Move the memcg_kmem_enabled() checks into memcg kmem charge/uncharge
functions, so, the users don't have to explicitly check that condition.
This is purely code cleanup patch without any functional change. Only
the order of checks in memcg_charge_slab() can potentially be changed
but the functionally it will be same. This should not matter as
memcg_charge_slab() is not in the hot path.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103161203.162375-1-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kmemleak keeps two global variables, min_addr and max_addr, which store
the range of valid (encountered by kmemleak) pointer values, which it
later uses to speed up pointer lookup when scanning blocks.
With tagged pointers this range will get bigger than it needs to be. This
patch makes kmemleak untag pointers before saving them to min_addr and
max_addr and when performing a lookup.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/16e887d442986ab87fe87a755815ad92fa431a5f.1550066133.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now we call kmemleak hooks before assigning tags to pointers in
KASAN hooks. As a result, when an objects gets allocated, kmemleak sees a
differently tagged pointer, compared to the one it sees when the object
gets freed. Fix it by calling KASAN hooks before kmemleak's ones.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cd825aa4897b0fc37d3316838993881daccbe9f5.1549921721.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kasan: add software tag-based mode for arm64", v13.
This patchset adds a new software tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. (Initially
this mode was called KHWASAN, but it got renamed, see the naming rationale
at the end of this section).
The plan is to implement HWASan [2] for the kernel with the incentive,
that it's going to have comparable to KASAN performance, but in the same
time consume much less memory, trading that off for somewhat imprecise bug
detection and being supported only for arm64.
The underlying ideas of the approach used by software tag-based KASAN are:
1. By using the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, we can store
pointer tags in the top byte of each kernel pointer.
2. Using shadow memory, we can store memory tags for each chunk of kernel
memory.
3. On each memory allocation, we can generate a random tag, embed it into
the returned pointer and set the memory tags that correspond to this
chunk of memory to the same value.
4. By using compiler instrumentation, before each memory access we can add
a check that the pointer tag matches the tag of the memory that is being
accessed.
5. On a tag mismatch we report an error.
With this patchset the existing KASAN mode gets renamed to generic KASAN,
with the word "generic" meaning that the implementation can be supported
by any architecture as it is purely software.
The new mode this patchset adds is called software tag-based KASAN. The
word "tag-based" refers to the fact that this mode uses tags embedded into
the top byte of kernel pointers and the TBI arm64 CPU feature that allows
to dereference such pointers. The word "software" here means that shadow
memory manipulation and tag checking on pointer dereference is done in
software. As it is the only tag-based implementation right now, "software
tag-based" KASAN is sometimes referred to as simply "tag-based" in this
patchset.
A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which
would use hardware memory tagging support (announced by Arm [3]) instead
of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation.
Same as generic KASAN, software tag-based KASAN is strictly a debugging
feature.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html
[2] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html
[3] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a
====== Rationale
On mobile devices generic KASAN's memory usage is significant problem.
One of the main reasons to have tag-based KASAN is to be able to perform a
similar set of checks as the generic one does, but with lower memory
requirements.
Comment from Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@google.com>:
I don't have data on-hand, but anecdotally both ASAN and KASAN have proven
problematic to enable for environments that don't tolerate the increased
memory pressure well. This includes
(a) Low-memory form factors - Wear, TV, Things, lower-tier phones like Go,
(c) Connected components like Pixel's visual core [1].
These are both places I'd love to have a low(er) memory footprint option at
my disposal.
Comment from Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>:
Looking at a live Android device under load, slab (according to
/proc/meminfo) + kernel stack take 8-10% available RAM (~350MB). KASAN's
overhead of 2x - 3x on top of it is not insignificant.
Not having this overhead enables near-production use - ex. running
KASAN/KHWASAN kernel on a personal, daily-use device to catch bugs that do
not reproduce in test configuration. These are the ones that often cost
the most engineering time to track down.
CPU overhead is bad, but generally tolerable. RAM is critical, in our
experience. Once it gets low enough, OOM-killer makes your life
miserable.
[1] https://www.blog.google/products/pixel/pixel-visual-core-image-processing-and-machine-learning-pixel-2/
====== Technical details
Software tag-based KASAN mode is implemented in a very similar way to the
generic one. This patchset essentially does the following:
1. TCR_TBI1 is set to enable Top Byte Ignore.
2. Shadow memory is used (with a different scale, 1:16, so each shadow
byte corresponds to 16 bytes of kernel memory) to store memory tags.
