This argument was just never documented in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
set from Mauro toward the completion of the RST conversion. I *really*
hope we are getting close to the end of this. Meanwhile, those patches
reach pretty far afield to update document references around the tree;
there should be no actual code changes there. There will be, alas, more of
the usual trivial merge conflicts.
Beyond that we have more translations, improvements to the sphinx
scripting, a number of additions to the sysctl documentation, and lots of
fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.8' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fair amount of stuff this time around, dominated by yet another
massive set from Mauro toward the completion of the RST conversion. I
*really* hope we are getting close to the end of this. Meanwhile,
those patches reach pretty far afield to update document references
around the tree; there should be no actual code changes there. There
will be, alas, more of the usual trivial merge conflicts.
Beyond that we have more translations, improvements to the sphinx
scripting, a number of additions to the sysctl documentation, and lots
of fixes"
* tag 'docs-5.8' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (130 commits)
Documentation: fixes to the maintainer-entry-profile template
zswap: docs/vm: Fix typo accept_threshold_percent in zswap.rst
tracing: Fix events.rst section numbering
docs: acpi: fix old http link and improve document format
docs: filesystems: add info about efivars content
Documentation: LSM: Correct the basic LSM description
mailmap: change email for Ricardo Ribalda
docs: sysctl/kernel: document unaligned controls
Documentation: admin-guide: update bug-hunting.rst
docs: sysctl/kernel: document ngroups_max
nvdimm: fixes to maintainter-entry-profile
Documentation/features: Correct RISC-V kprobes support entry
Documentation/features: Refresh the arch support status files
Revert "docs: sysctl/kernel: document ngroups_max"
docs: move locking-specific documents to locking/
docs: move digsig docs to the security book
docs: move the kref doc into the core-api book
docs: add IRQ documentation at the core-api book
docs: debugging-via-ohci1394.txt: add it to the core-api book
docs: fix references for ipmi.rst file
...
This is a first pass at updating the basic documentation on
Linux Security Modules (LSM), which is frighteningly out of date.
Remove untrue statements about the LSM framework. Replace them
with true statements where it is convenient to do so. This is
the beginnig of a larger effort to bring the LSM documentation
up to date.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4c053d72-2d58-612f-6d6b-f04226d0181e@schaufler-ca.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add a key/keyring change notification facility whereby notifications about
changes in key and keyring content and attributes can be received.
Firstly, an event queue needs to be created:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, 256);
then a notification can be set up to report notifications via that queue:
struct watch_notification_filter filter = {
.nr_filters = 1,
.filters = {
[0] = {
.type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
.subtype_filter[0] = UINT_MAX,
},
},
};
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
After that, records will be placed into the queue when events occur in
which keys are changed in some way. Records are of the following format:
struct key_notification {
struct watch_notification watch;
__u32 key_id;
__u32 aux;
} *n;
Where:
n->watch.type will be WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY.
n->watch.subtype will indicate the type of event, such as
NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED.
n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_LENGTH will indicate the length of the
record.
n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_ID will be the second argument to
keyctl_watch_key(), shifted.
n->key will be the ID of the affected key.
n->aux will hold subtype-dependent information, such as the key
being linked into the keyring specified by n->key in the case of
NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED.
Note that it is permissible for event records to be of variable length -
or, at least, the length may be dependent on the subtype. Note also that
the queue can be shared between multiple notifications of various types.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
The library implementation of the SHA-1 compression function is
confusingly called just "sha_transform()". Alongside it are some "SHA_"
constants and "sha_init()". Presumably these are left over from a time
when SHA just meant SHA-1. But now there are also SHA-2 and SHA-3, and
moreover SHA-1 is now considered insecure and thus shouldn't be used.
Therefore, rename these functions and constants to make it very clear
that they are for SHA-1. Also add a comment to make it clear that these
shouldn't be used.
For the extra-misleadingly named "SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES", rename it to
SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE and define it to just '64' rather than '(512/8)' so that
it matches the same definition in <crypto/sha.h>. This prepares for
merging <linux/cryptohash.h> into <crypto/sha.h>.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Changeset 58ad30cf91 ("docs: fix reference to core-api/namespaces.rst")
enabled a new feature at Sphinx: it will now generate index for each
document title, plus to each chapter inside it.
