Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.
The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so
print the triggering command name and pid.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs.
"/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose.
This functionality is needed by file system servers
implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS
layer.
Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext"
to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition
is allowed and -EPERM otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and
try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU
context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for
the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry
parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid
label.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached
information becomes invalid.
Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes
invalid.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing
inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they
will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
The trusted keys option parsing allows specifying the same option
multiple times. The last option value specified is used.
This is problematic because:
* No gain.
* This makes complicated to specify options that are dependent on other
options.
This patch changes the behavior in a way that option can be specified
only once.
Reported-by: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.
A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.
Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.
This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all
keys subsequently added are flagged.
In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
cleared.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.
IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue.
The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error
get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On
success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced.
IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to
writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does
list splice in RCU manner.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if
CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509'
This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when
CONFIG_EVM is set as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 2ce523eb89 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it
was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to
evm_verifyxattr().
When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to
re-verify EVM integrity as well. For example, after setting a digital
signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the
iint->flags that there is an EVM signature.
This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN
state.
Changes in v2:
* Flag setting moved to EVM layer
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the
kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process.
This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key
directly without using the KEY subsystem.
Changes in v4:
* kernel-doc style for evm_set_key
Changes in v3:
* error reporting moved to evm_set_key
* EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key
* added bitop to prevent key setting race
Changes in v2:
* use size_t for key size instead of signed int
* provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
* provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process,
evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Previously non-zero indicated
that the HMAC key was loaded. When EVM loads the X509 before calling
'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start
signature based verification.
This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded.
Changes in v3:
* print error message if key is not set
Changes in v2:
* EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
* EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook
to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
Changes in v4:
* Patch description updated
Changes in v3:
* Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used
directly.
Changes in v2:
* default key patch changed to /etc/keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.
This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
commit fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the
processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended
permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using
/sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that
interface does not presently expose extended permission information.
As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace
access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by
conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping
computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire
conditional rules processing.
Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed long lines in patch description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().
Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet.
2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK
packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering
the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet.
3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code,
from Rasmus Villemoes.
4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich.
5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard.
6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd
Bergmann.
8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong.
9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak.
10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6
counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca.
11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from
Francesco Ruggeri.
12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes,
from Jarod Wilson.
13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other
userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled"
bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS
qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE
net: fix a race in dst_release()
net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free.
net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes
macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read()
mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency
net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev
net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA
drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode
netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT
dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"
bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure
...
This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not
available for request sockets.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd08953
("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()")
so that we can use it other contexts.
Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
maintainer of that"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
selinux: use sprintf return value
selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
Smack: limited capability for changing process label
TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
vTPM: support little endian guests
char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
...
In commit e446f9dfe1 ("net: synack packets can be attached to request
sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security
access.
Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it.
Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the
listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of
duplicating the logic.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'
This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup.
But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct
is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes
because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64.
This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()).
So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size)
is increased exponentially.
E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes
Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count
---------------------------------------------------------------
770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032
At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each
file_security_struct
Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed extra subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was
not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's
no point in casting away the const qualifier of value.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).
Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate()
and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where
do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set)
are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases
the open permission has already been checked during file open and
therefore does not need to be repeated.
Commit 95dbf73931 ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls")
fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files
without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where
a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files
without the open permission, even when they receive an already open
file.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux
performs access control checking on the actual memory protections
used by the kernel and not those requested by the application.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because
they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for
duplication and validation seems better.
Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by
kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.
Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt
Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit
Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it
Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon write
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips.
We require explicit 'keyhandle=' option because there's no a fixed
storage root key inside TPM2 chips.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (on TPM 1.2)
Tested-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Kevin Strasser <kevin.strasser@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields
can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a ("bridge: Remove
br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve
netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's
net-next tree.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Conflicts:
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
since commit 8405a8fff3 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on
nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded.
So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is
removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
The following sequence of commands:
i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
keyctl unlink $i @s
tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
...
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
...
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
[<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
[<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
[<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
[<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
[<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
[<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
[<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.
The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages
can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer
(Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket)
Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This change has two goals:
- delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
it will be really effective
- ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
'commit e774ad683f ("smack: pass error code through pointers")'
made this function return proper error codes instead of NULL. Reflect that.
This is a fix for a NULL dereference introduced in
'commit 21abb1ec41 ("Smack: IPv6 host labeling")'
echo "$SOME_IPV6_ADDR \"test" > /smack/ipv6host
(this should return EINVAL, it doesn't)
cat /smack/ipv6host
(derefences 0x000a)
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via
IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA
trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When
the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded
without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a
trusted key on the system keyring. This patch removes the
KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/arp.c
The net/ipv4/arp.c conflict was one commit adding a new
local variable while another commit was deleting one.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There appears to be a race between:
(1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls
keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list
(2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
(ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).
Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key->security.
Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Only pass the void *priv parameter out of the nf_hook_ops. That is
all any of the functions are interested now, and by limiting what is
passed it becomes simpler to change implementation details.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct
structs should be constant.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea.
** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora **
- Smack
- add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
- support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data
- SELinux:
- add ioctl whitelisting (see
http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
- fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change
- Seccomp:
- add ptrace options for suspend/resume"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
Move certificate handling to its own directory
sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
...
Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.
Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:
$ BASE="ovl"
$ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
$ LOW="$BASE/lower"
$ UP="$BASE/upper"
$ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
$ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
$ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
$ cat /proc/mounts
none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
$ fusermount -u /proc
$ cat /proc/mounts
cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory
This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.
For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
f78f5b90c4 ("rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN()")
introduced a bug by incorrectly inverting the condition when moving from
rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(). This commit therefore fixes
the inversion.
Reported-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.
It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc/<pid>/ns/*.
It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.
Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.
The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main RCU changes in this cycle are:
- the combination of tree geometry-initialization simplifications and
OS-jitter-reduction changes to expedited grace periods. These two
are stacked due to the large number of conflicts that would
otherwise result.
- privatize smp_mb__after_unlock_lock().
This commit moves the definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() to
kernel/rcu/tree.h, in recognition of the fact that RCU is the only
thing using this, that nothing else is likely to use it, and that
it is likely to go away completely.
- documentation updates.
- torture-test updates.
- misc fixes"
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
rcu,locking: Privatize smp_mb__after_unlock_lock()
rcu: Silence lockdep false positive for expedited grace periods
rcu: Don't disable CPU hotplug during OOM notifiers
scripts: Make checkpatch.pl warn on expedited RCU grace periods
rcu: Update MAINTAINERS entry
rcu: Clarify CONFIG_RCU_EQS_DEBUG help text
rcu: Fix backwards RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() in synchronize_rcu_tasks()
rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN()
rcu: Make rcu_is_watching() really notrace
cpu: Wait for RCU grace periods concurrently
rcu: Create a synchronize_rcu_mult()
rcu: Fix obsolete priority-boosting comment
rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE in RCU_INIT_POINTER
rcu: Hide RCU_NOCB_CPU behind RCU_EXPERT
rcu: Add RCU-sched flavors of get-state and cond-sync
rcu: Add fastpath bypassing funnel locking
rcu: Rename RCU_GP_DONE_FQS to RCU_GP_DOING_FQS
rcu: Pull out wait_event*() condition into helper function
documentation: Describe new expedited stall warnings
rcu: Add stall warnings to synchronize_sched_expedited()
...