3. All slab objects are aligned to shadow scale, which is 16 bytes.
4. All pointers returned from the slab allocator are tagged with a random
tag and the corresponding shadow memory is poisoned with the same value.
5. Compiler instrumentation is used to insert tag checks. Either by
calling callbacks or by inlining them (CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and
CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE flags are reused).
6. When a tag mismatch is detected in callback instrumentation mode
KASAN simply prints a bug report. In case of inline instrumentation,
clang inserts a brk instruction, and KASAN has it's own brk handler,
which reports the bug.
7. The memory in between slab objects is marked with a reserved tag, and
acts as a redzone.
8. When a slab object is freed it's marked with a reserved tag.
Bug detection is imprecise for two reasons:
1. We won't catch some small out-of-bounds accesses, that fall into the
same shadow cell, as the last byte of a slab object.
2. We only have 1 byte to store tags, which means we have a 1/256
probability of a tag match for an incorrect access (actually even
slightly less due to reserved tag values).
Despite that there's a particular type of bugs that tag-based KASAN can
detect compared to generic KASAN: use-after-free after the object has been
allocated by someone else.
====== Testing
Some kernel developers voiced a concern that changing the top byte of
kernel pointers may lead to subtle bugs that are difficult to discover.
To address this concern deliberate testing has been performed.
It doesn't seem feasible to do some kind of static checking to find
potential issues with pointer tagging, so a dynamic approach was taken.
All pointer comparisons/subtractions have been instrumented in an LLVM
compiler pass and a kernel module that would print a bug report whenever
two pointers with different tags are being compared/subtracted (ignoring
comparisons with NULL pointers and with pointers obtained by casting an
error code to a pointer type) has been used. Then the kernel has been
booted in QEMU and on an Odroid C2 board and syzkaller has been run.
This yielded the following results.
The two places that look interesting are:
is_vmalloc_addr in include/linux/mm.h
is_kernel_rodata in mm/util.c
Here we compare a pointer with some fixed untagged values to make sure
that the pointer lies in a particular part of the kernel address space.
Since tag-based KASAN doesn't add tags to pointers that belong to rodata
or vmalloc regions, this should work as is. To make sure debug checks to
those two functions that check that the result doesn't change whether we
operate on pointers with or without untagging has been added.
A few other cases that don't look that interesting:
Comparing pointers to achieve unique sorting order of pointee objects
(e.g. sorting locks addresses before performing a double lock):
tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
pipe_double_lock in fs/pipe.c
unix_state_double_lock in net/unix/af_unix.c
lock_two_nondirectories in fs/inode.c
mutex_lock_double in kernel/events/core.c
ep_cmp_ffd in fs/eventpoll.c
fsnotify_compare_groups fs/notify/mark.c
Nothing needs to be done here, since the tags embedded into pointers
don't change, so the sorting order would still be unique.
Checks that a pointer belongs to some particular allocation:
is_sibling_entry in lib/radix-tree.c
object_is_on_stack in include/linux/sched/task_stack.h
Nothing needs to be done here either, since two pointers can only belong
to the same allocation if they have the same tag.
Overall, since the kernel boots and works, there are no critical bugs.
As for the rest, the traditional kernel testing way (use until fails) is
the only one that looks feasible.
Another point here is that tag-based KASAN is available under a separate
config option that needs to be deliberately enabled. Even though it might
be used in a "near-production" environment to find bugs that are not found
during fuzzing or running tests, it is still a debug tool.
====== Benchmarks
The following numbers were collected on Odroid C2 board. Both generic and
tag-based KASAN were used in inline instrumentation mode.
Boot time [1]:
* ~1.7 sec for clean kernel
* ~5.0 sec for generic KASAN
* ~5.0 sec for tag-based KASAN
Network performance [2]:
* 8.33 Gbits/sec for clean kernel
* 3.17 Gbits/sec for generic KASAN
* 2.85 Gbits/sec for tag-based KASAN
Slab memory usage after boot [3]:
* ~40 kb for clean kernel
* ~105 kb (~260% overhead) for generic KASAN
* ~47 kb (~20% overhead) for tag-based KASAN
KASAN memory overhead consists of three main parts:
1. Increased slab memory usage due to redzones.
2. Shadow memory (the whole reserved once during boot).
3. Quaratine (grows gradually until some preset limit; the more the limit,
the more the chance to detect a use-after-free).
