As for SVE provide a prctl() interface which allows processes to
configure their SME vector length.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-12-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'kernel.sys.v5.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull prctl updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the missing prctl uapi pieces for PR_SCHED_CORE.
In order to activate core scheduling the caller is expected to specify
the scope of the new core scheduling domain.
For example, passing 2 in the 4th argument of
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE, <pid>, 2, 0);
would indicate that the new core scheduling domain encompasses all
tasks in the process group of <pid>. Specifying 0 would only create a
core scheduling domain for the thread identified by <pid> and 2 would
encompass the whole thread-group of <pid>.
Note, the values 0, 1, and 2 correspond to PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID,
and PIDTYPE_PGID. A first version tried to expose those values
directly to which I objected because:
- PIDTYPE_* is an enum that is kernel internal which we should not
expose to userspace directly.
- PIDTYPE_* indicates what a given struct pid is used for it doesn't
express a scope.
But what the 4th argument of PR_SCHED_CORE prctl() expresses is the
scope of the operation, i.e. the scope of the core scheduling domain
at creation time. So Eugene's patch now simply introduces three new
defines PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD, PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP,
and PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP. They simply express what
happens.
This has been on the mailing list for quite a while with all relevant
scheduler folks Cced. I announced multiple times that I'd pick this up
if I don't see or her anyone else doing it. None of this touches
proper scheduler code but only concerns uapi so I think this is fine.
With core scheduling being quite common now for vm managers (e.g.
moving individual vcpu threads into their own core scheduling domain)
and container managers (e.g. moving the init process into its own core
scheduling domain and letting all created children inherit it) having
to rely on raw numbers passed as the 4th argument in prctl() is a bit
annoying and everyone is starting to come up with their own defines"
* tag 'kernel.sys.v5.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
uapi/linux/prctl: provide macro definitions for the PR_SCHED_CORE type argument
Commit 7ac592aa35 ("sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface")
made use of enum pid_type in prctl's arg4; this type and the associated
enumeration definitions are not exposed to userspace. Christian
has suggested to provide additional macro definitions that convey
the meaning of the type argument more in alignment with its actual
usage, and this patch does exactly that.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210825170613.GA3884@asgard.redhat.com
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Complements: 7ac592aa35 ("sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
- Support for 32-bit tasks on asymmetric AArch32 systems (on top of the
scheduler changes merged via the tip tree).
- More entry.S clean-ups and conversion to C.
- MTE updates: allow a preferred tag checking mode to be set per CPU
(the overhead of synchronous mode is smaller for some CPUs than
others); optimisations for kernel entry/exit path; optionally disable
MTE on the kernel command line.
- Kselftest improvements for SVE and signal handling, PtrAuth.
- Fix unlikely race where a TLBI could use stale ASID on an ASID
roll-over (found by inspection).
- Miscellaneous fixes: disable trapping of PMSNEVFR_EL1 to higher
exception levels; drop unnecessary sigdelsetmask() call in the
signal32 handling; remove BUG_ON when failing to allocate SVE state
(just signal the process); SYM_CODE annotations.
- Other trivial clean-ups: use macros instead of magic numbers, remove
redundant returns, typos.
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
- Support for 32-bit tasks on asymmetric AArch32 systems (on top of the
scheduler changes merged via the tip tree).
- More entry.S clean-ups and conversion to C.
- MTE updates: allow a preferred tag checking mode to be set per CPU
(the overhead of synchronous mode is smaller for some CPUs than
others); optimisations for kernel entry/exit path; optionally disable
MTE on the kernel command line.
- Kselftest improvements for SVE and signal handling, PtrAuth.
- Fix unlikely race where a TLBI could use stale ASID on an ASID
roll-over (found by inspection).
- Miscellaneous fixes: disable trapping of PMSNEVFR_EL1 to higher
exception levels; drop unnecessary sigdelsetmask() call in the
signal32 handling; remove BUG_ON when failing to allocate SVE state
(just signal the process); SYM_CODE annotations.
- Other trivial clean-ups: use macros instead of magic numbers, remove
redundant returns, typos.
