In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.
On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.
The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:
$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248
Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.
This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:
# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%
[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull force_sig() argument change from Eric Biederman:
"A source of error over the years has been that force_sig has taken a
task parameter when it is only safe to use force_sig with the current
task.
The force_sig function is built for delivering synchronous signals
such as SIGSEGV where the userspace application caused a synchronous
fault (such as a page fault) and the kernel responded with a signal.
Because the name force_sig does not make this clear, and because the
force_sig takes a task parameter the function force_sig has been
abused for sending other kinds of signals over the years. Slowly those
have been fixed when the oopses have been tracked down.
This set of changes fixes the remaining abusers of force_sig and
carefully rips out the task parameter from force_sig and friends
making this kind of error almost impossible in the future"
* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits)
signal/x86: Move tsk inside of CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE in do_sigbus
signal: Remove the signal number and task parameters from force_sig_info
signal: Factor force_sig_info_to_task out of force_sig_info
signal: Generate the siginfo in force_sig
signal: Move the computation of force into send_signal and correct it.
signal: Properly set TRACE_SIGNAL_LOSE_INFO in __send_signal
signal: Remove the task parameter from force_sig_fault
signal: Use force_sig_fault_to_task for the two calls that don't deliver to current
signal: Explicitly call force_sig_fault on current
signal/unicore32: Remove tsk parameter from __do_user_fault
signal/arm: Remove tsk parameter from __do_user_fault
signal/arm: Remove tsk parameter from ptrace_break
signal/nds32: Remove tsk parameter from send_sigtrap
signal/riscv: Remove tsk parameter from do_trap
signal/sh: Remove tsk parameter from force_sig_info_fault
signal/um: Remove task parameter from send_sigtrap
signal/x86: Remove task parameter from send_sigtrap
signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig_mceerr
signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig
signal: Remove task parameter from force_sigsegv
...
The locking in force_sig_info is not prepared to deal with a task that
exits or execs (as sighand may change). The is not a locking problem
in force_sig as force_sig is only built to handle synchronous
exceptions.
Further the function force_sig_info changes the signal state if the
signal is ignored, or blocked or if SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE will prevent the
delivery of the signal. The signal SIGKILL can not be ignored and can
not be blocked and SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE won't prevent it from being
delivered.
So using force_sig rather than send_sig for SIGKILL is confusing
and pointless.
Because it won't impact the sending of the signal and and because
using force_sig is wrong, replace force_sig with send_sig.
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: cf3f89214e ("pidns: add reboot_pid_ns() to handle the reboot syscall")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Replace send_sig_info in zap_pid_ns_processes with
group_send_sig_info. This makes more sense as the entire process
group is being killed. More importantly this allows the kill of those
processes with PIDTYPE_MAX to indicate all of the process in the pid
namespace are being signaled. This is needed for fork to detect when
signals are sent to a group of processes.
Admittedly fork has another case to catch SIGKILL but the principle remains
that it is desirable to know when a group of processes is being signaled.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that siginfo is never allocated for SIGKILL and SIGSTOP there is
no difference between SEND_SIG_PRIV and SEND_SIG_FORCED for SIGKILL
and SIGSTOP. This makes SEND_SIG_FORCED unnecessary and redundant in
the presence of SIGKILL and SIGSTOP. Therefore change users of
SEND_SIG_FORCED that are sending SIGKILL or SIGSTOP to use
SEND_SIG_PRIV instead.
This removes the last users of SEND_SIG_FORCED.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There was a lot of work this cycle fixing bugs that were discovered
after the merge window and getting everything ready where we can
reasonably support fully unprivileged fuse. The bug fixes you already
have and much of the unprivileged fuse work is coming in via other
trees.
Still left for fully unprivileged fuse is figuring out how to cleanly
handle .set_acl and .get_acl in the legacy case, and properly handling
of evm xattrs on unprivileged mounts.
Included in the tree is a cleanup from Alexely that replaced a linked
list with a statically allocated fix sized array for the pid caches,
which simplifies and speeds things up.
Then there is are some cleanups and fixes for the ipc namespace. The
motivation was that in reviewing other code it was discovered that
access ipc objects from different pid namespaces recorded pids in such
a way that when asked the wrong pids were returned. In the worst case
there has been a measured 30% performance impact for sysvipc
semaphores. Other test cases showed no measurable performance impact.