Comparing tag-based vs generic KASAN for each of these points:
1. 20% vs 260% overhead.
2. 1/16th vs 1/8th of physical memory.
3. Tag-based KASAN doesn't require quarantine.
[1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized.
[2] Measured as `iperf -s & iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 30`.
[3] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`.
====== Some notes
A few notes:
1. The patchset can be found here:
https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype/tree/khwasan
2. Building requires a recent Clang version (7.0.0 or later).
3. Stack instrumentation is not supported yet and will be added later.
This patch (of 25):
Tag-based KASAN changes the value of the top byte of pointers returned
from the kernel allocation functions (such as kmalloc). This patch
updates KASAN hooks signatures and their usage in SLAB and SLUB code to
reflect that.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec2b5e3973781ff8a6bb6760f8543643202c451.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce new config option, which is used to replace repeating
CONFIG_MEMCG && !CONFIG_SLOB pattern. Next patches add a little more
memcg+kmem related code, so let's keep the defines more clearly.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153063053670.1818.15013136946600481138.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Cc: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kasan quarantine is designed to delay freeing slab objects to catch
use-after-free. The quarantine can be large (several percent of machine
memory size). When kmem_caches are deleted related objects are flushed
from the quarantine but this requires scanning the entire quarantine
which can be very slow. We have seen the kernel busily working on this
while holding slab_mutex and badly affecting cache_reaper, slabinfo
readers and memcg kmem cache creations.
It can easily reproduced by following script:
yes . | head -1000000 | xargs stat > /dev/null
for i in `seq 1 10`; do
seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs mkdir)
seq 500 | xargs -I{} sh -c 'echo $BASHPID > \
/cg/memory/{}/tasks && exec stat .' > /dev/null
seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs rmdir)
done
The busy stack:
kasan_cache_shutdown
shutdown_cache
memcg_destroy_kmem_caches
mem_cgroup_css_free
css_free_rwork_fn
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
This patch is based on the observation that if the kmem_cache to be
destroyed is empty then there should not be any objects of this cache in
the quarantine.
Without the patch the script got stuck for couple of hours. With the
patch the script completed within a second.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327230603.54721-1-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If kmem case sizes are 32-bit, then usecopy region should be too.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-21-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that all sizes are properly typed, propagate "unsigned int" down the
callgraph.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-19-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
struct kmem_cache::size and ::align were always 32-bit.
Out of curiosity I created 4GB kmem_cache, it oopsed with division by 0.
kmem_cache_create(1UL<<32+1) created 1-byte cache as expected.
size_t doesn't work and never did.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-6-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
struct kmem_cache::size has always been "int", all those
"size_t size" are fake.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-5-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE is 32-bit so is the largest kmalloc cache size.
Christoph said:
:
: Ok SLABs maximum allocation size is limited to 32M (see
: include/linux/slab.h:
:
: #define KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH ((MAX_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT - 1) <= 25 ? \
: (MAX_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT - 1) : 25)
:
: And SLUB/SLOB pass all larger requests to the page allocator anyways.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-4-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the
next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage
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Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
"Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.
To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
control.
Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
...
calculate_alignment() function is only used inside slab_common.c. So
make it static and let the compiler do more optimizations.
After this patch there's a small improvement in text and data size.
$ gcc --version
gcc (GCC) 7.2.1 20171128
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
9890457 3828702 1212364 14931523 e3d643 vmlinux
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
9890437 3828670 1212364 14931471 e3d60f vmlinux
Also I fixed a style problem reported by checkpatch.
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
#53: FILE: mm/slab_common.c:286:
+ unsigned long ralign = cache_line_size();
+ while (size <= ralign / 2)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171210080132.406-1-bhlee.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Byongho Lee <bhlee.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches
are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data
to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common,
but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches
as whitelisted.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations
(useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on
my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size
members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a
new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache
with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields
within the objects that get copied to/from userspace.
In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation
as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained
whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed
to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not
copyable to/from userspace.
