In commit ed17b8d377 ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"),
it would take 'priority' to make a policy unique, and allow duplicated
policies with different 'priority' to be added, which is not expected
by userland, as Tobias reported in strongswan.
To fix this duplicated policies issue, and also fix the issue in
commit ed17b8d377 ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"),
when doing add/del/get/update on user interfaces, this patch is to change
to look up a policy with both mark and mask by doing:
mark.v == pol->mark.v && mark.m == pol->mark.m
and leave the check:
(mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v
for tx/rx path only.
As the userland expects an exact mark and mask match to manage policies.
v1->v2:
- make xfrm_policy_mark_match inline and fix the changelog as
Tobias suggested.
Fixes: 295fae5688 ("xfrm: Allow user space manipulation of SPD mark")
Fixes: ed17b8d377 ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list")
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Tested-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Without doing verify_sec_ctx_len() check in xfrm_add_acquire(), it may be
out-of-bounds to access uctx->ctx_str with uctx->ctx_len, as noticed by
syz:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_xfrm_alloc_user+0x237/0x430
Read of size 768 at addr ffff8880123be9b4 by task syz-executor.1/11650
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x16e
print_address_description.cold.3+0x9/0x23b
kasan_report.cold.4+0x64/0x95
memcpy+0x1f/0x50
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user+0x237/0x430
security_xfrm_policy_alloc+0x5c/0xb0
xfrm_policy_construct+0x2b1/0x650
xfrm_add_acquire+0x21d/0xa10
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x431/0x6f0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90
netlink_unicast+0x50e/0x6a0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd40
sock_sendmsg+0x133/0x170
___sys_sendmsg+0x834/0x9a0
__sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x660
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
So fix it by adding the missing verify_sec_ctx_len check there.
Fixes: 980ebd2579 ("[IPSEC]: Sync series - acquire insert")
Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
It's not sufficient to do 'uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) +
uctx->ctx_len)' check only, as uctx->len may be greater than nla_len(rt),
in which case it will cause slab-out-of-bounds when accessing uctx->ctx_str
later.
This patch is to fix it by return -EINVAL when uctx->len > nla_len(rt).
Fixes: df71837d50 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2019-07-05
1) Fix xfrm selector prefix length validation for
inter address family tunneling.
From Anirudh Gupta.
2) Fix a memleak in pfkey.
From Jeremy Sowden.
3) Fix SA selector validation to allow empty selectors again.
From Nicolas Dichtel.
4) Select crypto ciphers for xfrm_algo, this fixes some
randconfig builds. From Arnd Bergmann.
5) Remove a duplicated assignment in xfrm_bydst_resize.
From Cong Wang.
6) Fix a hlist corruption on hash rebuild.
From Florian Westphal.
7) Fix a memory leak when creating xfrm interfaces.
From Nicolas Dichtel.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
After commit b38ff4075a, the following command does not work anymore:
$ ip xfrm state add src 10.125.0.2 dst 10.125.0.1 proto esp spi 34 reqid 1 \
mode tunnel enc 'cbc(aes)' 0xb0abdba8b782ad9d364ec81e3a7d82a1 auth-trunc \
'hmac(sha1)' 0xe26609ebd00acb6a4d51fca13e49ea78a72c73e6 96 flag align4
In fact, the selector is not mandatory, allow the user to provide an empty
selector.
Fixes: b38ff4075a ("xfrm: Fix xfrm sel prefix length validation")
CC: Anirudh Gupta <anirudh.gupta@sophos.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Family of src/dst can be different from family of selector src/dst.
Use xfrm selector family to validate address prefix length,
while verifying new sa from userspace.
Validated patch with this command:
ip xfrm state add src 1.1.6.1 dst 1.1.6.2 proto esp spi 4260196 \
reqid 20004 mode tunnel aead "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" \
0x1111016400000000000000000000000044440001 128 \
sel src 1011:1:4::2/128 sel dst 1021:1:4::2/128 dev Port5
Fixes: 07bf790895 ("xfrm: Validate address prefix lengths in the xfrm selector.")
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Gupta <anirudh.gupta@sophos.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We currently have two levels of strict validation:
1) liberal (default)
- undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
- garbage at end of message accepted
2) strict (opt-in)
- NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
* TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
attributes (in message or nested)
* MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type
* UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
* STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size
The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().
Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.
We end up with the following renames:
* nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated
* nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
* nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
* nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
* nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
* nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated
Using spatch, of course:
@@
expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
@@
expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.
Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.
Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.
In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In commit 6a53b75932 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b75932 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This reverts commit f10e0010fa.
