Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages:
(1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.
(2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).
(3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means
that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.
(4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-fixes-20140916' into keys-next
Merge in keyrings fixes, at least some of which later patches depend on:
(1) Reinstate the production of EPERM for key types beginning with '.' in
requests from userspace.
(2) Tidy up the cleanup of PKCS#7 message signed information blocks and fix a
bug this made more obvious.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.coM>
Fix the parser cleanup code to drain parsed out X.509 certs in the case that
the decode fails and we jump to error_decode.
The function is rearranged so that the same cleanup code is used in the success
case as the error case - just that the message descriptor under construction is
only released if it is still pointed to by the context struct at that point.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
The code to free a signed info block is repeated several times, so move the
code to do it into a function of its own. This gives us a place to add clean
ups for stuff that gets added to pkcs7_signed_info.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the newly added drbg generator so that it actually works on
32-bit machines. Previously the code was only tested on 64-bit and on
32-bit it overflowed and simply doesn't work"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: drbg - remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle
crypto: drbg - backport "fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems"
The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
removed in previous patches.
Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.
Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
On archs with PAGE_SIZE >= 64 KiB the function skcipher_alloc_sgl()
fails with -ENOMEM no matter what user space actually requested.
This is caused by the fact sock_kmalloc call inside the function tried
to allocate more memory than allowed by the default kernel socket buffer
size (kernel param net.core.optmem_max).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Printing in base signature handling should have a prefix, so set pr_fmt().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 cert as it appears that the PE
file wrapper size gets rounded up to the nearest 8.
The debugging output looks like this:
PEFILE: ==> verify_pefile_signature()
PEFILE: ==> pefile_parse_binary()
PEFILE: checksum @ 110
PEFILE: header size = 200
PEFILE: cert = 968 @547be0 [68 09 00 00 00 02 02 00 30 82 09 56 ]
PEFILE: sig wrapper = { 968, 200, 2 }
PEFILE: Signature data not PKCS#7
The wrapper is the first 8 bytes of the hex dump inside []. This indicates a
length of 0x968 bytes, including the wrapper header - so 0x960 bytes of
payload.
The ASN.1 wrapper begins [ ... 30 82 09 56 ]. That indicates an object of size
0x956 - a four byte discrepency, presumably just padding for alignment
purposes.
So we just check that the ASN.1 container is no bigger than the payload and
reduce the recorded size appropriately.
Whilst we're at it, allow shorter PKCS#7 objects that manage to squeeze within
127 or 255 bytes. It's just about conceivable if no X.509 certs are included
in the PKCS#7 message.
Reported-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The length of the name of an asymmetric key subtype must be stored in struct
asymmetric_key_subtype::name_len so that it can be matched by a search for
"<subkey_name>:<partial_fingerprint>". Fix the public_key subtype to have
name_len set.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch adds a simple test vector for the lz4 and lz4hc compression
algorithms.
Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@sch.bme.hu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The lz4 library has two functions for decompression, with slightly
different signatures and behaviour. The lz4_decompress_crypto() function
seemed to be using the one that assumes that the decompressed length is
known in advance.
This patch switches to the other decompression function and makes sure
that the length of the decompressed output is properly returned to the
caller.
The same issue was present in the lz4hc algorithm.
Coincidentally, this change also makes very basic lz4 and lz4hc
compression tests in testmgr pass.
Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@sch.bme.hu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The SHA-512 NEON works just fine under big endian, so remove the Kconfig
condition preventing it from being selected if CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is
set.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
This tweaks the SHA-1 NEON code slightly so it works correctly under big
endian, and removes the Kconfig condition preventing it from being
selected if CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is set.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
The sparse tool complained that the cpu_to_be[32|64] functions return
__be[32|64] instead of __u32 or __u64. The patch replaces the __u32 and
__u64 with __be32 and __be64.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
During creation of the DRBG shadow state, it is ensured that the DRBG
state structure is already allocated. Thus, a sanity check for verifying
that the structure is allocated is removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
SP800-90A mandates several hard-coded values. The old drbg_cores allows
the setting of these values per DRBG implementation. However, due to the
hard requirement of SP800-90A, these values are now returned globally
for each DRBG.
