Avoid scribbling over memory if the received reply/challenge is larger
than the buffer supplied with the authorizer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with
a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds
with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the
client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect
against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse
the same authorizer to authenticate themselves.
Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random
challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond
with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the
service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this
specific connection instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit.
This addresses CVE-2018-1128.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Will be used for sending ceph_msg_connect with an updated authorizer,
after the server challenges the initial authorizer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
We already copy authorizer_reply_buf and authorizer_reply_buf_len into
ceph_connection. Factoring out __prepare_write_connect() requires two
more: authorizer_buf and authorizer_buf_len. Store the pointer to the
handshake in con->auth rather than piling on.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
ceph_con_keepalive_expired() is the last user of timespec_add() and some
of the last uses of ktime_get_real_ts(). Replacing this with timespec64
based interfaces lets us remove that deprecated API.
I'm introducing new ceph_encode_timespec64()/ceph_decode_timespec64()
here that take timespec64 structures and convert to/from ceph_timespec,
which is defined to have an unsigned 32-bit tv_sec member. This extends
the range of valid times to year 2106, avoiding the year 2038 overflow.
The ceph file system portion still uses the old functions for inode
timestamps, this will be done separately after the VFS layer is converted.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
All gotos to "more" are conditioned on con->state == OPEN, but the only
thing "more" does is opening the socket if con->state == PREOPEN. Kill
that label and rename "more_kvec" to "more".
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
ceph_con_workfn() validates con->state before calling try_read() and
then try_write(). However, try_read() temporarily releases con->mutex,
notably in process_message() and ceph_con_in_msg_alloc(), opening the
window for ceph_con_close() to sneak in, close the connection and
release con->sock. When try_write() is called on the assumption that
con->state is still valid (i.e. not STANDBY or CLOSED), a NULL sock
gets passed to the networking stack:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x5/0x20
Make sure con->state is valid at the top of try_write() and add an
explicit BUG_ON for this, similar to try_read().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23706
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
Add __init attribution to the functions which are called only once
during initiating/registering operations and deleting unnecessary
symbol exports.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
rbd needs this for null copyups -- if copyup data is all zeroes, we
want to save some I/O and network bandwidth. See rbd_obj_issue_copyup()
in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
In preparation for rbd "fancy" striping, introduce ceph_bvec_iter for
working with bio_vec array data buffers. The wrappers are trivial, but
make it look similar to ceph_bio_iter.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The reason we clone bios is to be able to give each object request
(and consequently each ceph_osd_data/ceph_msg_data item) its own
pointer to a (list of) bio(s). The messenger then initializes its
cursor with cloned bio's ->bi_iter, so it knows where to start reading
from/writing to. That's all the cloned bios are used for: to determine
each object request's starting position in the provided data buffer.
Introduce ceph_bio_iter to do exactly that -- store position within bio
list (i.e. pointer to bio) + position within that bio (i.e. bvec_iter).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
[idryomov@gmail.com: amended "Older OSDs" comment]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reencoding an already reencoded message is a bad idea. This could
happen on Policy::stateful_server connections (!CEPH_MSG_CONNECT_LOSSY),
such as MDS sessions.
This didn't pop up in testing because currently only OSD requests are
reencoded and OSD sessions are always lossy.
Fixes: 98ad5ebd15 ("libceph: ceph_connection_operations::reencode_message() method")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
If kmem_cache_zalloc() returns NULL then the INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data->links);
will Oops. The callers aren't really prepared for NULL returns so it
doesn't make a lot of difference in real life.
Fixes: 5240d9f95d ("libceph: replace message data pointer with list")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Give upper layers a chance to reencode the message after the connection
is negotiated and ->peer_features is set. OSD client will use this to
support both luminous and pre-luminous OSDs (in a single cluster): the
former need MOSDOp v8; the latter will continue to be sent MOSDOp v4.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
when reopen a connection, use 'reconnect seq' to clean up
messages that have already been received by peer.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/18690
Signed-off-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
CURRENT_TIME is not y2038 safe. The macro will be deleted and all the
references to it will be replaced by ktime_get_* apis.
struct timespec is also not y2038 safe. Retain timespec for timestamp
representation here as ceph uses it internally everywhere. These
references will be changed to use struct timespec64 in a separate patch.
