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Автор SHA1 Сообщение Дата
Kuniyuki Iwashima 2e29ff824b af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().
[ Upstream commit 1971d13ffa84a551d29a81fdf5b5ec5be166ac83 ]

syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().

One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.

So, the splat is false-positive.

Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.

Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
 -----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
       unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
       unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
       skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
       skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
       __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
       kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
       kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
       manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
       unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
       unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
       do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
       splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
       do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
       __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
       __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
       __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
       __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
       process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
       process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
       worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
       kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
       ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(unix_gc_lock);
                               lock(&u->lock);
                               lock(unix_gc_lock);
  lock(&u->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
 </TASK>

Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-05-02 16:24:47 +02:00
Michal Luczaj e76c267822 af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
[ Upstream commit 47d8ac011fe1c9251070e1bd64cb10b48193ec51 ]

Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting
enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that
carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a
different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight
count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.

sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable
V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped

connect(S, addr)	sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V)	__unix_gc()
----------------	-------------------------	-----------

NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)
unix_state_lock(L)
unix_peer(S) = NS
			// V count=1 inflight=0

 			NS = unix_peer(S)
 			skb2 = sock_alloc()
			skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])

			// V became in-flight
			// V count=2 inflight=1

			close(V)

			// V count=1 inflight=1
			// GC candidate condition met

						for u in gc_inflight_list:
						  if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
						    add u to gc_candidates

						// gc_candidates={L, V}

						for u in gc_candidates:
						  scan_children(u, dec_inflight)

						// embryo (skb1) was not
						// reachable from L yet, so V's
						// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
						for u in gc_candidates:
						  if (u.inflight)
						    scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)

						// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)

If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This
makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After
flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if
there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At
this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already
taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.

Fixes: 1fd05ba5a2 ("[AF_UNIX]: Rewrite garbage collector, fixes race.")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409201047.1032217-1-mhal@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-04-17 11:15:15 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima 37120fa8d9 af_unix: Do not use atomic ops for unix_sk(sk)->inflight.
[ Upstream commit 97af84a6bba2ab2b9c704c08e67de3b5ea551bb2 ]

When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).

Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-04-17 11:15:15 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima 8a029ee1e3 af_unix: Annotate data-race of gc_in_progress in wait_for_unix_gc().
[ Upstream commit 31e03207119a535d0b0e3b3a7f91983aeb2cb14d ]

gc_in_progress is changed under spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock),
but wait_for_unix_gc() reads it locklessly.

Let's use READ_ONCE().

Fixes: 5f23b73496 ("net: Fix soft lockups/OOM issues w/ unix garbage collector")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-26 18:21:17 -04:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima 6c480d0f13 af_unix: Drop oob_skb ref before purging queue in GC.
commit aa82ac51d63328714645c827775d64dbfd9941f3 upstream.

syzbot reported another task hung in __unix_gc().  [0]

The current while loop assumes that all of the left candidates
have oob_skb and calling kfree_skb(oob_skb) releases the remaining
candidates.

However, I missed a case that oob_skb has self-referencing fd and
another fd and the latter sk is placed before the former in the
candidate list.  Then, the while loop never proceeds, resulting
the task hung.

__unix_gc() has the same loop just before purging the collected skb,
so we can call kfree_skb(oob_skb) there and let __skb_queue_purge()
release all inflight sockets.

[0]:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 2784 Comm: kworker/u4:8 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01028-g71b605d32017 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x0/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:200
Code: 89 fb e8 23 00 00 00 48 8b 3d 84 f5 1a 0c 48 89 de 5b e9 43 26 57 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <f3> 0f 1e fa 48 8b 04 24 65 48 8b 0d 90 52 70 7e 65 8b 15 91 52 70
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a17fa78 EFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffffffff8a0a6108 RBX: ffff88802b6c2640 RCX: ffff88802c0b3b80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000a17fbf0 R08: ffffffff89383f1d R09: 1ffff1100ee5ff84
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100ee5ff85 R12: 1ffff110056d84ee
R13: ffffc9000a17fae0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff8f47b840
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffef5687ff8 CR3: 0000000029b34000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <NMI>
 </NMI>
 <TASK>
 __unix_gc+0xe69/0xf40 net/unix/garbage.c:343
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706
 worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
 kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
 </TASK>

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ecab4d36f920c3574bf9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ecab4d36f920c3574bf9
Fixes: 25236c91b5ab ("af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-06 14:38:50 +00:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima 36f7371de9 af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.
commit 25236c91b5ab4a26a56ba2e79b8060cf4e047839 upstream.

syzbot reported a task hung; at the same time, GC was looping infinitely
in list_for_each_entry_safe() for OOB skb.  [0]

syzbot demonstrated that the list_for_each_entry_safe() was not actually
safe in this case.