The ability to set such values per DRBG is therefore removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The drbg_make_shadow function contains sanity checks which are not
needed as the function is invoked at times where it is ensured that the
checked-for variables are available.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When allocating V, C, the zeroization is only needed when
allocating a new instance of the DRBG, i.e. when performing an
initial seeding. For all other allocations, the memcpy implemented in
drbg_copy_drbg ensures that the memory is filled with the correct
information.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove memset(0) which is not needed due to the kzalloc of the memory.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The crypto_init and crypto_fini functions are always implemented. Thus,
there is no need for a protecting check.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The kzfree function already performs the NULL pointer check. Therefore,
the DRBG code does not need to implement such check.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The DRBG requires the conversion of an integer into a string
representation of that integer. The previous implementation converted
the given integer byte-wise. However, the kernel offers the cpu_to_be
function which already re-arranges the memory representation of an
integer such that it applies when interpreting the same memory as
character string.
The change therefore uses an integer-cast / union of the target
character array together with the cpu_to_be function to convert an
integer into its string representation.
Tests show that the Hash and CTR DRBG implementations (the HMAC DRBG
does not require such conversion) is about 10% faster (or requires less
computing power, respectively).
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The argument "req" of do_one_async_hash_op is not used by the
function. This patch removes this argument and renames the
function to match more closely its purpose.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch introduces the multi-buffer crypto daemon which is responsible
for submitting crypto jobs in a work queue to the responsible multi-buffer
crypto algorithm. The idea of the multi-buffer algorihtm is to put
data streams from multiple jobs in a wide (AVX2) register and then
take advantage of SIMD instructions to do crypto computation on several
buffers simultaneously.
The multi-buffer crypto daemon is also responsbile for flushing the
remaining buffers to complete the computation if no new buffers arrive
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Prepare IV array only if the dependent code is executed.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch inverts two if conditions to remove code blocks
indentation. Several white space clean-ups follow.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch inverts one if condition to remove code block indentation.
Several white space clean-ups follow.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch inverts two if conditions and allows removal of one
tab-stop in their code-blocks. Only white-space clean-up follows.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For the special case when we have a null input string, we want
to initialize the entry len to 0 for the hash/ahash walk, so
cyrpto_hash_walk_last will return the correct result indicating
that we have completed the scatter list walk. Otherwise we may
keep walking the sg list and access bogus memory address.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
the partial xor result must be kept until the next
tx is generated.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xuelin Shi <xuelin.shi@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Now with 64bit bzImage and kexec tools, we support ramdisk that size is
bigger than 2g, as we could put it above 4G.
Found compressed initramfs image could not be decompressed properly. It
turns out that image length is int during decompress detection, and it
will become < 0 when length is more than 2G. Furthermore, during
decompressing len as int is used for inbuf count, that has problem too.
Change len to long, that should be ok as on 32 bit platform long is
32bits.
Tested with following compressed initramfs image as root with kexec.
gzip, bzip2, xz, lzma, lzop, lz4.
run time for populate_rootfs():
size name Nehalem-EX Westmere-EX Ivybridge-EX
9034400256 root_img : 26s 24s 30s
3561095057 root_img.lz4 : 28s 27s 27s
3459554629 root_img.lzo : 29s 29s 28s
3219399480 root_img.gz : 64s 62s 49s
2251594592 root_img.xz : 262s 260s 183s
2226366598 root_img.lzma: 386s 376s 277s
2901482513 root_img.bz2 : 635s 599s
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: "Daniel M. Weeks" <dan@danweeks.net>
Cc: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this release:
- PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
- appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
- bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
KEYS: revert encrypted key change
ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
...
Pull ARM updates from Russell King:
"Included in this update:
- perf updates from Will Deacon:
The main changes are callchain stability fixes from Jean Pihet and
event mapping and PMU name rework from Mark Rutland
The latter is preparatory work for enabling some code re-use with
arm64 in the future.
- updates for nommu from Uwe Kleine-König:
Two different fixes for the same problem making some ARM nommu
configurations not boot since 3.6-rc1. The problem is that
user_addr_max returned the biggest available RAM address which
makes some copy_from_user variants fail to read from XIP memory.
- deprecate legacy OMAP DMA API, in preparation for it's removal.
The popular drivers have been converted over, leaving a very small
number of rarely used drivers, which hopefully can be converted
during the next cycle with a bit more visibility (and hopefully
people popping out of the woodwork to help test)
- more tweaks for BE systems, particularly with the kernel image
format. In connection with this, I've cleaned up the way we
generate the linker script for the decompressor.
- removal of hard-coded assumptions of the kernel stack size, making
everywhere depend on the value of THREAD_SIZE_ORDER.
- MCPM updates from Nicolas Pitre.
- Make it easier for proper CPU part number checks (which should
always include the vendor field).
- Assembly code optimisation - use the "bx" instruction when
returning from a function on ARMv6+ rather than "mov pc, reg".
- Save the last kernel misaligned fault location and report it via
the procfs alignment file.
