...)
_do_fork(...):
...
copy_process(...)
example usage trace:
fs/binfmt_elf.c:
create_elf_tables(...):
...
elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv;
...
copy_to_user(..., elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t))
load_elf_binary(...):
...
create_elf_tables(...);
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Pull x86 PTI preparatory patches from Thomas Gleixner:
"Todays Advent calendar window contains twentyfour easy to digest
patches. The original plan was to have twenty three matching the date,
but a late fixup made that moot.
- Move the cpu_entry_area mapping out of the fixmap into a separate
address space. That's necessary because the fixmap becomes too big
with NRCPUS=8192 and this caused already subtle and hard to
diagnose failures.
The top most patch is fresh from today and cures a brain slip of
that tall grumpy german greybeard, who ignored the intricacies of
32bit wraparounds.
- Limit the number of CPUs on 32bit to 64. That's insane big already,
but at least it's small enough to prevent address space issues with
the cpu_entry_area map, which have been observed and debugged with
the fixmap code
- A few TLB flush fixes in various places plus documentation which of
the TLB functions should be used for what.
- Rename the SYSENTER stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA stack as it is used for
more than sysenter now and keeping the name makes backtraces
confusing.
- Prevent LDT inheritance on exec() by moving it to arch_dup_mmap(),
which is only invoked on fork().
- Make vysycall more robust.
- A few fixes and cleanups of the debug_pagetables code. Check
PAGE_PRESENT instead of checking the PTE for 0 and a cleanup of the
C89 initialization of the address hint array which already was out
of sync with the index enums.
- Move the ESPFIX init to a different place to prepare for PTI.
- Several code moves with no functional change to make PTI
integration simpler and header files less convoluted.
- Documentation fixes and clarifications"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
x86/cpu_entry_area: Prevent wraparound in setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes() on 32bit
init: Invoke init_espfix_bsp() from mm_init()
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit
x86/mm: Create asm/invpcid.h
x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place
x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks
x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h
x86/mm: Add comments to clarify which TLB-flush functions are supposed to flush what
x86/mm: Remove superfluous barriers
x86/mm: Use __flush_tlb_one() for kernel memory
x86/microcode: Dont abuse the TLB-flush interface
x86/uv: Use the right TLB-flush API
x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack
x86/doc: Remove obvious weirdnesses from the x86 MM layout documentation
x86/mm/64: Improve the memory map documentation
x86/ldt: Prevent LDT inheritance on exec
x86/ldt: Rework locking
arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail
x86/vsyscall/64: Warn and fail vsyscall emulation in NATIVE mode
...
In order to sanitize the LDT initialization on x86 arch_dup_mmap() must be
allowed to fail. Fix up all instances.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
pidhash is no longer required as all the information can be looked up
from idr tree. nr_hashed represented the number of pids that had been
hashed. Since, nr_hashed and PIDNS_HASH_ADDING are no longer relevant,
it has been renamed to pid_allocated and PIDNS_ADDING respectively.
[gs051095@gmail.com: v6]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507760379-21662-3-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507583624-22146-3-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gargi Sharma <gs051095@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [ia64]
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, we account page tables separately for each page table level,
but that's redundant -- we only make use of total memory allocated to
page tables for oom_badness calculation. We also provide the
information to userspace, but it has dubious value there too.
This patch switches page table accounting to single counter.
mm->pgtables_bytes is now used to account all page table levels. We use
bytes, because page table size for different levels of page table tree
may be different.
The change has user-visible effect: we don't have VmPMD and VmPUD
reported in /proc/[pid]/status. Not sure if anybody uses them. (As
alternative, we can always report 0 kB for them.)
OOM-killer report is also slightly changed: we now report pgtables_bytes
instead of nr_ptes, nr_pmd, nr_puds.
Apart from reducing number of counters per-mm, the benefit is that we
now calculate oom_badness() more correctly for machines which have
different size of page tables depending on level or where page tables
are less than a page in size.