There's a drawback, though: one document cannot have two sections
with the same name anymore.
A followup patch will change the logic of autosectionlabel to
avoid most creating references for every single section title,
but still we need to be able to reference the chapters inside
a document.
There are a few places where there are two chapters with the
same name. This patch renames one of the chapters, in order to
avoid symbol conflict within the same document.
PS.: as I don't speach Chinese, I had some help from a friend
(Wen Liu) at the Chinese translation for "publishing patches"
for this document:
Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/5.Posting.rst
Fixes: 58ad30cf91 ("docs: fix reference to core-api/namespaces.rst")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2bffb91e4a63d41bf5fae1c23e1e8b3bba0b8806.1584716446.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The reStructuredText syntax is wrong here; not sure how it was
intended but we can just use the section header as an implicit
hyperlink target, with a single "outward" underscore.
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <bhenryj0117@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
RST conversion is happily mostly behind us.
- A new document on reproducible builds.
- We finally got around to zapping the documentation for hardware support
that was removed in 2004; one doesn't want to rush these things.
- The usual assortment of fixes, typo corrections, etc.
You'll still find a handful of annoying conflicts against other trees,
mostly tied to the last RST conversions; resolutions are straightforward
and the linux-next ones are good.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.4' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's a somewhat calmer cycle for docs this time, as the churn of the
mass RST conversion is happily mostly behind us.
- A new document on reproducible builds.
- We finally got around to zapping the documentation for hardware
support that was removed in 2004; one doesn't want to rush these
things.
- The usual assortment of fixes, typo corrections, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.4' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (67 commits)
Documentation: kbuild: Add document about reproducible builds
docs: printk-formats: Stop encouraging use of unnecessary %h[xudi] and %hh[xudi]
Documentation: Add "earlycon=sbi" to the admin guide
doc🔒 remove reference to clever use of read-write lock
devices.txt: improve entry for comedi (char major 98)
docs: mtd: Update spi nor reference driver
doc: arm64: fix grammar dtb placed in no attributes region
Documentation: sysrq: don't recommend 'S' 'U' before 'B'
mailmap: Update email address for Quentin Perret
docs: ftrace: clarify when tracing is disabled by the trace file
docs: process: fix broken link
Documentation/arm/samsung-s3c24xx: Remove stray U+FEFF character to fix title
Documentation/arm/sa1100/assabet: Fix 'make assabet_defconfig' command
Documentation/arm/sa1100: Remove some obsolete documentation
docs/zh_CN: update Chinese howto.rst for latexdocs making
Documentation: virt: Fix broken reference to virt tree's index
docs: Fix typo on pull requests guide
kernel-doc: Allow anonymous enum
Documentation: sphinx: Don't parse socket() as identifier reference
Documentation: sphinx: Add missing comma to list of strings
...
Documentation briefly the new fTPM driver running inside TEE.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is
expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig"
template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as
well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that
it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
There are some weird quirks when it comes to UEFI event log. Provide a
brief introduction to TPM event log mechanism and describe the quirks
and how they can be sorted out.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
In order to be able to add this file to the security book,
we need first to convert it to reST.
While this is not part of any book, mark it as :orphan:, in order
to avoid build warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with other
trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on the wings
that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos, and one
on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic markup of
function() references because some people, for reasons I will never
understand, were of the opinion that :c:func:``function()`` is
unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
will never understand, were of the opinion that
:c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
...
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
A buffer(kexec boot command line arguments) measured into IMA
measuremnt list cannot be appraised, without already being
aware of the buffer contents. Since hashes are non-reversible,
raw buffer is needed for validation or regenerating hash for
appraisal/attestation.
Add support to store/read the buffer contents in HEX.
The kexec cmdline hash is stored in the "d-ng" field of the
template data. It can be verified using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
- Add two new fields to ima_event_data to hold the buf and
buf_len
- Add a new template field 'buf' to be used to store/read
the buffer data.
- Updated process_buffer_meaurement to add the buffer to
ima_event_data. process_buffer_measurement added in
"Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line
arguments"
- Add a new template policy name ima-buf to represent
'd-ng|n-ng|buf'
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a
token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check -
either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on
authentication data cached locally.
For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the
file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that
file descriptor.
