This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.
Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.
This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.
If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.
Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.
Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.
sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.
Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.
This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.
Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64. Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.
Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.
This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.
A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.
Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.
This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.
Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt
Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit
Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it
Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon write
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This change has two goals:
- delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
it will be really effective
- ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.
Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these,
and the third showed up by inspection. Making the
symbols static is proper.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.
This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add support for setting smack mount labels(using smackfsdef, smackfsroot,
smackfshat, smackfsfloor, smackfstransmute) for filesystems with binary
mount data like NFS.
To achieve this, implement sb_parse_opts_str and sb_set_mnt_opts security
operations in smack LSM similar to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch makes the following functions to use ERR_PTR() and related
macros to pass the appropriate error code through returned pointers:
smk_parse_smack()
smk_import_entry()
smk_fetch()
It also makes all the other functions that use them to handle the
error cases properly. This ways correct error codes from places
where they happened can be propagated to the user space if necessary.
Doing this it fixes a bug in onlycap and unconfined files
handling. Previously their content was cleared on any error from
smk_import_entry/smk_parse_smack, be it EINVAL (as originally intended)
or ENOMEM. Right now it only reacts on EINVAL passing other codes
properly to userspace.
Comments have been updated accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
The dmabuf fd can be shared between processes via unix domain
socket. The file of dmabuf fd is came from anon_inode. The inode
has no set and get xattr operations, so it can not be shared
between processes with smack. This patch fixes just to ignore
private inode including anon_inode for smack_file_receive.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.
Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights for this window:
- improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley
- addition of an unconfined label to Smack
- Smack documentation update
- TPM driver updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
selinux: increase avtab max buckets
selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
...
I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack
for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse
and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release.
I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a
general "permissive mode". So don't ask again.
Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns,
and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better
off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the
abuse potential.
Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows
for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one
label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for
debugging, but that's about it.
A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially.
If either the subject or object label of an access check
matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not
have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console
message are generated. The audit record "request" string is
marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the
request was granted because of an unconfined label. The
fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is
remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure"
object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in
the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of
using an unconfined label may still cause concern after
a reboot.
So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application
developers seem incapable of living without it I have
given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but
in the end it's still a chain saw.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM
side part of the system call keyctl with the action
code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY.
It is now possible to get the context of, for example,
the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s".
The original patch has been modified for merge.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These
sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in
label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The
result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing
smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label
is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are
omitted.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis <m.lis@samsung.com>
Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in Smack to get rid of
direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in
smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode().
task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack.
task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's
credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point
to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock.
Mainly task_security() used this way:
smk_of_task(task_security(p))
Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which
takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct
and do this under RCU read lock.
Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it.
KASan's report for this:
AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr c4635600
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc
new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8
smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c
security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c
prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110
smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150
security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54
proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370
SyS_write+0x5c/0x94
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564
kfree+0x270/0x290
smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0
security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c
put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc
rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998
__do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc
do_softirq+0x94/0xf4
irq_exit+0xbc/0x120
handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134
gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac
__irq_svc+0x44/0x78
_raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48
sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8
sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc
vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0
vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c
INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080
INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null)
Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb ....
Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1
Backtrace:
[<c00233a4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [<c0023dec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140
[<c0023dcc>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<c06d6d7c>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[<c06d6d5c>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<c01c1d50>] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144)
[<c01c1c2c>] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [<c01c1e88>] (object_err+0x3c/0x44)
r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600
[<c01c1e4c>] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [<c01cac18>] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538)
r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7
[<c01ca960>] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [<c01c9430>] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8)
[<c01c935c>] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [<c031e168>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70)
r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000
[<c031e118>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [<c031af64>] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44)
r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780
[<c031af28>] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [<c023d614>] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178)
r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124
[<c023d4f0>] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [<c01db98c>] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4)
r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148
[<c01db630>] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [<c01deec8>] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108)
[<c01ded08>] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [<c01dff04>] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648)
[<c01dfe10>] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [<c01e1458>] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88)
[<c01e141c>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [<c01ccb28>] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198)
r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000
[<c01cca38>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [<c01ccc00>] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34)
[<c01ccbd0>] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [<c001db80>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Read of size 4 by thread T834:
Memory state around the buggy address:
c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
During UDS connection check, both sides are checked for write access to
the other side. But only the first check is performed with audit support.
The second one didn't produce any audit logs. This simple patch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Smack uses CIPSO to label internet packets and thus provide
for access control on delivery of packets. The netfilter facility
was not used to allow for Smack to work properly without netfilter
configuration. Smack does not need netfilter, however there are
cases where it would be handy.
As a side effect, the labeling of local IPv4 packets can be optimized
and the handling of local IPv6 packets is just all out better.