While in most cases commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
retained previous error returns, in three cases it altered them without
any explanation in the commit message. Restore all of them - in the
security_old_inode_init_security() case this led to reiserfs using
uninitialized data, sooner or later crashing the system (the only other
user of this function - ocfs2 - was unaffected afaict, since it passes
pre-initialized structures).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.
Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Pull RCU changes from Paul E. McKenney:
- The combination of tree geometry-initialization simplifications
and OS-jitter-reduction changes to expedited grace periods.
These two are stacked due to the large number of conflicts
that would otherwise result.
[ With one addition, a temporary commit to silence a lockdep false
positive. Additional changes to the expedited grace-period
primitives (queued for 4.4) remove the cause of this false
positive, and therefore include a revert of this temporary commit. ]
- Documentation updates.
- Torture-test updates.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Adds an ignore case for kernel tasks,
so that they can access all resources.
Since kernel worker threads are spawned with
floor label, they are severely restricted by
Smack policy. It is not an issue without onlycap,
as these processes also run with root,
so CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE kicks in. But with onlycap
turned on, there is no way to change the label
for these processes.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Without this patch YAMA will not work at all if it is chosen
as the primary LSM instead of being "stacked".
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these,
and the third showed up by inspection. Making the
symbols static is proper.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.
This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.
Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This commit renames rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() for
consistency with the WARN() series of macros. This also requires
inverting the sense of the conditional, which this commit also does.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
security/smack/smackfs.c:2251:1-4: WARNING: end returns can be
simpified and declaration on line 2250 can be dropped
Simplify a trivial if-return sequence. Possibly combine with a
preceding function call.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/simple_return.cocci
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add support for setting smack mount labels(using smackfsdef, smackfsroot,
smackfshat, smackfsfloor, smackfstransmute) for filesystems with binary
mount data like NFS.
To achieve this, implement sb_parse_opts_str and sb_set_mnt_opts security
operations in smack LSM similar to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Create a common helper function to determine the label for a new inode.
This is then used by:
- may_create()
- selinux_dentry_init_security()
- selinux_inode_init_security()
This will change the behaviour of the functions slightly, bringing them
all into line.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Initialize the security class of sock security structures
to the generic socket class. This is similar to what is
already done in inode_alloc_security for files. Generally
the sclass field will later by set by socket_post_create
or sk_clone or sock_graft, but for protocol implementations
that fail to call any of these for newly accepted sockets,
we want some sane default that will yield a legitimate
avc denied message with non-garbage values for class and
permission.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The inode_free_security() function just took the superblock's isec_lock
before checking and trying to remove the inode security struct from the
linked list. In many cases, the list was empty and so the lock taking
is wasteful as no useful work is done. On multi-socket systems with
a large number of CPUs, there can also be a fair amount of spinlock
contention on the isec_lock if many tasks are exiting at the same time.
This patch changes the code to check the state of the list first before
taking the lock and attempting to dequeue it. The list_del_init()
can be called more than once on the same list with no harm as long
as they are properly serialized. It should not be possible to have
inode_free_security() called concurrently with list_add(). For better
safety, however, we use list_empty_careful() here even though it is
still not completely safe in case that happens.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:
allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds
Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.
When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.
The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.
The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the
file path and command number.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
commit 66fc130394 ("mm: shmem_zero_setup
skip security check and lockdep conflict with XFS") caused a regression
for SELinux by disabling any SELinux checking of mprotect PROT_EXEC on
shared anonymous mappings. However, even before that regression, the
checking on such mprotect PROT_EXEC calls was inconsistent with the
checking on a mmap PROT_EXEC call for a shared anonymous mapping. On a
mmap, the security hook is passed a NULL file and knows it is dealing
with an anonymous mapping and therefore applies an execmem check and no
file checks. On a mprotect, the security hook is passed a vma with a
non-NULL vm_file (as this was set from the internally-created shmem
file during mmap) and therefore applies the file-based execute check
and no execmem check. Since the aforementioned commit now marks the
shmem zero inode with the S_PRIVATE flag, the file checks are disabled
and we have no checking at all on mprotect PROT_EXEC. Add a test to
the mprotect hook logic for such private inodes, and apply an execmem
check in that case. This makes the mmap and mprotect checking
consistent for shared anonymous mappings, as well as for /dev/zero and
ashmem.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1.x
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
At present we don't create efficient ebitmaps when importing NetLabel
category bitmaps. This can present a problem when comparing ebitmaps
since ebitmap_cmp() is very strict about these things and considers
these wasteful ebitmaps not equal when compared to their more
efficient counterparts, even if their values are the same. This isn't
likely to cause problems on 64-bit systems due to a bit of luck on
how NetLabel/CIPSO works and the default ebitmap size, but it can be
a problem on 32-bit systems.
This patch fixes this problem by being a bit more intelligent when
importing NetLabel category bitmaps by skipping over empty sections
which should result in a nice, efficient ebitmap.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
stuff). UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle). 9P fixes.
fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"
[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups". The
file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge. - Linus ]
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
dax: Add block size note to documentation
fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
make simple_positive() public
ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
remove the pointless include of lglock.h
fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
...
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems
mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree
directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories
for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container
projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime,
read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
attributes remains for another time.
This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of
/proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
converted) and is not now actively wrong.
There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
I will mention briefly.
It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user
namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly
so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
performance part of pathname resolution.
As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
they are recognized"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization to
speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module lock
doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's breaking
up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load another module (yeah,
really). Unfortunately that broke the usual suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and
!CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were appended too.
Cheers,
Rusty.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module updates from Rusty Russell:
"Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization
to speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module
lock doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's
breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load
another module (yeah, really). Unfortunately that broke the usual
suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were
appended too"
* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits)
modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES
param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS.
rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
module: add per-module param_lock
module: make perm const
params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes.
modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'.
kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration
kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient
kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only
kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only
kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce
kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks
module: Rework module_addr_{min,max}
module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup()
module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree
rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree
seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch()
...
This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.
The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/ configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/ pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/ securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Four small audit patches for v4.2, all bug fixes. Only 10 lines of
change this time so very unremarkable, the patch subject lines pretty
much tell the whole story"
* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: Fix check of return value of strnlen_user()
audit: obsolete audit_context check is removed in audit_filter_rules()
audit: fix for typo in comment to function audit_log_link_denied()
lsm: rename duplicate labels in LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK audit message type
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).
See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/
This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add TX fast path in mac80211, from Johannes Berg.
2) Add TSO/GRO support to ibmveth, from Thomas Falcon
3) Move away from cached routes in ipv6, just like ipv4, from Martin
KaFai Lau.
4) Lots of new rhashtable tests, from Thomas Graf.
5) Run ingress qdisc lockless, from Alexei Starovoitov.
6) Allow servers to fetch TCP packet headers for SYN packets of new
connections, for fingerprinting. From Eric Dumazet.
7) Add mode parameter to pktgen, for testing receive. From Alexei
Starovoitov.
8) Cache access optimizations via simplifications of build_skb(), from
Alexander Duyck.
9) Move page frag allocator under mm/, also from Alexander.