This commit was just wrong. It caused a lot of
syzbot warnings, so just revert it.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
For rcu protected pointers, we'd better add '__rcu' for them.
Once added '__rcu' tag for rcu protected pointer, the sparse tool reports
warnings.
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1198:39: sparse: expected struct sock *sk
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1198:39: sparse: got struct sock [noderef] <asn:4> *nlsk
[...]
So introduce a new wrapper function of nlmsg_unicast to handle type
conversions.
This patch also fixes a direct access of a rcu protected socket.
Fixes: be33690d8fcf("[XFRM]: Fix aevent related crash")
Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
UBSAN report this:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289:24
index 6 is out of range for type 'unsigned int [6]'
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.162-514.55.6.9.x86_64+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
0000000000000000 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffff8801f6b07a58 ffffffff81cb35f4
0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83230f9c ffffffff81cb34e0 ffff8801f6b07a80
ffff8801f6b07a20 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffffffff851706e0 ffff8801f6b07ae8
Call Trace:
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] dump_stack+0x114/0x1a0 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff81d94225>] ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x8f lib/ubsan.c:164
[<ffffffff81d954db>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x16e/0x1b2 lib/ubsan.c:382
[<ffffffff82a25acd>] __xfrm_policy_unlink+0x3dd/0x5b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289
[<ffffffff82a2e572>] xfrm_policy_delete+0x52/0xb0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1309
[<ffffffff82a3319b>] xfrm_policy_timer+0x30b/0x590 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:243
[<ffffffff813d3927>] call_timer_fn+0x237/0x990 kernel/time/timer.c:1144
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1218 [inline]
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] run_timer_softirq+0x6ce/0xb80 kernel/time/timer.c:1401
[<ffffffff8120d6f9>] __do_softirq+0x299/0xe10 kernel/softirq.c:273
[<ffffffff8120e676>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:350 [inline]
[<ffffffff8120e676>] irq_exit+0x216/0x2c0 kernel/softirq.c:391
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:652 [inline]
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8b/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:926
[<ffffffff82c5c985>] apic_timer_interrupt+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:735
<EOI> [<ffffffff81188096>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:52
[<ffffffff810834d7>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:111 [inline]
[<ffffffff810834d7>] default_idle+0x27/0x430 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:446
[<ffffffff81085f05>] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:437
[<ffffffff8132abc3>] default_idle_call+0x53/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:92
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:156 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_idle_loop kernel/sched/idle.c:251 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_startup_entry+0x60d/0x9a0 kernel/sched/idle.c:299
[<ffffffff8113e119>] start_secondary+0x3c9/0x560 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:245
The issue is triggered as this:
xfrm_add_policy
-->verify_newpolicy_info //check the index provided by user with XFRM_POLICY_MAX
//In my case, the index is 0x6E6BB6, so it pass the check.
-->xfrm_policy_construct //copy the user's policy and set xfrm_policy_timer
-->xfrm_policy_insert
--> __xfrm_policy_link //use the orgin dir, in my case is 2
--> xfrm_gen_index //generate policy index, there is 0x6E6BB6
then xfrm_policy_timer be fired
xfrm_policy_timer
--> xfrm_policy_id2dir //get dir from (policy index & 7), in my case is 6
--> xfrm_policy_delete
--> __xfrm_policy_unlink //access policy_count[dir], trigger out of range access
Add xfrm_policy_id2dir check in verify_newpolicy_info, make sure the computed dir is
valid, to fix the issue.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: e682adf021 ("xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by user")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_state_put() moves struct xfrm_state to the GC list
and schedules the GC work to clean it up. On net exit call
path, xfrm_state_flush() is called to clean up and
xfrm_flush_gc() is called to wait for the GC work to complete
before exit.
However, this doesn't work because one of the ->destructor(),
ipcomp_destroy(), schedules the same GC work again inside
the GC work. It is hard to wait for such a nested async
callback. This is also why syzbot still reports the following
warning:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 33 at net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351 xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit+0x2cb/0x500 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351
...
ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xb0/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
cleanup_net+0x51d/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
process_one_work+0xd0c/0x1ce0 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x143/0x14a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
In fact, it is perfectly fine to bypass GC and destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit call path, because it is in process context
and doesn't need a work struct to do any blocking work.
This patch introduces xfrm_state_put_sync() which simply bypasses
GC, and lets its callers to decide whether to use this synchronous
version. On net exit path, xfrm_state_fini() and
xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit() use it. And, as ipcomp_destroy() itself is
blocking, it can use xfrm_state_put_sync() directly too.