A single skb could have references for multiple sockets.  If we free such
a skb in the list_for_each_entry_safe(), the current and next sockets could
be unlinked in a single iteration.

unix_notinflight() uses list_del_init() to unlink the socket, so the
prefetched next socket forms a loop itself and list_for_each_entry_safe()
never stops.

Here, we must use while() and make sure we always fetch the first socket.

[0]:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 5065 Comm: syz-executor236 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-syzkaller-00136-g1f719a2f3fa6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
RIP: 0010:preempt_count arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_kcov_mode kernel/kcov.c:173 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0xd/0x60 kernel/kcov.c:207
Code: cc cc cc cc 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 65 48 8b 14 25 40 c2 03 00 <65> 8b 05 b4 7c 78 7e a9 00 01 ff 00 48 8b 34 24 74 0f f6 c4 01 74
RSP: 0018:ffffc900033efa58 EFLAGS: 00000283
RAX: ffff88807b077800 RBX: ffff88807b077800 RCX: 1ffffffff27b1189
RDX: ffff88802a5a3b80 RSI: ffffffff8968488d RDI: ffff88807b077f70
RBP: ffffc900033efbb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff27a900c
R10: ffffffff93d48067 R11: ffffffff8ae000eb R12: ffff88807b077800
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88807b077e40 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000564f4fc1e3a8 CR3: 000000000d57a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <NMI>
 </NMI>
 <TASK>
 unix_gc+0x563/0x13b0 net/unix/garbage.c:319
 unix_release_sock+0xa93/0xf80 net/unix/af_unix.c:683
 unix_release+0x91/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1064
 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:659
 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1421
 __fput+0x270/0xb80 fs/file_table.c:376
 task_work_run+0x14f/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:180
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xa8a/0x2ad0 kernel/exit.c:871
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1020
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1031 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1029 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1029
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x270 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f9d6cbdac09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f9d6cbdabdf.
RSP: 002b:00007fff5952feb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9d6cbdac09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007f9d6cc552b0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000006
R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9d6cc552b0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f9d6cc55d00 R15: 00007f9d6cbabe70
 </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+4fa4a2d1f5a5ee06f006@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4fa4a2d1f5a5ee06f006
Fixes: 1279f9d9dec2 ("af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209220453.96053-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:55:10 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima 4fe505c63a af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC.
[ Upstream commit 1279f9d9dec2d7462823a18c29ad61359e0a007d ]

syzbot reported a warning [0] in __unix_gc() with a repro, which
creates a socketpair and sends one socket's fd to itself using the
peer.

  socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, [3, 4]) = 0
  sendmsg(4, {msg_name=NULL, msg_namelen=0, msg_iov=[{iov_base="\360", iov_len=1}],
          msg_iovlen=1, msg_control=[{cmsg_len=20, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
                                      cmsg_type=SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg_data=[3]}],
          msg_controllen=24, msg_flags=0}, MSG_OOB|MSG_PROBE|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_ZEROCOPY) = 1

This forms a self-cyclic reference that GC should finally untangle
but does not due to lack of MSG_OOB handling, resulting in memory
leak.

Recently, commit 11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for
GC.") removed io_uring's dead code in GC and revealed the problem.

The code was executed at the final stage of GC and unconditionally
moved all GC candidates from gc_candidates to gc_inflight_list.
That papered over the reported problem by always making the following
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&gc_candidates)) false.

The problem has been there since commit 2aab4b9690 ("af_unix: fix
struct pid leaks in OOB support") added full scm support for MSG_OOB
while fixing another bug.

