Allocate the kcov buffer during KCOV_MODE_INIT in order to untie mmapping
of a kcov instance and the actual coverage collection process. Modify
kcov_mmap, so that it can be reliably used any number of times once
KCOV_MODE_INIT has succeeded.
These changes to the user-facing interface of the tool only weaken the
preconditions, so all existing user space code should remain compatible
with the new version.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220117153634.150357-3-nogikh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kcov: improve mmap processing", v3.
Subsequent mmaps of the same kcov descriptor currently do not update the
virtual memory of the task and yet return 0 (success). This is
counter-intuitive and may lead to unexpected memory access errors.
Also, this unnecessarily limits the functionality of kcov to only the
simplest usage scenarios. Kcov instances are effectively forever attached
to their first address spaces and it becomes impossible to e.g. reuse the
same kcov handle in forked child processes without mmapping the memory
first. This is exactly what we tried to do in syzkaller and inadvertently
came upon this behavior.
This patch series addresses the problem described above.
This patch (of 3):
Currently all ioctls are de facto processed under a spinlock in order to
serialise them. This, however, prohibits the use of vmalloc and other
memory management functions in the implementations of those ioctls,
unnecessary complicating any further changes to the code.
Let all ioctls first be processed inside the kcov_ioctl() function which
should execute the ones that are not compatible with spinlock and then
pass control to kcov_ioctl_locked() for all other ones.
KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE is processed both in kcov_ioctl() and
kcov_ioctl_locked() as the steps are easily separable.
Although it is still compatible with a spinlock, move KCOV_INIT_TRACE
handling to kcov_ioctl(), so that the changes from the next commit are
easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220117153634.150357-1-nogikh@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220117153634.150357-2-nogikh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kcov code mixes local_irq_save() and spin_lock() in
kcov_remote_{start|end}(). This creates a warning on PREEMPT_RT because
local_irq_save() disables interrupts and spin_lock_t is turned into a
sleeping lock which can not be acquired in a section with disabled
interrupts.
The kcov_remote_lock is used to synchronize the access to the hash-list
kcov_remote_map. The local_irq_save() block protects access to the
per-CPU data kcov_percpu_data.
There is no compelling reason to change the lock type to raw_spin_lock_t
to make it work with local_irq_save(). Changing it would require to
move memory allocation (in kcov_remote_add()) and deallocation outside
of the locked section.
Adding an unlimited amount of entries to the hashlist will increase the
IRQ-off time during lookup. It could be argued that this is debug code
and the latency does not matter. There is however no need to do so and
it would allow to use this facility in an RT enabled build.
Using a local_lock_t instead of local_irq_save() has the befit of adding
a protection scope within the source which makes it obvious what is
protected. On a !PREEMPT_RT && !LOCKDEP build the local_lock_irqsave()
maps directly to local_irq_save() so there is overhead at runtime.
Replace the local_irq_save() section with a local_lock_t.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210923164741.1859522-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830172627.267989-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Reported-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kcov_remote_start() may need to allocate memory in the in_task() case
(otherwise per-CPU memory has been pre-allocated) and therefore requires
enabled interrupts.
The interrupts are enabled before checking if the allocation is required
so if no allocation is required then the interrupts are needlessly enabled
and disabled again.
Enable interrupts only if memory allocation is performed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210923164741.1859522-5-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830172627.267989-5-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
During boot kcov allocates per-CPU memory which is used later if remote/
softirq processing is enabled.
Allocate the per-CPU memory on the CPU local node to avoid cross node
memory access.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210923164741.1859522-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830172627.267989-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kcov_common_handle is a method that is used to obtain a "default" KCOV
remote handle of the current process. The handle can later be passed
to kcov_remote_start in order to collect coverage for the processing
that is initiated by one process, but done in another. For details see
Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst and comments in kernel/kcov.c.
Presently, if kcov_common_handle is called in an IRQ context, it will
return a handle for the interrupted process. This may lead to
unreliable and incorrect coverage collection.
Adjust the behavior of kcov_common_handle in the following way. If it
is called in a task context, return the common handle for the
currently running task. Otherwise, return 0.
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Fix sparse build warnings:
kernel/kcov.c:99:1: warning:
symbol '__pcpu_scope_kcov_percpu_data' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/kcov.c:778:6: warning:
symbol 'kcov_remote_softirq_start' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/kcov.c:795:6: warning:
symbol 'kcov_remote_softirq_stop' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200702115501.73077-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kcov_remote_stop() should check that the corresponding kcov_remote_start()
actually found the specified remote handle and started collecting
coverage. This is done by checking the per thread kcov_softirq flag.
