Fix __key_link_end()'s attempt to fix up the quota if an error occurs.
There are two erroneous cases: Firstly, we always decrease the quota if
the preallocated replacement keyring needs cleaning up, irrespective of
whether or not we should (we may have replaced a pointer rather than
adding another pointer).
Secondly, we never clean up the quota if we added a pointer without the
keyring storage being extended (we allocate multiple pointers at a time,
even if we're not going to use them all immediately).
We handle this by setting the bottom bit of the preallocation pointer in
__key_link_begin() to indicate that the quota needs fixing up, which is
then passed to __key_link() (which clears the whole thing) and
__key_link_end().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One failure path in security/keys/trusted.c::trusted_update() does
not free 'new_p' while the others do. This patch makes sure we also free
it in the remaining path (if datablob_parse() returns different from
Opt_update).
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and
encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional
changes.
Done using:
perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c
perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c
sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c
To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a
function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing
brace of a function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We can avoid scattering va_end() within the
va_start();
for (;;) {
}
va_end();
loop, assuming that crypto_shash_init()/crypto_shash_update() return 0 on
success and negative value otherwise.
Make TSS_authhmac()/TSS_checkhmac1()/TSS_checkhmac2() similar to TSS_rawhmac()
by removing "va_end()/goto" from the loop.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TSS_rawhmac() checks for data != NULL before using it.
We should do the same thing for TSS_authhmac().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TSS_rawhmac() forgot to call va_end()/kfree() when data == NULL and
forgot to call va_end() when crypto_shash_update() < 0.
Fix these bugs by escaping from the loop using "break"
(rather than "return"/"goto") in order to make sure that
va_end()/kfree() are always called.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add missing kfree(td) in tpm_seal() before the return, freeing
td on error paths as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In construct_alloc_key(), up_write() is called in the error path if
__key_link_begin() fails, but this is incorrect as __key_link_begin() only
returns with the nominated keyring locked if it returns successfully.
Without this patch, you might see the following in dmesg:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
mount.cifs/5769 is trying to release lock (&key->sem) at:
[<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
3 locks held by mount.cifs/5769:
#0: (&type->s_umount_key#41/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81131321>] sget+0x278/0x3e7
#1: (&ret_buf->session_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0258e59>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x35a/0x443 [cifs]
#2: (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81201000>] request_key_and_link+0x10a/0x3fc
stack backtrace:
Pid: 5769, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 2.6.37-rc6+ #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81081601>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xca/0xd5
[<ffffffff81083248>] lock_release_non_nested+0xc1/0x263
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81083567>] lock_release+0x17d/0x1a4
[<ffffffff81073f45>] up_write+0x23/0x3b
[<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffffa026fe9e>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x61/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffff812013c5>] request_key+0x41/0x74
[<ffffffffa027003d>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x200/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa026e296>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x55d/0x1273 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa02589e1>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
[<ffffffffa0258e7e>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x37f/0x443 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa025a9e3>] cifs_mount+0x1aa1/0x23f3 [cifs]
[<ffffffff8111fd94>] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xdb/0x120
[<ffffffffa027002c>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x1ef/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa024cc71>] cifs_do_mount+0x165/0x2b3 [cifs]
[<ffffffff81130e72>] vfs_kern_mount+0xaf/0x1dc
[<ffffffff81131007>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xef
[<ffffffff811483b9>] do_mount+0x6f4/0x733
[<ffffffff8114861f>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
[<ffffffff8100ac42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- use static const char arrays instead of #define
- rename init_sdesc to alloc_sdesc
- convert 'unsigned int' definitions to 'size_t'
- revert remaining 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Verify the hex ascii datablob length is correct before converting the IV,
encrypted data, and HMAC to binary.
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- replace kzalloc, where possible, with kmalloc
- revert 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previously not all TSS return codes were tested, as they were all eventually
caught by the TPM. Now all returns are tested and handled immediately.
This patch also fixes memory leaks in error and non-error paths.
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch fixes the linux-next powerpc build errors as reported by
Stephen Rothwell.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
(reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
(size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
(fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.
Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.
The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)
pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.
keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.
Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
(David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix an incorrect error check that returns 1 for error instead of the
expected error code.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix a bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() whereby it tries to check the ownership
of the parent process's session keyring whether or not the parent has a session
keyring [CVE-2010-2960].