10) Add xmit_more support to hv_netvsc, from KY Srinivasan.
11) Add a counter guard in case we try to perform endless reclassify
loops in the packet scheduler.
12) Extern flow dissector to be programmable and use it in new "Flower"
classifier. From Jiri Pirko.
13) AF_PACKET fanout rollover fixes, performance improvements, and new
statistics. From Willem de Bruijn.
14) Add netdev driver for GENEVE tunnels, from John W Linville.
15) Add ingress netfilter hooks and filtering, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
16) Fix handling of epoll edge triggers in TCP, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Add an ECN retry fallback for the initial TCP handshake, from Daniel
Borkmann.
18) Add tail call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
19) Add several pktgen helper scripts, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
20) Add zerocopy support to AF_UNIX, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
21) Favor even port numbers for allocation to connect() requests, and
odd port numbers for bind(0), in an effort to help avoid
ip_local_port_range exhaustion. From Eric Dumazet.
22) Add Cavium ThunderX driver, from Sunil Goutham.
23) Allow bpf programs to access skb_iif and dev->ifindex SKB metadata,
from Alexei Starovoitov.
24) Add support for T6 chips in cxgb4vf driver, from Hariprasad Shenai.
25) Double TCP Small Queues default to 256K to accomodate situations
like the XEN driver and wireless aggregation. From Wei Liu.
26) Add more entropy inputs to flow dissector, from Tom Herbert.
27) Add CDG congestion control algorithm to TCP, from Kenneth Klette
Jonassen.
28) Convert ipset over to RCU locking, from Jozsef Kadlecsik.
29) Track and act upon link status of ipv4 route nexthops, from Andy
Gospodarek.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1670 commits)
bridge: vlan: flush the dynamically learned entries on port vlan delete
bridge: multicast: add a comment to br_port_state_selection about blocking state
net: inet_diag: export IPV6_V6ONLY sockopt
stmmac: troubleshoot unexpected bits in des0 & des1
net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down
net: track link-status of ipv4 nexthops
net: switchdev: ignore unsupported bridge flags
net: Cavium: Fix MAC address setting in shutdown state
drivers: net: xgene: fix for ACPI support without ACPI
ip: report the original address of ICMP messages
net/mlx5e: Prefetch skb data on RX
net/mlx5e: Pop cq outside mlx5e_get_cqe
net/mlx5e: Remove mlx5e_cq.sqrq back-pointer
net/mlx5e: Remove extra spaces
net/mlx5e: Avoid TX CQE generation if more xmit packets expected
net/mlx5e: Avoid redundant dev_kfree_skb() upon NOP completion
net/mlx5e: Remove re-assignment of wq type in mlx5e_enable_rq()
net/mlx5e: Use skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs rather than counting them
net/mlx5e: Static mapping of netdev priv resources to/from netdev TX queues
net/mlx4_en: Use HW counters for rx/tx bytes/packets in PF device
...
While testing my netfilter changes I noticed several files where
recompiling unncessarily because they unncessarily included
netfilter.h.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the
existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files
based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read"
mode bit set (eg. read, read-write).
Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing
users. Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each
time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a
single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the
builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy.
[The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's
"ima: added new policy type exec" patch.]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC. This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes. For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.
Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".
Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13
This code used to rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) was a no-op, but
then we changed smk_parse_smack() to return error pointers on failure
instead of NULL. Calling kfree() on an error pointer will oops.
I have re-arranged things a bit so that we only free things if they
have been allocated.
Fixes: e774ad683f ('smack: pass error code through pointers')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Before calling into the filesystem, vfs_setxattr calls
security_inode_setxattr, which ends up calling selinux_inode_setxattr in
our case. That returns -EOPNOTSUPP whenever SBLABEL_MNT is not set.
SBLABEL_MNT was supposed to be set by sb_finish_set_opts, which sets it
only if selinux_is_sblabel_mnt returns true.
The selinux_is_sblabel_mnt logic was broken by eadcabc697 "SELinux: do
all flags twiddling in one place", which didn't take into the account
the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior that had been introduced for nfs
with eb9ae68650 "SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels".
This caused setxattr's of security labels over NFSv4.2 to fail.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.13
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com>
Reported-by: Richard Chan <rc556677@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the stable dependency]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0. Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.
Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }
Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Support per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on
genfscon policy entries. This is safe because the sysfs
and pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace,
except to unlink pstore entries.
This provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling
to sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from
userspace on each boot. The advantages of this approach are that
the labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated
and userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and
set the labels on each boot. The limitations of this approach are
that the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching.
You can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change
them at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Suggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that
we can distinguish them in policy. This is particularly
important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable
by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and
searched by all.
Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is
immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can
simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from
policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem.
Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it
for debugfs too.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Update the set of SELinux netlink socket class definitions to match
the set of netlink protocols implemented by the kernel. The
ip_queue implementation for the NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed in d16cf20e2f, so we can remove
the corresponding class definitions as this is dead code. Add new
classes for NETLINK_ISCSI, NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP, NETLINK_CONNECTOR,
NETLINK_NETFILTER, NETLINK_GENERIC, NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT, NETLINK_RDMA,
and NETLINK_CRYPTO so that we can distinguish among sockets created
for each of these protocols. This change does not define the finer-grained
nlsmsg_read/write permissions or map specific nlmsg_type values to those
permissions in the SELinux nlmsgtab; if finer-grained control of these
sockets is desired/required, that can be added as a follow-on change.
We do not define a SELinux class for NETLINK_ECRYPTFS as the implementation
was removed in 624ae52845.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
selinux_bprm_committed_creds()->__flush_signals() is not right, we
shouldn't clear TIF_SIGPENDING unconditionally. There can be other
reasons for signal_pending(): freezing(), JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK, and
potentially more.
Also change this code to check fatal_signal_pending() rather than
SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT, it looks a bit better.
Now we can kill __flush_signals() before it finds another buggy user.
Note: this code looks racy, we can flush a signal which was sent after
the task SID has been updated.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This prints the 'sclass' field as string instead of index in unrecognized netlink message.
The textual representation makes it easier to distinguish the right class.
Signed-off-by: Marek Milkovic <mmilkovi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: 80-char width fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Smack onlycap allows limiting of CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to
processes running with the configured label. But having single privileged
label is not enough in some real use cases. On a complex system like Tizen,
there maybe few programs that need to configure Smack policy in run-time
and running them all with a single label is not always practical.
This patch extends onlycap feature for multiple labels. They are configured
in the same smackfs "onlycap" interface, separated by spaces.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Use proper RCU functions and read locking in smackfs seq_operations.
Smack gets away with not using proper RCU functions in smackfs, because
it never removes entries from these lists. But now one list will be
needed (with interface in smackfs) that will have both elements added and
removed to it.
This change will also help any future changes implementing removal of
unneeded entries from other Smack lists.
