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Heiko Carstens 1e7bfb2134 [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 27
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:29 +01:00
Linus Torvalds b0f4b285d7 Merge branch 'tracing-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'tracing-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (241 commits)
  sched, trace: update trace_sched_wakeup()
  tracing/ftrace: don't trace on early stage of a secondary cpu boot, v3
  Revert "x86: disable X86_PTRACE_BTS"
  ring-buffer: prevent false positive warning
  ring-buffer: fix dangling commit race
  ftrace: enable format arguments checking
  x86, bts: memory accounting
  x86, bts: add fork and exit handling
  ftrace: introduce tracing_reset_online_cpus() helper
  tracing: fix warnings in kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c
  tracing: fix warning in kernel/trace/trace.c
  tracing/ring-buffer: remove unused ring_buffer size
  trace: fix task state printout
  ftrace: add not to regex on filtering functions
  trace: better use of stack_trace_enabled for boot up code
  trace: add a way to enable or disable the stack tracer
  x86: entry_64 - introduce FTRACE_ frame macro v2
  tracing/ftrace: add the printk-msg-only option
  tracing/ftrace: use preempt_enable_no_resched_notrace in ring_buffer_time_stamp()
  x86, bts: correctly report invalid bts records
  ...

Fixed up trivial conflict in scripts/recordmcount.pl due to SH bits
being already partly merged by the SH merge.
2008-12-28 12:21:10 -08:00
Markus Metzger bf53de907d x86, bts: add fork and exit handling
Impact: introduce new ptrace facility

Add arch_ptrace_untrace() function that is called when the tracer
detaches (either voluntarily or when the tracing task dies);
ptrace_disable() is only called on a voluntary detach.

Add ptrace_fork() and arch_ptrace_fork(). They are called when a
traced task is forked.

Clear DS and BTS related fields on fork.

Release DS resources and reclaim memory in ptrace_untrace(). This
releases resources already when the tracing task dies. We used to do
that when the traced task dies.

Signed-off-by: Markus Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-20 09:15:46 +01:00
James Morris ec98ce480a Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c

Manually fixed above to use new creds API functions, e.g.
nfs4_save_creds().

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-12-04 17:16:36 +11:00
Christoph Hellwig 96b8936a9e remove __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PTRACE
All architectures now use the generic compat_sys_ptrace, as should every
new architecture that needs 32bit compat (if we'll ever get another).

Remove the now superflous __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PTRACE define, and also
kill a comment about __ARCH_SYS_PTRACE that was added after
__ARCH_SYS_PTRACE was already gone.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-30 11:00:15 -08:00
David Howells d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells c69e8d9c01 CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:19 +11:00
David Howells b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells 76aac0e9a1 CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11:00
Adrian Bunk b747c8c102 make ptrace_untrace() static
ptrace_untrace() can now become static.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-20 08:52:39 -07:00
David Howells 5cd9c58fbe security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
Roland McGrath 85ba2d862e tracehook: wait_task_inactive
This extends wait_task_inactive() with a new argument so it can be used in
a "soft" mode where it will check for the task changing state unexpectedly
and back off.  There is no change to existing callers.  This lays the
groundwork to allow robust, noninvasive tracing that can try to sample a
blocked thread but back off safely if it wakes up.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 12:00:09 -07:00
Roland McGrath f470021adb ptrace children revamp
ptrace no longer fiddles with the children/sibling links, and the
old ptrace_children list is gone.  Now ptrace, whether of one's own
children or another's via PTRACE_ATTACH, just uses the new ptraced
list instead.

There should be no user-visible difference that matters.  The only
change is the order in which do_wait() sees multiple stopped
children and stopped ptrace attachees.  Since wait_task_stopped()
was changed earlier so it no longer reorders the children list, we
already know this won't cause any new problems.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
2008-07-16 18:02:33 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 006ebb40d3 Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.

Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.

In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).