This results in the following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0
IP: [<ffffffff811ae4dd>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x251/0x443
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811ae2f3>] ? keyctl_session_to_parent+0x67/0x443
[<ffffffff8109d286>] ? __do_fault+0x24b/0x3d0
[<ffffffff811af98c>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb8
[<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
if the parent process has no session keyring.
If the system is using pam_keyinit then it mostly protected against this as all
processes derived from a login will have inherited the session keyring created
by pam_keyinit during the log in procedure.
To test this, pam_keyinit calls need to be commented out in /etc/pam.d/.
Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There's an protected access to the parent process's credentials in the middle
of keyctl_session_to_parent(). This results in the following RCU warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyctl.c:1291 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by keyctl-session-/2137:
#0: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811ae2ec>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x60/0x236
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2137, comm: keyctl-session- Not tainted 2.6.36-rc2-cachefs+ #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105606a>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb3
[<ffffffff811ae379>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0xed/0x236
[<ffffffff811af77e>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The code should take the RCU read lock to make sure the parents credentials
don't go away, even though it's holding a spinlock and has IRQ disabled.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc
format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
request_key() should return -ENOKEY if the key it constructs has been
negatively instantiated.
Without this, request_key() can return an unusable key to its caller,
and if the caller then does key_validate() that won't catch the problem.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In commit bb952bb98a there was the accidental
deletion of a statement from call_sbin_request_key() to render the process
keyring ID to a text string so that it can be passed to /sbin/request-key.
With gcc 4.6.0 this causes the following warning:
CC security/keys/request_key.o
security/keys/request_key.c: In function 'call_sbin_request_key':
security/keys/request_key.c:102:15: warning: variable 'prkey' set but not used
This patch reinstates that statement.
Without this statement, /sbin/request-key will get some random rubbish from the
stack as that parameter.
Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
keyctl_describe_key() turns the key reference it gets into a usable key pointer
and assigns that to a variable called 'key', which it then ignores in favour of
recomputing the key pointer each time it needs it. Make it use the precomputed
pointer instead.
Without this patch, gcc 4.6 reports that the variable key is set but not used:
building with gcc 4.6 I'm getting a warning message:
CC security/keys/keyctl.o
security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_describe_key':
security/keys/keyctl.c:472:14: warning: variable 'key' set but not used
Reported-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make /proc/keys check to see if the calling process possesses each key before
performing the security check. The possession check can be skipped if the key
doesn't have the possessor-view permission bit set.
This causes the keys a process possesses to show up in /proc/keys, even if they
don't have matching user/group/other view permissions.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Authorise a process to perform keyctl_set_timeout() on an uninstantiated key if
that process has the authorisation key for it.
This allows the instantiator to set the timeout on a key it is instantiating -
provided it does it before instantiating the key.
For instance, the test upcall script provided with the keyutils package could
be modified to set the expiry to an hour hence before instantiating the key:
[/usr/share/keyutils/request-key-debug.sh]
if [ "$3" != "neg" ]
then
+ keyctl timeout $1 3600
keyctl instantiate $1 "Debug $3" $4 || exit 1
else
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is from a Smatch check I'm writing.
strncpy_from_user() returns -EFAULT on error so the first change just
silences a warning but doesn't change how the code works.
The other change is a bug fix because install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
can return a variety of errors such as -EINVAL, -EEXIST, -ENOMEM or
-EKEYREVOKED.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
No functional changes.
keyctl_session_to_parent() is the only user of signal->count which needs
the correct value. Change it to use thread_group_empty() instead, this
must be strictly equivalent under tasklist, and imho looks better.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change
subprocess_info->cred in advance. Now that we have info->init() we can
change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing
kernel thread.
Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with
UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup()
are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred()
which does key_get() on success.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- C99 knows about USHRT_MAX/SHRT_MAX/SHRT_MIN, not
USHORT_MAX/SHORT_MAX/SHORT_MIN.
- Make SHRT_MIN of type s16, not int, for consistency.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/dma/timb_dma.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix security/keys/keyring.c]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We were using the wrong variable here so the error codes weren't being returned
properly. The original code returns -ENOKEY.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Do preallocation for __key_link() so that the various callers in request_key.c
can deal with any errors from this source before attempting to construct a key.
This allows them to assume that the actual linkage step is guaranteed to be
successful.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Errors from construct_alloc_key() shouldn't just be ignored in the way they are
by construct_key_and_link(). The only error that can be ignored so is
EINPROGRESS as that is used to indicate that we've found a key and don't need
to construct one.