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (56 commits)
arm64: Do not trap PMSNEVFR_EL1
arm64: mm: fix comment typo of pud_offset_phys()
arm64: signal32: Drop pointless call to sigdelsetmask()
arm64/sve: Better handle failure to allocate SVE register storage
arm64: Document the requirement for SCR_EL3.HCE
arm64: head: avoid over-mapping in map_memory
arm64/sve: Add a comment documenting the binutils needed for SVE asm
arm64/sve: Add some comments for sve_save/load_state()
kselftest/arm64: signal: Add a TODO list for signal handling tests
kselftest/arm64: signal: Add test case for SVE register state in signals
kselftest/arm64: signal: Verify that signals can't change the SVE vector length
kselftest/arm64: signal: Check SVE signal frame shows expected vector length
kselftest/arm64: signal: Support signal frames with SVE register data
kselftest/arm64: signal: Add SVE to the set of features we can check for
arm64: replace in_irq() with in_hardirq()
kselftest/arm64: pac: Fix skipping of tests on systems without PAC
Documentation: arm64: describe asymmetric 32-bit support
arm64: Remove logic to kill 32-bit tasks on 64-bit-only cores
arm64: Hook up cmdline parameter to allow mismatched 32-bit EL0
arm64: Advertise CPUs capable of running 32-bit applications in sysfs
...
Allow the user program to specify both ASYNC and SYNC TCF modes by
repurposing the existing constants as bitfields. This will allow the
kernel to select one of the modes on behalf of the user program. With
this patch the kernel will always select async mode, but a subsequent
patch will make this configurable.
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icc5923c85a8ea284588cc399ae74fd19ec291230
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727205300.2554659-3-pcc@google.com
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Use the existing PR_GET/SET_SPECULATION_CTRL API to expose the L1D flush
capability. For L1D flushing PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and
PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC are not supported.
Enabling L1D flush does not check if the task is running on an SMT enabled
core, rather a check is done at runtime (at the time of flush), if the task
runs on a SMT sibling then the task is sent a SIGBUS which is executed
before the task returns to user space or to a guest.
This is better than the other alternatives of:
a. Ensuring strict affinity of the task (hard to enforce without further
changes in the scheduler)
b. Silently skipping flush for tasks that move to SMT enabled cores.
Hook up the core prctl and implement the x86 specific parts which in turn
makes it functional.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-5-sblbir@amazon.com
This patch provides support for setting and copying core scheduling
'task cookies' between threads (PID), processes (TGID), and process
groups (PGID).
The value of core scheduling isn't that tasks don't share a core,
'nosmt' can do that. The value lies in exploiting all the sharing
opportunities that exist to recover possible lost performance and that
requires a degree of flexibility in the API.
From a security perspective (and there are others), the thread,
process and process group distinction is an existent hierarchal
categorization of tasks that reflects many of the security concerns
about 'data sharing'. For example, protecting against cache-snooping
by a thread that can just read the memory directly isn't all that
useful.
With this in mind, subcommands to CREATE/SHARE (TO/FROM) provide a
mechanism to create and share cookies. CREATE/SHARE_TO specify a
target pid with enum pidtype used to specify the scope of the targeted
tasks. For example, PIDTYPE_TGID will share the cookie with the
process and all of it's threads as typically desired in a security
scenario.
API:
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_GET, tgtpid, pidtype, &cookie)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM, srcpid, pidtype, NULL)
where 'tgtpid/srcpid == 0' implies the current process and pidtype is
kernel enum pid_type {PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID, PIDTYPE_PGID, ...}.
For return values, EINVAL, ENOMEM are what they say. ESRCH means the
tgtpid/srcpid was not found. EPERM indicates lack of PTRACE permission
access to tgtpid/srcpid. ENODEV indicates your machines lacks SMT.
[peterz: complete rewrite]
Signed-off-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Don Hiatt <dhiatt@digitalocean.com>
Tested-by: Hongyu Ning <hongyu.ning@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210422123309.039845339@infradead.org
This change introduces a prctl that allows the user program to control
which PAC keys are enabled in a particular task. The main reason
why this is useful is to enable a userspace ABI that uses PAC to
sign and authenticate function pointers and other pointers exposed
outside of the function, while still allowing binaries conforming
to the ABI to interoperate with legacy binaries that do not sign or
authenticate pointers.