Also rename xfrm_state_gc_destroy() to ___xfrm_state_destroy() to
reflect this change.
Fixes: b48c05ab5d ("xfrm: Fix warning in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit.")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e9aebef558e3ed673934@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The check assumes that in transport mode, the first templates family
must match the address family of the policy selector.
Syzkaller managed to build a template using MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION,
with ipv4-in-ipv6 chain, leading to following splat:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888063e57aa0 by task a.out/2050
xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854
xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x100/0x1d0
xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x108/0x1000 [..]
Problem is that addresses point into flowi4 struct, but xfrm_state_find
treats them as being ipv6 because it uses templ->encap_family is used
(AF_INET6 in case of reproducer) rather than family (AF_INET).
This patch inverts the logic: Enforce 'template family must match
selector' EXCEPT for tunnel and BEET mode.
In BEET and Tunnel mode, xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one will have remote/local
address pointers changed to point at the addresses found in the template,
rather than the flowi ones, so no oob read will occur.
Reported-by: 3ntr0py1337@gmail.com
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2018-12-18
1) Fix error return code in xfrm_output_one()
when no dst_entry is attached to the skb.
From Wei Yongjun.
2) The xfrm state hash bucket count reported to
userspace is off by one. Fix from Benjamin Poirier.
3) Fix NULL pointer dereference in xfrm_input when
skb_dst_force clears the dst_entry.
4) Fix freeing of xfrm states on acquire. We use a
dedicated slab cache for the xfrm states now,
so free it properly with kmem_cache_free.
From Mathias Krause.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit 565f0fa902 ("xfrm: use a dedicated slab cache for struct
xfrm_state") moved xfrm state objects to use their own slab cache.
However, it missed to adapt xfrm_user to use this new cache when
freeing xfrm states.
Fix this by introducing and make use of a new helper for freeing
xfrm_state objects.
Fixes: 565f0fa902 ("xfrm: use a dedicated slab cache for struct xfrm_state")
Reported-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Now that in_compat_syscall() is consistent on all architectures and does
not longer report true on native i686, the workarounds (ifdeffery and
helpers) can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-3-dima@arista.com
Make sure extack is passed to nlmsg_parse where easy to do so.
Most of these are dump handlers and leveraging the extack in
the netlink_callback.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2018-10-01
1) Validate address prefix lengths in the xfrm selector,
otherwise we may hit undefined behaviour in the
address matching functions if the prefix is too
big for the given address family.
2) Fix skb leak on local message size errors.
From Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo.
3) We currently reset the transport header back to the network
header after a transport mode transformation is applied. This
leads to an incorrect transport header when multiple transport
mode transformations are applied. Reset the transport header
only after all transformations are already applied to fix this.
From Sowmini Varadhan.
4) We only support one offloaded xfrm, so reset crypto_done after
the first transformation in xfrm_input(). Otherwise we may call
the wrong input method for subsequent transformations.
From Sowmini Varadhan.
5) Fix NULL pointer dereference when skb_dst_force clears the dst_entry.
skb_dst_force does not really force a dst refcount anymore, it might
clear it instead. xfrm code did not expect this, add a check to not
dereference skb_dst() if it was cleared by skb_dst_force.
6) Validate xfrm template mode, otherwise we can get a stack-out-of-bounds
read in xfrm_state_find. From Sean Tranchetti.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We don't validate the address prefix lengths in the xfrm
selector we got from userspace. This can lead to undefined
behaviour in the address matching functions if the prefix
is too big for the given address family. Fix this by checking
the prefixes and refuse SA/policy insertation when a prefix
is invalid.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Air Icy <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The BTF conflicts were simple overlapping changes.
The virtio_net conflict was an overlap of a fix of statistics counter,
happening alongisde a move over to a bonafide statistics structure
rather than counting value on the stack.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2018-07-27
1) Extend the output_mark to also support the input direction
and masking the mark values before applying to the skb.
2) Add a new lookup key for the upcomming xfrm interfaces.
3) Extend the xfrm lookups to match xfrm interface IDs.
4) Add virtual xfrm interfaces. The purpose of these interfaces
is to overcome the design limitations that the existing
VTI devices have.
The main limitations that we see with the current VTI are the
following:
VTI interfaces are L3 tunnels with configurable endpoints.
For xfrm, the tunnel endpoint are already determined by the SA.
So the VTI tunnel endpoints must be either the same as on the
SA or wildcards. In case VTI tunnel endpoints are same as on
the SA, we get a one to one correlation between the SA and
the tunnel. So each SA needs its own tunnel interface.