After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15%
of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs
after a fresh boot:
Total Slab Memory: 48074720
Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2%
task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720
RAW 0.3% 300/96000
RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768
ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224
dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856
mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448
kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576
kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672
kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920
kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768
kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360
names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840
kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936
kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968
kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720
kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616
kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360
kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032
kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200
kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720
After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by
dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%:
Total Slab Memory: 95516184
Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8%
task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000
RAW 0.3% 300/96000
RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768
ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872
dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800
mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264
kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576
kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672
kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208
kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768
kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360
names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840
kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760
kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968
kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720
kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520
kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360
kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624
kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200
kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks]
[kees: add field names to function declarations]
[kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed]
[kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2.
As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck.
KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of
kmemcheck (single CPU, slow). KASan is already upstream.
We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't
consider KASan as a suitable replacement).
The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC
versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2
years, and try again.
Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports
KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons.
This patch (of 4):
Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel.
[alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add sparse-checked slab_flags_t for struct kmem_cache::flags (SLAB_POISON,
etc).
SLAB is bloated temporarily by switching to "unsigned long", but only
temporarily.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171021100225.GA22428@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kernel may panic when an oom happens without killable process
sometimes it is caused by huge unreclaimable slabs used by kernel.
Although kdump could help debug such problem, however, kdump is not
available on all architectures and it might be malfunction sometime.
And, since kernel already panic it is worthy capturing such information
in dmesg to aid touble shooting.
Print out unreclaimable slab info (used size and total size) which
actual memory usage is not zero (num_objs * size != 0) when
unreclaimable slabs amount is greater than total user memory (LRU
pages).
The output looks like:
Unreclaimable slab info:
Name Used Total
rpc_buffers 31KB 31KB
rpc_tasks 7KB 7KB
ebitmap_node 1964KB 1964KB
avtab_node 5024KB 5024KB
xfs_buf 1402KB 1402KB
xfs_ili 134KB 134KB
xfs_efi_item 115KB 115KB
xfs_efd_item 115KB 115KB
xfs_buf_item 134KB 134KB
xfs_log_item_desc 342KB 342KB
xfs_trans 1412KB 1412KB
xfs_ifork 212KB 212KB
[yang.s@alibaba-inc.com: v11]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507656303-103845-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507152550-46205-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
READ_ONCE() now has an implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() call, so it
can be used instead of lockless_dereference() without any change in
semantics.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
A while ago someone, and I cannot find the email just now, asked if we
could not implement the RECLAIM_FS inversion stuff with a 'fake' lock
like we use for other things like workqueues etc. I think this should
be possible which allows reducing the 'irq' states and will reduce the
amount of __bfs() lookups we do.
Removing the 1 IRQ state results in 4 less __bfs() walks per
dependency, improving lockdep performance. And by moving this
annotation out of the lockdep code it becomes easier for the mm people
to extend.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: boqun.feng@gmail.com
Cc: iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Cc: kernel-team@lge.com
Cc: kirill@shutemov.name
Cc: npiggin@gmail.com
Cc: walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Josef's redesign of the balancing between slab caches and the page cache
requires slab cache statistics at the lruvec level.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-7-hannes@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kmem-specific functions do the same thing. Switch and drop.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-5-hannes@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that the slab counters are moved from the zone to the node level we
can drop the private memcg node stats and use the official ones.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-4-hannes@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted
from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence
guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated
during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the
case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire
slab of blocks.
However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit
therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order
to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
[ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric
Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find
the new one. ]
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and
destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can
accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not
under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such
conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of
many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large
systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management
code. This is one of the patches to address the issue.
slub uses synchronize_sched() to deactivate a memcg cache.
synchronize_sched() is an expensive and slow operation and doesn't scale
when a huge number of caches are destroyed back-to-back. While there
used to be a simple batching mechanism, the batching was too restricted
to be helpful.
This patch implements slab_deactivate_memcg_cache_rcu_sched() which slub
can use to schedule sched RCU callback instead of performing
synchronize_sched() synchronously while holding cgroup_mutex. While
this adds online cpus, mems and slab_mutex operations, operating on
these locks back-to-back from the same kworker, which is what's gonna
happen when there are many to deactivate, isn't expensive at all and
this gets rid of the scalability problem completely.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-9-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__kmem_cache_shrink() is called with %true @deactivate only for memcg
caches. Remove @deactivate from __kmem_cache_shrink() and introduce
__kmemcg_cache_deactivate() instead. Each memcg-supporting allocator
should implement it and it should deactivate and drain the cache.
This is to allow memcg cache deactivation behavior to further deviate
from simple shrinking without messing up __kmem_cache_shrink().