This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14 15:01:47 +10:00
Christoph Hellwig bcf35afb52 make generic sys_ptrace unconditional
With s390 the last arch switched to the generic sys_ptrace yesterday so
we can now kill the ifdef around it to enforce every new port it using
it instead of introducing new weirdo versions.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-05-01 10:21:54 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 00cd5c37af ptrace: permit ptracing of /sbin/init
Afaics, currently there are no kernel problems with ptracing init, it can't
lose SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE flag and be killed/stopped by accident.

The ability to strace/debug init can be very useful if you try to figure out
why it does not work as expected.

However, admin should know what he does, "gdb /sbin/init 1" stops init, it
can't reap orphaned zombies or take care of /etc/inittab until continued.  It
is even possible to crash init (and thus the whole system) if you wish,
ptracer has full control.

See also the long discussion: http://marc.info/?t=120628018600001

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 08:29:38 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 33e9fc7d01 ptrace: ptrace_attach: use send_sig_info() instead force_sig_specific()
Nobody can block/ignore SIGSTOP, no need to use force_sig_specific() in
ptrace_attach.  Use the "regular" send_sig_info().

With this patch stracing of /sbin/init doesn't clear its SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE,
but not that this makes ptracing of init safe.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 08:29:38 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 68cb947866 ptrace: __ptrace_unlink: use the ptrace_reparented() helper
Currently __ptrace_unlink() checks list_empty(->ptrace_list) to figure out
whether the child was reparented.  Change the code to use ptrace_reparented()
to make this check more explicit and consistent.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 08:29:38 -07:00
Roland McGrath 9d04d9280c ptrace: conditionalize compat_ptrace_request
My recent additions to compat_ptrace_request made it mandatory
for CONFIG_COMPAT arch's to define copy_siginfo_from_user32.
This broke some builds, though they all really should get cleaned
up in that way.

Since all the arch's that actually call compat_ptrace_request have
now been cleaned up to use the generic compat_sys_ptrace, we can
avoid the build problems on the crufty arch's by changing the
conditionals on the definition.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 14:14:36 -07:00
Roland McGrath e16b278164 ptrace: compat_ptrace_request siginfo
This adds support for PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO in
compat_ptrace_request.  It relies on existing arch definitions for
copy_siginfo_to_user32 and copy_siginfo_from_user32.

On powerpc, this fixes a longstanding regression of 32-bit ptrace
calls on 64-bit kernels vs native calls (64-bit calls or 32-bit
kernels).  This can be seen in a 32-bit call using PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
to examine e.g. siginfo_t.si_addr from a signal that sets it.
(This was broken as of 2.6.24 and, I presume, many or all prior versions.)

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-21 15:53:41 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov c0c0b649d6 ptrace_check_attach: remove unneeded ->signal != NULL check
It is not possible to see the PT_PTRACED task without ->signal/sighand under
tasklist_lock, release_task() does ptrace_unlink() first.  If the task was
already released before, ptrace_attach() can't succeed and set PT_PTRACED.
Remove this check.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 09:22:26 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov 6b39c7bfbd kill PT_ATTACHED
Since the patch

	"Fix ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme()/de_thread() race"
	commit f5b40e363a

we set PT_ATTACHED and change child->parent "atomically" wrt task_list lock.

This means we can remove the checks like "PT_ATTACHED && ->parent != ptracer"
which were needed to catch the "ptrace attach is in progress" case.  We can
also remove the flag itself since nobody else uses it.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 09:22:26 -08:00
Adrian Bunk f17d30a803 kernel/ptrace.c should #include <linux/syscalls.h>
Every file should include the headers containing the prototypes for its global
functions (in this case sys_ptrace()).

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06 10:41:02 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov d9ae90ac4b use __set_task_state() for TRACED/STOPPED tasks
1. It is much easier to grep for ->state change if __set_task_state() is used
   instead of the direct assignment.

2. ptrace_stop() and handle_group_stop() use set_task_state() which adds the
   unneeded mb() (btw even if we use mb() it is still possible that do_wait()
   sees the new ->state but not ->exit_code, but this is ok).