The current_fs_time() api is being changed to use vfs struct inode* as
an argument instead of struct super_block*.
Set the new mds client request r_stamp field using ktime_get_real_ts()
instead of using current_fs_time().
Also, since r_stamp is used as mtime on the server, use timespec_trunc()
to truncate the timestamp, using the right granularity from the
superblock.
This api will be transitioned to be y2038 safe along with vfs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-5-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
M: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
M: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
M: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull vfs sendmsg updates from Al Viro:
"More sendmsg work.
This is a fairly separate isolated stuff (there's a continuation
around lustre, but that one was too late to soak in -next), thus the
separate pull request"
* 'work.sendmsg' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
ncpfs: switch to sock_sendmsg()
ncpfs: don't mess with manually advancing iovec on send
ncpfs: sendmsg does *not* bugger iovec these days
ceph_tcp_sendpage(): use ITER_BVEC sendmsg
afs_send_pages(): use ITER_BVEC
rds: remove dead code
ceph: switch to sock_recvmsg()
usbip_recv(): switch to sock_recvmsg()
iscsi_target: deal with short writes on the tx side
[nbd] pass iov_iter to nbd_xmit()
[nbd] switch sock_xmit() to sock_{send,recv}msg()
[drbd] use sock_sendmsg()
Since we need to change the implementation, stop exposing internals.
Provide kref_read() to read the current reference count; typically
used for debug messages.
Kills two anti-patterns:
atomic_read(&kref->refcount)
kref->refcount.counter
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
->get_authorizer(), ->verify_authorizer_reply(), ->sign_message() and
->check_message_signature() shouldn't be doing anything with or on the
connection (like closing it or sending messages).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's
ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the
messenger layer anyway.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1b ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time
ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page
cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE.
This promise never materialized. And unlikely will.
We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to
PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether
PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case,
especially on the border between fs and mm.
Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much
breakage to be doable.
Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are
not.
The changes are pretty straight-forward:
- <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;
- <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;
- PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN};
- page_cache_get() -> get_page();
- page_cache_release() -> put_page();
This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using
script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files.
I've called spatch for them manually.
The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to
PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later.
There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll
fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also
will be addressed with the separate patch.
virtual patch
@@
expression E;
@@
- E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E
@@
expression E;
@@
- E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT
+ PAGE_SHIFT
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ PAGE_SIZE
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_MASK
+ PAGE_MASK
@@
expression E;
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E)
+ PAGE_ALIGN(E)
@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_get(E)
+ get_page(E)
@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_release(E)
+ put_page(E)
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create() to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Don't open-code sizeof_footer() in read_partial_message() and
ceph_msg_revoke(). Also, after switching to sizeof_footer(), it's now
possible to use con_out_kvec_add() in prepare_write_message_footer().
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
ceph_msg_footer is 21 bytes long, while ceph_msg_footer_old is only 13.
Don't skip too much when CEPH_FEATURE_MSG_AUTH isn't negotiated.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
The contract between try_read() and try_write() is that when called
each processes as much data as possible. When instructed by osd_client
to skip a message, try_read() is violating this contract by returning
after receiving and discarding a single message instead of checking for
more. try_write() then gets a chance to write out more requests,
generating more replies/skips for try_read() to handle, forcing the
messenger into a starvation loop.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+
Reported-by: Varada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Varada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Commit 20e55c4cc7 ("libceph: clear messenger auth_retry flag when we
authenticate") got us only half way there. We clear the flag if the
second attempt succeeds, but it also needs to be cleared if that
attempt fails, to allow for the exponential backoff to kick in.
Otherwise, if ->should_authenticate() thinks our keys are valid, we
will busy loop, incrementing auth_retry to no avail:
process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 1
process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 2
process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 3
process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 4
process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 5
...