The idea is that a dynamic loader or early startup code would issue
this prctl very early after establishing that a process may load legacy
binaries, but before executing any PAC instructions.
This change adds a small amount of overhead to kernel entry and exit
due to additional required instruction sequences.
On a DragonBoard 845c (Cortex-A75) with the powersave governor, the
overhead of similar instruction sequences was measured as 4.9ns when
simulating the common case where IA is left enabled, or 43.7ns when
simulating the uncommon case where IA is disabled. These numbers can
be seen as the worst case scenario, since in more realistic scenarios
a better performing governor would be used and a newer chip would be
used that would support PAC unlike Cortex-A75 and would be expected
to be faster than Cortex-A75.
On an Apple M1 under a hypervisor, the overhead of the entry/exit
instruction sequences introduced by this patch was measured as 0.3ns
in the case where IA is left enabled, and 33.0ns in the case where
IA is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ibc41a5e6a76b275efbaa126b31119dc197b927a5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6609065f8f40397a4124654eb68c9f490b4d477.1616123271.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Michael Kerrisk suggested that, from an API perspective, it is a bad
idea to share the PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ defines between the prctl operation
and the selector variable.
Therefore, define two new constants to be used by SUD's selector variable
and update the corresponding documentation and test cases.
While this changes the API syscall user dispatch has never been part of a
Linux release, it will show up for the first time in 5.11.
Suggested-by: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210205184321.2062251-1-krisman@collabora.com
Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS. This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition. This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.
The proposed interface looks like this:
prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])
The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector. This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.
selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.
The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.
Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support. I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism. And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.
For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant. The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access. In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com
The IRG, ADDG and SUBG instructions insert a random tag in the resulting
address. Certain tags can be excluded via the GCR_EL1.Exclude bitmap
when, for example, the user wants a certain colour for freed buffers.
Since the GCR_EL1 register is not accessible at EL0, extend the
prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) interface to include a 16-bit field in
the first argument for controlling which tags can be generated by the
above instruction (an include rather than exclude mask). Note that by
default all non-zero tags are excluded. This setting is per-thread.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
By default, even if PROT_MTE is set on a memory range, there is no tag
check fault reporting (SIGSEGV). Introduce a set of option to the
exiting prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) to allow user control of the tag
check fault mode:
PR_MTE_TCF_NONE - no reporting (default)
PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC - synchronous tag check fault reporting
PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC - asynchronous tag check fault reporting
These options translate into the corresponding SCTLR_EL1.TCF0 bitfield,
context-switched by the kernel. Note that the kernel accesses to the
user address space (e.g. read() system call) are not checked if the user
thread tag checking mode is PR_MTE_TCF_NONE or PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC. If the
tag checking mode is PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC, the kernel makes a best effort to
check its user address accesses, however it cannot always guarantee it.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
There are several storage drivers like dm-multipath, iscsi, tcmu-runner,
amd nbd that have userspace components that can run in the IO path. For
example, iscsi and nbd's userspace deamons may need to recreate a socket
and/or send IO on it, and dm-multipath's daemon multipathd may need to
send SG IO or read/write IO to figure out the state of paths and re-set
them up.
In the kernel these drivers have access to GFP_NOIO/GFP_NOFS and the
memalloc_*_save/restore functions to control the allocation behavior,
but for userspace we would end up hitting an allocation that ended up
writing data back to the same device we are trying to allocate for.
The device is then in a state of deadlock, because to execute IO the
device needs to allocate memory, but to allocate memory the memory
layers want execute IO to the device.
Here is an example with nbd using a local userspace daemon that performs
network IO to a remote server. We are using XFS on top of the nbd device,
but it can happen with any FS or other modules layered on top of the nbd
device that can write out data to free memory. Here a nbd daemon helper
thread, msgr-worker-1, is performing a write/sendmsg on a socket to execute
a request. This kicks off a reclaim operation which results in a WRITE to
the nbd device and the nbd thread calling back into the mm layer.
