Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous to make it easier for
NFS to make use of them. There are now accessor functions that do
asynchronous constructions, a wait function to wait for construction to
complete, and a completion function for the key type to indicate completion
of construction.
Note that the construction queue is now gone. Instead, keys under
construction are linked in to the appropriate keyring in advance, and that
anyone encountering one must wait for it to be complete before they can use
it. This is done automatically for userspace.
The following auxiliary changes are also made:
(1) Key type implementation stuff is split from linux/key.h into
linux/key-type.h.
(2) AF_RXRPC provides a way to allocate null rxrpc-type keys so that AFS does
not need to call key_instantiate_and_link() directly.
(3) Adjust the debugging macros so that they're -Wformat checked even if
they are disabled, and make it so they can be enabled simply by defining
__KDEBUG to be consistent with other code of mine.
(3) Documentation.
[alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk: keys: missing word in documentation]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.
This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Rather than using a tri-state integer for the wait flag in
call_usermodehelper_exec, define a proper enum, and use that. I've
preserved the integer values so that any callers I've missed should
still work OK.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Export the keyring key type definition and document its availability.
Add alternative types into the key's type_data union to make it more useful.
Not all users necessarily want to use it as a list_head (AF_RXRPC doesn't, for
example), so make it clear that it can be used in other ways.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.
To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.
Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix the key serial number collision avoidance code in key_alloc_serial().
This didn't use to be so much of a problem as the key serial numbers were
allocated from a simple incremental counter, and it would have to go through
two billion keys before it could possibly encounter a collision. However, now
that random numbers are used instead, collisions are much more likely.
This is fixed by finding a hole in the rbtree where the next unused serial
number ought to be and using that by going almost back to the top of the
insertion routine and redoing the insertion with the new serial number rather
than trying to be clever and attempting to work out the insertion point
pointer directly.
This fixes kernel BZ #7727.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Name some of the remaning 'old_style_spin_init' locks
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Pass the work_struct pointer to the work function rather than context data.
The work function can use container_of() to work out the data.
For the cases where the container of the work_struct may go away the moment the
pending bit is cleared, it is made possible to defer the release of the
structure by deferring the clearing of the pending bit.
To make this work, an extra flag is introduced into the management side of the
work_struct. This governs auto-release of the structure upon execution.
Ordinarily, the work queue executor would release the work_struct for further
scheduling or deallocation by clearing the pending bit prior to jumping to the
work function. This means that, unless the driver makes some guarantee itself
that the work_struct won't go away, the work function may not access anything
else in the work_struct or its container lest they be deallocated.. This is a
problem if the auxiliary data is taken away (as done by the last patch).
However, if the pending bit is *not* cleared before jumping to the work
function, then the work function *may* access the work_struct and its container
with no problems. But then the work function must itself release the
work_struct by calling work_release().
In most cases, automatic release is fine, so this is the default. Special
initiators exist for the non-auto-release case (ending in _NAR).
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to
userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key. This is
because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will
be contacted through rpc_pipefs.
This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall
operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a
pre-existing communications channel more easily.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-By: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add more poison values to include/linux/poison.h. It's not clear to me
whether some others should be added or not, so I haven't added any of
these:
./include/linux/libata.h:#define ATA_TAG_POISON 0xfafbfcfdU
./arch/ppc/8260_io/fcc_enet.c:1918: memset((char *)(&(immap->im_dprambase[(mem_addr+64)])), 0x88, 32);
./drivers/usb/mon/mon_text.c:429: memset(mem, 0xe5, sizeof(struct mon_event_text));
./drivers/char/ftape/lowlevel/ftape-ctl.c:738: memset(ft_buffer[i]->address, 0xAA, FT_BUFF_SIZE);
./drivers/block/sx8.c:/* 0xf is just arbitrary, non-zero noise; this is sorta like poisoning */
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is
granted View permission are presented.
The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause key_alloc_serial() to generate key serial numbers randomly rather than
in linear sequence.
Using an linear sequence permits a covert communication channel to be
established, in which one process can communicate with another by creating or
not creating new keys within a certain timeframe. The second process can
probe for the expected next key serial number and judge its existence by the
error returned.
This is a problem as the serial number namespace is globally shared between
all tasks, regardless of their context.
