Added some clarifying comments, changed the register allocations to make
the code clearer, and added register aliases.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add hardware accelerated version of XCTR for ARM64 CPUs with ARMv8
Crypto Extension support. This XCTR implementation is based on the CTR
implementation in aes-modes.S.
More information on XCTR can be found in
the HCTR2 paper: "Length-preserving encryption with HCTR2":
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1441.pdf
Signed-off-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Instead of processing the entire input with the 8-way bit sliced
algorithm, which is sub-optimal for inputs that are not a multiple of
128 bytes in size, invoke the plain NEON version of CTR for the
remainder of the input after processing the bulk using 128 byte strides.
This allows us to greatly simplify the asm code that implements CTR, and
get rid of all the branches and special code paths. It also gains us a
couple of percent of performance.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Instead of falling back to C code to do a memcpy of the output of the
last block, handle this in the asm code directly if possible, which is
the case if the entire input is longer than 16 bytes.
Cc: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Calls into the skcipher API can only occur from contexts where the SIMD
unit is available, so there is no need for the SIMD helper.
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Counter mode is a stream cipher chaining mode that is typically used
with inputs that are of arbitrarily length, and so a tail block which
is smaller than a full AES block is rule rather than exception.
The current ctr(aes) implementation for arm64 always makes a separate
call into the assembler routine to process this tail block, which is
suboptimal, given that it requires reloading of the AES round keys,
and prevents us from handling this tail block using the 5-way stride
that we use for better performance on deep pipelines.
So let's update the assembler routine so it can handle any input size,
and uses NEON permutation instructions and overlapping loads and stores
to handle the tail block. This results in a ~16% speedup for 1420 byte
blocks on cores with deep pipelines such as ThunderX2.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Commit 69b6f2e817 ("crypto: arm64/aes-neon - limit exposed routines if
faster driver is enabled") intended to hide modes from the plain NEON
driver that are also implemented by the faster bit sliced NEON one if
both are enabled. However, the defined() CPP function does not detect
if the bit sliced NEON driver is enabled as a module. So instead, let's
use IS_ENABLED() here.
Fixes: 69b6f2e817 ("crypto: arm64/aes-neon - limit exposed routines if ...")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Instead of manually allocating a 'struct shash_desc' on the stack and
calling crypto_shash_digest(), switch to using the new helper function
crypto_shash_tfm_digest() which does this for us.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Update the AES-XTS implementation based on NEON instructions so that it
can deal with inputs whose size is not a multiple of the cipher block
size. This is part of the original XTS specification, but was never
implemented before in the Linux kernel.
Since the bit slicing driver is only faster if it can operate on at
least 7 blocks of input at the same time, let's reuse the alternate
path we are adding for CTS to process any data tail whose size is
not a multiple of 128 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add the missing support for ciphertext stealing in the implementation
of AES-XTS, which is part of the XTS specification but was omitted up
until now due to lack of a need for it.
The asm helpers are updated so they can deal with any input size, as
long as the last full block and the final partial block are presented
at the same time. The glue code is updated so that the common case of
operating on a sector or page is mostly as before. When CTS is needed,
the walk is split up into two pieces, unless the entire input is covered
by a single step.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since the CTS-CBC code completes synchronously, there is no point in
keeping part of the scratch data it uses in the request context, so
move it to the stack instead.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The pure NEON AES implementation predates the bit-slicing one, and is
generally slower, unless the algorithm in question can only execute
sequentially.
So advertising the skciphers that the bit-slicing driver implements as
well serves no real purpose, and we can just disable them. Note that the
bit-slicing driver also has a link time dependency on the pure NEON
driver, for CBC encryption and for XTS tweak calculation, so we still
need both drivers on systems that do not implement the Crypto Extensions.
At the same time, expose those modaliases for the AES instruction based
driver. This is necessary since otherwise, we may end up loading the
wrong driver when any of the skciphers are instantiated before the CPU
capability based module loading has completed.
Finally, add the missing modalias for cts(cbc(aes)) so requests for
this algorithm will autoload the correct module.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO contains if(IS_ERR(...)) + PTR_ERR. It is better to
use it directly. hence just replace it.
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)' skcipher,
which is used by fscrypt or dm-crypt on systems where CBC mode is
signficantly more performant than XTS mode (e.g., when using a h/w
accelerator which supports the former but not the latter) This avoids
a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation of duplicating the sync ctr(aes) functionality to modules
under arch/arm, move the helper function from a inline .h file to the
AES library, which is already depended upon by the drivers that use this
fallback.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Switch to the new AES library that also provides an implementation of
the AES key expansion routine. This removes the dependency on the
generic AES cipher, allowing it to be omitted entirely in the future.
While at it, remove some references to the table based arm64 version
of AES and replace them with AES library calls as well.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
My patches to make testmgr fuzz algorithms against their generic
implementation detected that the arm64 implementations of "cbcmac(aes)"
handle empty messages differently from the cbcmac template. Namely, the
arm64 implementations return the encrypted initial value, but the cbcmac
template returns the initial value directly.