The best part is that the netfilter tools use "contexts" that
are just strings, and they work just as well for Smack as they
do for SELinux.
All of the conditional compilation for IPv6 was implemented
by Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This is one of those cases where you look at code you did
years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking.
There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers,
and most of them really want the security data from the inode.
Some, however, really want the security context that the process
had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in
Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real
testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss.
This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several
of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as
the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and
the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for
different reasons.
Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The 54e70ec5eb commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo subject's OUT label is checked with
object's OUT. Should be OUT to IN.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Files created with __shmem_file_stup() appear to have somewhat fake
dentries which make them look like root directories and not get
the label the current process or ("*") star meant for tmpfs files.
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@samsung.com>
In principle if this function was called with "value" == NULL and "len"
not NULL it could return different results for the "len" compared to a
case where "name" was not NULL. This is a hypothetical case that does
not exist in the kernel, but it's a logic bug nonetheless.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
The patch use kmem_cache to allocate/free inode_smack since they are
alloced in high volumes making it a perfect case for kmem_cache.
As per analysis, 24 bytes of memory is wasted per allocation due
to internal fragmentation. With kmem_cache, this can be avoided.
Accounting of memory allocation is below :
total slack net count-alloc/free caller
Before (with kzalloc)
1919872 719952 1919872 29998/0 new_inode_smack+0x14
After (with kmem_cache)
1201680 0 1201680 30042/0 new_inode_smack+0x18
>From above data, we found that 719952 bytes(~700 KB) of memory is
saved on allocation of 29998 smack inodes.
Signed-off-by: Rohit <rohit.kr@samsung.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris.
Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
integrity: do zero padding of the key id
KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys
KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid
KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching
KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys
X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description
KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
selinux: normalize audit log formatting
selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID
ima: detect violations for mmaped files
ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement
ima: added ima_policy_flag variable
ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate()
ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option
ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init()
PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs
PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys
KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling
...
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Smack used to use a mix of smack_known struct and char* throughout its
APIs and implementation. This patch unifies the behaviour and makes it
store and operate exclusively on smack_known struct pointers when managing
labels.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_access.c
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
The 54e70ec5eb commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo the second check was incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
People keep asking me for permissive mode, and I keep saying "no".
Permissive mode is wrong for more reasons than I can enumerate,
but the compelling one is that it's once on, never off.
Nonetheless, there is an argument to be made for running a
process with lots of permissions, logging which are required,
and then locking the process down. There wasn't a way to do
that with Smack, but this provides it.
The notion is that you start out by giving the process an
appropriate Smack label, such as "ATBirds". You create rules
with a wide range of access and the "b" mode. On Tizen it
might be:
ATBirds System rwxalb
ATBirds User rwxalb
ATBirds _ rwxalb
User ATBirds wb
System ATBirds wb
Accesses that fail will generate audit records. Accesses
that succeed because of rules marked with a "b" generate
log messages identifying the rule, the program and as much
object information as is convenient.
When the system is properly configured and the programs
brought in line with the labeling scheme the "b" mode can
be removed from the rules. When the system is ready for
production the facility can be configured out.
This provides the developer the convenience of permissive
mode without creating a system that looks like it is
enforcing a policy while it is not.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
While opening with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE file label is not set.
Other calls may access it after CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is dropped from process.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Niesluchowski <m.niesluchow@samsung.com>
Values of extended attributes are stored as binary blobs. NULL-termination
of them isn't required. It just wastes disk space and confuses command-line
tools like getfattr because they have to print that zero byte at the end.
This patch removes terminating zero byte from initial security label in
smack_inode_init_security and cuts it out in function smack_inode_getsecurity
which is used by syscall getxattr. This change seems completely safe, because
function smk_parse_smack ignores everything after first zero byte.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them.
This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels:
# attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file
And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp:
# python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog
The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack()
which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero
it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this
function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Security operation ->inode_listsecurity is used for generating list of
available extended attributes for syscall listxattr. Currently it's used
only in nfs4 or if filesystem doesn't provide i_op->listxattr.
The list is the set of NULL-terminated names, one after the other.
This method must include zero byte at the and into result.
Also this function must return length even if string does not fit into
output buffer or it is NULL, see similar method in selinux and man listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data
structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel
code and anyone who uses NetLabel. This patch renames the catmap
functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*"
which improves things greatly.
There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to
properly use extented attributes. This patch makes
files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by
a system running Smack and systemd.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack believes that many of the operatons that can
be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations.
The fstat and lseek system calls are examples.