This is pure reorganization and doesn't introduce any observable
behavior changes.
v2: Dropped unnecessary ifdef in mm/slab.h as suggested by Vladimir.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-8-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and
destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can
accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not
under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such
conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of
many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large
systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management
code. This is one of the patches to address the issue.
slab_caches currently lists all caches including root and memcg ones.
This is the only data structure which lists the root caches and
iterating root caches can only be done by walking the list while
skipping over memcg caches. As there can be a huge number of memcg
caches, this can become very expensive.
This also can make /proc/slabinfo behave very badly. seq_file processes
reads in 4k chunks and seeks to the previous Nth position on slab_caches
list to resume after each chunk. With a lot of memcg cache churns on
the list, reading /proc/slabinfo can become very slow and its content
often ends up with duplicate and/or missing entries.
This patch adds a new list slab_root_caches which lists only the root
caches. When memcg is not enabled, it becomes just an alias of
slab_caches. memcg specific list operations are collected into
memcg_[un]link_cache().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-7-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and
destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can
accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not
under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such
conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of
many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large
systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management
code. This is one of the patches to address the issue.
While a memcg kmem_cache is listed on its root cache's ->children list,
there is no direct way to iterate all kmem_caches which are assocaited
with a memory cgroup. The only way to iterate them is walking all
caches while filtering out caches which don't match, which would be most
of them.
This makes memcg destruction operations O(N^2) where N is the total
number of slab caches which can be huge. This combined with the
synchronous RCU operations can tie up a CPU and affect the whole machine
for many hours when memory reclaim triggers offlining and destruction of
the stale memcgs.
This patch adds mem_cgroup->kmem_caches list which goes through
memcg_cache_params->kmem_caches_node of all kmem_caches which are
associated with the memcg. All memcg specific iterations, including
stat file access, are updated to use the new list instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-6-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We're going to change how memcg caches are iterated. In preparation,
clean up and reorganize memcg_cache_params.
* The shared ->list is replaced by ->children in root and
->children_node in children.
* ->is_root_cache is removed. Instead ->root_cache is moved out of
the child union and now used by both root and children. NULL
indicates root cache. Non-NULL a memcg one.
This patch doesn't cause any observable behavior changes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-5-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "slab: make memcg slab destruction scalable", v3.
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and
destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can
accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not
under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such
conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of
many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large
systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management
code.
I've seen machines which end up with hundred thousands of caches and
many millions of kernfs_nodes. The current code is O(N^2) on the total
number of caches and has synchronous rcu_barrier() and
synchronize_sched() in cgroup offline / release path which is executed
while holding cgroup_mutex. Combined, this leads to very expensive and
slow cache destruction operations which can easily keep running for half
a day.
This also messes up /proc/slabinfo along with other cache iterating
operations. seq_file operates on 4k chunks and on each 4k boundary
tries to seek to the last position in the list. With a huge number of
caches on the list, this becomes very slow and very prone to the list
content changing underneath it leading to a lot of missing and/or
duplicate entries.
This patchset addresses the scalability problem.
* Add root and per-memcg lists. Update each user to use the
appropriate list.
* Make rcu_barrier() for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU caches globally batched
and asynchronous.
* For dying empty slub caches, remove the sysfs files after
deactivation so that we don't end up with millions of sysfs files
without any useful information on them.
This patchset contains the following nine patches.
0001-Revert-slub-move-synchronize_sched-out-of-slab_mutex.patch
0002-slub-separate-out-sysfs_slab_release-from-sysfs_slab.patch
0003-slab-remove-synchronous-rcu_barrier-call-in-memcg-ca.patch
0004-slab-reorganize-memcg_cache_params.patch
0005-slab-link-memcg-kmem_caches-on-their-associated-memo.patch
0006-slab-implement-slab_root_caches-list.patch
0007-slab-introduce-__kmemcg_cache_deactivate.patch
0008-slab-remove-synchronous-synchronize_sched-from-memcg.patch
0009-slab-remove-slub-sysfs-interface-files-early-for-emp.patch
0010-slab-use-memcg_kmem_cache_wq-for-slab-destruction-op.patch
0001 reverts an existing optimization to prepare for the following
changes. 0002 is a prep patch. 0003 makes rcu_barrier() in release
path batched and asynchronous. 0004-0006 separate out the lists.