For more information on this topic, this old TCSEC guide is recommended:
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-030.html
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the
quota burden to the new user.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it
causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked.
This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than
waiting for the key to actually be destroyed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.
This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a revocation notification method to the key type and calls it whilst
the key's semaphore is still write-locked after setting the revocation
flag.
The patch then uses this to maintain a reference on the task_struct of the
process that calls request_key() for as long as the authorisation key
remains unrevoked.
This fixes a potential race between two processes both of which have
assumed the authority to instantiate a key (one may have forked the other
for example). The problem is that there's no locking around the check for
revocation of the auth key and the use of the task_struct it points to, nor
does the auth key keep a reference on the task_struct.
Access to the "context" pointer in the auth key must thenceforth be done
with the auth key semaphore held. The revocation method is called with the
target key semaphore held write-locked and the search of the context
process's keyrings is done with the auth key semaphore read-locked.
The check for the revocation state of the auth key just prior to searching
it is done after the auth key is read-locked for the search. This ensures
that the auth key can't be revoked between the check and the search.
The revocation notification method is added so that the context task_struct
can be released as soon as instantiation happens rather than waiting for
the auth key to be destroyed, thus avoiding the unnecessary pinning of the
requesting process.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.
Has passed David's testsuite.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove an unnecessary memory barrier (implicit in rcu_dereference()) from
install_session_keyring().
install_session_keyring() is also rearranged a little to make it slightly
more efficient.
As install_*_keyring() may schedule (in synchronize_rcu() or
keyring_alloc()), they may not be entered with interrupts disabled - and so
there's no point saving the interrupt disablement state over the critical
section.
exec_keys() will also be invoked with interrupts enabled, and so that doesn't
need to save the interrupt state either.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a
key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522].
The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the
keyring it's been given is actually a keyring.
I've fixed this problem by:
(1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that
the keyring is a keyring; and
(2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring,
and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't.
This can be tested by:
keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s`
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause an attempt to add a duplicate non-updateable key (such as a keyring) to
a keyring to discard the extant copy in favour of the new one rather than
failing with EEXIST:
# do the test in an empty session
keyctl session
# create a new keyring called "a" and attach to session
keyctl newring a @s
# create another new keyring called "a" and attach to session,
# displacing the keyring added by the second command:
keyctl newring a @s
Without this patch, the third command will fail.
For updateable keys (such as those of "user" type), the update method will
still be called rather than a new key being created.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make key quota detection generate an error if either quota is exceeded rather
than only if both quotas are exceeded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string
duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the
type.)
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Semaphore to mutex conversion.
The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In the small window between strnlen_user() and copy_from_user() userspace
could alter the terminating `\0' character.
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;
- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
mm/, security/, & sound/;
many more drivers/ to go)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to
instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.
The patch makes the following changes:
(1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type
to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be
spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the
rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.
The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation
name are passed to the method.
(2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key
to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in
/proc/pid/cmdline.
This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the
patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no
longer there.
A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.
(3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this
key will retrieve the information.
(4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the
authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here
for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the
lowest level of the session keyring.
This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to
switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and
so is usable in multithreaded programs.
The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.
(5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that
permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated
key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated
with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings.
This function can also clear the assumption.
(6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently
assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).
(7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is
assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if
instantiation is successful.
(8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the
file of permissions functions.
(9) The documentation is updated.
From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Build fix.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause any links within a keyring to keys that match a key to be linked into
that keyring to be discarded as a link to the new key is added. The match is
contingent on the type and description strings being the same.
This permits requests, adds and searches to displace negative, expired,
revoked and dead keys easily. After some discussion it was concluded that
duplicate valid keys should probably be discarded also as they would otherwise
hide the new key.
Since request_key() is intended to be the primary method by which keys are
added to a keyring, duplicate valid keys wouldn't be an issue there as that
function would return an existing match in preference to creating a new key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a new keyctl function that allows the expiry time to be set on a key or
removed from a key, provided the caller has attribute modification access.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
make needlessly global code static
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the key duplication stuff since there's nothing that uses it, no way
to get at it and it's awkward to deal with for LSM purposes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Permit add_key() to once again update a matching key rather than adding a
new one if a matching key already exists in the target keyring.