[ 1626.609191] msgr-worker-1 D 0 1026 1 0x00004000
[ 1626.609193] Call Trace:
[ 1626.609195] ? __schedule+0x29b/0x630
[ 1626.609197] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609198] schedule+0x30/0xb0
[ 1626.609200] schedule_timeout+0x1f6/0x2f0
[ 1626.609202] ? blk_finish_plug+0x21/0x2e
[ 1626.609204] ? _xfs_buf_ioapply+0x2e6/0x410
[ 1626.609206] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609208] wait_for_completion+0x108/0x170
[ 1626.609210] ? wake_up_q+0x70/0x70
[ 1626.609212] ? __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609214] ? xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609215] xfs_buf_iowait+0x22/0xf0
[ 1626.609218] __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609220] xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609222] xfs_reclaim_inode+0x2e8/0x310
[ 1626.609224] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x1b6/0x300
[ 1626.609227] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40
[ 1626.609228] super_cache_scan+0x152/0x1a0
[ 1626.609231] do_shrink_slab+0x12c/0x2d0
[ 1626.609233] shrink_slab+0x9c/0x2a0
[ 1626.609235] shrink_node+0xd7/0x470
[ 1626.609237] do_try_to_free_pages+0xbf/0x380
[ 1626.609240] try_to_free_pages+0xd9/0x1f0
[ 1626.609245] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x3a4/0xd30
[ 1626.609251] ? ___slab_alloc+0x238/0x560
[ 1626.609254] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x30c/0x350
[ 1626.609259] skb_page_frag_refill+0x97/0xd0
[ 1626.609274] sk_page_frag_refill+0x1d/0x80
[ 1626.609279] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2bb/0xdd0
[ 1626.609304] tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
[ 1626.609307] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60
[ 1626.609308] ___sys_sendmsg+0x29f/0x320
[ 1626.609313] ? sock_poll+0x66/0xb0
[ 1626.609318] ? ep_item_poll.isra.15+0x40/0xc0
[ 1626.609320] ? ep_send_events_proc+0xe6/0x230
[ 1626.609322] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x54/0xf0
[ 1626.609324] ? ep_read_events_proc+0xc0/0xc0
[ 1626.609326] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609327] ? ep_scan_ready_list.constprop.19+0x218/0x230
[ 1626.609329] ? __hrtimer_init+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1626.609331] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609334] ? ep_poll+0x26c/0x4a0
[ 1626.609337] ? tcp_tsq_write.part.54+0xa0/0xa0
[ 1626.609339] ? release_sock+0x43/0x90
[ 1626.609341] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609342] __sys_sendmsg+0x47/0x80
[ 1626.609347] do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1c0
[ 1626.609349] ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x75/0xa0
[ 1626.609351] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This patch adds a new prctl command that daemons can use after they have
done their initial setup, and before they start to do allocations that
are in the IO path. It sets the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and PF_LESS_THROTTLE
flags so both userspace block and FS threads can use it to avoid the
allocation recursion and try to prevent from being throttled while
writing out data to free up memory.
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Masato Suzuki <masato.suzuki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112001900.9206-1-mchristi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Pull x86 cpu-feature updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Rework the Intel model names symbols/macros, which were decades of
ad-hoc extensions and added random noise. It's now a coherent, easy
to follow nomenclature.
- Add new Intel CPU model IDs:
- "Tiger Lake" desktop and mobile models
- "Elkhart Lake" model ID
- and the "Lightning Mountain" variant of Airmont, plus support code
- Add the new AVX512_VP2INTERSECT instruction to cpufeatures
- Remove Intel MPX user-visible APIs and the self-tests, because the
toolchain (gcc) is not supporting it going forward. This is the
first, lowest-risk phase of MPX removal.
- Remove X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC
- Various smaller cleanups and fixes
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (25 commits)
x86/cpu: Update init data for new Airmont CPU model
x86/cpu: Add new Airmont variant to Intel family
x86/cpu: Add Elkhart Lake to Intel family
x86/cpu: Add Tiger Lake to Intel family
x86: Correct misc typos
x86/intel: Add common OPTDIFFs
x86/intel: Aggregate microserver naming
x86/intel: Aggregate big core graphics naming
x86/intel: Aggregate big core mobile naming
x86/intel: Aggregate big core client naming
x86/cpufeature: Explain the macro duplication
x86/ftrace: Remove mcount() declaration
x86/PCI: Remove superfluous returns from void functions
x86/msr-index: Move AMD MSRs where they belong
x86/cpu: Use constant definitions for CPU models
lib: Remove redundant ftrace flag removal
x86/crash: Remove unnecessary comparison
x86/bitops: Use __builtin_constant_p() directly instead of IS_IMMEDIATE()
x86: Remove X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC
x86/mpx: Remove MPX APIs
...