An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open
if the task doesn't have read access even if it has
write access and the file is being opened write only.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack IPC policy requires that the sender have write access
to the receiver. UDS streams don't do per-packet checks. The
only check is done at connect time. The existing code checks
if the connecting process can write to the other, but not the
other way around. This change adds a check that the other end
can write to the connecting process.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schuafler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Sam Henderson points out that removing the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
attribute from a directory does not result in the directory
transmuting. This is because the inode flag indicating that
the directory is transmuting isn't cleared. The fix is a tad
less than trivial because smk_task and smk_mmap should have
been broken out, too.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The function `smack_inode_post_setxattr` is called each
time that a setxattr is done, for any value of name.
The kernel allow to put value==NULL when size==0
to set an empty attribute value. The systematic
call to smk_import_entry was causing the dereference
of a NULL pointer hence a KERNEL PANIC!
The problem can be produced easily by issuing the
command `setfattr -n user.data file` under bash prompt
when SMACK is active.
Moving the call to smk_import_entry as proposed by this
patch is correcting the behaviour because the function
smack_inode_post_setxattr is called for the SMACK's
attributes only if the function smack_inode_setxattr validated
the value and its size (what will not be the case when size==0).
It also has a benefical effect to not fill the smack hash
with garbage values coming from any extended attribute
write.
Change-Id: Iaf0039c2be9bccb6cee11c24a3b44d209101fe47
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
1. In order to remove any SMACK extended attribute from a file, a user
should have CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. But user without having this
capability is able to remove SMACK64MMAP security attribute.
2. While validating size and value of smack extended attribute in
smack_inode_setsecurity hook, wrong error code is returned.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <pamkaj.k2@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
This allows to limit ptrace beyond the regular smack access rules.
It adds a smackfs/ptrace interface that allows smack to be configured
to require equal smack labels for PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH access.
See the changes in Documentation/security/Smack.txt below for details.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following
functions:
smack_ptrace_traceme()
smack_ptrace_access_check()
smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced)
This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that
checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check().
This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the
TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process.
Additional bugs fixed:
- The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly
translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1.
PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE.
- Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds().
- Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info
in case this flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The order of subject/object is currently reversed in
smack_ptrace_traceme(). It is currently checked if the tracee has a
capability to trace tracer and according to this rule a decision is made
whether the tracer will be allowed to trace tracee.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
For any keyring access type SMACK always used MAY_READWRITE access check.
It prevents reading the key with label "_", which should be allowed for anyone.
This patch changes default access check to MAY_READ and use MAY_READWRITE in only
appropriate cases.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.
Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.
(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Pull audit update from Eric Paris:
"Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system.
Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were
inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an
int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places).
We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called
the audit system. We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go
round, but it wasn't ready.
I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday. I should have internet
access, but it'll be spotty. If anything goes wrong please be sure to
cc rgb@redhat.com. He'll make fixing things his top priority"
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits)
audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt
audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops
audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace
audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions
audit: Convert int limit uses to u32
audit: Use more current logging style
audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper
audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments
audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once
audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET
audit: use define's for audit version
audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter
audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability
audit: update MAINTAINERS
audit: log task info on feature change
audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock
audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket
audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output
audit: log on errors from filter user rules
...
Remove the call to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with
the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling
audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more
complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Eric Paris politely points out:
Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK. And then use
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().
Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense. (and depending
on how it's used fix a crash...)
He is correct. This puts things in order.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
to be fully implemented and has never been used.
The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
then, they get removed.
The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
get the label of their creator.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The syslog control requires that the calling proccess
have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any
processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label.
This changes allows the admin to configure a specific
label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*")
label, effectively removing the restriction. The value
can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants
a more restrictive behavior.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels
because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly.
All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that
there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That
is repaired.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
When the ptrace security hooks were split the addition of
a mode parameter was not taken advantage of in the Smack
ptrace access check. This changes the access check from
always looking for read and write access to using the
passed mode. This will make use of /proc much happier.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Linux file locking does not follow the same rules
as other mechanisms. Even though it is a write operation
a process can set a read lock on files which it has open
only for read access. Two programs with read access to
a file can use read locks to communicate.
This is not acceptable in a Mandatory Access Control
environment. Smack treats setting a read lock as the
write operation that it is. Unfortunately, many programs
assume that setting a read lock is a read operation.
These programs are unhappy in the Smack environment.
This patch introduces a new access mode (lock) to address
this problem. A process with lock access to a file can
set a read lock. A process with write access to a file can
set a read lock or a write lock. This prevents a situation
where processes are granted write access just so they can
set read locks.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Nothing major for this kernel, just maintenance updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits)
apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policy
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module
apparmor: add the profile introspection file to interface
apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profiles
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces
apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state
apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c
apparmor: rework namespace free path
apparmor: update how unconfined is handled
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once
apparmor: add a features/policy dir to interface
apparmor: enable users to query whether apparmor is enabled
apparmor: remove minimum size check for vmalloc()
Smack: parse multiple rules per write to load2, up to PAGE_SIZE-1 bytes
Smack: network label match fix
security: smack: add a hash table to quicken smk_find_entry()
security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list()
xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".