To fix this problem, we must call kfree_skb() for unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb
if the socket still exists in gc_candidates after purging collected skb.

Then, we need to set NULL to oob_skb before calling kfree_skb() because
it calls last fput() and triggers unix_release_sock(), where we call
duplicate kfree_skb(u->oob_skb) if not NULL.

Note that the leaked socket remained being linked to a global list, so
kmemleak also could not detect it.  We need to check /proc/net/protocol
to notice the unfreed socket.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2863 at net/unix/garbage.c:345 __unix_gc+0xc74/0xe80 net/unix/garbage.c:345
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2863 Comm: kworker/u4:11 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00583-g1701940b1a02 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
RIP: 0010:__unix_gc+0xc74/0xe80 net/unix/garbage.c:345
Code: 8b 5c 24 50 e9 86 f8 ff ff e8 f8 e4 22 f8 31 d2 48 c7 c6 30 6a 69 89 4c 89 ef e8 97 ef ff ff e9 80 f9 ff ff e8 dd e4 22 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 7b fd ff ff 48 89 df e8 5c e7 7c f8 e9 d3 f8 ff ff e8
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b03fba0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000b03fc10 RCX: ffffffff816c493e
RDX: ffff88802c02d940 RSI: ffffffff896982f3 RDI: ffffc9000b03fb30
RBP: ffffc9000b03fce0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52001607f66
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffc9000b03fc10 R14: ffffc9000b03fc10 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005559c8677a60 CR3: 000000000d57a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 process_one_work+0x889/0x15e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2633
 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]
 worker_thread+0x8b9/0x12a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
 kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
 </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+fa3ef895554bdbfd1183@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa3ef895554bdbfd1183
Fixes: 2aab4b9690 ("af_unix: fix struct pid leaks in OOB support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203183149.63573-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:54:58 +01:00
Pavel Begunkov 813d8fe5d3 io_uring/af_unix: defer registered files gc to io_uring release
[ upstream commit 0091bfc817 ]

Instead of putting io_uring's registered files in unix_gc() we want it
to be done by io_uring itself. The trick here is to consider io_uring
registered files for cycle detection but not actually putting them down.
Because io_uring can't register other ring instances, this will remove
all refs to the ring file triggering the ->release path and clean up
with io_ring_ctx_free().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b06314c47 ("io_uring: add file set registration")
Reported-and-tested-by: David Bouman <dbouman03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[axboe: add kerneldoc comment to skb, fold in skb leak fix]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-10-26 12:35:52 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 3872d146f2 af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress
commit 9d6d7f1cb6 upstream.

wait_for_unix_gc() reads unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress
without synchronization.

Adds READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() and their associated comments
to better document the intent.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / wait_for_unix_gc

write to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9380 on cpu 0:
 unix_inflight+0x1e8/0x260 net/unix/scm.c:63
 unix_attach_fds+0x10c/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:121
 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1674 [inline]
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x679/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1817
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9375 on cpu 1:
 wait_for_unix_gc+0x24/0x160 net/unix/garbage.c:196
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x8e/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1772
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000002 -> 0x00000004

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 9375 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 9915672d41 ("af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220114164328.2038499-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-01-27 11:05:30 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner a85036f66f treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 62
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  released under the gpl version 2 or later

and 1 additional normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or
  modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license
  as published by the free software foundation either version
  2 of the license or at your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520071858.828691433@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-24 17:36:46 +02:00
Jens Axboe f4e65870e5 net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files
We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but
we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers
to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is
m/y.

No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Jens Axboe 2b188cc1bb Add io_uring IO interface
The submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) rings are shared
between the application and the kernel. This eliminates the need to
copy data back and forth to submit and complete IO.

IO submissions use the io_uring_sqe data structure, and completions
are generated in the form of io_uring_cqe data structures. The SQ
ring is an index into the io_uring_sqe array, which makes it possible
to submit a batch of IOs without them being contiguous in the ring.
The CQ ring is always contiguous, as completion events are inherently
unordered, and hence any io_uring_cqe entry can point back to an
arbitrary submission.