It is not desirable to relax the ABI to allow tagged user addresses into
the kernel indiscriminately. This patch introduces a prctl() interface
for enabling or disabling the tagged ABI with a global sysctl control
for preventing applications from enabling the relaxed ABI (meant for
testing user-space prctl() return error checking without reconfiguring
the kernel). The ABI properties are inherited by threads of the same
application and fork()'ed children but cleared on execve(). A Kconfig
option allows the overall disabling of the relaxed ABI.
The PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL will be expanded in the future to handle
MTE-specific settings like imprecise vs precise exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
MPX is being removed from the kernel due to a lack of support in the
toolchain going forward (gcc).
The first step is to remove the userspace-visible ABIs so that applications
will stop using it. The most visible one are the enable/disable prctl()s.
Remove them first.
This is the most minimal and least invasive change needed to ensure that
apps stop using MPX with new kernels.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190705175321.DB42F0AD@viggo.jf.intel.com
With the default SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP/SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL mode,
the TIF_SSBD bit will be inherited when a new task is fork'ed or cloned.
It will also remain when a new program is execve'ed.
Only certain class of applications (like Java) that can run on behalf of
multiple users on a single thread will require disabling speculative store
bypass for security purposes. Those applications will call prctl(2) at
startup time to disable SSB. They won't rely on the fact the SSB might have
been disabled. Other applications that don't need SSBD will just move on
without checking if SSBD has been turned on or not.
The fact that the TIF_SSBD is inherited across execve(2) boundary will
cause performance of applications that don't need SSBD but their
predecessors have SSBD on to be unwittingly impacted especially if they
write to memory a lot.
To remedy this problem, a new PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC argument for the
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option of prctl(2) is added to allow applications
to specify that the SSBD feature bit on the task structure should be
cleared whenever a new program is being execve'ed.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547676096-3281-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
In the end, we ended up with quite a lot more than I expected:
- Support for ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication in userspace (CRIU and
kernel-side support to come later)
- Support for per-thread stack canaries, pending an update to GCC that
is currently undergoing review
- Support for kexec_file_load(), which permits secure boot of a kexec
payload but also happens to improve the performance of kexec
dramatically because we can avoid the sucky purgatory code from
userspace. Kdump will come later (requires updates to libfdt).
- Optimisation of our dynamic CPU feature framework, so that all
detected features are enabled via a single stop_machine() invocation
- KPTI whitelisting of Cortex-A CPUs unaffected by Meltdown, so that
they can benefit from global TLB entries when KASLR is not in use
- 52-bit virtual addressing for userspace (kernel remains 48-bit)
- Patch in LSE atomics for per-cpu atomic operations
- Custom preempt.h implementation to avoid unconditional calls to
preempt_schedule() from preempt_enable()
- Support for the new 'SB' Speculation Barrier instruction
- Vectorised implementation of XOR checksumming and CRC32 optimisations
- Workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum #1165522
- Improved compatibility with Clang/LLD
- Support for TX2 system PMUS for profiling the L3 cache and DMC
- Reflect read-only permissions in the linear map by default
- Ensure MMIO reads are ordered with subsequent calls to Xdelay()
- Initial support for memory hotplug
- Tweak the threshold when we invalidate the TLB by-ASID, so that
mremap() performance is improved for ranges spanning multiple PMDs.
- Minor refactoring and cleanups
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 festive updates from Will Deacon:
"In the end, we ended up with quite a lot more than I expected:
- Support for ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication in userspace (CRIU and
kernel-side support to come later)
- Support for per-thread stack canaries, pending an update to GCC
that is currently undergoing review
- Support for kexec_file_load(), which permits secure boot of a kexec
payload but also happens to improve the performance of kexec
dramatically because we can avoid the sucky purgatory code from
userspace. Kdump will come later (requires updates to libfdt).