...
The original implementation of the Smack IPv6 port based
local controls works most of the time using a sockaddr as
a temporary variable, but not always as it overflows in
some circumstances. The correct data is a sockaddr_in6.
A struct sockaddr isn't as large as a struct sockaddr_in6.
There would need to be casting one way or the other. This
patch gets it the right way.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The Smack code that matches incoming CIPSO tags with Smack labels
reaches through the NetLabel interfaces and compares the network
data with the CIPSO header associated with a Smack label. This was
done in a ill advised attempt to optimize performance. It works
so long as the categories fit in a single capset, but this isn't
always the case.
This patch changes the Smack code to use the appropriate NetLabel
interfaces to compare the incoming CIPSO header with the CIPSO
header associated with a label. It will always match the CIPSO
headers correctly.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Accepted for the smack-next tree after changing the number of
slots from 128 to 16.
This patch adds a hash table to quicken searching of a smack label by its name.
Basically, the patch improves performance of SMACK initialization. Parsing of
rules involves translation from a string to a smack_known (aka label) entity
which is done in smk_find_entry().
The current implementation of the function iterates over a global list of
smack_known resulting in O(N) complexity for smk_find_entry(). The total
complexity of SMACK initialization becomes O(rules * labels). Therefore it
scales quadratically with a complexity of a system.
Applying the patch reduced the complexity of smk_find_entry() to O(1) as long
as number of label is in hundreds. If the number of labels is increased please
update SMACK_HASH_SLOTS constant defined in security/smack/smack.h. Introducing
the configuration of this constant with Kconfig or cmdline might be a good
idea.
The size of the hash table was adjusted experimentally. The rule set used by
TIZEN contains circa 17K rules for 500 labels. The table above contains
results of SMACK initialization using 'time smackctl apply' bash command.
The 'Ref' is a kernel without this patch applied. The consecutive values
refers to value of SMACK_HASH_SLOTS. Every measurement was repeated three
times to reduce noise.
| Ref | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 16 | 32 | 64 | 128 | 256 | 512
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Run1 | 1.156 | 1.096 | 0.883 | 0.764 | 0.692 | 0.667 | 0.649 | 0.633 | 0.634 | 0.629 | 0.620
Run2 | 1.156 | 1.111 | 0.885 | 0.764 | 0.694 | 0.661 | 0.649 | 0.651 | 0.634 | 0.638 | 0.623
Run3 | 1.160 | 1.107 | 0.886 | 0.764 | 0.694 | 0.671 | 0.661 | 0.638 | 0.631 | 0.624 | 0.638
AVG | 1.157 | 1.105 | 0.885 | 0.764 | 0.693 | 0.666 | 0.653 | 0.641 | 0.633 | 0.630 | 0.627
Surprisingly, a single hlist is slightly faster than a double-linked list.
The speed-up saturates near 64 slots. Therefore I chose value 128 to provide
some margin if more labels were used.
It looks that IO becomes a new bottleneck.
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Stanislawski <t.stanislaws@samsung.com>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Feature highlights include:
- Add basic client support for NFSv4.2
- Add basic client support for Labeled NFS (selinux for NFSv4.2)
- Fix the use of credentials in NFSv4.1 stateful operations, and
add support for NFSv4.1 state protection.
Bugfix highlights:
- Fix another NFSv4 open state recovery race
- Fix an NFSv4.1 back channel session regression
- Various rpc_pipefs races
- Fix another issue with NFSv3 auth negotiation
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.11-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
"Feature highlights include:
- Add basic client support for NFSv4.2
- Add basic client support for Labeled NFS (selinux for NFSv4.2)
- Fix the use of credentials in NFSv4.1 stateful operations, and add
support for NFSv4.1 state protection.
Bugfix highlights:
- Fix another NFSv4 open state recovery race
- Fix an NFSv4.1 back channel session regression
- Various rpc_pipefs races
- Fix another issue with NFSv3 auth negotiation
Please note that Labeled NFS does require some additional support from
the security subsystem. The relevant changesets have all been
reviewed and acked by James Morris."