Two new system calls are added for this:

io_uring_setup(entries, params)
	Sets up an io_uring instance for doing async IO. On success,
	returns a file descriptor that the application can mmap to
	gain access to the SQ ring, CQ ring, and io_uring_sqes.

io_uring_enter(fd, to_submit, min_complete, flags, sigset, sigsetsize)
	Initiates IO against the rings mapped to this fd, or waits for
	them to complete, or both. The behavior is controlled by the
	parameters passed in. If 'to_submit' is non-zero, then we'll
	try and submit new IO. If IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS is set, the
	kernel will wait for 'min_complete' events, if they aren't
	already available. It's valid to set IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS
	and 'min_complete' == 0 at the same time, this allows the
	kernel to return already completed events without waiting
	for them. This is useful only for polling, as for IRQ
	driven IO, the application can just check the CQ ring
	without entering the kernel.

With this setup, it's possible to do async IO with a single system
call. Future developments will enable polled IO with this interface,
and polled submission as well. The latter will enable an application
to do IO without doing ANY system calls at all.

For IRQ driven IO, an application only needs to enter the kernel for
completions if it wants to wait for them to occur.

Each io_uring is backed by a workqueue, to support buffered async IO
as well. We will only punt to an async context if the command would
need to wait for IO on the device side. Any data that can be accessed
directly in the page cache is done inline. This avoids the slowness
issue of usual threadpools, since cached data is accessed as quickly
as a sync interface.

Sample application: http://git.kernel.dk/cgit/fio/plain/t/io_uring.c

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Andrey Ulanov 7df9c24625 net: unix: properly re-increment inflight counter of GC discarded candidates
Dmitry has reported that a BUG_ON() condition in unix_notinflight()
may be triggered by a simple code that forwards unix socket in an
SCM_RIGHTS message.
That is caused by incorrect unix socket GC implementation in unix_gc().

The GC first collects list of candidates, then (a) decrements their
"children's" inflight counter, (b) checks which inflight counters are
now 0, and then (c) increments all inflight counters back.
(a) and (c) are done by calling scan_children() with inc_inflight or
dec_inflight as the second argument.

Commit 6209344f5a ("net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage
collector") changed scan_children() such that it no longer considers
sockets that do not have UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE flag. It also added a block
of code that that unsets this flag _before_ invoking
scan_children(, dec_iflight, ). This may lead to incorrect inflight
counters for some sockets.

This change fixes this bug by changing order of operations:
UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE is now unset only after all inflight counters are
restored to the original state.

  kernel BUG at net/unix/garbage.c:149!
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8717ebf4>]  [<ffffffff8717ebf4>]
  unix_notinflight+0x3b4/0x490 net/unix/garbage.c:149
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff8716cfbf>] unix_detach_fds.isra.19+0xff/0x170 net/unix/af_unix.c:1487
   [<ffffffff8716f6a9>] unix_destruct_scm+0xf9/0x210 net/unix/af_unix.c:1496
   [<ffffffff86a90a01>] skb_release_head_state+0x101/0x200 net/core/skbuff.c:655
   [<ffffffff86a9808a>] skb_release_all+0x1a/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668
   [<ffffffff86a980ea>] __kfree_skb+0x1a/0x30 net/core/skbuff.c:684
   [<ffffffff86a98284>] kfree_skb+0x184/0x570 net/core/skbuff.c:705
   [<ffffffff871789d5>] unix_release_sock+0x5b5/0xbd0 net/unix/af_unix.c:559
   [<ffffffff87179039>] unix_release+0x49/0x90 net/unix/af_unix.c:836
   [<ffffffff86a694b2>] sock_release+0x92/0x1f0 net/socket.c:570
   [<ffffffff86a6962b>] sock_close+0x1b/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
   [<ffffffff81a76b8e>] __fput+0x34e/0x910 fs/file_table.c:208
   [<ffffffff81a771da>] ____fput+0x1a/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
   [<ffffffff81483ab0>] task_work_run+0x1a0/0x280 kernel/task_work.c:116
   [<     inline     >] exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21
   [<ffffffff8141287a>] do_exit+0x183a/0x2640 kernel/exit.c:828
   [<ffffffff8141383e>] do_group_exit+0x14e/0x420 kernel/exit.c:931
   [<ffffffff814429d3>] get_signal+0x663/0x1880 kernel/signal.c:2307
   [<ffffffff81239b45>] do_signal+0xc5/0x2190 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:807
   [<ffffffff8100666a>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1ea/0x2d0
  arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
   [<     inline     >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
   [<ffffffff81009693>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x4d3/0x570
  arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
   [<ffffffff881478e6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6

Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/6/252
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ulanov <andreyu@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 6209344 ("net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage collector")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-21 15:25:10 -07:00
Hannes Frederic Sowa 415e3d3e90 unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.