- Clean up the way we create the initial stack frame, which is a
repeated pattern in several different locations.
- Support for 8-byte get_user(), needed for some DRM implementations.
- mcs locking from Will Deacon.
- Save and restore a few more Cortex-A9 registers (for errata
workarounds)
- Fix various aspects of the SWP emulation, and the ELF hwcap for the
SWP instruction.
- Update LPAE logic for pte_write and pmd_write to make it more
correct.
- Support for Broadcom Brahma15 CPU cores.
- ARM assembly crypto updates from Ard Biesheuvel"
* 'for-linus' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: (53 commits)
ARM: add comments to the early page table remap code
ARM: 8122/1: smp_scu: enable SCU standby support
ARM: 8121/1: smp_scu: use macro for SCU enable bit
ARM: 8120/1: crypto: sha512: add ARM NEON implementation
ARM: 8119/1: crypto: sha1: add ARM NEON implementation
ARM: 8118/1: crypto: sha1/make use of common SHA-1 structures
ARM: 8113/1: remove remaining definitions of PLAT_PHYS_OFFSET from <mach/memory.h>
ARM: 8111/1: Enable erratum 798181 for Broadcom Brahma-B15
ARM: 8110/1: do CPU-specific init for Broadcom Brahma15 cores
ARM: 8109/1: mm: Modify pte_write and pmd_write logic for LPAE
ARM: 8108/1: mm: Introduce {pte,pmd}_isset and {pte,pmd}_isclear
ARM: hwcap: disable HWCAP_SWP if the CPU advertises it has exclusives
ARM: SWP emulation: only initialise on ARMv7 CPUs
ARM: SWP emulation: always enable when SMP is enabled
ARM: 8103/1: save/restore Cortex-A9 CP15 registers on suspend/resume
ARM: 8098/1: mcs lock: implement wfe-based polling for MCS locking
ARM: 8091/2: add get_user() support for 8 byte types
ARM: 8097/1: unistd.h: relocate comments back to place
ARM: 8096/1: Describe required sort order for textofs-y (TEXT_OFFSET)
ARM: 8090/1: add revision info for PL310 errata 588369 and 727915
...
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
- CTR(AES) optimisation on x86_64 using "by8" AVX.
- arm64 support to ccp
- Intel QAT crypto driver
- Qualcomm crypto engine driver
- x86-64 assembly optimisation for 3DES
- CTR(3DES) speed test
- move FIPS panic from module.c so that it only triggers on crypto
modules
- SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (drbg).
- more test vectors for ghash.
- tweak self tests to catch partial block bugs.
- misc fixes.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (94 commits)
crypto: drbg - fix failure of generating multiple of 2**16 bytes
crypto: ccp - Do not sign extend input data to CCP
crypto: testmgr - add missing spaces to drbg error strings
crypto: atmel-tdes - Switch to managed version of kzalloc
crypto: atmel-sha - Switch to managed version of kzalloc
crypto: testmgr - use chunks smaller than algo block size in chunk tests
crypto: qat - Fixed SKU1 dev issue
crypto: qat - Use hweight for bit counting
crypto: qat - Updated print outputs
crypto: qat - change ae_num to ae_id
crypto: qat - change slice->regions to slice->region
crypto: qat - use min_t macro
crypto: qat - remove unnecessary parentheses
crypto: qat - remove unneeded header
crypto: qat - checkpatch blank lines
crypto: qat - remove unnecessary return codes
crypto: Resolve shadow warnings
crypto: ccp - Remove "select OF" from Kconfig
crypto: caam - fix DECO RSR polling
crypto: qce - Let 'DEV_QCE' depend on both HAS_DMA and HAS_IOMEM
...
Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() so that PKCS#7 can use it if
compiled as a module.
Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The function drbg_generate_long slices the request into 2**16 byte
or smaller chunks. However, the loop, however invokes the random number
generation function with zero bytes when the request size is a multiple
of 2**16 bytes. The fix prevents zero bytes requests.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There are a few missing spaces in the error text strings for
drbg_cavs_test, trivial fix.
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch updates many of the chunked tcrypt test cases so that not all of the
chunks are an exact multiple of the block size. This should help uncover cases
where the residue passed to blkcipher_walk_done() is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Change formal parameters to not clash with global names to
eliminate many W=2 warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Th AF_ALG socket was missing a security label (e.g. SELinux)
which means that socket was in "unlabeled" state.
This was recently demonstrated in the cryptsetup package
(cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later.)