* tag 'nfs-for-3.11-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (54 commits)
NFS: Set NFS_CS_MIGRATION for NFSv4 mounts
NFSv4.1 Refactor nfs4_init_session and nfs4_init_channel_attrs
nfs: have NFSv3 try server-specified auth flavors in turn
nfs: have nfs_mount fake up a auth_flavs list when the server didn't provide it
nfs: move server_authlist into nfs_try_mount_request
nfs: refactor "need_mount" code out of nfs_try_mount
SUNRPC: PipeFS MOUNT notification optimization for dying clients
SUNRPC: split client creation routine into setup and registration
SUNRPC: fix races on PipeFS UMOUNT notifications
SUNRPC: fix races on PipeFS MOUNT notifications
NFSv4.1 use pnfs_device maxcount for the objectlayout gdia_maxcount
NFSv4.1 use pnfs_device maxcount for the blocklayout gdia_maxcount
NFSv4.1 Fix gdia_maxcount calculation to fit in ca_maxresponsesize
NFS: Improve legacy idmapping fallback
NFSv4.1 end back channel session draining
NFS: Apply v4.1 capabilities to v4.2
NFSv4.1: Clean up layout segment comparison helper names
NFSv4.1: layout segment comparison helpers should take 'const' parameters
NFSv4: Move the DNS resolver into the NFSv4 module
rpc_pipefs: only set rpc_dentry_ops if d_op isn't already set
...
The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows
us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Suppliment the smkfsroot mount option with another, smkfstransmute,
that does the same thing but also marks the root inode as
transmutting. This allows a freshly created filesystem to
be mounted with a transmutting heirarchy.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Each Smack label that the kernel has seen is added to a
list of labels. The list of access rules for a given subject
label hangs off of the label list entry for the label.
This patch changes the structures that contain subject
labels to point at the label list entry rather that the
label itself. Doing so removes a label list lookup in
smk_access() that was accounting for the largest single
chunk of Smack overhead.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack does not provide access controls on IPv6 communications.
This patch introduces a mechanism for maintaining Smack lables
for local IPv6 communications. It is based on labeling local ports.
The behavior should be compatible with any future "real" IPv6
support as it provides no interfaces for users to manipulate
the labeling. Remote IPv6 connections use the ambient label
the same way that unlabeled IPv4 packets are treated.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type
in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir().
When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging
is not zero) and you try to delete the file which
1) you cannot delete due to SMACK rules and logging of failures is on
or
2) you can delete and logging of success is on,
you will see following:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002d7
[<...>] (strlen+0x0/0x28)
[<...>] (audit_log_untrustedstring+0x14/0x28)
[<...>] (common_lsm_audit+0x108/0x6ac)
[<...>] (smack_log+0xc4/0xe4)
[<...>] (smk_curacc+0x80/0x10c)
[<...>] (smack_inode_unlink+0x74/0x80)
[<...>] (security_inode_unlink+0x2c/0x30)
[<...>] (vfs_unlink+0x7c/0x100)
[<...>] (do_unlinkat+0x144/0x16c)
The function smack_inode_unlink() (and smack_inode_rmdir()) need
to log two structures of different types. First of all it does:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
This will set common audit data type to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
and store dentry for auditing (by function smk_curacc(), which in turn calls
dump_common_audit_data(), which is actually uses provided data and logs it).
/*
* You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
*/
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0) {
/*
* You also need write access to the containing directory
*/
Then this function wants to log anoter data:
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
The function sets inode field, but don't change common_audit_data type.
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
So the dump_common_audit() function incorrectly interprets inode structure
as dentry, and Oops will happen.
This patch reinitializes common_audit_data structures with correct type.
Also I removed unneeded
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
initialization, because both dentry and inode pointers are stored
in the same union.
Signed-off-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
The data structure allocations being done in prepare_creds
are duplicated in smack_setprocattr. This results in the
structure allocated in prepare_creds being orphaned and
never freed. The duplicate code is removed from
smack_setprocattr.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 12/20/2011 11:20 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Allow SIGCHLD to be passed to child process without
> explicit policy. This will help to keep the access
> control policy simple and easily maintainable with
> complex applications that require use of multiple
> security contexts. It will also help to keep them
> as isolated as possible.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
I have a slightly different version that applies to the
current smack-next tree.
Allow SIGCHLD to be passed to child process without
explicit policy. This will help to keep the access
control policy simple and easily maintainable with
complex applications that require use of multiple
security contexts. It will also help to keep them
as isolated as possible.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 37 ++++++++-----------------------------
1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.
This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In January of 2012 Al Viro pointed out three bits of code that
he titled "new_inode_smack bogosities". This patch repairs these
errors.
1. smack_sb_kern_mount() included a NULL check that is impossible.
The check and NULL case are removed.
2. smack_kb_kern_mount() included pointless locking. The locking is
removed. Since this is the only place that lock was used the lock
is removed from the superblock_smack structure.
3. smk_fill_super() incorrectly and unnecessarily set the Smack label
for the smackfs root inode. The assignment has been removed.
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like
softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats
are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.
The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.
The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.
The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.
Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.
The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
access "Subject Object rwxat"
access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
load "Subject Object rwxat"
load2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
load-self "Subject Object rwxat"
load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Dave Chinner wrote:
> Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except
> for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the
> filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the
> only really safe way to allocate memory here.