- Optimisation of our dynamic CPU feature framework, so that all
detected features are enabled via a single stop_machine()
invocation
- KPTI whitelisting of Cortex-A CPUs unaffected by Meltdown, so that
they can benefit from global TLB entries when KASLR is not in use
- 52-bit virtual addressing for userspace (kernel remains 48-bit)
- Patch in LSE atomics for per-cpu atomic operations
- Custom preempt.h implementation to avoid unconditional calls to
preempt_schedule() from preempt_enable()
- Support for the new 'SB' Speculation Barrier instruction
- Vectorised implementation of XOR checksumming and CRC32
optimisations
- Workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum #1165522
- Improved compatibility with Clang/LLD
- Support for TX2 system PMUS for profiling the L3 cache and DMC
- Reflect read-only permissions in the linear map by default
- Ensure MMIO reads are ordered with subsequent calls to Xdelay()
- Initial support for memory hotplug
- Tweak the threshold when we invalidate the TLB by-ASID, so that
mremap() performance is improved for ranges spanning multiple PMDs.
- Minor refactoring and cleanups"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (125 commits)
arm64: kaslr: print PHYS_OFFSET in dump_kernel_offset()
arm64: sysreg: Use _BITUL() when defining register bits
arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps using multi_entry_cap_matches
arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4
arm64: docs: document pointer authentication
arm64: ptr auth: Move per-thread keys from thread_info to thread_struct
arm64: enable pointer authentication
arm64: add prctl control for resetting ptrauth keys
arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace
arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace
arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication
arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests
arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags
arm64: add pointer authentication register bits
arm64: add comments about EC exception levels
arm64: perf: Treat EXCLUDE_EL* bit definitions as unsigned
arm64: kpti: Whitelist Cortex-A CPUs that don't implement the CSV3 field
arm64: enable per-task stack canaries
...
Add an arm64-specific prctl to allow a thread to reinitialize its
pointer authentication keys to random values. This can be useful when
exec() is not used for starting new processes, to ensure that different
processes still have different keys.
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.
Invocations:
Check indirect branch speculation status with
- prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
Enable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
Disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
Force disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Plenty of acronym soup here:
- Initial support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE)
- Improved handling for SError interrupts (required to handle RAS events)
- Enable GCC support for 128-bit integer types
- Remove kernel text addresses from backtraces and register dumps
- Use of WFE to implement long delay()s
- ACPI IORT updates from Lorenzo Pieralisi
- Perf PMU driver for the Statistical Profiling Extension (SPE)
- Perf PMU driver for Hisilicon's system PMUs
- Misc cleanups and non-critical fixes
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"The big highlight is support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE)
which required extensive ABI work to ensure we don't break existing
applications by blowing away their signal stack with the rather large
new vector context (<= 2 kbit per vector register). There's further
work to be done optimising things like exception return, but the ABI
is solid now.
Much of the line count comes from some new PMU drivers we have, but
they're pretty self-contained and I suspect we'll have more of them in
future.
Plenty of acronym soup here:
- initial support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE)
- improved handling for SError interrupts (required to handle RAS
events)
- enable GCC support for 128-bit integer types
- remove kernel text addresses from backtraces and register dumps
- use of WFE to implement long delay()s
- ACPI IORT updates from Lorenzo Pieralisi
- perf PMU driver for the Statistical Profiling Extension (SPE)
- perf PMU driver for Hisilicon's system PMUs
- misc cleanups and non-critical fixes"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (97 commits)
arm64: Make ARMV8_DEPRECATED depend on SYSCTL
arm64: Implement __lshrti3 library function
arm64: support __int128 on gcc 5+
arm64/sve: Add documentation
arm64/sve: Detect SVE and activate runtime support
arm64/sve: KVM: Hide SVE from CPU features exposed to guests
arm64/sve: KVM: Treat guest SVE use as undefined instruction execution
arm64/sve: KVM: Prevent guests from using SVE
arm64/sve: Add sysctl to set the default vector length for new processes
arm64/sve: Add prctl controls for userspace vector length management
arm64/sve: ptrace and ELF coredump support
arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around EFI runtime service calls
arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around kernel-mode NEON use
arm64/sve: Probe SVE capabilities and usable vector lengths
arm64: cpufeature: Move sys_caps_initialised declarations
arm64/sve: Backend logic for setting the vector length
arm64/sve: Signal handling support
arm64/sve: Support vector length resetting for new processes
arm64/sve: Core task context handling
arm64/sve: Low-level CPU setup
...