During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except
perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the
filesystems. Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling
one or more of the following, for instance:
->lookup()
->permission()
->d_revalidate()
->d_automount()
->get_acl()
->getxattr()
on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call
request_key(). And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual
operation:
->mkdir()
->mknod()
->getattr()
->open()
...
which may need to go and get the token again.
However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single
dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use
the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a
good idea.
To this end:
(1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't
require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct.
(2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one.
(3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume.
(4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Provide a request_key_rcu() function that can be used to request a key
under RCU conditions. It can only search and check permissions; it cannot
allocate a new key, upcall or wait for an upcall to complete. It may
return a partially constructed key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it
will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key()
function in a later commit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The request_key() syscall allows a process to gain access to the 'possessor'
permits of any key that grants it Search permission by virtue of request_key()
not checking whether a key it finds grants Link permission to the caller.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Multi-line literal markups only work when they're idented at the
same level, with is not the case here:
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Fix it by using a code-block instead.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The code-block tag is at the wrong place, causing those
warnings:
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:112: WARNING: Literal block expected; none found.
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:121: WARNING: Unexpected indentation.
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:122: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:123: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add a keyctl to atomically move a link to a key from one keyring to
another. The key must exist in "from" keyring and a flag can be given to
cause the operation to fail if there's a matching key already in the "to"
keyring.
This can be done with:
keyctl(KEYCTL_MOVE,
key_serial_t key,
key_serial_t from_keyring,
key_serial_t to_keyring,
unsigned int flags);
The key being moved must grant Link permission and both keyrings must grant
Write permission.
flags should be 0 or KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL, with the latter preventing
displacement of a matching key from the "to" keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
There is a lot of kern-doc for the LSM internals, but it wasn't visible
in the HTML output. This exposes some formatting flaws in lsm_hooks.h
that will be fixed in a later series of patches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
integrity: Remove references to module keyring
ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
efi: Add EFI signature data types
integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
ima: add support for arch specific policies
ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
document on perf security, more Italian translations, more
improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the
pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller
fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document
on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the
memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup
documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes.
As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of
Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments"
* tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits)
docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure
configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation
docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section
slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc
doc:process: add links where missing
docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured
x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup
Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting
doc🇮🇹 add some process/* translations
doc🇮🇹 fixes in process/1.Intro
Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text
Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst
Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file
scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing
Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst
Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation
Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior
Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups
Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"
dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation
...
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to
set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth:
| Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more
| formal, and "while" is the common word.
|
| [...]
|
| Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to
| use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never
| uses?
dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is
probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation.
Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while".
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull keys updates from James Morris:
"Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented
for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key
retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.
int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out);
int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, const void *in2);
Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces,
they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an
operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them.
Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature
instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the
expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may
work"
* 'next-keys2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (22 commits)
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]
KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]
KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver #2]
KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver #2]
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]
KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]
KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]
KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver #2]
KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]
KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver #2]
KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]
...
- Introduces the stackleak gcc plugin ported from grsecurity by Alexander
Popov, with x86 and arm64 support.
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Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
"Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
against at least two classes of flaws:
- Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).
- Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
provides the coverage for stacks.
The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).
With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"
* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.
(*) Query an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);
Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned
in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:
__u32 supported_ops;
A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is
constructed from a bitwise-OR of:
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}
__u32 key_size;
The size in bits of the key.
__u16 max_data_size;
__u16 max_sig_size;
__u16 max_enc_size;
__u16 max_dec_size;
The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.
reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand
over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.
If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key,
EOPNOTSUPP is returned.
(*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
const void *in2);
Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
a blob of data.
The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
values:
__s32 key_id;
__u32 in_len;
__u32 out_len;
__u32 in2_len;
For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:
Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len
======================= =============== =============== ===========
KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature -
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature
info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
information.
The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is
intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
required to unlock a key.
If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for
the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in
RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.
int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out);
int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, const void *in2);
Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're
rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID
in the params argument to distinguish them.
Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead
and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that
this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES updates
including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the unloved and
unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document from Kees, more
MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo fixes and
corrections.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"This is a fairly typical cycle for documentation. There's some welcome
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES
updates including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the
unloved and unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document
from Kees, more MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo
fixes and corrections"
* tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (41 commits)
docs: Fix typos in histogram.rst
docs: Introduce deprecated APIs list
kernel-doc: fix declaration type determination
doc: fix a typo in adding-syscalls.rst
docs/admin-guide: memory-hotplug: remove table of contents
doc: printk-formats: Remove bogus kobject references for device nodes
Documentation: preempt-locking: Use better example
dm flakey: Document "error_writes" feature
docs/completion.txt: Fix a couple of punctuation nits
LICENSES: Add ISC license text
LICENSES: Add note to CDDL-1.0 license that it should not be used
docs/core-api: memory-hotplug: add some details about locking internals
docs/core-api: rename memory-hotplug-notifier to memory-hotplug
docs: improve readability for people with poorer eyesight
yama: clarify ptrace_scope=2 in Yama documentation
docs/vm: split memory hotplug notifier description to Documentation/core-api
docs: move memory hotplug description into admin-guide/mm
doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs
docs: fix some broken documentation references
iommu: Fix passthrough option documentation
...
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fix Documentation location reference for where LSM descriptions should
be placed.
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
"FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key
Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK".
Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add information about STACKLEAK feature to the "Memory poisoning"
section of self-protection.rst.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A number of new docs were added, but they're currently not on
the index.rst from the session they're supposed to be, causing
Sphinx warnings.
Add them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Update SELinux-sctp.rst "SCTP Peer Labeling" section to reflect
how the association permission is validated.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SCTP security hooks are explained in:
Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch updates the documentation with the observations that led
to commit bdcf0a423e ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a
responsibility group_info allocators") and the new behaviour required.
Specifically that groups_sort() should be called on a new group_list
before set_groups() or set_current_groups() is called.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
[jc: use proper :c:func: references]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented
recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding
leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but
security/self-protection missed out.
Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is
inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as
possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel
documentation contradicted the man page on this point.
Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is
unspecified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which
avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to
X.509 signature chain verification.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to
some strange formatting artifacts.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The existing LSM.txt file covered both usage and development, so split
this into two files, one under admin-guide and one under kernel
development.
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjust IMA-templates.txt for ReST markup and add to the index for
security/, under the Kernel API Documentation.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked
to a keyring can be associated with specific key types. Each key type
may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link
functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure
that the requested keys can be examined.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to the more sensible CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
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Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook:
"This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related
SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
STRICT_MODULE_RWX"
* tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are
necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only.
Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be
turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent
location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those
arches.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:
Yama:
- allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting
TPM:
- add documentation
- many bugfixes & cleanups
- define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Integrity:
- Harden against malformed xattrs
SELinux:
- bugfixes & cleanups
Smack:
- Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
- Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
- parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
...
In order too make Documentation root directory cleaner move the tpm
directory under Documentation/security.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system. The objectives here
are to make it easier to create better-integrated (and more attractive)
documents while (eventually) dumping our one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together
system for something that is widely used and maintained by others. There's
a fair amount of information what's being done, why, and how to use it in:
https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/
Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how it
works.
For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon see
the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some significant
media conversion work as well. Once all the docs have been moved over and
we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are are a few) have been
smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go away.
Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make this
stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from Markus Heiser,
Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab.
Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course of
the merge window; they are trivially resolvable. That file may be a bit of
a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that situation to
last for any real length of time.
Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks, updates,
and typo fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"Some big changes this month, headlined by the addition of a new
formatted documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system.
The objectives here are to make it easier to create better-integrated
(and more attractive) documents while (eventually) dumping our
one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together system for something that is widely
used and maintained by others. There's a fair amount of information
what's being done, why, and how to use it in:
https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/
Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how
it works.
For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon
see the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some
significant media conversion work as well. Once all the docs have
been moved over and we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are
are a few) have been smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go
away.
Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make
this stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from
Markus Heiser, Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab.
Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course
of the merge window; they are trivially resolvable. That file may be
a bit of a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that
situation to last for any real length of time.
Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks,
updates, and typo fixes"
* tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (77 commits)
doc-rst: kernel-doc: fix handling of address_space tags
Revert "doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings"
doc-rst: kernel-doc directive, fix state machine reporter
docs: deprecate kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt
doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings
Documentation: add watermark_scale_factor to the list of vm systcl file
kernel-doc: Fix up warning output
docs: Get rid of some kernel-documentation warnings
doc-rst: add an option to ignore DocBooks when generating docs
workqueue: Fix a typo in workqueue.txt
Doc: ocfs: Fix typo in filesystems/ocfs2-online-filecheck.txt
Documentation/sphinx: skip build if user requested specific DOCBOOKS
Documentation: add cleanmediadocs to the documentation targets
Add .pyc files to .gitignore
Doc: PM: Fix a typo in intel_powerclamp.txt
doc-rst: flat-table directive - initial implementation
Documentation: add meta-documentation for Sphinx and kernel-doc
Documentation: tiny typo fix in usb/gadget_multi.txt
Documentation: fix wrong value in md.txt
bcache: documentation formatting, edited for clarity, stripe alignment notes
...
The meaning of "leak" can be both "untracked resource allocation" and
"memory content disclosure". This document's use was entirely of the
latter meaning, so avoid the confusion by using the Common Weakness
Enumeration name for this: Information Exposure (CWE-200). Additionally
adds a section on structure randomization.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used
in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic
keys. Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a
key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman
result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command.
[This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that
had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply
requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL]
Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using restructured
text. Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be able to eliminate
the DocBook dependency and have a much better integrated set of kernel
docs. Someday.
Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees, the
movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of improvements to
the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection of corrections, typo
fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull Documentation updates from Jon Corbet:
"A bit busier this time around.
The most interesting thing (IMO) this time around is some beginning
infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using
restructured text. Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be
able to eliminate the DocBook dependency and have a much better
integrated set of kernel docs. Someday.
Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees,
the movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of
improvements to the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection
of corrections, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (55 commits)
doc: self-protection: provide initial details
serial: doc: Use port->state instead of info
serial: doc: Always refer to tty_port->mutex
Documentation: vm: Spelling s/paltform/platform/g
Documentation/memcg: update kmem limit doc as codes behavior
docproc: print a comment about autogeneration for rst output
docproc: add support for reStructuredText format via --rst option
docproc: abstract terminating lines at first space
docproc: abstract docproc directive detection
docproc: reduce unnecessary indentation
docproc: add variables for subcommand and filename
kernel-doc: use rst C domain directives and references for types
kernel-doc: produce RestructuredText output
kernel-doc: rewrite usage description, remove duplicated comments
Doc: correct the location of sysrq.c
Documentation: fix common spelling mistakes
samples: v4l: from Documentation to samples directory
samples: connector: from Documentation to samples directory
Documentation: xillybus: fix spelling mistake
Documentation: x86: fix spelling mistakes
...
This document attempts to codify the intent around kernel self-protection
along with discussion of both existing and desired technologies, with
attention given to the rationale behind them, and the expectations of
their usage.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
[jc: applied fixes suggested by Randy]
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted. That's currently a two-step process:
(1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
upon them.
This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.
If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.
(2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it. This was meant to be the
system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
permit it.
These patches change that:
(1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
when the trust is evaluated only.
(2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
restrict what may be added to that keyring. This is called whenever a
key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
created in one keyring and then linked across.
This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation. It
is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
keyrings such as the system keyrings.
[*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.
(3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
contents of the system keyring.
A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.
(4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
root of the trust relationship.
(5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
key_preparsed_payload::trusted.
This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
relationships.
Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:
(*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
only. It carries only keys built in to the kernel. It may be where
UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.
(*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.
(*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
be vouched for by either ring of system keys.
(*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
the new secondary keyring.
(*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.
(*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
system keyrings.
If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
the builtin system keyring only.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a
new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public
keys using input parameters stored in the keyring.
Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit
for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid
exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys.
The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption
that the values are only needed in userspace.
Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new
command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE.
Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code
can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible
hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Ben Boeckel
Linus Torvalds
Casey Schaufler
David Howells
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Eric Biggers
Daniel W. S. Almeida
Brendan Jackman
Sasha Levin
Thiago Jung Bauermann
Jarkko Sakkinen
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Prakhar Srivastava
Kees Cook
Dave Jiang
Stefan Berger
Will Deacon
Randy Dunlap
Felix Eckhofer
Alexander Popov
Richard Haines
NeilBrown
Tobin C. Harding
Tom Saeger
Josh Holland
Mat Martineau
Jonathan Corbet
Stephan Mueller
Laura Abbott
Baruch Siach
James Morris