See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1115120
This patch clones the sock's label from the parent sock
and resolves the issue (similar to AF_BLUETOOTH protocol family).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
X.509 certificate issuer and subject fields are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
and so their existence needn't be tested for. They are guaranteed to end up
with an empty string if the name material has nothing we can use (see
x509_fabricate_name()).
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() and x509_request_asymmetric_key() do the same
thing, the latter being a copy of the former created by the IMA folks, so drop
the PKCS#7 version as the X.509 location is more general.
Whilst we're at it, rename the arguments of x509_request_asymmetric_key() to
better reflect what the values being passed in are intended to match on an
X.509 cert.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need the lengths of the NUL-terminated
strings passing in as it can work that out for itself.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes the following sparse warnings:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:73:17: warning:
symbol 'key_type_pkcs7' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c needs to #include linux/err.h rather
than relying on getting it through other headers.
Without this, the powerpc allyesconfig build fails.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
With DMA_API_DEBUG set, following warnings are emitted
(tested on CAAM accelerator):
DMA-API: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata
DMA-API: device driver maps memory from stack
and the culprits are:
-key in __test_aead and __test_hash
-result in __test_hash
MAX_KEYLEN is changed to accommodate maximum key length from
existing test vectors in crypto/testmgr.h (131 bytes) and rounded.
Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge tag 'keys-pefile-20140709' into keys-next
Here's a set of changes that implement a PE file signature checker.
This provides the following facility:
(1) Extract the signature from the PE file. This is a PKCS#7 message
containing, as its data, a hash of the signed parts of the file.
(2) Digest the signed parts of the file.
(3) Compare the digest with the one from the PKCS#7 message.
(4) Validate the signatures on the PKCS#7 message and indicate
whether it was matched by a trusted key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-pkcs7-20140708' into keys-next
Here's a set of changes that implement a PKCS#7 message parser in the kernel.
The PKCS#7 message parsing will then be used to limit kexec to authenticated
kernels only if so configured.
The changes provide the following facilities:
(1) Parse an ASN.1 PKCS#7 message and pick out useful bits such as the data
content and the X.509 certificates used to sign it and all the data
signatures.
(2) Verify all the data signatures against the set of X.509 certificates
available in the message.
(3) Follow the certificate chains and verify that:
(a) for every self-signed X.509 certificate, check that it validly signed
itself, and:
(b) for every non-self-signed certificate, if we have a 'parent'
certificate, the former is validly signed by the latter.
(4) Look for intersections between the certificate chains and the trusted
keyring, if any intersections are found, verify that the trusted
certificates signed the intersection point in the chain.
(5) For testing purposes, a key type can be made available that will take a
PKCS#7 message, check that the message is trustworthy, and if so, add its
data content into the key.
Note that (5) has to be altered to take account of the preparsing patches
already committed to this branch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond
with those in struct key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse
hook. This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked
to retain the new key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
You can select MPILIB_EXTRA all you want, it doesn't exist ;-)
Surprised kconfig doesn't complain about that...
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by
builtin keys on the system keyring.
This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter
'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys.
Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch
Changelog v7:
- rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed by a
particular key on the system keyring.
This patch defines a new kernel parameter 'ca_keys' to identify the
specific key which must be used for trust validation of certificates.
Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch.
Changelog:
- support for builtin x509 public keys only
- export "asymmetric_keyid_match"
- remove ifndefs MODULE
- rename kernel boot parameter from keys_ownerid to ca_keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To avoid code duplication this patch refactors asymmetric_key_match(),
making partial ID string match a separate function.
This patch also implicitly fixes a bug in the code. asymmetric_key_match()
allows to match the key by its subtype. But subtype matching could be
undone if asymmetric_key_id(key) would return NULL. This patch first
checks for matching spec and then for its value.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying
a certificate's signature.
This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.
Changelog v6:
- on error free key - Dmitry
- validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry
- formatting cleanup
Changelog:
- define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table
before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the
PKCS#7 signed content.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The pesign utility had a bug where it was using OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose
instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId - so allow both OIDs.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing"
data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed
content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically
SHA256).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7
signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got
something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later
patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The patch corrects the security strength of the HMAC-SHA1 DRBG to 128
bits. This strength defines the size of the seed required for the DRBG.
Thus, the patch lowers the seeding requirement from 256 bits to 128 bits
for HMAC-SHA1.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The current locking approach of the DRBG tries to keep the protected
code paths very minimal. It is therefore possible that two threads query
one DRBG instance at the same time. When thread A requests random
numbers, a shadow copy of the DRBG state is created upon which the
request for A is processed. After finishing the state for A's request is
merged back into the DRBG state. If now thread B requests random numbers
from the same DRBG after the request for thread A is received, but
before A's shadow state is merged back, the random numbers for B will be
identical to the ones for A. Please note that the time window is very
small for this scenario.