I see. Thank you.
I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network
filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that
involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem?
----------
[PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage.
new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs
to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for
security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and
inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS.
smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like
selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g.
btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is
using GFP_NOFS.
smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for
security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and
audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock
held.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that
the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases.
It seems the users of this facility would expect that the
transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that
are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem
to add any additional complexity to the understanding of
how the system works.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support.
Move the initialization of predefined Smack label
list entries to the LSM initialization from the
smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs
acquired xattr support, but was never correct.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y.
This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af68a
("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union").
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On some build configurations PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID symbol was not
found when compiling smack_lsm.c. This patch fixes the issue by
explicitly doing #include <linux/personality.h>.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.j.sakkinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.
This patch takes advantage of the recent changes for performance
and points the packet labels on UDS connect at the output label of
the far side. This makes getsockopt(...SO_PEERCRED...) function
properly. Without this change the getsockopt does not provide any
information.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
There are a number of comments in the Smack code that
are either malformed or include code. This patch cleans
them up.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Al Viro pointed out that the processing of fcntl done
by Smack appeared poorly designed. He was right. There
are three things that required change. Most obviously,
the list of commands that really imply writing is limited
to those involving file locking and signal handling.
The initialization if the file security blob was
incomplete, requiring use of a heretofore unused LSM hook.
Finally, the audit information coming from a helper
masked the identity of the LSM hook. This patch corrects
all three of these defects.
This is targeted for the smack-next tree pending comments.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.
Smack access checks suffer from two significant performance
issues. In cases where there are large numbers of rules the
search of the single list of rules is wasteful. Comparing the
string values of the smack labels is less efficient than a
numeric comparison would.
These changes take advantage of the Smack label list, which
maintains the mapping of Smack labels to secids and optional
CIPSO labels. Because the labels are kept perpetually, an
access check can be done strictly based on the address of the
label in the list without ever looking at the label itself.
Rather than keeping one global list of rules the rules with
a particular subject label can be based off of that label
list entry. The access check need never look at entries that
do not use the current subject label.
This requires that packets coming off the network with
CIPSO direct Smack labels that have never been seen before
be treated carefully. The only case where they could be
delivered is where the receiving socket has an IPIN star
label, so that case is explicitly addressed.
On a system with 39,800 rules (200 labels in all permutations)
a system with this patch runs an access speed test in 5% of
the time of the old version. That should be a best case
improvement. If all of the rules are associated with the
same subject label and all of the accesses are for processes
with that label (unlikely) the improvement is about 30%.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the
dentry.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
interaction between the global and local rule lists.
Instead of going through one and then the other, which
missed the important case where a rule specified that
there should be no access, combine the access limitations
where there is a rule in each list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In the embedded world there are often situations
where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
security characteristics. These differences
might include privilege required for a given library
provided interface to function properly, as occurs
from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
also cases where it is important to limit use of
libraries based on the provider of the library and
the security aware application may make choices
based on that criteria.
These issues are addressed by providing an additional
Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
if there is no such attribute.
If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
only if a subject with that label has all of the access
permitted a subject with the current task label.
Security aware applications may from time to time
wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
of privilege. One case where this arises is the
environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
to perform the same functions. An application may know
that it should eschew services made available from a
particular vendor, or of a particular version.
In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
been added that is local to the task. This list is
consulted only in the case where the global list has
approved access. It can only further restrict access.
Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
local list access is granted. An application can add
entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.
The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
the list handling to accomodate there being more
than one rule list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.
However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().
Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.
This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.
A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.
Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.
Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.
Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
SMACK64EXEC
This patch addresses a number of long standing issues
with the way Smack treats UNIX domain sockets.
All access control was being done based on the label of
the file system object. This is inconsistant with the
internet domain, in which access is done based on the
IPIN and IPOUT attributes of the socket. As a result
of the inode label policy it was not possible to use
a UDS socket for label cognizant services, including
dbus and the X11 server.
Support for SCM_PEERSEC on UDS sockets is also provided.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.
This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting
correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In
order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags
they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't
need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or
any LSM.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch removes some unneeded code for if opt_dentry is null because
that can never happen.
The function dereferences "opt_dentry" earlier when it checks
"if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {". That code was added in
2008.
This function called from security_d_instantiate(). I checked all the
places which call security_d_instantiate() and dentry is always non-null.
I also checked the selinux version of this hook and there is a comment
which says that dentry should be non-null if called from
d_instantiate().