The only downside can be debuggability because we do not know which page
table level could leak. But I do not remember many bugs that would be
caught by separate counters so I wouldn't lose sleep over this.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/huge_memory.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171006100651.44742-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
[kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com: fix build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016150113.ikfxy3e7zzfvsr4w@black.fi.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Let's add wrappers for ->nr_ptes with the same interface as for nr_pmd
and nr_pud.
The patch also makes nr_ptes accounting dependent onto CONFIG_MMU. Page
table accounting doesn't make sense if you don't have page tables.
It's preparation for consolidation of page-table counters in mm_struct.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171006100651.44742-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On a machine with 5-level paging support a process can allocate
significant amount of memory and stay unnoticed by oom-killer and memory
cgroup. The trick is to allocate a lot of PUD page tables. We don't
account PUD page tables, only PMD and PTE.
We already addressed the same issue for PMD page tables, see commit
dc6c9a35b6 ("mm: account pmd page tables to the process").
Introduction of 5-level paging brings the same issue for PUD page
tables.
The patch expands accounting to PUD level.
[kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com: s/pmd_t/pud_t/]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171004074305.x35eh5u7ybbt5kar@black.fi.intel.com
[heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: s390/mm: fix pud table accounting]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103090551.18231-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171002080427.3320-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Drop the global lru lock in isolate callback before calling
zap_page_range which calls cond_resched, and re-acquire the global lru
lock before returning. Also change return code to LRU_REMOVED_RETRY.
Use mmput_async when fail to acquire mmap sem in an atomic context.
Fix "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context"
errors when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled.
Also restore mmput_async, which was initially introduced in commit
ec8d7c14ea ("mm, oom_reaper: do not mmput synchronously from the oom
reaper context"), and was removed in commit 2129258024 ("mm: oom: let
oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170914182231.90908-1-sherryy@android.com
Fixes: f2517eb76f ("android: binder: Add global lru shrinker to binder")
Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang <sherryy@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reported-by: Kyle Yan <kyan@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: Riley Andrews <riandrews@android.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hoeun Ryu <hoeun.ryu@gmail.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
having any substantive changes.
These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
explosion in the diffstat).
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"
[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]
* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
lsm_audit: update my email address
selinux: update my email address
MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
credits: update Paul Moore's info
selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
HMM provides 3 separate types of functionality:
- Mirroring: synchronize CPU page table and device page table
- Device memory: allocating struct page for device memory
- Migration: migrating regular memory to device memory
This patch introduces some common helpers and definitions to all of
those 3 functionality.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170817000548.32038-3-jglisse@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Baskakov <ebaskakov@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Hairgrove <mhairgrove@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sherry Cheung <SCheung@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Subhash Gutti <sgutti@nvidia.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Nellans <dnellans@nvidia.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK semantics, which result in a VMA being empty
in the child process after fork. This differs from MADV_DONTFORK in one
important way.
If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_WIPEONFORK, it will get
zeroes. The address ranges are still valid, they are just empty.
If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_DONTFORK, it will get a
segmentation fault, since those address ranges are no longer valid in
the child after fork.
Since MADV_DONTFORK also seems to be used to allow very large programs
to fork in systems with strict memory overcommit restrictions, changing
the semantics of MADV_DONTFORK might break existing programs.
MADV_WIPEONFORK only works on private, anonymous VMAs.
The use case is libraries that store or cache information, and want to
know that they need to regenerate it in the child process after fork.
Examples of this would be:
- systemd/pulseaudio API checks (fail after fork) (replacing a getpid
check, which is too slow without a PID cache)
- PKCS#11 API reinitialization check (mandated by specification)
- glibc's upcoming PRNG (reseed after fork)
- OpenSSL PRNG (reseed after fork)
The security benefits of a forking server having a re-inialized PRNG in
every child process are pretty obvious. However, due to libraries
having all kinds of internal state, and programs getting compiled with
many different versions of each library, it is unreasonable to expect
calling programs to re-initialize everything manually after fork.
A further complication is the proliferation of clone flags, programs
bypassing glibc's functions to call clone directly, and programs calling
unshare, causing the glibc pthread_atfork hook to not get called.