To prevent that there is even a theoretical chance for thread A and B
having the same DRBG state, the current time stamp is provided as
additional information string for each new request.
The addition of the time stamp as additional information string implies
that now all generate functions must be capable to process a linked
list with additional information strings instead of a scalar.
CC: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When the DRBG is initialized, the core is looked up using the DRBG name.
The name that can be used for the lookup is registered in
cra_driver_name. The cra_name value contains stdrng.
Thus, the lookup code must use crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name to obtain the
precise DRBG name and select the correct DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CTR DRBG requires the update function to be called twice when
generating a random number. In both cases, update function must process
the additional information string by using the DF function. As the DF
produces the same result in both cases, we can save one invocation of
the DF function when the first DF function result is reused.
The result of the DF function is stored in the scratchpad storage. The
patch ensures that the scratchpad is not cleared when we want to reuse
the DF result. For achieving this, the CTR DRBG update function must
know by whom and in which scenario it is called. This information is
provided with the reseed parameter to the update function.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The initial format strings caused warnings on several architectures. The
updated format strings now match the variable types.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
CC: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The structure used to construct the module description line was marked
problematic by the sparse code analysis tool. The module line
description now does not contain any ifdefs to prevent error reports
from sparse.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7
message and a set of keys that we already know and trust.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7
message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify
fails, we reject the whole lot.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with
it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that
chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the
public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of
RFC 2315.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch removes the build-time test that ensures at least one RNG
is set. Instead we will simply not build drbg if no options are set
through Kconfig.
This also fixes a typo in the name of the Kconfig option CRYTPO_DRBG
(should be CRYPTO_DRBG).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The DRBG-style linked list to manage input data that is fed into the
cipher invocations is replaced with the kernel linked list
implementation.
The change is transparent to users of the interfaces offered by the
DRBG. Therefore, no changes to the testmgr code is needed.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For the CTR DRBG, the drbg_state->scratchpad temp buffer (i.e. the
memory location immediately before the drbg_state->tfm variable
is the buffer that the BCC function operates on. BCC operates
blockwise. Making the temp buffer drbg_statelen(drbg) in size is
sufficient when the DRBG state length is a multiple of the block
size. For AES192 this is not the case and the length for temp is
insufficient (yes, that also means for such ciphers, the final
output of all BCC rounds are truncated before used to update the
state of the DRBG!!).
The patch enlarges the temp buffer from drbg_statelen to
drbg_statelen + drbg_blocklen to have sufficient space.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Print the driver name that is being tested. The driver name can be
inferred parsing /proc/crypto but having it in the output is
clearer
Signed-off-by: Luca Clementi <luca.clementi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.
v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an
X.509 certificate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
As reported by a static code analyzer, the code for the ordering of
the linked list can be simplified.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
kvfree() helper is now available, use it instead of open code it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This adds 4 test vectors for GHASH (of which one for chunked mode), making
a total of 5.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The DRBG test code implements the CAVS test approach.
As discussed for the test vectors, all DRBG types are covered with
testing. However, not every backend cipher is covered with testing. To
prevent the testmgr from logging missing testing, the NULL test is
registered for all backend ciphers not covered with specific test cases.
All currently implemented DRBG types and backend ciphers are defined
in SP800-90A. Therefore, the fips_allowed flag is set for all.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All types of the DRBG (CTR, HMAC, Hash) are covered with test vectors.
In addition, all permutations of use cases of the DRBG are covered:
* with and without predition resistance
* with and without additional information string
* with and without personalization string
As the DRBG implementation is agnositc of the specific backend cipher,
only test vectors for one specific backend cipher is used. For example:
the Hash DRBG uses the same code paths irrespectively of using SHA-256
or SHA-512. Thus, the test vectors for SHA-256 cover the testing of all
DRBG code paths of SHA-512.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
David Howells
Linus Torvalds
Herbert Xu
Stephan Mueller
Ted Percival
Ondrej Kozina
KOVACS Krisztian
Ard Biesheuvel
Fengguang Wu
Cristian Stoica
Tim Chen
Xuelin Shi
Yinghai Lu
Jussi Kivilinna
Jarod Wilson
Mark Rustad
Milan Broz
Wei Yongjun
Horia Geanta
Jean Delvare
Dmitry Kasatkin
Mimi Zohar
Vivek Goyal
Luca Clementi
Eric Dumazet