The patch also fixes handling of pos argument in smk_seq_start and
smk_seq_next. This fixes a bug in case when smackfs is read with a small
buffer:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0xfa0000011b
CPU: 0 PID: 1292 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.1.0-rc1-00012-g98179b8 #13
Stack:
00000003 0000000d 7ff39e48 7f69fd00
7ff39ce0 601ae4b0 7ff39d50 600e587b
00000010 6039f690 7f69fd40 00612003
Call Trace:
[<601ae4b0>] load2_seq_show+0x19/0x1d
[<600e587b>] seq_read+0x168/0x331
[<600c5943>] __vfs_read+0x21/0x101
[<601a595e>] ? security_file_permission+0xf8/0x105
[<600c5ec6>] ? rw_verify_area+0x86/0xe2
[<600c5fc3>] vfs_read+0xa1/0x14c
[<600c68e2>] SyS_read+0x57/0xa0
[<6001da60>] handle_syscall+0x60/0x80
[<6003087d>] userspace+0x442/0x548
[<6001aa77>] ? interrupt_end+0x0/0x80
[<6001daae>] ? copy_chunk_to_user+0x0/0x2b
[<6002cb6b>] ? save_registers+0x1f/0x39
[<60032ef7>] ? arch_prctl+0xf5/0x170
[<6001a92d>] fork_handler+0x85/0x87
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK pid= and comm= labels are duplicates of those at the
start of this function with different values. Rename them to their object
counterparts opid= and ocomm= to disambiguate.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: minor merging needed due to differences in the tree]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.
In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.
Test compiled on x86_64 against:
* allnoconfig
* allmodconfig
* allyesconfig
@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This patch adds the iint associated to the current inode as a new
parameter of ima_add_violation(). The passed iint is always not NULL
if a violation is detected. This modification will be used to determine
the inode for which there is a violation.
Since the 'd' and 'd-ng' template field init() functions were detecting
a violation from the value of the iint pointer, they now check the new
field 'violation', added to the 'ima_event_data' structure.
Changelog:
- v1:
- modified an old comment (Roberto Sassu)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
All event related data has been wrapped into the new 'ima_event_data'
structure. The main benefit of this patch is that a new information
can be made available to template fields initialization functions
by simply adding a new field to the new structure instead of modifying
the definition of those functions.
Changelog:
- v2:
- f_dentry replaced with f_path.dentry (Roberto Sassu)
- removed declaration of temporary variables in template field functions
when possible (suggested by Dmitry Kasatkin)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch adds validity checks for 'path' parameter and
makes it const.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
EVM needs to be atomically updated when removing xattrs.
Otherwise concurrent EVM verification may fail in between.
This patch fixes by moving i_mutex unlocking after calling
EVM hook. fsnotify_xattr() is also now called while locked
the same way as it is done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm.
Changelog:
- remove unused 'inode' variable.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled. As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.
Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems. This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
File hashes are automatically set and updated and should not be
manually set. This patch limits file hash setting to fix and log
modes.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.
Changelog:
- Update documentation
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19
This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.
Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch makes the following functions to use ERR_PTR() and related
macros to pass the appropriate error code through returned pointers:
smk_parse_smack()
smk_import_entry()
smk_fetch()
It also makes all the other functions that use them to handle the
error cases properly. This ways correct error codes from places
where they happened can be propagated to the user space if necessary.
Doing this it fixes a bug in onlycap and unconfined files
handling. Previously their content was cleared on any error from
smk_import_entry/smk_parse_smack, be it EINVAL (as originally intended)
or ENOMEM. Right now it only reacts on EINVAL passing other codes
properly to userspace.
Comments have been updated accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
The dmabuf fd can be shared between processes via unix domain
socket. The file of dmabuf fd is came from anon_inode. The inode
has no set and get xattr operations, so it can not be shared
between processes with smack. This patch fixes just to ignore
private inode including anon_inode for smack_file_receive.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
It's a bit easier to read this if we split it up into two for loops.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The stub functions in capability.c are no longer required
with the list based stacking mechanism. Remove the file.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.
Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the
security operations vector. The marco versions here do not
change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the
dentry.
inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly
in RCU-walk mode.
selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and
inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call
avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set.
Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means
that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt
to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not
actually drop the RCU read-lock.
However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed
region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This allows MAY_NOT_BLOCK to be passed, in RCU-walk mode, through
the new avc_has_perm_flags() to avc_audit() and thence the slow_avc_audit.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
it is about to become private to namei.c.
So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
The mm->exe_file is currently serialized with mmap_sem (shared) in order
to both safely (1) read the file and (2) compute the realpath by calling
tomoyo_realpath_from_path, making it an absolute overkill. Good users
will, on the other hand, make use of the more standard get_mm_exe_file(),
requiring only holding the mmap_sem to read the value, and relying on
reference
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge second patchbomb from Andrew Morton:
- the rest of MM
- various misc bits
- add ability to run /sbin/reboot at reboot time
- printk/vsprintf changes
- fiddle with seq_printf() return value
* akpm: (114 commits)
parisc: remove use of seq_printf return value
lru_cache: remove use of seq_printf return value
tracing: remove use of seq_printf return value
cgroup: remove use of seq_printf return value
proc: remove use of seq_printf return value
s390: remove use of seq_printf return value
cris fasttimer: remove use of seq_printf return value
cris: remove use of seq_printf return value
openrisc: remove use of seq_printf return value
ARM: plat-pxa: remove use of seq_printf return value
nios2: cpuinfo: remove use of seq_printf return value
microblaze: mb: remove use of seq_printf return value
ipc: remove use of seq_printf return value
rtc: remove use of seq_printf return value
power: wakeup: remove use of seq_printf return value
x86: mtrr: if: remove use of seq_printf return value
linux/bitmap.h: improve BITMAP_{LAST,FIRST}_WORD_MASK
MAINTAINERS: CREDITS: remove Stefano Brivio from B43
.mailmap: add Ricardo Ribalda
CREDITS: add Ricardo Ribalda Delgado
...
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than
working with dentries given to it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights for this window:
- improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley
- addition of an unconfined label to Smack
- Smack documentation update
- TPM driver updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
selinux: increase avtab max buckets
selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add BQL support to via-rhine, from Tino Reichardt.
2) Integrate SWITCHDEV layer support into the DSA layer, so DSA drivers
can support hw switch offloading. From Floria Fainelli.
3) Allow 'ip address' commands to initiate multicast group join/leave,
from Madhu Challa.
4) Many ipv4 FIB lookup optimizations from Alexander Duyck.
5) Support EBPF in cls_bpf classifier and act_bpf action, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Remove the ugly compat support in ARP for ugly layers like ax25,
rose, etc. And use this to clean up the neigh layer, then use it to
implement MPLS support. All from Eric Biederman.
7) Support L3 forwarding offloading in switches, from Scott Feldman.
8) Collapse the LOCAL and MAIN ipv4 FIB tables when possible, to speed
up route lookups even further. From Alexander Duyck.
9) Many improvements and bug fixes to the rhashtable implementation,
from Herbert Xu and Thomas Graf. In particular, in the case where
an rhashtable user bulk adds a large number of items into an empty
table, we expand the table much more sanely.
10) Don't make the tcp_metrics hash table per-namespace, from Eric
Biederman.
11) Extend EBPF to access SKB fields, from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Split out new connection request sockets so that they can be
established in the main hash table. Much less false sharing since
hash lookups go direct to the request sockets instead of having to
go first to the listener then to the request socks hashed
underneath. From Eric Dumazet.
13) Add async I/O support for crytpo AF_ALG sockets, from Tadeusz Struk.