Manfred Spraul and Davidlohr Bueso who tend to work on sysvipc
performance both gave the nod that this is good enough.
Casey Schaufler and James Morris have given their approval to the LSM
side of the changes.
I simplified the types and the code dealing with sysvipc to pass just
kern_ipc_perm for all three types of ipc. Which reduced the header
dependencies throughout the kernel and simplified the lsm code.
Which let me work on the pid fixes without having to worry about
trivial changes causing complete kernel recompiles"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ipc/shm: Fix pid freeing.
ipc/shm: fix up for struct file no longer being available in shm.h
ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooks
ipc: Directly call the security hook in ipc_ops.associate
ipc/sem: Fix semctl(..., GETPID, ...) between pid namespaces
ipc/msg: Fix msgctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces
ipc/shm: Fix shmctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces.
ipc/util: Helpers for making the sysvipc operations pid namespace aware
ipc: Move IPCMNI from include/ipc.h into ipc/util.h
msg: Move struct msg_queue into ipc/msg.c
shm: Move struct shmid_kernel into ipc/shm.c
sem: Move struct sem and struct sem_array into ipc/sem.c
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks
pidns: simpler allocation of pid_* caches
All call sites of sys_wait4() set *rusage to NULL. Therefore, there is
no need for the copy_to_user() handling of *rusage, and we can use
kernel_wait4() directly.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Those pid_* caches are created on demand when a process advances to the new
level of pid namespace. Which means pointers are stable, write only and
thus can be packed into an array instead of spreading them over and using
lists(!) to find them.
Both first and subsequent clone/unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) become faster.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
pidhash is no longer required as all the information can be looked up
from idr tree. nr_hashed represented the number of pids that had been
hashed. Since, nr_hashed and PIDNS_HASH_ADDING are no longer relevant,
it has been renamed to pid_allocated and PIDNS_ADDING respectively.
[gs051095@gmail.com: v6]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507760379-21662-3-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507583624-22146-3-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gargi Sharma <gs051095@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [ia64]
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "Replacing PID bitmap implementation with IDR API", v4.
This series replaces kernel bitmap implementation of PID allocation with
IDR API. These patches are written to simplify the kernel by replacing
custom code with calls to generic code.
The following are the stats for pid and pid_namespace object files
before and after the replacement. There is a noteworthy change between
the IDR and bitmap implementation.
Before
text data bss dec hex filename
8447 3894 64 12405 3075 kernel/pid.o
After
text data bss dec hex filename
3397 304 0 3701 e75 kernel/pid.o
Before
text data bss dec hex filename
5692 1842 192 7726 1e2e kernel/pid_namespace.o
After
text data bss dec hex filename
2854 216 16 3086 c0e kernel/pid_namespace.o
The following are the stats for ps, pstree and calling readdir on /proc
for 10,000 processes.
ps:
With IDR API With bitmap
real 0m1.479s 0m2.319s
user 0m0.070s 0m0.060s
sys 0m0.289s 0m0.516s
pstree:
With IDR API With bitmap
real 0m1.024s 0m1.794s
user 0m0.348s 0m0.612s
sys 0m0.184s 0m0.264s
proc:
With IDR API With bitmap
real 0m0.059s 0m0.074s
user 0m0.000s 0m0.004s
sys 0m0.016s 0m0.016s
This patch (of 2):
Replace the current bitmap implementation for Process ID allocation.
Functions that are no longer required, for example, free_pidmap(),
alloc_pidmap(), etc. are removed. The rest of the functions are
modified to use the IDR API. The change was made to make the PID
allocation less complex by replacing custom code with calls to generic
API.
[gs051095@gmail.com: v6]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507760379-21662-2-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
[avagin@openvz.org: restore the old behaviour of the ns_last_pid sysctl]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171106183144.16368-1-avagin@openvz.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507583624-22146-2-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gargi Sharma <gs051095@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is pointless and confusing to allow a pid namespace hierarchy and
the user namespace hierarchy to get out of sync. The owner of a child
pid namespace should be the owner of the parent pid namespace or
a descendant of the owner of the parent pid namespace.
Otherwise it is possible to construct scenarios where a process has a
capability over a parent pid namespace but does not have the
capability over a child pid namespace. Which confusingly makes
permission checks non-transitive.