It would be better to have the kernel take care of this automatically.
The patch also adds MADV_KEEPONFORK, to undo the effects of a prior
MADV_WIPEONFORK.
This is similar to the OpenBSD minherit syscall with MAP_INHERIT_ZERO:
https://man.openbsd.org/minherit.2
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: numerically order arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h #defines]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170811212829.29186-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Colm MacCártaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is purely required because exit_aio() may block and exit_mmap() may
never start, if the oom_reap_task cannot start running on a mm with
mm_users == 0.
At the same time if the OOM reaper doesn't wait at all for the memory of
the current OOM candidate to be freed by exit_mmap->unmap_vmas, it would
generate a spurious OOM kill.
If it wasn't because of the exit_aio or similar blocking functions in
the last mmput, it would be enough to change the oom_reap_task() in the
case it finds mm_users == 0, to wait for a timeout or to wait for
__mmput to set MMF_OOM_SKIP itself, but it's not just exit_mmap the
problem here so the concurrency of exit_mmap and oom_reap_task is
apparently warranted.
It's a non standard runtime, exit_mmap() runs without mmap_sem, and
oom_reap_task runs with the mmap_sem for reading as usual (kind of
MADV_DONTNEED).
The race between the two is solved with a combination of
tsk_is_oom_victim() (serialized by task_lock) and MMF_OOM_SKIP
(serialized by a dummy down_write/up_write cycle on the same lines of
the ksm_exit method).
If the oom_reap_task() may be running concurrently during exit_mmap,
exit_mmap will wait it to finish in down_write (before taking down mm
structures that would make the oom_reap_task fail with use after free).
If exit_mmap comes first, oom_reap_task() will skip the mm if
MMF_OOM_SKIP is already set and in turn all memory is already freed and
furthermore the mm data structures may already have been taken down by
free_pgtables.
[aarcange@redhat.com: incremental one liner]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726164319.GC29716@redhat.com
[rientjes@google.com: remove unused mmput_async]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1708141733130.50317@chino.kir.corp.google.com
[aarcange@redhat.com: microoptimization]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170817171240.GB5066@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726162912.GA29716@redhat.com
Fixes: 26db62f179 ("oom: keep mm of the killed task available")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- VMAP_STACK support, allowing the kernel stacks to be allocated in
the vmalloc space with a guard page for trapping stack overflows. One
of the patches introduces THREAD_ALIGN and changes the generic
alloc_thread_stack_node() to use this instead of THREAD_SIZE (no
functional change for other architectures)
- Contiguous PTE hugetlb support re-enabled (after being reverted a
couple of times). We now have the semantics agreed in the generic mm
layer together with API improvements so that the architecture code can
detect between contiguous and non-contiguous huge PTEs
- Initial support for persistent memory on ARM: DC CVAP instruction
exposed to user space (HWCAP) and the in-kernel pmem API implemented
- raid6 improvements for arm64: faster algorithm for the delta syndrome
and implementation of the recovery routines using Neon
- FP/SIMD refactoring and removal of support for Neon in interrupt
context. This is in preparation for full SVE support
- PTE accessors converted from inline asm to cmpxchg so that we can
use LSE atomics if available (ARMv8.1)
- Perf support for Cortex-A35 and A73
- Non-urgent fixes and cleanups
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
- VMAP_STACK support, allowing the kernel stacks to be allocated in the
vmalloc space with a guard page for trapping stack overflows. One of
the patches introduces THREAD_ALIGN and changes the generic
alloc_thread_stack_node() to use this instead of THREAD_SIZE (no
functional change for other architectures)
- Contiguous PTE hugetlb support re-enabled (after being reverted a
couple of times). We now have the semantics agreed in the generic mm
layer together with API improvements so that the architecture code
can detect between contiguous and non-contiguous huge PTEs
- Initial support for persistent memory on ARM: DC CVAP instruction
exposed to user space (HWCAP) and the in-kernel pmem API implemented
- raid6 improvements for arm64: faster algorithm for the delta syndrome
and implementation of the recovery routines using Neon
- FP/SIMD refactoring and removal of support for Neon in interrupt