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06 10:41:00 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 75659ca0c1 Merge branch 'task_killable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/willy/misc
* 'task_killable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/willy/misc: (22 commits)
  Remove commented-out code copied from NFS
  NFS: Switch from intr mount option to TASK_KILLABLE
  Add wait_for_completion_killable
  Add wait_event_killable
  Add schedule_timeout_killable
  Use mutex_lock_killable in vfs_readdir
  Add mutex_lock_killable
  Use lock_page_killable
  Add lock_page_killable
  Add fatal_signal_pending
  Add TASK_WAKEKILL
  exit: Use task_is_*
  signal: Use task_is_*
  sched: Use task_contributes_to_load, TASK_ALL and TASK_NORMAL
  ptrace: Use task_is_*
  power: Use task_is_*
  wait: Use TASK_NORMAL
  proc/base.c: Use task_is_*
  proc/array.c: Use TASK_REPORT
  perfmon: Use task_is_*
  ...

Fixed up conflicts in NFS/sunrpc manually..
2008-02-01 11:45:47 +11:00
Roland McGrath c269f19617 x86: compat_sys_ptrace
This adds a generic definition of compat_sys_ptrace that calls
compat_arch_ptrace, parallel to sys_ptrace/arch_ptrace.  Some
machines needing this already define a function by that name.
The new generic function is defined only on machines that
put #define __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PTRACE into asm/ptrace.h.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 13:31:48 +01:00
Roland McGrath 032d82d906 x86: compat_ptrace_request
This adds a compat_ptrace_request that is the analogue of ptrace_request
for the things that 32-on-64 ptrace implementations can share in common.
So far there are just a couple of requests handled generically.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 13:31:47 +01:00
Roland McGrath 16c3e389e7 x86: ptrace_request peekdata/pokedata
This makes ptrace_request handle {PEEK,POKE}{TEXT,DATA} directly.
Every arch_ptrace that could call generic_ptrace_peekdata already
has a default case calling ptrace_request, so this keeps things
simpler for the arch code.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 13:31:47 +01:00
Roland McGrath 5b88abbf77 ptrace: generic PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK
This makes ptrace_request handle PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK along with
PTRACE_CONT et al.  The new generic code makes use of the
arch_has_block_step macro and generic entry points on machines
that define them.

[ mingo@elte.hu: bugfix ]

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 13:30:53 +01:00
Roland McGrath 36df29d799 ptrace: generic resume
This makes ptrace_request handle all the ptrace requests that wake
up the traced task.  These do low-level ptrace implementation magic
that is not arch-specific and should be kept out of arch code.  The
implementations on each arch usually do the same thing.  The new
generic code makes use of the arch_has_single_step macro and generic
entry points to handle PTRACE_SINGLESTEP.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 13:30:51 +01:00
Haavard Skinnemoen 6ea6dd93c9 ptrace: Call arch_ptrace_attach() when request=PTRACE_TRACEME
arch_ptrace_attach() is a hook that allows the architecture to do
book-keeping after a ptrace attach. This patch adds a call to this
hook when handling a PTRACE_TRACEME request as well.

Currently only one architecture, m32r, implements this hook. When
called, it initializes a number of debug trap slots in the ptraced
task's thread struct, and it looks to me like this is the right thing
to do after a PTRACE_TRACEME request as well, not only after
PTRACE_ATTACH. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

I want to use this hook on AVR32 to turn the debugging hardware on
when a process is actually being debugged and keep it off otherwise.
To be able to do this, I need to intercept PTRACE_TRACEME and
PTRACE_ATTACH, as well as PTRACE_DETACH and thread exit. The latter
two can be handled by existing hooks.

Signed-off-by: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@atmel.com>
2008-01-25 08:31:39 +01:00
Linus Torvalds b8c9a18712 Fix kernel/ptrace.c compile problem (missing "may_attach()")
The previous commit missed one use of "may_attach()" that had been
renamed to __ptrace_may_attach().  Tssk, tssk, Al.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-01-02 13:48:27 -08:00
Al Viro 831830b5a2 restrict reading from /proc/<pid>/maps to those who share ->mm or can ptrace pid
Contents of /proc/*/maps is sensitive and may become sensitive after
open() (e.g.  if target originally shares our ->mm and later does exec
on suid-root binary).