To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.

Fixes: 712f4aad40 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-08 10:30:42 -05:00
willy tarreau 712f4aad40 unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.

This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.

Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-01-11 00:05:30 -05:00
Jason Eastman d1ab39f17f net: unix: garbage: fixed several comment and whitespace style issues
fixed several comment and whitespace style issues

Signed-off-by: Jason Eastman <eastman.jason.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-23 13:15:20 -04:00
Fabian Frederick 505e907db3 af_unix: remove 0 assignment on static
static values are automatically initialized to 0

Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-07 17:03:14 -04:00
Eric Dumazet 60bc851ae5 af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields
Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1]
uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them.
If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose
critical concurrent changes.

This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)->gc_candidate/
gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word.

This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever
on a spinlock that will never be available again.

A safer way would be to use a long to store flags.
This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things.

As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits,
we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit().

recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock,
as it is set only with this spinlock held.

[1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 :
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080

Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-05-01 15:13:49 -04:00
Al Viro 496ad9aa8e new helper: file_inode(file)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
Al Viro 326be7b484 Allow passing O_PATH descriptors via SCM_RIGHTS datagrams
Just need to make sure that AF_UNIX garbage collector won't
confuse O_PATHed socket on filesystem for real AF_UNIX opened
socket.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-03-15 02:21:45 -04:00
Eric Dumazet 25888e3031 af_unix: limit recursion level
Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.

lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8

This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
recursion limit.

Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
sizes only.

Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.

Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
when socket receive queue is emptied.

Reported-by: Марк Коренберг <socketpair@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-11-29 09:45:15 -08:00
Eric Dumazet 9915672d41 af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight
Vegard Nossum found a unix socket OOM was possible, posting an exploit
program.

My analysis is we can eat all LOWMEM memory before unix_gc() being
called from unix_release_sock(). Moreover, the thread blocked in
unix_gc() can consume huge amount of time to perform cleanup because of
huge working set.

One way to handle this is to have a sensible limit on unix_tot_inflight,
tested from wait_for_unix_gc() and to force a call to unix_gc() if this
limit is hit.

This solves the OOM and also reduce overall latencies, and should not
slowdown normal workloads.

Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-11-24 09:15:27 -08:00
Ilpo Järvinen a2f3be17c0 unix/garbage: kill copy of the skb queue walker
Worse yet, it seems that its arguments were in reverse order. Also
remove one related helper which seems hardly worth keeping.

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-05-03 15:39:58 -07:00
Tejun Heo 5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
David S. Miller aa2ba5f108 Merge branch 'master' of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
Conflicts:

	drivers/net/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
	drivers/net/smc91x.c
2008-12-02 19:50:27 -08:00
dann frazier 5f23b73496 net: Fix soft lockups/OOM issues w/ unix garbage collector
This is an implementation of David Miller's suggested fix in:
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=470201

It has been updated to use wait_event() instead of
wait_event_interruptible().

Paraphrasing the description from the above report, it makes sendmsg()
block while UNIX garbage collection is in progress. This avoids a
situation where child processes continue to queue new FDs over a
AF_UNIX socket to a parent which is in the exit path and running
garbage collection on these FDs. This contention can result in soft
lockups and oom-killing of unrelated processes.

Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dannf@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-11-26 15:32:27 -08:00
David S. Miller 7e452baf6b Merge branch 'master' of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
Conflicts:

	drivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c
	drivers/net/sfc/ethtool.c
	net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
2008-11-11 15:43:02 -08:00
Miklos Szeredi 6209344f5a net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage collector
Previously I assumed that the receive queues of candidates don't
change during the GC.  This is only half true, nothing can be received
from the queues (see comment in unix_gc()), but buffers could be added
through the other half of the socket pair, which may still have file
descriptors referring to it.