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
There are a number of problems with revoking a "was sending" message:
(1) We never make any attempt to revoke data - only kvecs contibute to
con->out_skip. However, once the header (envelope) is written to the
socket, our peer learns data_len and sets itself to expect at least
data_len bytes to follow front or front+middle. If ceph_msg_revoke()
is called while the messenger is sending message's data portion,
anything we send after that call is counted by the OSD towards the now
revoked message's data portion. The effects vary, the most common one
is the eventual hang - higher layers get stuck waiting for the reply to
the message that was sent out after ceph_msg_revoke() returned and
treated by the OSD as a bunch of data bytes. This is what Matt ran
into.
(2) Flat out zeroing con->out_kvec_bytes worth of bytes to handle kvecs
is wrong. If ceph_msg_revoke() is called before the tag is sent out or
while the messenger is sending the header, we will get a connection
reset, either due to a bad tag (0 is not a valid tag) or a bad header
CRC, which kind of defeats the purpose of revoke. Currently the kernel
client refuses to work with header CRCs disabled, but that will likely
change in the future, making this even worse.
(3) con->out_skip is not reset on connection reset, leading to one or
more spurious connection resets if we happen to get a real one between
con->out_skip is set in ceph_msg_revoke() and before it's cleared in
write_partial_skip().
Fixing (1) and (3) is trivial. The idea behind fixing (2) is to never
zero the tag or the header, i.e. send out tag+header regardless of when
ceph_msg_revoke() is called. That way the header is always correct, no
unnecessary resets are induced and revoke stands ready for disabled
CRCs. Since ceph_msg_revoke() rips out con->out_msg, introduce a new
"message out temp" and copy the header into it before sending.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Reported-by: Matt Conner <matt.conner@keepertech.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Matt Conner <matt.conner@keepertech.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() instead of list_for_each_safe() to
simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
[idryomov@gmail.com: nuke call to list_splice_init() as well]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next
with it.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The following bit in ceph_msg_revoke_incoming() is unsafe:
struct ceph_connection *con = msg->con;
if (!con)
return;
mutex_lock(&con->mutex);
<more msg->con use>
There is nothing preventing con from getting destroyed right after
msg->con test. One easy way to reproduce this is to disable message
signing only on the server side and try to map an image. The system
will go into a
libceph: read_partial_message ffff880073f0ab68 signature check failed
libceph: osd0 192.168.255.155:6801 bad crc/signature
libceph: read_partial_message ffff880073f0ab68 signature check failed
libceph: osd0 192.168.255.155:6801 bad crc/signature
loop which has to be interrupted with Ctrl-C. Hit Ctrl-C and you are
likely to end up with a random GP fault if the reset handler executes
"within" ceph_msg_revoke_incoming():
<yet another reply w/o a signature>
...
<Ctrl-C>
rbd_obj_request_end
ceph_osdc_cancel_request
__unregister_request
ceph_osdc_put_request
ceph_msg_revoke_incoming
...
osd_reset
__kick_osd_requests
__reset_osd
remove_osd
ceph_con_close
reset_connection
<clear con->in_msg->con>
<put con ref>
put_osd
<free osd/con>
<msg->con use> <-- !!!
If ceph_msg_revoke_incoming() executes "before" the reset handler,
osd/con will be leaked because ceph_msg_revoke_incoming() clears
con->in_msg but doesn't put con ref, while reset_connection() only puts
con ref if con->in_msg != NULL.
The current msg->con scheme was introduced by commits 38941f8031
("libceph: have messages point to their connection") and 92ce034b5a
("libceph: have messages take a connection reference"), which defined
when messages get associated with a connection and when that
association goes away. Part of the problem is that this association is
supposed to go away in much too many places; closing this race entirely
requires either a rework of the existing or an addition of a new layer
of synchronization.
In lieu of that, we can make it *much* less likely to hit by
disassociating messages only on their destruction and resend through
a different connection. This makes the code simpler and is probably
a good thing to do regardless - this patch adds a msg_con_set() helper
which is is called from only three places: ceph_con_send() and
ceph_con_in_msg_alloc() to set msg->con and ceph_msg_release() to clear
it.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Support for message signing was merged into 3.19, along with
nocephx_require_signatures option. But, all that option does is allow
the kernel client to talk to clusters that don't support MSG_AUTH
feature bit. That's pretty useless, given that it's been supported
since bobtail.