On the other hand, we can have only one VTI tunnel with
wildcard src/dst tunnel endpoints in the system because the
lookup is based on the tunnel endpoints. The existing tunnel
lookup won't work with multiple tunnels with wildcard
tunnel endpoints. Some usecases require more than on
VTI tunnel of this type, for example if somebody has multiple
namespaces and every namespace requires such a VTI.
VTI needs separate interfaces for IPv4 and IPv6 tunnels.
So when routing to a VTI, we have to know to which address
family this traffic class is going to be encapsulated.
This is a lmitation because it makes routing more complex
and it is not always possible to know what happens behind the
VTI, e.g. when the VTI is move to some namespace.
VTI works just with tunnel mode SAs. We need generic interfaces
that ensures transfomation, regardless of the xfrm mode and
the encapsulated address family.
VTI is configured with a combination GRE keys and xfrm marks.
With this we have to deal with some extra cases in the generic
tunnel lookup because the GRE keys on the VTI are actually
not GRE keys, the GRE keys were just reused for something else.
All extensions to the VTI interfaces would require to add
even more complexity to the generic tunnel lookup.
So to overcome this, we developed xfrm interfaces with the
following design goal:
It should be possible to tunnel IPv4 and IPv6 through the same
interface.
No limitation on xfrm mode (tunnel, transport and beet).
Should be a generic virtual interface that ensures IPsec
transformation, no need to know what happens behind the
interface.
Interfaces should be configured with a new key that must match a
new policy/SA lookup key.
The lookup logic should stay in the xfrm codebase, no need to
change or extend generic routing and tunnel lookups.
Should be possible to use IPsec hardware offloads of the underlying
interface.
5) Remove xfrm pcpu policy cache. This was added after the flowcache
removal, but it turned out to make things even worse.
From Florian Westphal.
6) Allow to update the set mark on SA updates.
From Nathan Harold.
7) Convert some timestamps to time64_t.
From Arnd Bergmann.
8) Don't check the offload_handle in xfrm code,
it is an opaque data cookie for the driver.
From Shannon Nelson.
9) Remove xfrmi interface ID from flowi. After this pach
no generic code is touched anymore to do xfrm interface
lookups. From Benedict Wong.
10) Allow to update the xfrm interface ID on SA updates.
From Nathan Harold.
11) Don't pass zero to ERR_PTR() in xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle.
From YueHaibing.
12) Return more detailed errors on xfrm interface creation.
From Benedict Wong.
13) Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO instead of IS_ERR + PTR_ERR.
From the kbuild test robot.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
nlmsg_multicast() always frees the skb, so in case we cannot call
it we must do that ourselves.
Fixes: 21ee543edc ("xfrm: fix race between netns cleanup and state expire notification")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This patch adds the xfrm interface id as a lookup key
for xfrm states and policies. With this we can assign
states and policies to virtual xfrm interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Tested-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Tested-by: Antony Antony <antony@phenome.org>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
We already support setting an output mark at the xfrm_state,
unfortunately this does not support the input direction and
masking the marks that will be applied to the skb. This change
adds support applying a masked value in both directions.
The existing XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK number is reused for this purpose
and as it is now bi-directional, it is renamed to XFRMA_SET_MARK.
An additional XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK attribute is added for setting the
mask. If the attribute mask not provided, it is set to 0xffffffff,
keeping the XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK existing 'full mask' semantics.
Co-developed-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Co-developed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
The sanity test added in ecd7918745 can be bypassed, validation
only occurs if XFRM_STATE_ESN flag is set, but rest of code doesn't care
and just checks if the attribute itself is present.
So always validate. Alternative is to reject if we have the attribute
without the flag but that would change abi.
Reported-by: syzbot+0ab777c27d2bb7588f73@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Fixes: ecd7918745 ("xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid")
Fixes: d8647b79c3 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Current code configures the hardware with a new SA before the state has been
fully initialized. During this time interval, an incoming ESP packet can cause
a crash due to a NULL dereference. More specifically, xfrm_input() considers
the packet as valid, and yet, anti-replay mechanism is not initialized.
Move hardware configuration to the end of xfrm_state_construct(), and mark
the state as valid once the SA is fully initialized.
Fixes: d77e38e612 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
Signed-off-by: Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@mellnaox.com>
Signed-off-by: Aviv Heller <avivh@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Yossi Kuperman <yossiku@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
On policies with a transport mode template, we pass the addresses
from the flowi to xfrm_state_find(), assuming that the IP addresses
(and address family) don't change during transformation.
Unfortunately our policy template validation is not strict enough.