0007-0008 replace synchronize_sched() in slub destruction path with
call_rcu_sched(). 0009 removes sysfs files early for empty dying
caches. 0010 makes destruction work items use a workqueue with limited
concurrency.
This patch (of 10):
Revert 89e364db71 ("slub: move synchronize_sched out of slab_mutex on
shrink").
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed
frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if
there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory
pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead
to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily
hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability
issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to
address the issue.
Moving synchronize_sched() out of slab_mutex isn't enough as it's still
inside cgroup_mutex. The whole deactivation / release path will be
updated to avoid all synchronous RCU operations. Revert this insufficient
optimization in preparation to ease future changes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-2-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rather than tracking the number of active slabs for each node, track the
total number of slabs. This is a minor improvement that avoids active
slab tracking when a slab goes from free to partial or partial to free.
For slab debugging, this also removes an explicit free count since it
can easily be inferred by the difference in number of total objects and
number of active objects.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1612042020110.115755@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Suggested-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reading /proc/slabinfo or monitoring slabtop(1) can become very
expensive if there are many slab caches and if there are very lengthy
per-node partial and/or free lists.
Commit 07a63c41fa ("mm/slab: improve performance of gathering slabinfo
stats") addressed the per-node full lists which showed a significant
improvement when no objects were freed. This patch has the same
motivation and optimizes the remainder of the usecases where there are
very lengthy partial and free lists.
This patch maintains per-node active_slabs (full and partial) and
free_slabs rather than iterating the lists at runtime when reading
/proc/slabinfo.
When allocating 100GB of slab from a test cache where every slab page is
on the partial list, reading /proc/slabinfo (includes all other slab
caches on the system) takes ~247ms on average with 48 samples.
As a result of this patch, the same read takes ~0.856ms on average.
[rientjes@google.com: changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1611081505240.13403@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Verify that kmem_create_cache flags are not allocator specific. It is
done before removing flags that are not available with the current
configuration.
The current kmem_cache_create removes incorrect flags but do not
validate the callers are using them right. This change will ensure that
callers are not trying to create caches with flags that won't be used
because allocator specific.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478553075-120242-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
synchronize_sched() is a heavy operation and calling it per each cache
owned by a memory cgroup being destroyed may take quite some time. What
is worse, it's currently called under the slab_mutex, stalling all works
doing cache creation/destruction.
Actually, there isn't much point in calling synchronize_sched() for each
cache - it's enough to call it just once - after setting cpu_partial for
all caches and before shrinking them. This way, we can also move it out
of the slab_mutex, which we have to hold for iterating over the slab
cache list.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=172991
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a10d71ecae3db00fb4421bcd3f82bcc911f4be4.1475329751.git.vdavydov.dev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net>
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On large systems, when some slab caches grow to millions of objects (and
many gigabytes), running 'cat /proc/slabinfo' can take up to 1-2
seconds. During this time, interrupts are disabled while walking the
slab lists (slabs_full, slabs_partial, and slabs_free) for each node,
and this sometimes causes timeouts in other drivers (for instance,
Infiniband).
This patch optimizes 'cat /proc/slabinfo' by maintaining a counter for
total number of allocated slabs per node, per cache. This counter is
updated when a slab is created or destroyed. This enables us to skip
traversing the slabs_full list while gathering slabinfo statistics, and
since slabs_full tends to be the biggest list when the cache is large,
it results in a dramatic performance improvement. Getting slabinfo
statistics now only requires walking the slabs_free and slabs_partial
lists, and those lists are usually much smaller than slabs_full.
We tested this after growing the dentry cache to 70GB, and the
performance improved from 2s to 5ms.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472517876-26814-1-git-send-email-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
For KASAN builds:
- switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
- change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
into the quarantine.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Handle memcg_kmem_enabled check out to the caller. This reduces the
number of function definitions making the code easier to follow. At
the same time it doesn't result in code bloat, because all of these
functions are used only in one or two places.
- Move __GFP_ACCOUNT check to the caller as well so that one wouldn't
have to dive deep into memcg implementation to see which allocations
are charged and which are not.
- Refresh comments.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52882a28b542c1979fd9a033b4dc8637fc347399.1464079537.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their
allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow
easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to
control the following chunk overflowed.
For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap:
- Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU)
- Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95)
***Problems that needed solving:
- Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator.
- Ensure good performance to encourage usage.
- Get best entropy in early boot stage.