It requires use of setns into a pid namespace (but not into a user
namespace) to create such a scenario.
Add the function in_userns to help in making this determination.
v2: Optimized in_userns by using level as suggested
by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Ref: 49f4d8b93c ("pidns: Capture the user namespace and filter ns_last_pid")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The code can potentially sleep for an indefinite amount of time in
zap_pid_ns_processes triggering the hung task timeout, and increasing
the system average. This is undesirable. Sleep with a task state of
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE instead of TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE to remove these
undesirable side effects.
Apparently under heavy load this has been allowing Chrome to trigger
the hung time task timeout error and cause ChromeOS to reboot.
Reported-by: Vovo Yang <vovoy@google.com>
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Fixes: 6347e90091 ("pidns: guarantee that the pidns init will be the last pidns process reaped")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
pid_ns_for_children set by a task is known only to the task itself, and
it's impossible to identify it from outside.
It's a big problem for checkpoint/restore software like CRIU, because it
can't correctly handle tasks, that do setns(CLONE_NEWPID) in proccess of
their work.
This patch solves the problem, and it exposes pid_ns_for_children to ns
directory in standard way with the name "pid_for_children":
~# ls /proc/5531/ns -l | grep pid
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid_for_children -> pid:[4026532286]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149201123914.6007.2187327078064239572.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of including the full <linux/signal.h>, we are going to include the
types-only <linux/signal_types.h> header in <linux/sched.h>, to further
decouple the scheduler header from the signal headers.
This means that various files which relied on the full <linux/signal.h> need
to be updated to gain an explicit dependency on it.
Update the code that relies on sched.h's inclusion of the <linux/signal.h> header.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
=========================================================
[ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ]
4.10.0-rc2-00024-g4aecec9-dirty #118 Tainted: G W
---------------------------------------------------------
swapper/1/0 just changed the state of lock:
(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){-.....}, at: [<ffffffffbd0a1bc6>] __lock_task_sighand+0xb6/0x2c0
but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
(ucounts_lock){+.+...}
and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &(&tty->ctrl_lock)->rlock --> ucounts_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(ucounts_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock);
lock(&(&tty->ctrl_lock)->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
This patch removes a dependency between rlock and ucount_lock.
Fixes: f333c700c6 ("pidns: Add a limit on the number of pid namespaces")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Each namespace has an owning user namespace and now there is not way
to discover these relationships.
Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships too.
Why we may want to know relationships between namespaces?
One use would be visualization, in order to understand the running
system. Another would be to answer the question: what capability does
process X have to perform operations on a resource governed by namespace
Y?
One more use-case (which usually called abnormal) is checkpoint/restart.
In CRIU we are going to dump and restore nested namespaces.
There [1] was a discussion about which interface to choose to determing
relationships between namespaces.
Eric suggested to add two ioctl-s [2]:
> Grumble, Grumble. I think this may actually a case for creating ioctls
> for these two cases. Now that random nsfs file descriptors are bind
> mountable the original reason for using proc files is not as pressing.
>
> One ioctl for the user namespace that owns a file descriptor.
> One ioctl for the parent namespace of a namespace file descriptor.
Here is an implementaions of these ioctl-s.
$ man man7/namespaces.7
...
Since Linux 4.X, the following ioctl(2) calls are supported for
namespace file descriptors. The correct syntax is:
fd = ioctl(ns_fd, ioctl_type);
where ioctl_type is one of the following:
NS_GET_USERNS
Returns a file descriptor that refers to an owning user names‐
pace.
NS_GET_PARENT
Returns a file descriptor that refers to a parent namespace.
This ioctl(2) can be used for pid and user namespaces. For
user namespaces, NS_GET_PARENT and NS_GET_USERNS have the same
meaning.
In addition to generic ioctl(2) errors, the following specific ones
can occur:
EINVAL NS_GET_PARENT was called for a nonhierarchical namespace.
EPERM The requested namespace is outside of the current namespace
scope.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/6/158
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/9/101
Changes for v2:
* don't return ENOENT for init_user_ns and init_pid_ns. There is nothing
outside of the init namespace, so we can return EPERM in this case too.
> The fewer special cases the easier the code is to get
> correct, and the easier it is to read. // Eric
Changes for v3:
* rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
grabs a reference.
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "W. Trevor King" <wking@tremily.us>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships.