We don't, however, handle ENOMEM, EDQUOT or EACCES to indicate allocation
failures of one sort or another.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links as it's
used to prevent cycle detection from being avoided by parallel keyring
additions.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
call_sbin_request_key() creates a keyring and then attempts to insert a link to
the authorisation key into that keyring, but does so without holding a write
lock on the keyring semaphore.
It will normally get away with this because it hasn't told anyone that the
keyring exists yet. The new keyring, however, has had its serial number
published, which means it can be accessed directly by that handle.
This was found by a previous patch that adds RCU lockdep checks to the code
that reads the keyring payload pointer, which includes a check that the keyring
semaphore is actually locked.
Without this patch, the following command:
keyctl request2 user b a @s
will provoke the following lockdep warning is displayed in dmesg:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyring.c:727 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
2 locks held by keyctl/2076:
#0: (key_types_sem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811a5b29>] key_type_lookup+0x1c/0x71
#1: (keyring_serialise_link_sem){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811a6d1e>] __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2076, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc6-cachefs #54
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81051fdc>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2
[<ffffffff811a6d1e>] ? __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5
[<ffffffff811a6e6f>] __key_link+0x19e/0x3c5
[<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc
[<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f
[<ffffffff811aa0dc>] call_sbin_request_key+0xe7/0x33b
[<ffffffff8139376a>] ? mutex_unlock+0x9/0xb
[<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc
[<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f
[<ffffffff811aa6fa>] ? request_key_auth_new+0x1c2/0x23c
[<ffffffff810aaf15>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after+0x108/0x173
[<ffffffff811a9d00>] ? request_key_and_link+0x146/0x300
[<ffffffff810ac568>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xe1/0x118
[<ffffffff811a9e45>] request_key_and_link+0x28b/0x300
[<ffffffff811a89ac>] sys_request_key+0xf7/0x14a
[<ffffffff81052c0b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10c/0x130
[<ffffffff81394fb9>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The keyring key type code should use RCU dereference wrappers, even when it
holds the keyring's key semaphore.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
key_gc_keyring() needs to either hold the RCU read lock or hold the keyring
semaphore if it's going to scan the keyring's list. Given that it only needs
to read the key list, and it's doing so under a spinlock, the RCU read lock is
the thing to use.
Furthermore, the RCU check added in e7b0a61b79 is
incorrect as holding the spinlock on key_serial_lock is not grounds for
assuming a keyring's pointer list can be read safely. Instead, a simple
rcu_dereference() inside of the previously mentioned RCU read lock is what we
want.
Reported-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
keys: don't need to use RCU in keyring_read() as semaphore is held
The request_key() system call and request_key_and_link() should make a
link from an existing key to the destination keyring (if supplied), not
just from a new key to the destination keyring.
This can be tested by:
ring=`keyctl newring fred @s`
keyctl request2 user debug:a a
keyctl request user debug:a $ring
keyctl list $ring
If it says:
keyring is empty
then it didn't work. If it shows something like:
1 key in keyring:
1070462727: --alswrv 0 0 user: debug:a
then it did.
request_key() system call is meant to recursively search all your keyrings for
the key you desire, and, optionally, if it doesn't exist, call out to userspace
to create one for you.
If request_key() finds or creates a key, it should, optionally, create a link
to that key from the destination keyring specified.
Therefore, if, after a successful call to request_key() with a desination
keyring specified, you see the destination keyring empty, the code didn't work
correctly.
If you see the found key in the keyring, then it did - which is what the patch
is required for.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
keyring_read() doesn't need to use rcu_dereference() to access the keyring
payload as the caller holds the key semaphore to prevent modifications
from happening whilst the data is read out.
This should solve the following warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyring.c:204 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by keyctl/2144:
#0: (&key->sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81177f7c>] keyctl_read_key+0x9c/0xcf
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2144, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc2-cachefs #113
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105121f>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2
[<ffffffff811762d5>] keyring_read+0x4d/0xe7
[<ffffffff81177f8c>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811788d4>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb9
[<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix the following RCU warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/request_key.c:116 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
This was caused by doing:
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl newring fred @s
539196288
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request2 user a a 539196288
request_key: Required key not available
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
David Howells
Jesper Juhl
Mimi Zohar
Tetsuo Handa
James Morris
Andi Kleen
Justin P. Mattock
Dan Carpenter
Oleg Nesterov
Alexey Dobriyan
Toshiyuki Okajima
Linus Torvalds
Eric Paris
Tejun Heo