Meanwhile, if one disables message signing on the server side with
"cephx sign messages = false", it becomes impossible to use the kernel
client since it expects messages to be signed if MSG_AUTH was
negotiated. Add nocephx_sign_messages option to support this use case.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
supported_features and required_features serve no purpose at all, while
nocrc and tcp_nodelay belong to ceph_options::flags.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
We can use msg->con instead - at the point we sign an outgoing message
or check the signature on the incoming one, msg->con is always set. We
wouldn't know how to sign a message without an associated session (i.e.
msg->con == NULL) and being able to sign a message using an explicitly
provided authorizer is of no use.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Use local variable cursor in place of &msg->cursor in
read_partial_msg_data() and write_partial_msg_data().
Signed-off-by: Shraddha Barke <shraddha.6596@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
This
struct ceph_timespec ceph_ts;
...
con_out_kvec_add(con, sizeof(ceph_ts), &ceph_ts);
wraps ceph_ts into a kvec and adds it to con->out_kvec array, yet
ceph_ts becomes invalid on return from prepare_write_keepalive(). As
a result, we send out bogus keepalive2 stamps. Fix this by encoding
into a ceph_timespec member, similar to how acks are read and written.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Only ->alloc_msg() should check data_len of the incoming message
against the preallocated ceph_msg, doing it in the messenger is not
right. The contract is that either ->alloc_msg() returns a ceph_msg
which will fit all of the portions of the incoming message, or it
returns NULL and possibly sets skip, signaling whether NULL is due to
an -ENOMEM. ->alloc_msg() should be the only place where we make the
skip/no-skip decision.
I stumbled upon this while looking at con/osd ref counting. Right now,
if we get a non-extent message with a larger data portion than we are
prepared for, ->alloc_msg() returns a ceph_msg, and then, when we skip
it in the messenger, we don't put the con/osd ref acquired in
ceph_con_in_msg_alloc() (which is normally put in process_message()),
so this also fixes a memory leak.
An existing BUG_ON in ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() ensures we don't
corrupt random memory should a buggy ->alloc_msg() return an unfit
ceph_msg.
While at it, I changed the "unknown tid" dout() to a pr_warn() to make
sure all skips are seen and unified format strings.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Even though it's static, con_work(), being a work func, shows up in
various stacktraces a lot. Prefix it with ceph_.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
ceph_msgr_slab_init may fail due to a temporary ENOMEM.
Delay a bit the initialization of zero_page in ceph_msgr_init and
reorder its cleanup in _ceph_msgr_exit so it's done in reverse
order of setup.
BUG_ON() will not suffer to be postponed in case it is triggered.
Signed-off-by: Benoît Canet <benoit.canet@nodalink.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
addr_is_blank() should return true if family is neither AF_INET nor
AF_INET6. This is what its counterpart entity_addr_t::is_blank_ip() is
doing and it is the right thing to do: in process_banner() we check if
our address is blank and if it is "learn" it from our peer. As it is,
we never learn our address and always send out a blank one. This goes
way back to ceph.git commit dd732cbfc1c9 ("use sockaddr_storage; and
some ipv6 support groundwork") from 2009.
While at at, do not open-code ipv6_addr_any() and use INADDR_ANY
constant instead of 0.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Grab a reference on a network namespace of the 'rbd map' (in case of
rbd) or 'mount' (in case of ceph) process and use that to open sockets
instead of always using init_net and bailing if network namespace is
anything but init_net. Be careful to not share struct ceph_client
instances between different namespaces and don't add any code in the
!CONFIG_NET_NS case.
This is based on a patch from Hong Zhiguo <zhiguohong@tencent.com>.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Ilya Dryomov
Arnd Bergmann
Chengguang Xu
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Dan Carpenter
Yan, Zheng
Deepa Dinamani
Linus Torvalds
Peter Zijlstra
Al Viro
Kirill A. Shutemov
Geliang Tang
Shraddha Barke
Benoît Canet