14) Support stable privacy address generation for RFC7217 in IPV6. From
Hannes Frederic Sowa.
15) Hash network namespace into IP frag IDs, also from Hannes Frederic
Sowa.
16) Convert PTP get/set methods to use 64-bit time, from Richard
Cochran.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1816 commits)
fm10k: Bump driver version to 0.15.2
fm10k: corrected VF multicast update
fm10k: mbx_update_max_size does not drop all oversized messages
fm10k: reset head instead of calling update_max_size
fm10k: renamed mbx_tx_dropped to mbx_tx_oversized
fm10k: update xcast mode before synchronizing multicast addresses
fm10k: start service timer on probe
fm10k: fix function header comment
fm10k: comment next_vf_mbx flow
fm10k: don't handle mailbox events in iov_event path and always process mailbox
fm10k: use separate workqueue for fm10k driver
fm10k: Set PF queues to unlimited bandwidth during virtualization
fm10k: expose tx_timeout_count as an ethtool stat
fm10k: only increment tx_timeout_count in Tx hang path
fm10k: remove extraneous "Reset interface" message
fm10k: separate PF only stats so that VF does not display them
fm10k: use hw->mac.max_queues for stats
fm10k: only show actual queues, not the maximum in hardware
fm10k: allow creation of VLAN on default vid
fm10k: fix unused warnings
...
When task->comm is passed directly to audit_log_untrustedstring() without
getting a copy or using the task_lock, there is a race that could happen that
would output a NULL (\0) in the middle of the output string that would
effectively truncate the rest of the report text after the comm= field in the
audit log message, losing fields.
Using get_task_comm() to get a copy while acquiring the task_lock to prevent
this and to prevent the result from being a mixture of old and new values of
comm would incur potentially unacceptable overhead, considering that the value
can be influenced by userspace and therefore untrusted anyways.
Copy the value before passing it to audit_log_untrustedstring() ensures that a
local copy is used to calculate the length *and* subsequently printed. Even if
this value contains a mix of old and new values, it will only calculate and
copy up to the first NULL, preventing the rest of the audit log message being
truncated.
Use a second local copy of comm to avoid a race between the first and second
calls to audit_log_untrustedstring() with comm.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull vfs update from Al Viro:
"Part one:
- struct filename-related cleanups
- saner iov_iter_init() replacements (and switching the syscalls to
use of those)
- ntfs switch to ->write_iter() (Anton)
- aio cleanups and splitting iocb into common and async parts
(Christoph)
- assorted fixes (me, bfields, Andrew Elble)
There's a lot more, including the completion of switchover to
->{read,write}_iter(), d_inode/d_backing_inode annotations, f_flags
race fixes, etc, but that goes after #for-davem merge. David has
pulled it, and once it's in I'll send the next vfs pull request"
* 'for-linus-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (35 commits)
sg_start_req(): use import_iovec()
sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
blk_rq_map_user(): use import_single_range()
sg_io(): use import_iovec()
process_vm_access: switch to {compat_,}import_iovec()
switch keyctl_instantiate_key_common() to iov_iter
switch {compat_,}do_readv_writev() to {compat_,}import_iovec()
aio_setup_vectored_rw(): switch to {compat_,}import_iovec()
vmsplice_to_user(): switch to import_iovec()
kill aio_setup_single_vector()
aio: simplify arguments of aio_setup_..._rw()
aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
lift iov_iter into {compat_,}do_readv_writev()
NFS: fix BUG() crash in notify_change() with patch to chown_common()
dcache: return -ESTALE not -EBUSY on distributed fs race
NTFS: Version 2.1.32 - Update file write from aio_write to write_iter.
VFS: Add iov_iter_fault_in_multipages_readable()
drop bogus check in file_open_root()
switch security_inode_getattr() to struct path *
constify tomoyo_realpath_from_path()
...
When a new rtnl or xfrm command is added, this part of the code is frequently
missing. Let's help the developer with a build time test.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: 3a2dfbe8ac ("xfrm: Notify changes in UDP encapsulation via netlink")
CC: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: 5c79de6e79 ("[XFRM]: User interface for handling XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: 97a64b4577 ("[XFRM]: Introduce XFRM_MSG_REPORT.")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
These commands are missing.
Fixes: 28d8909bc7 ("[XFRM]: Export SAD info.")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This command is missing.
Fixes: ecfd6b1837 ("[XFRM]: Export SPD info")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This new command is missing.
Fixes: 880a6fab8f ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink")
Reported-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This new command is missing.
Fixes: 9a9634545c ("netns: notify netns id events")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
These new commands are missing.
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bd ("netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The Makefile automatically generates the tomoyo policy files, which are
not removed by make clean (because they could have been provided by the
user). Instead of generating the missing files, use /dev/null if a
given file is not provided. Store the default exception_policy in
exception_policy.conf.default.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Combine the generation of builtin-policy.h into a single command and use
if_changed, so that the file is regenerated each time the command
changes. The next patch will make use of this.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Simplify the Makefile by using a readily available tool instead of a
custom sed script. The downside is that builtin-policy.h becomes
unreadable for humans, but it is only a generated file.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Now that we can safely increase the avtab max buckets without
triggering high order allocations and have a hash function that
will make better use of the larger number of buckets, increase
the max buckets to 2^16.
Original:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 374
With new hash function:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 81
With increased max buckets:
101421 entries and 31078/32768 buckets used, longest chain length 12
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This function, based on murmurhash3, has much better distribution than
the original. Using the current default of 2048 buckets, there are many
fewer collisions:
Before:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 374
After:
101421 entries and 2048/2048 buckets used, longest chain length 81
The difference becomes much more significant when buckets are increased.
A naive attempt to expand the current function to larger outputs doesn't
yield any significant improvement; so this function is a prerequisite
for increasing the bucket size.
sds: Adapted from the original patches for libsepol to the kernel.
Signed-off-by: John Brooks <john.brooks@jolla.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously we shrank the avtab max hash buckets to avoid
high order memory allocations, but this causes avtab lookups to
degenerate to very long linear searches for the Fedora policy. Convert to
using a flex_array instead so that we can increase the buckets
without such limitations.
This change does not alter the max hash buckets; that is left to a
separate follow-on change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Move the NetLabel secattr MLS category import logic into
mls_import_netlbl_cat() where it belongs, and use the
mls_import_netlbl_cat() function in security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid().
Reported-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Commit f01e1af445 ("selinux: don't pass in NULL avd to avc_has_perm_noaudit")
made this pointer reassignment unnecessary. Avd should continue to reference
the stack-based copy.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c
drivers/net/usb/sr9800.c
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c
include/linux/usb/usbnet.h
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
The TCP conflicts were overlapping changes. In 'net' we added a
READ_ONCE() to the socket cached RX route read, whilst in 'net-next'
Eric Dumazet touched the surrounding code dealing with how mini
sockets are handled.
With USB, it's a case of the same bug fix first going into net-next
and then I cherry picked it back into net.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Return a negative error value like the rest of the entries in this function.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In commit 00f84f3f2e ("Smack: Make the
syslog control configurable") this mutex was added, but the rest of
the final commit never actually made use of it, resulting in:
In file included from include/linux/mutex.h:29:0,
from include/linux/notifier.h:13,
from include/linux/memory_hotplug.h:6,
from include/linux/mmzone.h:821,
from include/linux/gfp.h:5,
from include/linux/slab.h:14,
from include/linux/security.h:27,
from security/smack/smackfs.c:21:
security/smack/smackfs.c:63:21: warning: ‘smack_syslog_lock’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable]
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock);
^
A git grep shows no other instances/references to smack_syslog_lock.