This isn't actually a meaningful case because any user of cbcmac needs
to prepend the message length, as CCM does; otherwise it's insecure.
However, we should keep the behavior consistent; at the very least this
makes testing easier.
Do it the easy way, which is to change the arm64 implementations to have
the same behavior as the cbcmac template.
For what it's worth, ghash does things essentially the same way: it
returns its initial value when given an empty message, even though in
practice ghash is never passed an empty message.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Replace all calls to may_use_simd() in the arm64 crypto code with
crypto_simd_usable(), in order to allow testing the no-SIMD code paths.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the new arm64 CTS-CBC implementation, return an error code rather
than crashing on inputs shorter than AES_BLOCK_SIZE bytes. Also set
cra_blocksize to AES_BLOCK_SIZE (like is done in the cts template) to
indicate the minimum input size.
Fixes: dd597fb33f ("crypto: arm64/aes-blk - add support for CTS-CBC mode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, we rely on the generic CTS chaining mode wrapper to
instantiate the cts(cbc(aes)) skcipher. Due to the high performance
of the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions AES instructions (~1 cycles per byte),
any overhead in the chaining mode layers is amplified, and so it pays
off considerably to fold the CTS handling into the SIMD routines.
On Cortex-A53, this results in a ~50% speedup for smaller input sizes.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For some reason, the asmlinkage prototypes of the NEON routines take
u8[] arguments for the round key arrays, while the actual round keys
are arrays of u32, and so passing them into those routines requires
u8* casts at each occurrence. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this
is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and
crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and
restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and
involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(),
and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason,
the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON
enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may
include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory
allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with
preemption disabled.
Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now
restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action
is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel.
So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around
the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of
the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled)
Note that this requires some reshuffling of the registers in the asm
code, because the XTS routines can no longer rely on the registers to
retain their contents between invocations.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When a cipher fails to register in aes_init(), the error path goes thought
aes_exit() then crypto_unregister_skciphers().
Since aes_exit calls also crypto_unregister_skcipher, this triggers a
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To accommodate systems that may disallow use of the NEON in kernel mode
in some circumstances, introduce a C fallback for synchronous AES in CTR
mode, and use it if may_use_simd() returns false.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There are quite a number of occurrences in the kernel of the pattern
if (dst != src)
memcpy(dst, src, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_xor(dst, final, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
or
crypto_xor(keystream, src, nbytes);
memcpy(dst, keystream, nbytes);
where crypto_xor() is preceded or followed by a memcpy() invocation
that is only there because crypto_xor() uses its output parameter as
one of the inputs. To avoid having to add new instances of this pattern
in the arm64 code, which will be refactored to implement non-SIMD
fallbacks, add an alternative implementation called crypto_xor_cpy(),
taking separate input and output arguments. This removes the need for
the separate memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
On ARMv8 implementations that do not support the Crypto Extensions,
such as the Raspberry Pi 3, the CCM driver falls back to the generic
table based AES implementation to perform the MAC part of the
algorithm, which is slow and not time invariant. So add a CBCMAC
implementation to the shared glue code between NEON AES and Crypto
Extensions AES, so that it can be used instead now that the CCM
driver has been updated to look for CBCMAC implementations other
than the one it supplies itself.
Also, given how these algorithms mostly only differ in the way the key
handling and the final encryption are implemented, expose CMAC and XCBC
algorithms as well based on the same core update code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The non-bitsliced AES implementation using the NEON is highly sensitive
to micro-architectural details, and, as it turns out, the Cortex-A53 on
the Raspberry Pi 3 is a core that can benefit from this code, given that
its scalar AES performance is abysmal (32.9 cycles per byte).
The new bitsliced AES code manages 19.8 cycles per byte on this core,
but can only operate on 8 blocks at a time, which is not supported by
all chaining modes. With a bit of tweaking, we can get the plain NEON
code to run at 22.0 cycles per byte, making it useful for sequential
modes like CBC encryption. (Like bitsliced NEON, the plain NEON
implementation does not use any lookup tables, which makes it easy on
the D-cache, and invulnerable to cache timing attacks)
So tweak the plain NEON AES code to use tbl instructions rather than
shl/sri pairs, and to avoid the need to reload permutation vectors or
other constants from memory in every round. Also, improve the decryption
performance by switching to 16x8 pmul instructions for the performing
the multiplications in GF(2^8).
To allow the ECB and CBC encrypt routines to be reused by the bitsliced
NEON code in a subsequent patch, export them from the module.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the unnecessary alignmask: it is much more efficient to deal with
the misalignment in the core algorithm than relying on the crypto API to
copy the data to a suitably aligned buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In addition to wrapping the AES-CTR cipher into the async SIMD wrapper,
which exposes it as an async skcipher that defers processing to process
context, expose our AES-CTR implementation directly as a synchronous cipher
as well, but with a lower priority.