In a future we will use this interface to dump and restore nested
namespaces.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Return -EPERM if an owning user namespace is outside of a process
current user namespace.
v2: In a first version ns_get_owner returned ENOENT for init_user_ns.
This special cases was removed from this version. There is nothing
outside of init_user_ns, so we can return EPERM.
v3: rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
grabs a reference.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The current error codes returned when a the per user per user
namespace limit are hit (EINVAL, EUSERS, and ENFILE) are wrong. I
asked for advice on linux-api and it we made clear that those were
the wrong error code, but a correct effor code was not suggested.
The best general error code I have found for hitting a resource limit
is ENOSPC. It is not perfect but as it is unambiguous it will serve
until someone comes up with a better error code.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull vfs pile #2 from Al Viro:
"Next pile (and there'll be one or two more).
The large piece in this one is getting rid of /proc/*/ns/* weirdness;
among other things, it allows to (finally) make nameidata completely
opaque outside of fs/namei.c, making for easier further cleanups in
there"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
coda_venus_readdir(): use file_inode()
fs/namei.c: fold link_path_walk() call into path_init()
path_init(): don't bother with LOOKUP_PARENT in argument
fs/namei.c: new helper (path_cleanup())
path_init(): store the "base" pointer to file in nameidata itself
make default ->i_fop have ->open() fail with ENXIO
make nameidata completely opaque outside of fs/namei.c
kill proc_ns completely
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
bury struct proc_ns in fs/proc
copy address of proc_ns_ops into ns_common
new helpers: ns_alloc_inum/ns_free_inum
make proc_ns_operations work with struct ns_common * instead of void *
switch the rest of proc_ns_operations to working with &...->ns
netns: switch ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() to working with &net->ns
make mntns ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() work with &mnt_ns->ns
common object embedded into various struct ....ns
The comments in zap_pid_ns_processes() are not clear, we need to explain
how this code actually works.
1. "Ignore SIGCHLD" looks like optimization but it is not, we also
need this for correctness.
2. The comment above sys_wait4() could tell more.
EXIT_ZOMBIE child is only possible if it has exited before we
ignored SIGCHLD. Or if it is traced from the parent namespace,
but in this case it will be reaped by debugger after detach,
sys_wait4() acts as a synchronization point.
3. The comment about TASK_DEAD (EXIT_DEAD in fact) children is
outdated. Contrary to what it says we do not need to make sure
they all go away after 0a01f2cc39 "pidns: Make the pidns proc
mount/umount logic obvious".
At the same time, we do need to wait for nr_hashed==init_pids,
but the reasons are quite different and not obvious: setns().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
pidns_get()->get_pid_ns() can hit ns == NULL. This task_struct can't
go away, but task_active_pid_ns(task) is NULL if release_task(task)
was already called. Alternatively we could change get_pid_ns(ns) to
check ns != NULL, but it seems that other callers are fine.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug
fixes.
The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable
is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be
considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally
tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace
infrastructure.
Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace
capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows
the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy
capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD
userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on.
pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup
sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs
userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted
vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces
kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code.
proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem
vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
nsown_capable is a special case of ns_capable essentially for just CAP_SETUID and
CAP_SETGID. For the existing users it doesn't noticably simplify things and
from the suggested patches I have seen it encourages people to do the wrong
thing. So remove nsown_capable.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
nsproxy.pid_ns is *not* the task's pid namespace. The name should clarify
that.
This makes it more obvious that setns on a pid namespace is weird --
it won't change the pid namespace shown in procfs.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).
7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
...
Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Move BITS_PER_PAGE from pid_namespace.c to pid_namespace.h, since we can
simplify the define PID_MAP_ENTRIES by using the BITS_PER_PAGE.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: kernel/pid.c:54:1: warning: "BITS_PER_PAGE" redefined]
Signed-off-by: Raphael S.Carvalho <raphael.scarv@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a multi-threaded init exits and the initial thread is not the
last thread to exit the initial thread hangs around as a zombie
until the last thread exits. In that case zap_pid_ns_processes
needs to wait until there are only 2 hashed pids in the pid
namespace not one.
v2. Replace thread_pid_vnr(me) == 1 with the test thread_group_leader(me)
as suggested by Oleg.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caj Larsson <caj@omnicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Oleg pointed out that in a pid namespace the sequence.