Delete it, assuming that the mutex addition was just a leftover from
an earlier work in progress version of the change.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack
for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse
and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release.
I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a
general "permissive mode". So don't ask again.
Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns,
and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better
off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the
abuse potential.
Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows
for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one
label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for
debugging, but that's about it.
A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially.
If either the subject or object label of an access check
matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not
have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console
message are generated. The audit record "request" string is
marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the
request was granted because of an unconfined label. The
fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is
remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure"
object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in
the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of
using an unconfined label may still cause concern after
a reboot.
So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application
developers seem incapable of living without it I have
given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but
in the end it's still a chain saw.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM
side part of the system call keyctl with the action
code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY.
It is now possible to get the context of, for example,
the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s".
The original patch has been modified for merge.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These
sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in
label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The
result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing
smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label
is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are
omitted.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis <m.lis@samsung.com>
This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8.
No longer needed after commit eb8895debe
("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc")
When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing
because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener->sk_wmem_alloc
Since tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need
to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When the sysctl table is constified, we won't be able to directly modify
it. Instead, use a table copy that carries any needed changes.
Suggested-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff from this cycle. The big ones here are multilayer
overlayfs from Miklos and beginning of sorting ->d_inode accesses out
from David"
* 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (51 commits)
autofs4 copy_dev_ioctl(): keep the value of ->size we'd used for allocation
procfs: fix race between symlink removals and traversals
debugfs: leave freeing a symlink body until inode eviction
Documentation/filesystems/Locking: ->get_sb() is long gone
trylock_super(): replacement for grab_super_passive()
fanotify: Fix up scripted S_ISDIR/S_ISREG/S_ISLNK conversions
Cachefiles: Fix up scripted S_ISDIR/S_ISREG/S_ISLNK conversions
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry)
SELinux: Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode
Smack: Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode
TOMOYO: Use d_is_dir() rather than d_inode and S_ISDIR()
Apparmor: Use d_is_positive/negative() rather than testing dentry->d_inode
Apparmor: mediated_filesystem() should use dentry->d_sb not inode->i_sb
VFS: Split DCACHE_FILE_TYPE into regular and special types
VFS: Add a fallthrough flag for marking virtual dentries
VFS: Add a whiteout dentry type
VFS: Introduce inode-getting helpers for layered/unioned fs environments
Infiniband: Fix potential NULL d_inode dereference
posix_acl: fix reference leaks in posix_acl_create
autofs4: Wrong format for printing dentry
...
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in SELinux to get rid
of direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in Smack to get rid of
direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use d_is_dir() rather than d_inode and S_ISDIR(). Note that this will include
fake directories such as automount triggers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use d_is_positive(dentry) or d_is_negative(dentry) rather than testing
dentry->d_inode as the dentry may cover another layer that has an inode when
the top layer doesn't or may hold a 0,0 chardev that's actually a whiteout.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
mediated_filesystem() should use dentry->d_sb not dentry->d_inode->i_sb and
should avoid file_inode() also since it is really dealing with the path.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull kconfig updates from Michal Marek:
"Yann E Morin was supposed to take over kconfig maintainership, but
this hasn't happened. So I'm sending a few kconfig patches that I
collected:
- Fix for missing va_end in kconfig
- merge_config.sh displays used if given too few arguments
- s/boolean/bool/ in Kconfig files for consistency, with the plan to
only support bool in the future"
* 'kconfig' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mmarek/kbuild:
kconfig: use va_end to match corresponding va_start
merge_config.sh: Display usage if given too few arguments
kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
"This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
more or less one pull request per branch.
This is the first pile; more to follow in a few. In this one are
several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
namespace_unlock()"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
new fs_pin killing logics
allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
pull bumping refcount into ->kill()
kill pin_put()
mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
gut proc_register() a bit
kill d_validate()
ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.
key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.
Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog. Nothing
major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which was all
acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to come
through this tree.
All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char / misc patches from Greg KH:
"Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.
Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog.
Nothing major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which
was all acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to
come through this tree.
All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while"
* tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (90 commits)
coresight: fix function etm_writel_cp14() parameter order
coresight-etm: remove check for unknown Kconfig macro
coresight: fixing CPU hwid lookup in device tree
coresight: remove the unnecessary function coresight_is_bit_set()
coresight: fix the debug AMBA bus name
coresight: remove the extra spaces
coresight: fix the link between orphan connection and newly added device
coresight: remove the unnecessary replicator property
coresight: fix the replicator subtype value
pdfdocs: Fix 'make pdfdocs' failure for 'uio-howto.tmpl'
mcb: Fix error path of mcb_pci_probe
virtio/console: verify device has config space
ti-st: clean up data types (fix harmless memory corruption)
mei: me: release hw from reset only during the reset flow
mei: mask interrupt set bit on clean reset bit
extcon: max77693: Constify struct regmap_config
extcon: adc-jack: Release IIO channel on driver remove
extcon: Remove duplicated include from extcon-class.c
Drivers: hv: vmbus: hv_process_timer_expiration() can be static
Drivers: hv: vmbus: serialize Offer and Rescind offer
...
Pull backing device changes from Jens Axboe:
"This contains a cleanup of how the backing device is handled, in
preparation for a rework of the life time rules. In this part, the
most important change is to split the unrelated nommu mmap flags from
it, but also removing a backing_dev_info pointer from the
address_space (and inode), and a cleanup of other various minor bits.
Christoph did all the work here, I just fixed an oops with pages that
have a swap backing. Arnd fixed a missing export, and Oleg killed the
lustre backing_dev_info from staging. Last patch was from Al,
unexporting parts that are now no longer needed outside"
* 'for-3.20/bdi' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
Make super_blocks and sb_lock static
mtd: export new mtd_mmap_capabilities
fs: make inode_to_bdi() handle NULL inode
staging/lustre/llite: get rid of backing_dev_info
fs: remove default_backing_dev_info
fs: don't reassign dirty inodes to default_backing_dev_info
nfs: don't call bdi_unregister
ceph: remove call to bdi_unregister
fs: remove mapping->backing_dev_info
fs: export inode_to_bdi and use it in favor of mapping->backing_dev_info
nilfs2: set up s_bdi like the generic mount_bdev code
block_dev: get bdev inode bdi directly from the block device
block_dev: only write bdev inode on close
fs: introduce f_op->mmap_capabilities for nommu mmap support
fs: kill BDI_CAP_SWAP_BACKED
fs: deduplicate noop_backing_dev_info
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Smack adds secmark support for Netfilter
- /proc/keys is now mandatory if CONFIG_KEYS=y
- TPM gets its own device class
- Added TPM 2.0 support
- Smack file hook rework (all Smack users should review this!)"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (64 commits)
cipso: don't use IPCB() to locate the CIPSO IP option
SELinux: fix error code in policydb_init()
selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs
selinux: quiet the filesystem labeling behavior message
selinux: Remove unused function avc_sidcmp()
ima: /proc/keys is now mandatory
Smack: Repair netfilter dependency
X.509: silence asn1 compiler debug output
X.509: shut up about included cert for silent build
KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y
MAINTAINERS: email update
tpm/tpm_tis: Add missing ifdef CONFIG_ACPI for pnp_acpi_device
smack: fix possible use after frees in task_security() callers
smack: Add missing logging in bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: secmark support for netfilter
Smack: Rework file hooks
tpm: fix format string error in tpm-chip.c
char/tpm/tpm_crb: fix build error
smack: Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typo
smack: introduce a special case for tmpfs in smack_d_instantiate()
...
