The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A number of new docs were added, but they're currently not on
the index.rst from the session they're supposed to be, causing
Sphinx warnings.
Add them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Update SELinux-sctp.rst "SCTP Peer Labeling" section to reflect
how the association permission is validated.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SCTP security hooks are explained in:
Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch updates the documentation with the observations that led
to commit bdcf0a423e ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a
responsibility group_info allocators") and the new behaviour required.
Specifically that groups_sort() should be called on a new group_list
before set_groups() or set_current_groups() is called.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
[jc: use proper :c:func: references]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented
recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding
leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but
security/self-protection missed out.
Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is
inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as
possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel
documentation contradicted the man page on this point.
Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is
unspecified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which
avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to
X.509 signature chain verification.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to
some strange formatting artifacts.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The existing LSM.txt file covered both usage and development, so split
this into two files, one under admin-guide and one under kernel
development.
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjust IMA-templates.txt for ReST markup and add to the index for
security/, under the Kernel API Documentation.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked
to a keyring can be associated with specific key types. Each key type
may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link
functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure
that the requested keys can be examined.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to the more sensible CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
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Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook:
"This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related
SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
STRICT_MODULE_RWX"
* tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are
necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only.
Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be
turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent
location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those
arches.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:
Yama:
- allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting
TPM:
- add documentation
- many bugfixes & cleanups
- define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Integrity:
- Harden against malformed xattrs
SELinux:
- bugfixes & cleanups
Smack:
- Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
- Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
- parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
...
In order too make Documentation root directory cleaner move the tpm
directory under Documentation/security.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system. The objectives here
are to make it easier to create better-integrated (and more attractive)
documents while (eventually) dumping our one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together
system for something that is widely used and maintained by others. There's
a fair amount of information what's being done, why, and how to use it in:
https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/
Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how it
works.
For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon see
the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some significant
media conversion work as well. Once all the docs have been moved over and
we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are are a few) have been
smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go away.
Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make this
stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from Markus Heiser,
Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab.
Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course of
the merge window; they are trivially resolvable. That file may be a bit of
a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that situation to
last for any real length of time.
Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks, updates,
and typo fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"Some big changes this month, headlined by the addition of a new
formatted documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system.
The objectives here are to make it easier to create better-integrated
(and more attractive) documents while (eventually) dumping our
one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together system for something that is widely
used and maintained by others. There's a fair amount of information
what's being done, why, and how to use it in:
https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/
Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how
it works.
For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon
see the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some
significant media conversion work as well. Once all the docs have
been moved over and we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are
are a few) have been smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go
away.
Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make
this stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from
Markus Heiser, Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab.
Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course
of the merge window; they are trivially resolvable. That file may be
a bit of a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that
situation to last for any real length of time.
Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks,
updates, and typo fixes"
* tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (77 commits)
doc-rst: kernel-doc: fix handling of address_space tags
Revert "doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings"
doc-rst: kernel-doc directive, fix state machine reporter
docs: deprecate kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt
doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings
Documentation: add watermark_scale_factor to the list of vm systcl file
kernel-doc: Fix up warning output
docs: Get rid of some kernel-documentation warnings
doc-rst: add an option to ignore DocBooks when generating docs
workqueue: Fix a typo in workqueue.txt
Doc: ocfs: Fix typo in filesystems/ocfs2-online-filecheck.txt
Documentation/sphinx: skip build if user requested specific DOCBOOKS
Documentation: add cleanmediadocs to the documentation targets
Add .pyc files to .gitignore
Doc: PM: Fix a typo in intel_powerclamp.txt
doc-rst: flat-table directive - initial implementation
Documentation: add meta-documentation for Sphinx and kernel-doc
Documentation: tiny typo fix in usb/gadget_multi.txt
Documentation: fix wrong value in md.txt
bcache: documentation formatting, edited for clarity, stripe alignment notes
...
The meaning of "leak" can be both "untracked resource allocation" and
"memory content disclosure". This document's use was entirely of the
latter meaning, so avoid the confusion by using the Common Weakness
Enumeration name for this: Information Exposure (CWE-200). Additionally
adds a section on structure randomization.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used
in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic
keys. Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a
key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman
result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command.
[This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that
had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply
requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL]
Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using restructured
text. Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be able to eliminate
the DocBook dependency and have a much better integrated set of kernel
docs. Someday.
Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees, the
movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of improvements to
the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection of corrections, typo
fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull Documentation updates from Jon Corbet:
"A bit busier this time around.
The most interesting thing (IMO) this time around is some beginning
infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using
restructured text. Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be
able to eliminate the DocBook dependency and have a much better
integrated set of kernel docs. Someday.
Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees,
the movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of
improvements to the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection
of corrections, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (55 commits)
doc: self-protection: provide initial details
serial: doc: Use port->state instead of info
serial: doc: Always refer to tty_port->mutex
Documentation: vm: Spelling s/paltform/platform/g
Documentation/memcg: update kmem limit doc as codes behavior
docproc: print a comment about autogeneration for rst output
docproc: add support for reStructuredText format via --rst option
docproc: abstract terminating lines at first space
docproc: abstract docproc directive detection
docproc: reduce unnecessary indentation
docproc: add variables for subcommand and filename
kernel-doc: use rst C domain directives and references for types
kernel-doc: produce RestructuredText output
kernel-doc: rewrite usage description, remove duplicated comments
Doc: correct the location of sysrq.c
Documentation: fix common spelling mistakes
samples: v4l: from Documentation to samples directory
samples: connector: from Documentation to samples directory
Documentation: xillybus: fix spelling mistake
Documentation: x86: fix spelling mistakes
...
This document attempts to codify the intent around kernel self-protection
along with discussion of both existing and desired technologies, with
attention given to the rationale behind them, and the expectations of
their usage.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
[jc: applied fixes suggested by Randy]
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted. That's currently a two-step process:
(1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
upon them.
This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.
If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.
(2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it. This was meant to be the
system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
permit it.
These patches change that:
(1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
when the trust is evaluated only.
(2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
restrict what may be added to that keyring. This is called whenever a
key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
created in one keyring and then linked across.
This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation. It
is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
keyrings such as the system keyrings.
[*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.
(3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
contents of the system keyring.
A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.
(4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
root of the trust relationship.
(5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
key_preparsed_payload::trusted.
This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
relationships.
Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:
(*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
only. It carries only keys built in to the kernel. It may be where
UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.
(*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.
(*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
be vouched for by either ring of system keys.
(*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
the new secondary keyring.
(*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.
(*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
system keyrings.
If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
the builtin system keyring only.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Linus Torvalds
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Richard Haines
NeilBrown
Tobin C. Harding
Eric Biggers
Tom Saeger
Josh Holland
Mat Martineau
Jonathan Corbet
Kees Cook
Stephan Mueller
David Howells
Laura Abbott
Casey Schaufler
Baruch Siach
Jarkko Sakkinen
James Morris