- pid 1 becomes a zombie
- setns(thepidns), fork,...
- reaping pid 1.
- The injected processes exiting.
Can lead to processes attempting access their child reaper and
instead following a stale pointer.
That waitpid for init can return before all of the processes in
the pid namespace have exited is also unfortunate.
Avoid these problems by disabling the allocation of new pids in a pid
namespace when init dies, instead of when the last process in a pid
namespace is reaped.
Pointed-out-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.
However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.
Which made the following nasty sequence possible.
pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
setns(fd, 0);
system("su -");
}
Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.
A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.
This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.
We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.
I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces
does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children
created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init
process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children
of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process
that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map.
A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was
settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from
pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare.
I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following
appears to be a representative sample of their logic.
{
setup stuff include pam
child = fork();
if (!child) {
setuid()
exec /bin/bash
}
waitpid(child);
pam and other cleanup
}
As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user
space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space
process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further
most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which
means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to
the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more
comprehensible.
The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is
that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly.
Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct
pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not
the least of which is that glibc caches getpid().
These semantics are implemented by having two notions
of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns
which is the pid namspace the process was created with
and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to
that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored
in the struct pid of the task.
Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children
that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Pid namespaces are designed to be inescapable so verify that the
passed in pid namespace is a child of the currently active
pid namespace or the currently active pid namespace itself.
Allowing the currently active pid namespace is important so
the effects of an earlier setns can be cancelled.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns will
soon be allowed to support unshare and setns.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of current->ns_proxy->pid_ns. However
that leads to strange cases like trying to have a single process be
init in multiple pid namespaces, which is racy and hard to think
about.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of task_active_pid_ns(current). While
that seems less racy it does not provide any utility.
Therefore define the semantics of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns to be that the
pid namespace creation fails. That is easy to implement and easy
to think about.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Looking at pid_ns->nr_hashed is a bit simpler and it works for
disjoint process trees that an unshare or a join of a pid_namespace
may create.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Capture the the user namespace that creates the pid namespace
- Use that user namespace to test if it is ok to write to
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid.
Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> noticed I was missing a put_user_ns
in when destroying a pid_ns. I have foloded his patch into this one
so that bisects will work properly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
'struct pid' is a "variable sized struct" - a header with an array of
upids at the end.
The size of the array depends on a level (depth) of pid namespaces. Now a
level of pidns is not limited, so 'struct pid' can be more than one page.
Looks reasonable, that it should be less than a page. MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL is
not calculated from PAGE_SIZE, because in this case it depends on
architectures, config options and it will be reduced, if someone adds a
new fields in struct pid or struct upid.
I suggest to set MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL = 32, because it saves ability to expand
"struct pid" and it's more than enough for all known for me use-cases.
When someone finds a reasonable use case, we can add a config option or a
sysctl parameter.
In addition it will reduce the effect of another problem, when we have
many nested namespaces and the oldest one starts dying.
zap_pid_ns_processe will be called for each namespace and find_vpid will
be called for each process in a namespace. find_vpid will be called
minimum max_level^2 / 2 times. The reason of that is that when we found a
bit in pidmap, we can't determine this pidns is top for this process or it
isn't.
vpid is a heavy operation, so a fork bomb, which create many nested
namespace, can make a system inaccessible for a long time. For example my
system becomes inaccessible for a few minutes with 4000 processes.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: return -EINVAL in response to excessive nesting, not -ENOMEM]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
free_pid_ns() operates in a recursive fashion:
free_pid_ns(parent)
put_pid_ns(parent)
kref_put(&ns->kref, free_pid_ns);
free_pid_ns
thus if there was a huge nesting of namespaces the userspace may trigger
avalanche calling of free_pid_ns leading to kernel stack exhausting and a
panic eventually.
This patch turns the recursion into an iterative loop.
Based on a patch by Andrew Vagin.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export put_pid_ns() to modules]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Matteo Croce
Linus Torvalds
Eric W. Biederman
Thomas Gleixner
Dominik Brodowski
Alexey Dobriyan
Gargi Sharma
Kirill Tkhai
Ingo Molnar
Andrei Vagin
Oleg Nesterov
Al Viro
Andy Lutomirski
David Howells
Raphael S.Carvalho
Cyrill Gorcunov