If hashtab_create() returns a NULL pointer then we should return -ENOMEM
but instead the current code returns success.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
- add "pstore" and "debugfs" to list of in-core exceptions
- change fstype checks to boolean equation
- change from strncmp to strcmp for checking
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked the subject line prefix to "selinux"]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
While the filesystem labeling method is only printed at the KERN_DEBUG
level, this still appears in dmesg and on modern Linux distributions
that create a lot of tmpfs mounts for session handling, the dmesg can
easily be filled with a lot of "SELinux: initialized (dev X ..."
messages. This patch removes this notification for the normal case
but leaves the error message intact (displayed when mounting a
filesystem with an unknown labeling behavior).
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Remove the function avc_sidcmp() that is not used anywhere.
This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
[PM: rewrite the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
/proc/keys is now mandatory and its config option no longer exists, so it
doesn't need selecting.
Reported-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).
These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.
(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
On 1/23/2015 8:20 AM, Jim Davis wrote:
> Building with the attached random configuration file,
>
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c: In function ‘smack_ipv4_output’:
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c:55:6: error: ‘struct sk_buff’ has no
> member named ‘secmark’
> skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
> ^
> make[2]: *** [security/smack/smack_netfilter.o] Error 1
The existing Makefile used the wrong configuration option to
determine if smack_netfilter should be built. This sets it right.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Now that /proc/keys is used by libkeyutils to look up a key by type and
description, we should make it unconditional and remove
CONFIG_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS.
Reported-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in
smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode().
task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack.
task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's
credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point
to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock.
Mainly task_security() used this way:
smk_of_task(task_security(p))
Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which
takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct
and do this under RCU read lock.
Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it.
KASan's report for this:
AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr c4635600
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc
new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8
smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c
security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c
prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110
smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150
security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54
proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370
SyS_write+0x5c/0x94
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564
kfree+0x270/0x290
smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0
security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c
put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc
rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998
__do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc
do_softirq+0x94/0xf4
irq_exit+0xbc/0x120
handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134
gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac
__irq_svc+0x44/0x78
_raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48
sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8
sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc
vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0
vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c
INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080
INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null)
Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb ....
Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1
Backtrace:
[<c00233a4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [<c0023dec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140
[<c0023dcc>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<c06d6d7c>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[<c06d6d5c>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<c01c1d50>] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144)
[<c01c1c2c>] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [<c01c1e88>] (object_err+0x3c/0x44)
r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600
[<c01c1e4c>] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [<c01cac18>] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538)
r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7
[<c01ca960>] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [<c01c9430>] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8)
[<c01c935c>] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [<c031e168>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70)
r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000
[<c031e118>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [<c031af64>] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44)
r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780
[<c031af28>] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [<c023d614>] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178)
r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124
[<c023d4f0>] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [<c01db98c>] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4)
r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148
[<c01db630>] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [<c01deec8>] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108)
[<c01ded08>] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [<c01dff04>] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648)
[<c01dfe10>] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [<c01e1458>] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88)
[<c01e141c>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [<c01ccb28>] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198)
r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000
[<c01cca38>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [<c01ccc00>] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34)
[<c01ccbd0>] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [<c001db80>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Read of size 4 by thread T834:
Memory state around the buggy address:
c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Pull RCU updates from Paul E. McKenney:
- Documentation updates.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
- Preemptible-RCU fixes, including fixing an old bug in the
interaction of RCU priority boosting and CPU hotplug.
- SRCU updates.
- RCU CPU stall-warning updates.
- RCU torture-test updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
During UDS connection check, both sides are checked for write access to
the other side. But only the first check is performed with audit support.
The second one didn't produce any audit logs. This simple patch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Smack uses CIPSO to label internet packets and thus provide
for access control on delivery of packets. The netfilter facility
was not used to allow for Smack to work properly without netfilter
configuration. Smack does not need netfilter, however there are
cases where it would be handy.
As a side effect, the labeling of local IPv4 packets can be optimized
and the handling of local IPv6 packets is just all out better.
The best part is that the netfilter tools use "contexts" that
are just strings, and they work just as well for Smack as they
do for SELinux.
All of the conditional compilation for IPv6 was implemented
by Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This is one of those cases where you look at code you did
years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking.
There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers,
and most of them really want the security data from the inode.
Some, however, really want the security context that the process
had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in
Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real
testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss.
This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several
of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as
the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and
the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for
different reasons.
Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the
backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap
operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated
to it's original purpose.
Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to
the nommu mmap code instead. Splitting this from the backing_dev_info
structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't
otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a
backing_dev_info for a character device. It also removes the need for
the mtd_inodefs filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
The 54e70ec5eb commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo subject's OUT label is checked with
object's OUT. Should be OUT to IN.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Files created with __shmem_file_stup() appear to have somewhat fake
dentries which make them look like root directories and not get
the label the current process or ("*") star meant for tmpfs files.
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@samsung.com>
In principle if this function was called with "value" == NULL and "len"
not NULL it could return different results for the "len" compared to a
case where "name" was not NULL. This is a hypothetical case that does
not exist in the kernel, but it's a logic bug nonetheless.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.
No functional change.
Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger <cj@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
SRCU is not necessary to be compiled by default in all cases. For tinification
efforts not compiling SRCU unless necessary is desirable.
The current patch tries to make compiling SRCU optional by introducing a new
Kconfig option CONFIG_SRCU which is selected when any of the components making
use of SRCU are selected.
If we do not select CONFIG_SRCU, srcu.o will not be compiled at all.
text data bss dec hex filename
2007 0 0 2007 7d7 kernel/rcu/srcu.o
Size of arch/powerpc/boot/zImage changes from
text data bss dec hex filename
831552 64180 23944 919676 e087c arch/powerpc/boot/zImage : before
829504 64180 23952 917636 e0084 arch/powerpc/boot/zImage : after
so the savings are about ~2000 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
CC: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
CC: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ paulmck: resolve conflict due to removal of arch/ia64/kvm/Kconfig. ]
When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before
the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's
respective tracking structures.
This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open
for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is
find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is
in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but
->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list).
This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory.
Fixes CVE-2014-9529.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
We already checked if "desc" was NULL at the beginning of the function
and we've dereferenced it so this causes a static checker warning.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
Pull VFS changes from Al Viro:
"First pile out of several (there _definitely_ will be more). Stuff in
this one:
- unification of d_splice_alias()/d_materialize_unique()
- iov_iter rewrite
- killing a bunch of ->f_path.dentry users (and f_dentry macro).
