During a context switch, we first switch_mm() to the next task's mm,
then switch_to() that new task. This means that vmalloc'd regions which
had previously been faulted in can transiently disappear in the context
of the prev task.
Functions instrumented by KCOV may try to access a vmalloc'd kcov_area
during this window, and as the fault handling code is instrumented, this
results in a recursive fault.
We must avoid accessing any kcov_area during this window. We can do so
with a new flag in kcov_mode, set prior to switching the mm, and cleared
once the new task is live. Since task_struct::kcov_mode isn't always a
specific enum kcov_mode value, this is made an unsigned int.
The manipulation is hidden behind kcov_{prepare,finish}_switch() helpers,
which are empty for !CONFIG_KCOV kernels.
The code uses macros because I can't use static inline functions without a
circular include dependency between <linux/sched.h> and <linux/kcov.h>,
since the definition of task_struct uses things defined in <linux/kcov.h>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On many architectures the vmalloc area is lazily faulted in upon first
access. This is problematic for KCOV, as __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc
accesses the (vmalloc'd) kcov_area, and fault handling code may be
instrumented. If an access to kcov_area faults, this will result in
mutual recursion through the fault handling code and
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), eventually leading to stack corruption
and/or overflow.
We can avoid this by faulting in the kcov_area before
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is permitted to access it. Once it has been
faulted in, it will remain present in the process page tables, and will
not fault again.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: code cleanup]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment explaining kcov_fault_in_area()]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fancier code comment from Mark]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kcov: fix unexpected faults".
These patches fix a few issues where KCOV code could trigger recursive
faults, discovered while debugging a patch enabling KCOV for arch/arm:
* On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels, there's a small race window where
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() can see a bogus kcov_area.
* Lazy faulting of the vmalloc area can cause mutual recursion between
fault handling code and __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().
* During the context switch, switching the mm can cause the kcov_area to
be transiently unmapped.
These are prerequisites for enabling KCOV on arm, but the issues
themsevles are generic -- we just happen to avoid them by chance rather
than design on x86-64 and arm64.
This patch (of 3):
For kernels built with CONFIG_PREEMPT, some C code may execute before or
after the interrupt handler, while the hardirq count is zero. In these
cases, in_task() can return true.
A task can be interrupted in the middle of a KCOV_DISABLE ioctl while it
resets the task's kcov data via kcov_task_init(). Instrumented code
executed during this period will call __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), and as
in_task() returns true, will inspect t->kcov_mode before trying to write
to t->kcov_area.
In kcov_init_task() we update t->kcov_{mode,area,size} with plain stores,
which may be re-ordered, torn, etc. Thus __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() may
see bogus values for any of these fields, and may attempt to write to
memory which is not mapped.
Let's avoid this by using WRITE_ONCE() to set t->kcov_mode, with a
barrier() to ensure this is ordered before we clear t->kov_{area,size}.
This ensures that any code execute while kcov_init_task() is preempted
will either see valid values for t->kcov_{area,size}, or will see that
t->kcov_mode is KCOV_MODE_DISABLED, and bail out without touching
t->kcov_area.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently KCOV_ENABLE does not check if the current task is already
associated with another kcov descriptor. As the result it is possible
to associate a single task with more than one kcov descriptor, which
later leads to a memory leak of the old descriptor. This relation is
really meant to be one-to-one (task has only one back link).
Extend validation to detect such misuse.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122082520.15716-1-dvyukov@google.com
Fixes: 5c9a8750a6 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Shankara Pailoor <sp3485@columbia.edu>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Enables kcov to collect comparison operands from instrumented code.
This is done by using Clang's -fsanitize=trace-cmp instrumentation
(currently not available for GCC).
The comparison operands help a lot in fuzz testing. E.g. they are used
in Syzkaller to cover the interiors of conditional statements with way
less attempts and thus make previously unreachable code reachable.
To allow separate collection of coverage and comparison operands two
different work modes are implemented. Mode selection is now done via a
KCOV_ENABLE ioctl call with corresponding argument value.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171011095459.70721-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Victor Chibotaru <tchibo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is a hot code, so it's worth to remove
pointless '!current' check. Current is never NULL.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929162221.32500-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Support compat processes in KCOV by providing compat_ioctl callback.
Compat mode uses the same ioctl callback: we have 2 commands that do not
use the argument and 1 that already checks that the arg does not overflow
INT_MAX. This allows to use KCOV-guided fuzzing in compat processes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823100553.55812-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
in_interrupt() semantics are confusing and wrong for most users as it
also returns true when bh is disabled. Thus we open coded a proper
check for interrupts in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() with a lengthy
explanatory comment.
Use the new in_task() predicate instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170321091026.139655-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is fragile that some definitions acquired via transitive
dependencies, as shown in below:
atomic_* (<linux/atomic.h>)
ENOMEM/EN* (<linux/errno.h>)
EXPORT_SYMBOL (<linux/export.h>)
device_initcall (<linux/init.h>)
preempt_* (<linux/preempt.h>)
Include them to prevent possible issues.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481163221-40170-1-git-send-email-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc we use task_struct and fields within it, but
as we haven't included <linux/sched.h>, it is not guaranteed to be
defined. While we usually happen to acquire the definition through a
transitive include, this is fragile (and hasn't been true in the past,
causing issues with backports).
Include <linux/sched.h> to avoid any fragility.
[mark.rutland@arm.com: rewrote changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481007384-27529-1-git-send-email-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
in_interrupt() returns a nonzero value when we are either in an
interrupt or have bh disabled via local_bh_disable(). Since we are
interested in only ignoring coverage from actual interrupts, do a proper
check instead of just calling in_interrupt().
As a result of this change, kcov will start to collect coverage from
within local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() sections.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476115803-20712-1-git-send-email-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since commit 49d200deaa ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files'
private data"), a debugfs file's file_operations methods get proxied
through lifetime aware wrappers.
However, only a certain subset of the file_operations members is supported
by debugfs and ->mmap isn't among them -- it appears to be NULL from the
VFS layer's perspective.
This behaviour breaks the /sys/kernel/debug/kcov file introduced
concurrently with commit 5c9a8750a6 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage").
Since that file never gets removed, there is no file removal race and thus,
a lifetime checking proxy isn't needed.
Avoid the proxying for /sys/kernel/debug/kcov by creating it via
debugfs_create_file_unsafe() rather than debugfs_create_file().
Fixes: 49d200deaa ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data")
Fixes: 5c9a8750a6 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage")
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kcov causes the compiler to add a call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() in
every basic block. Ftrace patches in a call to _mcount() to each
function it has annotated.
Letting these mechanisms annotate each other is a bad thing. Break the
loop by adding 'notrace' to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() so that ftrace
won't try to patch this code.
This patch lets arm64 with KCOV and STACK_TRACER boot.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mark Rutland
Dmitry Vyukov
Victor Chibotaru
Andrey Ryabinin
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Alexander Popov
Kefeng Wang
Andrey Konovalov
Nicolai Stange
James Morse