* Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
security model supports locking access to the media at
device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and secure-erase
(crypto-scramble).
Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm security
implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations at OS
runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys facility to
provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key material. The
usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is driven via
libnvdimm sysfs.
* Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
"The vast bulk of this update is the new support for the security
capabilities of some nvdimms.
The userspace tooling for this capability is still a work in progress,
but the changes survive the existing libnvdimm unit tests. The changes
also pass manual checkout on hardware and the new nfit_test emulation
of the security capability.
The touches of the security/keys/ files have received the necessary
acks from Mimi and David. Those changes were necessary to allow for a
new generic encrypted-key type, and allow the nvdimm sub-system to
lookup key material referenced by the libnvdimm-sysfs interface.
Summary:
- Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
security model supports locking access to the media at
device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and
secure-erase (crypto-scramble).
Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm
security implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations
at OS runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys
facility to provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key
material. The usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is
driven via libnvdimm sysfs.
- Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (21 commits)
libnvdimm/security: Quiet security operations
libnvdimm/security: Add documentation for nvdimm security support
tools/testing/nvdimm: add Intel DSM 1.8 support for nfit_test
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add overwrite support for nfit_test
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add test support for Intel nvdimm security DSMs
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add enable/update passphrase support for Intel nvdimms
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add disable passphrase support to Intel nvdimm.
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add freeze security support to Intel nvdimm
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops
keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys
keys: Export lookup_user_key to external users
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Store dimm id as a member to struct nvdimm
libnvdimm, namespace: Replace kmemdup() with kstrndup()
libnvdimm, label: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
ACPI/nfit: Adjust annotation for why return 0 if fail to find NFIT at start
libnvdimm, bus: Check id immediately following ida_simple_get
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add 1472-byte test to tcrypt for IPsec
- Reintroduced crypto stats interface with numerous changes
- Support incremental algorithm dumps
Algorithms:
- Add xchacha12/20
- Add nhpoly1305
- Add adiantum
- Add streebog hash
- Mark cts(cbc(aes)) as FIPS allowed
Drivers:
- Improve performance of arm64/chacha20
- Improve performance of x86/chacha20
- Add NEON-accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add SSE2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add AVX2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add support for 192/256-bit keys in gcmaes AVX
- Add SG support in gcmaes AVX
- ESN for inline IPsec tx in chcr
- Add support for CryptoCell 703 in ccree
- Add support for CryptoCell 713 in ccree
- Add SM4 support in ccree
- Add SM3 support in ccree
- Add support for chacha20 in caam/qi2
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/jr
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/qi2
- Add AEAD cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (130 commits)
crypto: skcipher - remove remnants of internal IV generators
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix build with !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
crypto: salsa20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk
crypto: skcipher - add might_sleep() to skcipher_walk_virt()
crypto: x86/chacha - avoid sleeping under kernel_fpu_begin()
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Added AEAD cipher support
crypto: mxc-scc - fix build warnings on ARM64
crypto: api - document missing stats member
crypto: user - remove unused dump functions
crypto: chelsio - Fix wrong error counter increments
crypto: chelsio - Reset counters on cxgb4 Detach
crypto: chelsio - Handle PCI shutdown event
crypto: chelsio - cleanup:send addr as value in function argument
crypto: chelsio - Use same value for both channel in single WR
crypto: chelsio - Swap location of AAD and IV sent in WR
crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'kctx_len'
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in hash_set_dma_transfer
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in cryp_set_dma_transfer
crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C
crypto: aesni - Introduce partial block macro
..
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use
all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc. Only the one
responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit
needs to declare these. In this case, that file is "encrypted.c"
and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here.
Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests
show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit
use of string.h - so that is added as well.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore
already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause
confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is
somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b145 ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
A key of type "encrypted" references a "master key" which is used to
encrypt and decrypt the encrypted key's payload. However, when we
accessed the master key's payload, we failed to handle the case where
the master key has been revoked, which sets the payload pointer to NULL.
Note that request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.
Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.
This was an issue for master keys of type "user" only. Master keys can
also be of type "trusted", but those cannot be revoked.
Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.38+]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates"
* tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (90 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: handle DECLARE_HASHTABLE
Documentation: atomic_ops.txt is core-api/atomic_ops.rst
Docs: clean up some DocBook loose ends
Make the main documentation title less Geocities
Docs: Use kernel-figure in vidioc-g-selection.rst
Docs: fix table problems in ras.rst
Docs: Fix breakage with Sphinx 1.5 and upper
Docs: Include the Latex "ifthen" package
doc/kokr/howto: Only send regression fixes after -rc1
docs-rst: fix broken links to dynamic-debug-howto in kernel-parameters
doc: Document suitability of IBM Verse for kernel development
Doc: fix a markup error in coding-style.rst
docs: driver-api: i2c: remove some outdated information
Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
Docs: Insert missing space to separate link from text
doc/ko_KR/memory-barriers: Update control-dependencies example
Documentation, kbuild: fix typo "minimun" -> "minimum"
docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
...
For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material
before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted
payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys
derived from the master key.
Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also
zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although
depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information
does not necessarily need to be kept secret.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent
timing attacks.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform,
which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on
different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix
this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a
HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes.
The following script reproduces the bug:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
for i in $(seq 2); do
(
set -e
for j in $(seq 1000); do
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s)
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
done
) &
done
Output with bug:
[ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22)
add_key: Invalid argument
add_key: Invalid argument
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt
stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for
the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the
encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the
decryption padding.
Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s)
datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
[ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!"
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but
they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This function has two callers and neither are able to handle a NULL
return. Really, -EINVAL is the correct thing return here anyway. This
fixes some static checker warnings like:
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:709 encrypted_key_decrypt()
error: uninitialized symbol 'master_key'.
Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The IV must not be modified by the skcipher operation so we need
to duplicate it.
Fixes: c3917fd9df ("KEYS: Use skcipher")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of
aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an
error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale
entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel
crash when registering a new key type later.
This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes()
and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error
paths.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Commit fc7c70e "KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two
payload pointers" erroneously modified encrypted-keys. This patch
reverts the change to that file.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond
with those in struct key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
provision of two new key type operations:
int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
was called.
preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
void *type_data[2];
void *payload;
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
};
Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.
The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
ops.
The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
to tell the upcall about the key to be created.
This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.
The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:
int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_RCU and CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER resulted in
"suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!" and "incompatible types
in comparison expression (different address spaces)" messages.
Access the masterkey directly when holding the rwsem.
Changelog v1:
- Use either rcu_read_lock()/rcu_derefence_key()/rcu_read_unlock()
or remove the unnecessary rcu_derefence() - David Howells
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define rcu_assign_keypointer(), which uses the key payload.rcudata instead
of payload.data, to resolve the CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER message:
"incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces)"
Replace the rcu_assign_pointer() calls in encrypted/trusted keys with
rcu_assign_keypointer().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Encrypted keys are encrypted/decrypted using either a trusted or
user-defined key type, which is referred to as the 'master' key.
The master key may be of type trusted iff the trusted key is
builtin or both the trusted key and encrypted keys are built as
modules. This patch resolves the build dependency problem.
- Use "masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS)-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS)" construct
to encapsulate the above logic. (Suggested by Dimtry Kasatkin.)
- Fixing the encrypted-keys Makefile, results in a module name change
from encrypted.ko to encrypted-keys.ko.
- Add module dependency for request_trusted_key() definition
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
There is no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
For each hex2bin call in encrypted keys, check that the ascii hex string
is valid. On failure, return -EINVAL.
Changelog v1:
- hex2bin now returns an int
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Fixes this build error:
security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c: In function 'request_trusted_key':
security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c:35:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'IS_ERR'
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or,
for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key. This patch
removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Linus Torvalds
Dave Jiang
Paul Gortmaker
Eric Biggers
Greg Kroah-Hartman
David Howells
Markus Elfring
Kees Cook
Dan Carpenter
Herbert Xu
Takashi Iwai
Mimi Zohar
Jingoo Han
Andy Shevchenko
Stephen Rothwell