This bug causes add_key() to always add a new key, displacing the old from
the target keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This is the security/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.
Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in security/.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch removes a couple of incorrect and obsolete '!' operators
left over from the conversion of the key permission functions from
true/false returns to zero/error returns.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable
changes are:
(1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security
modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which
programs may access a key.
(2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key.
(3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules;
the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out.
(4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather
than a boolean value.
(5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of
attributes (UID, GID, permissions).
Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation,
but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based
on the permission request bits.
Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both
CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled.
This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected:
[PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Export user-defined key operations so that those who wish to define their
own key type based on the user-defined key operations may do so (as has
been requested).
The header file created has been placed into include/keys/user-type.h, thus
creating a directory where other key types may also be placed. Any
objections to doing this?
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch makes the possessor permissions on a key additive with
user/group/other permissions on the same key.
This permits extra rights to be granted to the possessor of a key without
taking away any rights conferred by them owning the key or having common group
membership.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and
moves it into a .c file. It's quite large and called quite a lot, and
it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys...
key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch adds documentation for the process by which request-key
works, including how it permits helper processes to gain access to the
requestor's keyrings.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Plug request_key_auth memleak. This can be triggered by unprivileged
users, so is local DoS.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a
key in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes
SUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key
targets using the LSM facilities.
This patch adds a second "pointer type" to key structures (struct key_ref *)
that can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of
a key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered
key. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts
to dereference a potentially incorrect pointer.
The "possession" attribute can't be attached to a key structure directly as
it's not an intrinsic property of a key.
Pointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *'s wherever
possession information needs to be passed through.
This does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on
return from kmem_cache_alloc().
The key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be
located in the sources, even though it's basically a pointer to an undefined
type. I've also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all
reference variables should now end in "_ref".
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch makes sure that a keyring that failed to instantiate
properly is destroyed without oopsing [CAN-2005-2099].
The problem occurs in three stages:
(1) The key allocator initialises the type-specific data to all zeroes. In
the case of a keyring, this will become a link in the keyring name list
when the keyring is instantiated.
(2) If a user (any user) attempts to add a keyring with anything other than
an empty payload, the keyring instantiation function will fail with an
error and won't add the keyring to the name list.
(3) The keyring's destructor then sees that the keyring has a description
(name) and tries to remove the keyring from the name list, which oopses
because the link pointers are both zero.
This bug permits any user to take down a box trivially.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The attached patch prevents an error during the key session joining operation
from hanging future joins in the D state [CAN-2005-2098].
The problem is that the error handling path for the KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
operation has one error path that doesn't release the session management
semaphore. Further attempts to get the semaphore will then sleep for ever in
the D state.
This can happen in four situations, all involving an attempt to allocate a new
session keyring:
(1) ENOMEM.
(2) The users key quota being reached.
(3) A keyring name that is an empty string.
(4) A keyring name that is too long.
Any user may attempt this operation, and so any user can cause the problem to
occur.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This fixes five bugs in the key management syscall interface:
(1) add_key() returns 0 rather than EINVAL if the key type is "".
Checking the key type isn't "" should be left to lookup_user_key().
(2) request_key() returns ENOKEY rather than EPERM if the key type begins
with a ".".
lookup_user_key() can't do this because internal key types begin with a
".".
(3) Key revocation always returns 0, even if it fails.
(4) Key read can return EAGAIN rather than EACCES under some circumstances.
A key is permitted to by read by a process if it doesn't grant read
access, but it does grant search access and it is in the process's
keyrings. That search returns EAGAIN if it fails, and this needs
translating to EACCES.
(5) request_key() never adds the new key to the destination keyring if one is
supplied.
The wrong macro was being used to test for an error condition: PTR_ERR()
will always return true, whether or not there's an error; this should've
been IS_ERR().
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
David Howells
Jan Engelhardt
Paul Mundt
Jeremy Fitzhardinge
Tim Schmielau
Arjan van de Ven
Peter Zijlstra
Eric Sesterhenn
Christoph Lameter
Randy Dunlap
Michael LeMay
Fredrik Tolf
David Woodhouse
Davi Arnaut
Ingo Molnar
Adrian Bunk
Jesper Juhl