It is possible to configure policies with transport mode template
where the address family of the template does not match the selectors
address family. This lead to stack-out-of-bound reads because
we compare arddesses of the wrong family. Fix this by refusing
such a configuration, address family can not change on transport
mode.
We use the assumption that, on transport mode, the first templates
address family must match the address family of the policy selector.
Subsequent transport mode templates must mach the address family of
the previous template.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This seems to be an obvious typo, NLA_U32 is type of the attribute, not its
(minimal) length.
Fixes: 077fbac405 ("net: xfrm: support setting an output mark.")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
syzbot reported a kernel warning in xfrm_state_fini(), which
indicates that we have entries left in the list
net->xfrm.state_all whose proto is zero. And
xfrm_id_proto_match() doesn't consider them as a match with
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY in this case.
Proto with value 0 is probably not a valid value, at least
verify_newsa_info() doesn't consider it valid either.
This patch fixes it by checking the proto value in
validate_tmpl() and rejecting invalid ones, like what iproute2
does in xfrm_xfrmproto_getbyname().
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30
1) Change some variables that can't be negative
from int to unsigned int. From Alexey Dobriyan.
2) Remove a redundant header initialization in esp6.
From Colin Ian King.
3) Some BUG to BUG_ON conversions.
From Gustavo A. R. Silva.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
All netlink message sizes are a) unsigned, b) can't be >= 4GB in size
because netlink doesn't support >= 64KB messages in the first place.
All those size_t across the code are a scam especially across networking
which likes to work with small numbers like 1500 or 65536.
Propagate unsignedness and flip some "int" to "unsigned int" as well.
This is preparation to switching nlmsg_new() to "unsigned int".
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Replay detection bitmaps can't have negative length.
Comparisons with nla_len() are left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Propagate unsignedness for code size savings:
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/5 up/down: 0/-38 (-38)
function old new delta
xfrm_state_construct 1802 1800 -2
xfrm_update_ae_params 295 289 -6
xfrm_state_migrate 1345 1339 -6
xfrm_replay_notify_esn 349 337 -12
xfrm_replay_notify_bmp 345 333 -12
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Key lengths can't be negative.
Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Key lengths can't be negative.
Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Key lengths can't be negative.
Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
When we off load a SA, it gets pushed to the NIC before we can
add it. In case of a failure, we don't delete this SA from the
NIC. Fix this by calling xfrm_dev_state_delete on failure.
Fixes: d77e38e612 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
Reported-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
A recent commit added an output_mark. When copying
this output_mark, the return value of copy_sec_ctx
is overwitten without a check. Fix this by copying
the output_mark before the security context.
Fixes: 077fbac405 ("net: xfrm: support setting an output mark.")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The memory reserved to dump the ID of the xfrm state includes a padding
byte in struct xfrm_usersa_id added by the compiler for alignment. To
prevent the heap info leak, memset(0) the sa_id before filling it.
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Fixes: d51d081d65 ("[IPSEC]: Sync series - user")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The memory reserved to dump the expired xfrm state includes padding
bytes in struct xfrm_user_expire added by the compiler for alignment. To
prevent the heap info leak, memset(0) the remainder of the struct.
Initializing the whole structure isn't needed as copy_to_user_state()
already takes care of clearing the padding bytes within the 'state'
member.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The memory reserved to dump the ID of the xfrm state includes a padding
byte in struct xfrm_usersa_id added by the compiler for alignment. To
prevent the heap info leak, memset(0) the whole struct before filling
it.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fixes: 0603eac0d6 ("[IPSEC]: Add XFRMA_SA/XFRMA_POLICY for delete notification")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm offload state includes padding
bytes of struct xfrm_user_offload added by the compiler for alignment.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap
info leak.
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Fixes: d77e38e612 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for
routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed
correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses
socket marks to route packets via different networks.
Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of
zero, making routing incorrect on such systems.
This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and
a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output
mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways:
1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while
the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence
the routing) of the packets emitted by those states.
2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of
the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output
mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state.
The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For
example:
- A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside
tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it,
one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA.
- On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets
emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that
is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the
unencrypted packets.
- Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without
breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based
routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use
the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could
change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups.
If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not
set or changed.
Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Xin Long
David S. Miller
Nicolas Dichtel
Anirudh Gupta
Thomas Gleixner
Johannes Berg
Cong Wang
Steffen Klassert
Su Yanjun
YueHaibing
Florian Westphal
Mathias Krause
Dmitry Safonov
David Ahern
Sean Tranchetti
Stephen Hemminger
Eric Dumazet
Yossi Kuperman
Michal Kubecek
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Herbert Xu
Alexey Dobriyan
Lorenzo Colitti