Check at read() (actually, ->start() of iterator) time that mm_struct
we'd grabbed and locked is
 - still the ->mm of target
 - equal to reader's ->mm or the target is ptracable by reader.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-01-02 13:13:27 -08:00
Matthew Wilcox 6618a3e275 ptrace: Use task_is_*
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
2007-12-06 17:34:52 -05:00
Pavel Emelyanov bac0abd617 Isolate some explicit usage of task->tgid
With pid namespaces this field is now dangerous to use explicitly, so hide
it behind the helpers.

Also the pid and pgrp fields o task_struct and signal_struct are to be
deprecated.  Unfortunately this patch cannot be sent right now as this
leads to tons of warnings, so start isolating them, and deprecate later.

Actually the p->tgid == pid has to be changed to has_group_leader_pid(),
but Oleg pointed out that in case of posix cpu timers this is the same, and
thread_group_leader() is more preferable.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 11:53:40 -07:00
Pavel Emelyanov 228ebcbe63 Uninline find_task_by_xxx set of functions
The find_task_by_something is a set of macros are used to find task by pid
depending on what kind of pid is proposed - global or virtual one.  All of
them are wrappers above the most generic one - find_task_by_pid_type_ns() -
and just substitute some args for it.

It turned out, that dereferencing the current->nsproxy->pid_ns construction
and pushing one more argument on the stack inline cause kernel text size to
grow.

This patch moves all this stuff out-of-line into kernel/pid.c.  Together
with the next patch it saves a bit less than 400 bytes from the .text
section.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 11:53:40 -07:00
Pavel Emelyanov b488893a39 pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user
This is the largest patch in the set. Make all (I hope) the places where
the pid is shown to or get from user operate on the virtual pids.

The idea is:
 - all in-kernel data structures must store either struct pid itself
   or the pid's global nr, obtained with pid_nr() call;
 - when seeking the task from kernel code with the stored id one
   should use find_task_by_pid() call that works with global pids;
 - when showing pid's numerical value to the user the virtual one
   should be used, but however when one shows task's pid outside this
   task's namespace the global one is to be used;
 - when getting the pid from userspace one need to consider this as
   the virtual one and use appropriate task/pid-searching functions.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: nuther build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet nuther build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded casts]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 11:53:40 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig 0ac1555915 m32r: convert to generic sys_ptrace
Convert m32r to the generic sys_ptrace.  The conversion requires an
architecture hook after ptrace_attach which this patch adds.  The hook
will also be needed for a conersion of ia64 to the generic ptrace code.

Thanks to Hirokazu Takata for fixing a bug in the first version of this
code.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:04 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan 1bcf548293 Consolidate PTRACE_DETACH
Identical handlers of PTRACE_DETACH go into ptrace_request().
Not touching compat code.
Not touching archs that don't call ptrace_request.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:42:49 -07:00
Roland McGrath 7d94143291 Fix spurious syscall tracing after PTRACE_DETACH + PTRACE_ATTACH
When PTRACE_SYSCALL was used and then PTRACE_DETACH is used, the
TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE flag is left set on the formerly-traced task.  This
means that when a new tracer comes along and does PTRACE_ATTACH, it's
possible he gets a syscall tracing stop even though he's never used
PTRACE_SYSCALL.  This happens if the task was in the middle of a system
call when the second PTRACE_ATTACH was done.  The symptom is an
unexpected SIGTRAP when the tracer thinks that only SIGSTOP should have
been provoked by his ptrace calls so far.

A few machines already fixed this in ptrace_disable (i386, ia64, m68k).
But all other machines do not, and still have this bug.  On x86_64, this
constitutes a regression in IA32 compatibility support.