context. This is in preparation for full SVE support
- PTE accessors converted from inline asm to cmpxchg so that we can use
LSE atomics if available (ARMv8.1)
- Perf support for Cortex-A35 and A73
- Non-urgent fixes and cleanups
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (75 commits)
arm64: cleanup {COMPAT_,}SET_PERSONALITY() macro
arm64: introduce separated bits for mm_context_t flags
arm64: hugetlb: Cleanup setup_hugepagesz
arm64: Re-enable support for contiguous hugepages
arm64: hugetlb: Override set_huge_swap_pte_at() to support contiguous hugepages
arm64: hugetlb: Override huge_pte_clear() to support contiguous hugepages
arm64: hugetlb: Handle swap entries in huge_pte_offset() for contiguous hugepages
arm64: hugetlb: Add break-before-make logic for contiguous entries
arm64: hugetlb: Spring clean huge pte accessors
arm64: hugetlb: Introduce pte_pgprot helper
arm64: hugetlb: set_huge_pte_at Add WARN_ON on !pte_present
arm64: kexec: have own crash_smp_send_stop() for crash dump for nonpanic cores
arm64: dma-mapping: Mark atomic_pool as __ro_after_init
arm64: dma-mapping: Do not pass data to gen_pool_set_algo()
arm64: Remove the !CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM alternative code paths
arm64: Ignore hardware dirty bit updates in ptep_set_wrprotect()
arm64: Move PTE_RDONLY bit handling out of set_pte_at()
kvm: arm64: Convert kvm_set_s2pte_readonly() from inline asm to cmpxchg()
arm64: Convert pte handling from inline asm to using (cmp)xchg
arm64: neon/efi: Make EFI fpsimd save/restore variables static
...
Commit 7c05126793 ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
the new mm_struct's ->uprobes_state.xol_area has been set to NULL after
being copied from the old mm_struct by the memcpy in dup_mm(). For a
task that has previously hit a uprobe tracepoint, this resulted in the
'struct xol_area' being freed multiple times if the task was killed at
just the right time while forking.
Fix it by setting ->uprobes_state.xol_area to NULL in mm_init() rather
than in uprobe_dup_mmap().
With CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS=y, the bug can be reproduced by the same C
program given by commit 2b7e8665b4 ("fork: fix incorrect fput of
->exe_file causing use-after-free"), provided that a uprobe tracepoint
has been set on the fork_thread() function. For example:
$ gcc reproducer.c -o reproducer -lpthread
$ nm reproducer | grep fork_thread
0000000000400719 t fork_thread
$ echo "p $PWD/reproducer:0x719" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/uprobe_events
$ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
$ ./reproducer
Here is the use-after-free reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800320a8b88 by task reproducer/198
CPU: 1 PID: 198 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.13.0-rc7-00015-g36fde05f3fb5 #255
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xdb/0x185
print_address_description+0x7e/0x290
kasan_report+0x23b/0x350
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20
uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200
mmput+0xd6/0x360
do_exit+0x740/0x1670
do_group_exit+0x13f/0x380
get_signal+0x597/0x17d0
do_signal+0x99/0x1df0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x166/0x1e0
syscall_return_slowpath+0x258/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe
...
Allocated by task 199:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x180
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x330
__create_xol_area+0x10f/0x780
uprobe_notify_resume+0x1674/0x2210
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x150/0x1e0
prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x14b/0x180
retint_user+0x8/0x20
Freed by task 199:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
kasan_slab_free+0xa8/0x1a0
kfree+0xba/0x210
uprobe_clear_state+0x151/0x200
mmput+0xd6/0x360
copy_process.part.8+0x605f/0x65d0
_do_fork+0x1a5/0xbd0
SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x22f/0x660
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
Note: without KASAN, you may instead see a "Bad page state" message, or
simply a general protection fault.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170830033303.17927-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c05126793 ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 7c05126793 ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c05126793 ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In some cases, an architecture might wish its stacks to be aligned to a
boundary larger than THREAD_SIZE. For example, using an alignment of
double THREAD_SIZE can allow for stack overflows smaller than
THREAD_SIZE to be detected by checking a single bit of the stack
pointer.