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is an unused hook in SMACK so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (52 commits)
init: Open /dev/console from rootfs
mqueue: fix typo "failues" -> "failures"
mqueue: only set error codes if they are really necessary
mqueue: simplify do_open() error handling
mqueue: apply mathematics distributivity on mq_bytes calculation
mqueue: remove unneeded info->messages initialization
mqueue: fix mq_open() file descriptor leak on user-space processes
fix race in d_splice_alias()
set S_DEAD on unlink() and non-directory rename() victims
vfs: add NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2)
get rid of ->mnt_parent in tomoyo/realpath
hppfs can use existing proc_mnt, no need for do_kern_mount() in there
Mirror MS_KERNMOUNT in ->mnt_flags
get rid of useless vfsmount_lock use in put_mnt_ns()
Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.h
get rid of insanity with namespace roots in tomoyo
take check for new events in namespace (guts of mounts_poll()) to namespace.c
Don't mess with generic_permission() under ->d_lock in hpfs
sanitize const/signedness for udf
nilfs: sanitize const/signedness in dealing with ->d_name.name
...
Fix up fairly trivial (famous last words...) conflicts in
drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c and security/tomoyo/realpath.c
(mnt,mnt_mountpoint) pair is conceptually wrong; if you want
to use it for generating pathname and for nothing else *and*
if you know that vfsmount tree is unchanging, you can get
away with that, but the right solution for that is (mnt,mnt_root).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Move various magic-number definitions into magic.h.
Signed-off-by: Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink
inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the
previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for
the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the
sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the
iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event
that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only
stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved
into one dynamically allocated field.
This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI
configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs
required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd
access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained
labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled
appropriately.
[sds: Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.]
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get
all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is
used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context
derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the
LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are
for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security
on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's
explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.
Quote Stephen Smalley
inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the
fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes
this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
operation.
inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security
context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context
managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS
client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its
incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the
server returned the file's attributes to the client.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Elsewhere the sin_family field holds a value with a name of the form
AF_..., so it seems reasonable to do so here as well. Also the values of
PF_INET and AF_INET are the same.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
struct sockaddr_in sip;
@@
(
sip.sin_family ==
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
|
sip.sin_family !=
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
|
sip.sin_family =
- PF_INET
+ AF_INET
)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.
Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.
[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We don't need to explicitly initialize to cap_* because
it will be filled by security_fixup_ops().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity
from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user)
to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).
Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions.
This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does.
As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \
It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch :
0: no logging
1: log denied (default)
2: log accepted
3: log denied&accepted
Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds a new special option '-CIPSO' to the Smack subsystem. When used
in the netlabel list, it means "use CIPSO networking". A use case is when your
local network speaks CIPSO and you want also to connect to the unlabeled
Internet. This patch also add some documentation describing that. The patch
also corrects an oops when setting a '' SMACK64 xattr to a file.
Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch cleans up a lot of the Smack network access control code. The
largest changes are to fix the labeling of incoming TCP connections in a
manner similar to the recent SELinux changes which use the
security_inet_conn_request() hook to label the request_sock and let the label
move to the child socket via the normal network stack mechanisms. In addition
to the incoming TCP connection fixes this patch also removes the smk_labled
field from the socket_smack struct as the minor optimization advantage was
outweighed by the difficulty in maintaining it's proper state.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but
only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of
standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality
imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets
created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire
labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based
on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options
were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in
relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child
sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire
label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP
options of the remote peer.
This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook
locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming
connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the
correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant
is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks
which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get
ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies
the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I
also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been
fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
the following patch (on top of 2.6.29) converts Smack lists to standard linux lists
Please review and consider for inclusion in 2.6.30-rc
regards,
Etienne
Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The following patch (against 2.6.29rc5) fixes a few issues in the
smack/netlabel "unlabeled host support" functionnality that was added in
2.6.29rc. It should go in before -final.
1) smack_host_label disregard a "0.0.0.0/0 @" rule (or other label),
preventing 'tagged' tasks to access Internet (many systems drop packets with
IP options)
2) netmasks were not handled correctly, they were stored in a way _not
equivalent_ to conversion to be32 (it was equivalent for /0, /8, /16, /24,
/32 masks but not other masks)
3) smack_netlbladdr prefixes (IP/mask) were not consistent (mask&IP was not
done), so there could have been different list entries for the same IP
prefix; if those entries had different labels, well ...
4) they were not sorted
1) 2) 3) are bugs, 4) is a more cosmetic issue.
The patch :
-creates a new helper smk_netlbladdr_insert to insert a smk_netlbladdr,
-sorted by netmask length
-use the new sorted nature of smack_netlbladdrs list to simplify
smack_host_label : the first match _will_ be the more specific
-corrects endianness issues in smk_write_netlbladdr & netlbladdr_seq_show
Signed-off-by: <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:
commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.
There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.
Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.
One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.
The affected capability check is in generic_permission():
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and
SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current
process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op -
task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds.
strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the
task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since
two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.