Getting that completed will make life much simpler for
unionmount/overlayfs, since then we'll be able to limit the places
sensitive to file _dentry_ to reasonably few. Which allows to have
file_inode(file) pointing to inode in a covered layer, with dentry
pointing to (negative) dentry in union one.
Still not complete, but much closer now.
- crapectomy in lustre (dead code removal, mostly)
- "let's make seq_printf return nothing" preparations
- assorted cleanups and fixes
There _definitely_ will be more piles"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
copy_from_iter_nocache()
new helper: iov_iter_kvec()
csum_and_copy_..._iter()
iov_iter.c: handle ITER_KVEC directly
iov_iter.c: convert copy_to_iter() to iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: convert copy_from_iter() to iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: get rid of bvec_copy_page_{to,from}_iter()
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_zero() to iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_get_pages_alloc() to iterate_all_kinds
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_get_pages() to iterate_all_kinds
iov_iter.c: convert iov_iter_npages() to iterate_all_kinds
iov_iter.c: iterate_and_advance
iov_iter.c: macros for iterating over iov_iter
kill f_dentry macro
dcache: fix kmemcheck warning in switch_names
new helper: audit_file()
nfsd_vfs_write(): use file_inode()
ncpfs: use file_inode()
kill f_dentry uses
lockd: get rid of ->f_path.dentry->d_sb
...
On powerpc we can end up with IMA=y and PPC_PSERIES=n which leads to:
warning: (IMA) selects TCG_IBMVTPM which has unmet direct dependencies (TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES)
tpm_ibmvtpm.c:(.text+0x14f3e8): undefined reference to `.plpar_hcall_norets'
I'm not sure why IMA needs to select those user-visible symbols, but if
it must then the simplest fix is to just express the proper dependencies
on the select.
Tested-by: Hon Ching (Vicky) Lo <lo1@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of
aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an
error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale
entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel
crash when registering a new key type later.
This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes()
and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error
paths.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Since the keyring facility can be viewed as a cache (at least in some
applications), the local expiration time on the key should probably be viewed
as a 'needs updating after this time' property rather than an absolute 'anyone
now wanting to use this object is out of luck' property.
Since request_key() is the main interface for the usage of keys, this should
update or replace an expired key rather than issuing EKEYEXPIRED if the local
expiration has been reached (ie. it should refresh the cache).
For absolute conditions where refreshing the cache probably doesn't help, the
key can be negatively instantiated using KEYCTL_REJECT_KEY with EKEYEXPIRED
given as the error to issue. This will still cause request_key() to return
EKEYEXPIRED as that was explicitly set.
In the future, if the key type has an update op available, we might want to
upcall with the expired key and allow the upcall to update it. We would pass
a different operation name (the first column in /etc/request-key.conf) to the
request-key program.
request_key() returning EKEYEXPIRED is causing an NFS problem which Chuck
Lever describes thusly:
After about 10 minutes, my NFSv4 functional tests fail because the
ownership of the test files goes to "-2". Looking at /proc/keys
shows that the id_resolv keys that map to my test user ID have
expired. The ownership problem persists until the expired keys are
purged from the keyring, and fresh keys are obtained.
I bisected the problem to 3.13 commit b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand
the capacity of a keyring"). This commit inadvertantly changes the
API contract of the internal function keyring_search_aux().
The root cause appears to be that b2a4df200d made "no state check"
the default behavior. "No state check" means the keyring search
iterator function skips checking the key's expiry timeout, and
returns expired keys. request_key_and_link() depends on getting
an -EAGAIN result code to know when to perform an upcall to refresh
an expired key.
This patch can be tested directly by:
keyctl request2 user debug:fred a @s
keyctl timeout %user:debug:fred 3
sleep 4
keyctl request2 user debug:fred a @s
Without the patch, the last command gives error EKEYEXPIRED, but with the
command it gives a new key.
Reported-by: Carl Hetherington <cth@carlh.net>
Reported-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags to be two variations of the
same flag. They are effectively mutually exclusive and one or the other
should be provided, but not both.
Keyring cycle detection and key possession determination are the only things
that set NO_STATE_CHECK, except that neither flag really does anything there
because neither purpose makes use of the keyring_search_iterator() function,
but rather provides their own.
For cycle detection we definitely want to check inside of expired keyrings,
just so that we don't create a cycle we can't get rid of. Revoked keyrings
are cleared at revocation time and can't then be reused, so shouldn't be a
problem either way.
For possession determination, we *might* want to validate each keyring before
searching it: do you possess a key that's hidden behind an expired or just
plain inaccessible keyring? Currently, the answer is yes. Note that you
cannot, however, possess a key behind a revoked keyring because they are
cleared on revocation.
keyring_search() sets DO_STATE_CHECK, which is correct.
request_key_and_link() currently doesn't specify whether to check the key
state or not - but it should set DO_STATE_CHECK.
key_get_instantiation_authkey() also currently doesn't specify whether to
check the key state or not - but it probably should also set DO_STATE_CHECK.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
When a key description argument is imported into the kernel from userspace, as
happens in add_key(), request_key(), KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
KEYCTL_SEARCH, the description is copied into a buffer up to PAGE_SIZE in size.
PAGE_SIZE, however, is a variable quantity, depending on the arch. Fix this at
4096 instead (ie. 4095 plus a NUL termination) and define a constant
(KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE) to this end.
When reading the description back with KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, a PAGE_SIZE internal
buffer is allocated into which the information and description will be
rendered. This means that the description will get truncated if an extremely
long description it has to be crammed into the buffer with the stringified
information. There is no particular need to copy the description into the
buffer, so just copy it directly to userspace in a separate operation.
Reported-by: Christian Kastner <debian@kvr.at>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Christian Kastner <debian@kvr.at>
Vladis Dronov
Andrew Perepechko
Andreas Gruenbacher
Jarkko Sakkinen
David Howells
Roman Kubiak
Paul Gortmaker
Mimi Zohar
Petko Manolov
Arnd Bergmann
Dmitry Kasatkin
Casey Schaufler
James Morris
Stephen Smalley
Linus Torvalds
Eric Dumazet
Mel Gorman
David S. Miller
Sangwoo
Geliang Tang
Rasmus Villemoes
Jeff Vander Stoep
Paul Moore
Insu Yun
Zbigniew Jasinski
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Florian Westphal
José Bollo
Lukasz Pawelczyk
Dmitry Kasatkin
Eric W. Biederman
Ingo Molnar
Kirill A. Shutemov
Kees Cook
Andy Lutomirski
Paul E. McKenney
Jan Beulich
Salvatore Mesoraca
Colin Ian King
kbuild test robot
Vivek Trivedi
Waiman Long
Al Viro
Dan Carpenter
J. Bruce Fields
Oleg Nesterov
Marek Milkovic
Rafal Krypa
Richard Guy Briggs
Luis R. Rodriguez
Roberto Sassu
Dmitry Kasatkin
Seung-Woo Kim
NeilBrown
Davidlohr Bueso
Iulia Manda
Nicolas Dichtel
Michal Marek
John Brooks
Joe Perches
José Bollo
Marcin Lis
David Jeffery
Mark Salyzyn
Rickard Strandqvist
Andrey Ryabinin
Christoph Hellwig
Łukasz Stelmach
Christoph Jaeger
Pranith Kumar
Sasha Levin
Michael Ellerman
Takashi Iwai
Yao Dongdong