This patch adds two arm64-specific prctls, to permit userspace to
control its vector length:
* PR_SVE_SET_VL: set the thread's SVE vector length and vector
length inheritance mode.
* PR_SVE_GET_VL: get the same information.
Although these prctls resemble instruction set features in the SVE
architecture, they provide additional control: the vector length
inheritance mode is Linux-specific and nothing to do with the
architecture, and the architecture does not permit EL0 to set its
own vector length directly. Both can be used in portable tools
without requiring the use of SVE instructions.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[will: Fixed up prctl constants to avoid clash with PDEATHSIG]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
This patch implements the core logic for changing a task's vector
length on request from userspace. This will be used by the ptrace
and prctl frontends that are implemented in later patches.
The SVE architecture permits, but does not require, implementations
to support vector lengths that are not a power of two. To handle
this, logic is added to check a requested vector length against a
possibly sparse bitmap of available vector lengths at runtime, so
that the best supported value can be chosen.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.
Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Userland code may be built using an ABI which permits linking to objects
that have more restrictive floating point requirements. For example,
userland code may be built to target the O32 FPXX ABI. Such code may be
linked with other FPXX code, or code built for either one of the more
restrictive FP32 or FP64. When linking with more restrictive code, the
overall requirement of the process becomes that of the more restrictive
code. The kernel has no way to know in advance which mode the process
will need to be executed in, and indeed it may need to change during
execution. The dynamic loader is the only code which will know the
overall required mode, and so it needs to have a means to instruct the
kernel to switch the FP mode of the process.
This patch introduces 2 new options to the prctl syscall which provide
such a capability. The FP mode of the process is represented as a
simple bitmask combining a number of mode bits mirroring those present
in the hardware. Userland can either retrieve the current FP mode of
the process:
mode = prctl(PR_GET_FP_MODE);
or modify the current FP mode of the process:
err = prctl(PR_SET_FP_MODE, new_mode);
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Matthew Fortune <matthew.fortune@imgtec.com>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8899/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to
review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here
and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a
relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below).
Long Description:
This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the
management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel
allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables")
and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications
do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect
some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel
support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application
needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an
explicit signal from userspace.
PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to
require kernel's help in managing bounds tables.
PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't
want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel
won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX.
PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds
directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into
a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can
use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in
kernel is enabled.
Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves,
which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce
the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time.
Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time
because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS.
==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ====
MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information.
If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to
spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this
which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers
and some new "bounds tables".
They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by
the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables
are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for
not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes
address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced
earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory
over to it.
The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to
memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall)
to access the tables would obviously destroy performance.
==== Why not do this in userspace? ====
This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel.
However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel.
It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are
a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are
practical in the real-world, but here they are.
Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so
that we never have to allocate them?
A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual
area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds
directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of
user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB,
which is larger than the entire virtual address space today.
This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a
single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB
of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.
Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory
is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually
need bounds tables?
A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every
memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small,
constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger
scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the
parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The
kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls.
Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables
allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async
handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still
requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the
allocation state there.
Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
the kernel.
Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add VM_INIT_DEF_MASK, to allow us to set the default flags for VMs. It
also adds a prctl control which allows us to set the THP disable bit in
mm->def_flags so that VMs will pick up the setting as they are created.
Signed-off-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Mark Brown
Colin Cross
Linus Torvalds
Peter Collingbourne
Eugene Syromiatnikov
Balbir Singh
Chris Hyser
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
Catalin Marinas
Mike Christie
Dave Hansen
Waiman Long
Kristina Martsenko
Thomas Gleixner
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Dave Martin
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Andy Lutomirski
Paul Burton
Cyrill Gorcunov
Alex Thorlton
David Howells