This patch allows architectures to override the alignment of VMAP'd
stacks, by defining THREAD_ALIGN. Where not defined, this defaults to
THREAD_SIZE, as is the case today.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Conflicts:
include/linux/mm_types.h
mm/huge_memory.c
I removed the smp_mb__before_spinlock() like the following commit does:
8b1b436dd1 ("mm, locking: Rework {set,clear,mm}_tlb_flush_pending()")
and fixed up the affected commits.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Patch series "fixes of TLB batching races", v6.
It turns out that Linux TLB batching mechanism suffers from various
races. Races that are caused due to batching during reclamation were
recently handled by Mel and this patch-set deals with others. The more
fundamental issue is that concurrent updates of the page-tables allow
for TLB flushes to be batched on one core, while another core changes
the page-tables. This other core may assume a PTE change does not
require a flush based on the updated PTE value, while it is unaware that
TLB flushes are still pending.
This behavior affects KSM (which may result in memory corruption) and
MADV_FREE and MADV_DONTNEED (which may result in incorrect behavior). A
proof-of-concept can easily produce the wrong behavior of MADV_DONTNEED.
Memory corruption in KSM is harder to produce in practice, but was
observed by hacking the kernel and adding a delay before flushing and
replacing the KSM page.
Finally, there is also one memory barrier missing, which may affect
architectures with weak memory model.
This patch (of 7):
Setting and clearing mm->tlb_flush_pending can be performed by multiple
threads, since mmap_sem may only be acquired for read in
task_numa_work(). If this happens, tlb_flush_pending might be cleared
while one of the threads still changes PTEs and batches TLB flushes.
This can lead to the same race between migration and
change_protection_range() that led to the introduction of
tlb_flush_pending. The result of this race was data corruption, which
means that this patch also addresses a theoretically possible data
corruption.
An actual data corruption was not observed, yet the race was was
confirmed by adding assertion to check tlb_flush_pending is not set by
two threads, adding artificial latency in change_protection_range() and
using sysctl to reduce kernel.numa_balancing_scan_delay_ms.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802000818.4760-2-namit@vmware.com
Fixes: 2084140594 ("mm: fix TLB flush race between migration, and
change_protection_range")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Lockdep is a runtime locking correctness validator that detects and
reports a deadlock or its possibility by checking dependencies between
locks. It's useful since it does not report just an actual deadlock but
also the possibility of a deadlock that has not actually happened yet.
That enables problems to be fixed before they affect real systems.
However, this facility is only applicable to typical locks, such as
spinlocks and mutexes, which are normally released within the context in
which they were acquired. However, synchronization primitives like page
locks or completions, which are allowed to be released in any context,
also create dependencies and can cause a deadlock.
So lockdep should track these locks to do a better job. The 'crossrelease'
implementation makes these primitives also be tracked.
Signed-off-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: boqun.feng@gmail.com
Cc: kernel-team@lge.com
Cc: kirill@shutemov.name
Cc: npiggin@gmail.com
Cc: walken@google.com
Cc: willy@infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502089981-21272-6-git-send-email-byungchul.park@lge.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Since commit a79be23860 ("selinux: Use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook") changed to use task_alloc hook, task_create hook is
no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kirill A. Shutemov
Linus Torvalds
Tetsuo Handa
Yang Shi
Mathieu Desnoyers
Richard Guy Briggs
Kees Cook
Mark Rutland
Dominik Brodowski
Andrew Morton
Marcos Paulo de Souza
Ingo Molnar
David Windsor
Thomas Gleixner
Gargi Sharma
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)
Konstantin Khlebnikov
Sherry Yang
Davidlohr Bueso
Jérôme Glisse
Rik van Riel
Andrea Arcangeli
Eric Biggers
Nadav Amit
Byungchul Park
James Morris