***Parts:
- 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements
with the SLUB implementation.
- 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach
than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB.
***Performance data:
slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts
without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall
impact on the system is way lower.
Before:
Single thread testing
=====================
1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test
100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles
2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test
100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles
After:
Single thread testing
=====================
1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test
100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles
2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test
100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles
100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles
Kernbench, before:
Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation):
Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069)
User Time 1045.22 (1.60447)
System Time 88.969 (0.559195)
Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279)
Context Switches 189140 (2282.15)
Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091)
After:
Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation):
Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732)
User Time 1045.3 (1.34263)
System Time 88.311 (0.342554)
Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444)
Context Switches 189081 (2355.78)
Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358)
This patch (of 2):
This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to
prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be
shared to slab_common.
The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation,
now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen
because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better
performance when specific arch instructions are not available.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.
When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).
When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.
Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).
As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.
Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add GFP flags to KASAN hooks for future patches to use.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Show how much memory is used for storing reclaimable and unreclaimable
in-kernel data structures allocated from slab caches.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
SLAB_DEBUG_FREE allows expensive consistency checks at free to be turned
on or off. Expand its use to be able to turn off all consistency
checks. This gives a nice speed up if you only want features such as
poisoning or tracing.
Credit to Mathias Krause for the original work which inspired this
series
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix up trivial spelling errors, noticed while reading the code.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove the SLAB specific function slab_should_failslab(), by moving the
check against fault-injection for the bootstrap slab, into the shared
function should_failslab() (used by both SLAB and SLUB).
This is a step towards sharing alloc_hook's between SLUB and SLAB.
This bootstrap slab "kmem_cache" is used for allocating struct
kmem_cache objects to the allocator itself.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
First step towards sharing alloc_hook's between SLUB and SLAB
allocators. Move the SLUB allocators *_alloc_hook to the common
mm/slab.h for internal slab definitions.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When slub_debug alloc_calls_show is enabled we will try to track
location and user of slab object on each online node, kmem_cache_node
structure and cpu_cache/cpu_slub shouldn't be freed till there is the
last reference to sysfs file.
This fixes the following panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: list_locations+0x169/0x4e0
PGD 257304067 PUD 438456067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 PID: 973074 Comm: cat ve: 0 Not tainted 3.10.0-229.7.2.ovz.9.30-00007-japdoll-dirty #2 9.30
Hardware name: DEPO Computers To Be Filled By O.E.M./H67DE3, BIOS L1.60c 07/14/2011
task: ffff88042a5dc5b0 ti: ffff88037f8d8000 task.ti: ffff88037f8d8000
RIP: list_locations+0x169/0x4e0
Call Trace:
alloc_calls_show+0x1d/0x30
slab_attr_show+0x1b/0x30
sysfs_read_file+0x9a/0x1a0
vfs_read+0x9c/0x170
SyS_read+0x58/0xb0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 5e 07 12 00 b9 00 04 00 00 3d 00 04 00 00 0f 4f c1 3d 00 04 00 00 89 45 b0 0f 84 c3 00 00 00 48 63 45 b0 49 8b 9c c4 f8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 43 20 48 85 c0 74 b6 48 89 df e8 46 37 44 00 48 8b 53 10
CR2: 0000000000000020
Separated __kmem_cache_release from __kmem_cache_shutdown which now
called on slab_kmem_cache_release (after the last reference to sysfs
file object has dropped).
Reintroduced locking in free_partial as sysfs file might access cache's
partial list after shutdowning - partial revert of the commit
69cb8e6b7c ("slub: free slabs without holding locks"). Zap
__remove_partial and use remove_partial (w/o underscores) as
free_partial now takes list_lock which s partial revert for commit
1e4dd9461f ("slub: do not assert not having lock in removing freed
partial")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Shakeel Butt
Andrey Konovalov
Kirill Tkhai
Alexey Dobriyan
Linus Torvalds
Byongho Lee
David Windsor
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)
Yang Shi
Ingo Molnar
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Will Deacon
Peter Zijlstra
Johannes Weiner
Paul E. McKenney
Tejun Heo
Vlastimil Babka
David Rientjes
Greg Thelen
Thomas Garnier
Vladimir Davydov
Aruna Ramakrishna
Alexander Potapenko
Vladimir Davydov
Laura Abbott
Jesper Dangaard Brouer
Dmitry Safonov