This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:
/*
* t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
*
* Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
* Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"
static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
perror(msg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */
static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, perm, uid, gid;
char *testpath;
char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];
testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;
unlink(testpath);
fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
if (fd == -1) errExit("open");
if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
close(fd);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
system(cmd);
if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");
accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */
This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem. If successful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
If unsuccessful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Don't store the field->op in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g.
audit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full
validation of userland-submitted value while we are at it.
->audit_init_rule() and ->audit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree
instances updated.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks.
Relies heavily on Paul Moore's netlabel support.
Creates a new entry in /smack called netlabel. Writes to /smack/netlabel
take the form:
A.B.C.D LABEL
or
A.B.C.D/N LABEL
where A.B.C.D is a network address, N is an integer between 0-32,
and LABEL is the Smack label to be used. If /N is omitted /32 is
assumed. N designates the netmask for the address. Entries are
matched by the most specific address/mask pair. 0.0.0.0/0 will
match everything, while 192.168.1.117/32 will match exactly one
host.
A new system label "@", pronounced "web", is defined. Processes
can not be assigned the web label. An address assigned the web
label can be written to by any process, and packets coming from
a web address can be written to any socket. Use of the web label
is a violation of any strict MAC policy, but the web label has
been requested many times.
The nltype entry has been removed from /smack. It did not work right
and the netlabel interface can be used to specify that all hosts
be treated as unlabeled.
CIPSO labels on incoming packets will be honored, even from designated
single label hosts. Single label hosts can only be written to by
processes with labels that can write to the label of the host.
Packets sent to single label hosts will always be unlabeled.
Once added a single label designation cannot be removed, however
the label may be changed.
The behavior of the ambient label remains unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules
can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.
This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.
This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
(*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
(*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
a task creates.
The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:
(1) prepare_kernel_cred()
Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared.
(2) set_security_override()
Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.
(3) set_security_override_from_ctx()
As (2), but takes the security context as a string.
(4) set_create_files_as()
Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
same as that on a particular inode.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Smack needs to call netlbl_skbuff_err() to let NetLabel do the necessary
protocol specific error handling.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.
__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.
This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.
(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.
In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().
Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().
(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.
(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.
(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.
(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.
I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.
In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).
This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).
Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The d_instantiate hook for Smack can hang on the root inode of a
filesystem if the file system code has not really done all the set-up.
Fuse is known to encounter this problem.
This change detects an attempt to instantiate a root inode and addresses
it early in the processing, before any attempt is made to do something
that might hang.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from
the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should
call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the
same check from ->task_kill() implementations.
(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session
but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).
NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think
he is very right.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Setup the new Audit hooks for Smack. SELinux Audit rule fields are recycled
to avoid `auditd' userspace modifications. Currently only equality testing
is supported on labels acting as a subject (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER) or as an object
(AUDIT_OBJ_USER).
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related
prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl(). Have smack use
cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
SELinux: remove redundant exports
Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.
User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.
LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
and SMACK to do so.
Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on
boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and
the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Smack doesn't have the need to create a private copy of the LSM "domain" when
setting NetLabel security attributes like SELinux, however, the current
NetLabel code requires a private copy of the LSM "domain". This patches fixes
that by letting the LSM determine how it wants to pass the domain value.
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
The current behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a copy and
frees it when done
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN
New, Smack-friendly behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a
reference to a string managed by the LSM and does not free it when done
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
James Morris
Huw Davies
Seth Forshee
Rafal Krypa
Al Viro
José Bollo
Casey Schaufler
Jann Horn
Linus Torvalds
Andreas Gruenbacher
Roman Kubiak
Zbigniew Jasinski
Geliang Tang
Vivek Trivedi
Lukasz Pawelczyk
Seung-Woo Kim
David Howells
José Bollo
Marcin Lis
Andrey Ryabinin
Łukasz Stelmach
Rohit
Jeff Layton
Marcin Niesluchowski
Konstantin Khlebnikov
Paul Moore
Pankaj Kumar
Lukasz Pawelczyk
Dmitry Kasatkin
Richard Guy Briggs
Tomasz Stanislawski
Tetsuo Handa
David Quigley
Igor Zhbanov
Kees Cook
Eric Paris
Al Viro
Jarkko Sakkinen
Jarkko Sakkinen
Paul Moore
James Morris
Andi Kleen
Lucas De Marchi
David S. Miller
Jarkko Sakkinen
KOSAKI Motohiro
Dan Carpenter
Uwe Kleine-König
Tejun Heo
Kees Cook
Eric Dumazet
Nick Black
David P. Quigley
Julia Lawall
Ingo Molnar
Etienne Basset
Randy Dunlap
Stephen Smalley
Oleg Nesterov
Ahmed S. Darwish
Serge E. Hallyn
Harvey Harrison