This can result in inc_inflight_move_tail() erronously increasing the
"inflight" counter for a unix socket for which dec_inflight() wasn't
previously called.  This in turn can trigger the "BUG_ON(total_refs <
inflight_refs)" in a later garbage collection run.

Fix this by only manipulating the "inflight" counter for sockets which
are candidates themselves.  Duplicating the file references in
unix_attach_fds() is also needed to prevent a socket becoming a
candidate for GC while the skb that contains it is not yet queued.

Reported-by: Andrea Bittau <a.bittau@cs.ucl.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-09 11:17:33 -08:00
Jianjun Kong e27dfcea48 af_unix: clean up net/unix/af_unix.c garbage.c sysctl_net_unix.c
clean up net/unix/af_unix.c garbage.c sysctl_net_unix.c

Signed-off-by: Jianjun Kong <jianjun@zeuux.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-11-01 21:38:31 -07:00
Al Viro 516e0cc564 [PATCH] f_count may wrap around
make it atomic_long_t; while we are at it, get rid of useless checks in affs,
hfs and hpfs - ->open() always has it equal to 1, ->release() - to 0.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:40 -04:00
Pavel Emelyanov 5c80f1ae98 [AF_UNIX]: Convert socks to unix_socks in scan_inflight, not in callbacks
The scan_inflight() routine scans through the unix sockets and calls
some passed callback. The fact is that all these callbacks work with
the unix_sock objects, not the sock ones, so make this conversion in
the scan_inflight() before calling the callbacks.

This removes one unneeded variable from the inc_inflight_move_tail().

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-10 22:07:13 -08:00
Pavel Emelyanov 9305cfa444 [AF_UNIX]: Make unix_tot_inflight counter non-atomic
This counter is _always_ modified under the unix_gc_lock spinlock, 
so its atomicity can be provided w/o additional efforts.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-10 22:06:01 -08:00
Miklos Szeredi 1fd05ba5a2 [AF_UNIX]: Rewrite garbage collector, fixes race.
Throw out the old mark & sweep garbage collector and put in a
refcounting cycle detecting one.

The old one had a race with recvmsg, that resulted in false positives
and hence data loss.  The old algorithm operated on all unix sockets
in the system, so any additional locking would have meant performance
problems for all users of these.

The new algorithm instead only operates on "in flight" sockets, which
are very rare, and the additional locking for these doesn't negatively
impact the vast majority of users.

In fact it's probable, that there weren't *any* heavy senders of
sockets over sockets, otherwise the above race would have been
discovered long ago.

The patch works OK with the app that exposed the race with the old
code.  The garbage collection has also been verified to work in a few
simple cases.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-07-11 14:22:39 -07:00
Tim Schmielau cd354f1ae7 [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there.  Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.

To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.

Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm.  I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).

Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00
YOSHIFUJI Hideaki ac7bfa62f3 [NET] UNIX: Fix whitespace errors.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-10 23:20:18 -08:00
Josef Sipek 592ccbf9fb [PATCH] struct path: convert unix
Signed-off-by: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:50 -08:00
Arjan van de Ven 4a3e2f711a [NET] sem2mutex: net/
Semaphore to mutex conversion.

The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20 22:33:17 -08:00
David S. Miller fbe9cc4a87 [AF_UNIX]: Use spinlock for unix_table_lock
This lock is actually taken mostly as a writer,
so using a rwlock actually just makes performance
worse especially on chips like the Intel P4.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-03 13:10:59 -08:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo c752f0739f [TCP]: Move the tcp sock states to net/tcp_states.h
Lots of places just needs the states, not even linux/tcp.h, where this
enum was, needs it.

This speeds up development of the refactorings as less sources are
rebuilt when things get moved from net/tcp.h.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-29 15:41:54 -07:00
David S. Miller 8728b834b2 [NET]: Kill skb->list
Remove the "list" member of struct sk_buff, as it is entirely
redundant.  All SKB list removal callers know which list the
SKB is on, so storing this in sk_buff does nothing other than
taking up some space.

Two tricky bits were SCTP, which I took care of, and two ATM
drivers which Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com> fixed
up.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com>
2005-08-29 15:31:14 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00