This makes the AES-CTR transform usable in places where synchronous
transforms are required, such as the MAC802.11 encryption code, which
executes in sotfirq context, where SIMD processing is allowed on arm64.
Users of the async transform will keep the existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix a missing statement that got lost in the skcipher conversion of
the CTR transform.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When building the arm64 kernel with both CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_CE_BLK=y
and CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_NEON_BLK=y configured, the build breaks with
the following error:
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neon-blk.o:(.bss+0x0): multiple definition of `aes_simd_algs'
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-blk.o:(.bss+0x0): first defined here
Fix this by making aes_simd_algs 'static'.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The AES-CTR glue code avoids calling into the blkcipher API for the
tail portion of the walk, by comparing the remainder of walk.nbytes
modulo AES_BLOCK_SIZE with the residual nbytes, and jumping straight
into the tail processing block if they are equal. This tail processing
block checks whether nbytes != 0, and does nothing otherwise.
However, in case of an allocation failure in the blkcipher layer, we
may enter this code with walk.nbytes == 0, while nbytes > 0. In this
case, we should not dereference the source and destination pointers,
since they may be NULL. So instead of checking for nbytes != 0, check
for (walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0, which implies the former in
non-error conditions.
Fixes: 49788fe2a1 ("arm64/crypto: AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 NEON and Crypto Extensions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: xiakaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.6:
API:
- Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
- Remove crypto_hash interface.
- Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
- Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
- Add akcipher documentation.
- Add skcipher documentation.
Algorithms:
- Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
- Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.
Drivers:
- Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
- Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
- Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
- Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
- Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
- Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
- Make atmel-sha available again.
- Make sahara hashing available again.
- Make ccp hashing available again.
- Make sha1-mb available again.
- Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
- Improve DMA performance in caam.
- Add hashing support to rockchip"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
lib/mpi: Endianness fix
crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
crypto: xts - fix compile errors
crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
...
Commit 28856a9e52 missed the addition of the crypto/xts.h include file
for different architecture-specific AES implementations.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The patch centralizes the XTS key check logic into the service function
xts_check_key which is invoked from the different XTS implementations.
With this, the XTS implementations in ARM, ARM64, PPC and S390 have now
a sanity check for the XTS keys similar to the other arches.
In addition, this service function received a check to ensure that the
key != the tweak key which is mandated by FIPS 140-2 IG A.9. As the
check is not present in the standards defining XTS, it is only enforced
in FIPS mode of the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
ECB modes don't use an initialization vector. The kernel
/proc/crypto interface doesn't reflect this properly.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Flag all 64 bit ARMv8 AES helper ciphers as internal ciphers to
prevent them from being called by normal users.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
- The crypto API is now documented :)
- Disallow arbitrary module loading through crypto API.
- Allow get request with empty driver name through crypto_user.
- Allow speed testing of arbitrary hash functions.
- Add caam support for ctr(aes), gcm(aes) and their derivatives.
- nx now supports concurrent hashing properly.
- Add sahara support for SHA1/256.
- Add ARM64 version of CRC32.
- Misc fixes.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (77 commits)
crypto: tcrypt - Allow speed testing of arbitrary hash functions
crypto: af_alg - add user space interface for AEAD
crypto: qat - fix problem with coalescing enable logic
crypto: sahara - add support for SHA1/256
crypto: sahara - replace tasklets with kthread
crypto: sahara - add support for i.MX53
crypto: sahara - fix spinlock initialization
crypto: arm - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: powerpc - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: sha - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: sparc - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: algif_skcipher - initialize upon init request
crypto: algif_skcipher - removed unneeded code
crypto: algif_skcipher - Fixed blocking recvmsg
crypto: drbg - use memzero_explicit() for clearing sensitive data
crypto: drbg - use MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
crypto: user - add MODULE_ALIAS
crypto: sha-mb - remove a bogus NULL check
crytpo: qat - Fix 64 bytes requests
...
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch implements the AES key schedule generation using ARMv8
Crypto Instructions. It replaces the table based C implementation
in aes_generic.ko, which means we can drop the dependency on that
module.
Tested-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
cryptsetup fails on arm64 when using kernel encryption via AF_ALG socket.
See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1122937
The bug is caused by incorrect handling of unaligned data in
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c. Cryptsetup creates a buffer that is aligned
on 8 bytes, but not on 16 bytes. It opens AF_ALG socket and uses the
socket to encrypt data in the buffer. The arm64 crypto accelerator causes
data corruption or crashes in the scatterwalk_pagedone.
This patch fixes the bug by passing the residue bytes that were not
processed as the last parameter to blkcipher_walk_done.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Nathan Huckleberry
Ard Biesheuvel
Eric Biggers
Ard Biesheuvel
zhong jiang
Thomas Gleixner
Herbert Xu
Jia He
Corentin Labbe
Linus Torvalds
Stephan Mueller
Jeremy Linton
Kees Cook
Mikulas Patocka