Since all machines now use TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE for this, I put the
clearing of TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE in the generic ptrace_detach code rather
than adding it to every other machine's ptrace_disable.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-09-10 18:57:47 -07:00
Kawai, Hidehiro 6c5d523826 coredump masking: reimplementation of dumpable using two flags
This patch changes mm_struct.dumpable to a pair of bit flags.

set_dumpable() converts three-value dumpable to two flags and stores it into
lower two bits of mm_struct.flags instead of mm_struct.dumpable.
get_dumpable() behaves in the opposite way.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export set_dumpable]
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19 10:04:46 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan f284ce7269 PTRACE_POKEDATA consolidation
Identical implementations of PTRACE_POKEDATA go into generic_ptrace_pokedata()
function.

AFAICS, fix bug on xtensa where successful PTRACE_POKEDATA will nevertheless
return EPERM.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 10:23:03 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan 7664732315 PTRACE_PEEKDATA consolidation
Identical implementations of PTRACE_PEEKDATA go into generic_ptrace_peekdata()
function.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 10:23:03 -07:00
Sripathi Kodi 6175ecfed3 Use write_trylock_irqsave in ptrace_attach
This patch makes ptrace_attach use write_trylock_irqsave().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded initialisation]
Signed-off-by: Sripathi Kodi <sripathik@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 09:05:40 -07:00
Al Viro a5cb013da7 [PATCH] auditing ptrace
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-05-11 05:38:25 -04:00
Sukadev Bhattiprolu f400e198b2 [PATCH] pidspace: is_init()
This is an updated version of Eric Biederman's is_init() patch.
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/2/6/280).  It applies cleanly to 2.6.18-rc3 and
replaces a few more instances of ->pid == 1 with is_init().

Further, is_init() checks pid and thus removes dependency on Eric's other
patches for now.

Eric's original description:

	There are a lot of places in the kernel where we test for init
	because we give it special properties.  Most  significantly init
	must not die.  This results in code all over the kernel test
	->pid == 1.

	Introduce is_init to capture this case.

	With multiple pid spaces for all of the cases affected we are
	looking for only the first process on the system, not some other
	process that has pid == 1.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: <lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:12 -07:00
David Howells 0ec76a110f [PATCH] NOMMU: Check that access_process_vm() has a valid target
Check that access_process_vm() is accessing a valid mapping in the target
process.

This limits ptrace() accesses and accesses through /proc/<pid>/maps to only
those regions actually mapped by a program.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-27 08:26:14 -07:00
Ingo Molnar 36c8b58689 [PATCH] sched: cleanup, remove task_t, convert to struct task_struct
cleanup: remove task_t and convert all the uses to struct task_struct. I
introduced it for the scheduler anno and it was a mistake.

Conversion was mostly scripted, the result was reviewed and all
secondary whitespace and style impact (if any) was fixed up by hand.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:27:11 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov d5f70c00ad [PATCH] coredump: kill ptrace related stuff
With this patch zap_process() sets SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT while sending SIGKILL to
the thread group.  This means that a TASK_TRACED task

	1. Will be awakened by signal_wake_up(1)

	2. Can't sleep again via ptrace_notify()

	3. Can't go to do_signal_stop() after return
	   from ptrace_stop() in get_signal_to_deliver()

So we can remove all ptrace related stuff from coredump path.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:27 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman df26c40e56 [PATCH] proc: Cleanup proc_fd_access_allowed
In process of getting proc_fd_access_allowed to work it has developed a few
warts.  In particular the special case that always allows introspection and
the special case to allow inspection of kernel threads.

The special case for introspection is needed for /proc/self/mem.

The special case for kernel threads really should be overridable
by security modules.

So consolidate these checks into ptrace.c:may_attach().

The check to always allow introspection is trivial.

The check to allow access to kernel threads, and zombies is a little
trickier.  mem_read and mem_write already verify an mm exists so it isn't
needed twice.  proc_fd_access_allowed only doesn't want a check to verify
task->mm exits, s it prevents all access to kernel threads.  So just move
the task->mm check into ptrace_attach where it is needed for practical
reasons.

I did a quick audit and none of the security modules in the kernel seem to
care if they are passed a task without an mm into security_ptrace.  So the
above move should be safe and it allows security modules to come up with
more restrictive policy.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00