A particular failure scenario where this was observed involved a softirq
with a remote coverage collection section coming between check_kcov_mode()
and the access to t->kcov_area in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). In that
softirq kcov_remote_start() bailed out after kcov_remote_find() check, but
the matching kcov_remote_stop() didn't check if kcov_remote_start()
succeeded, and overwrote per thread kcov parameters with invalid (zero)
values.
Fixes: 5ff3b30ab5 ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fcd1cd16eac1d2c01a66befd8ea4afc6f8d09833.1591576806.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This change extends kcov remote coverage support to allow collecting
coverage from soft interrupts in addition to kernel background threads.
To collect coverage from code that is executed in softirq context, a part
of that code has to be annotated with kcov_remote_start/stop() in a
similar way as how it is done for global kernel background threads. Then
the handle used for the annotations has to be passed to the
KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl.
Internally this patch adjusts the __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() compiler
inserted callback to not bail out when called from softirq context.
kcov_remote_start/stop() are updated to save/restore the current per task
kcov state in a per-cpu area (in case the softirq came when the kernel was
already collecting coverage in task context). Coverage from softirqs is
collected into pre-allocated per-cpu areas, whose size is controlled by
the new CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE.
[andreyknvl@google.com: turn current->kcov_softirq into unsigned int to fix objtool warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/841c778aa3849c5cb8c3761f56b87ce653a88671.1585233617.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/469bd385c431d050bc38a593296eff4baae50666.1584655448.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() check t->kcov to find
out whether the coverage is already being collected by the current task.
Use t->kcov_mode for that instead. This doesn't change the overall
behavior in any way, but serves as a preparation for the following softirq
coverage collection support patch.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f70377945d1d8e6e4916cbce871a12303d6186b4.1585233617.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ee1a1dec43059da5d7664c85c1addc89c4cd58de.1584655448.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If vmalloc() fails in kcov_remote_start() we'll access remote->kcov
without holding kcov_remote_lock, so remote might potentially be freed at
that point. Cache kcov pointer in a local variable.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9d9134359725a965627b7e8f2652069f86f1d1fa.1585233617.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/de0d3d30ff90776a2a509cc34c7c1c7521bda125.1584655448.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series " kcov: collect coverage from usb and vhost", v3.
This patchset extends kcov to allow collecting coverage from backgound
kernel threads. This extension requires custom annotations for each of
the places where coverage collection is desired. This patchset
implements this for hub events in the USB subsystem and for vhost
workers. See the first patch description for details about the kcov
extension. The other two patches apply this kcov extension to USB and
vhost.
Examples of other subsystems that might potentially benefit from this
when custom annotations are added (the list is based on
process_one_work() callers for bugs recently reported by syzbot):
1. fs: writeback wb_workfn() worker,
2. net: addrconf_dad_work()/addrconf_verify_work() workers,
3. net: neigh_periodic_work() worker,
4. net/p9: p9_write_work()/p9_read_work() workers,
5. block: blk_mq_run_work_fn() worker.
These patches have been used to enable coverage-guided USB fuzzing with
syzkaller for the last few years, see the details here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/external_fuzzing_usb.md
This patchset has been pushed to the public Linux kernel Gerrit
instance:
https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux/+/1524
This patch (of 3):
Add background thread coverage collection ability to kcov.
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to
collect coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that
those parts are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a
limited number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is
spawned per USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user
interacts with some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of
such handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field
of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to
the code sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from
different userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per
annotation. Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle
through the common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This
common handle gets saved to the kcov_handle field in the current
task_struct and needs to be passed to the newly spawned threads via
custom annotations. Those threads should in turn be annotated with
kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a
handle is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs
to, and the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance
within that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for
common handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The
bytes 4-7 are currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the
number of bytes used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace process collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is
annotated to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the
current task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect
coverage selectively from different subsystems.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e90e315426a384207edbec1d6aa89e43008e4caf.1572366574.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference
counters with the following properties:
- counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set()
- a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero
- once counter reaches zero, its further
increments aren't allowed
- counter schema uses basic atomic operations
(set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.)
Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t
type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows.
This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to
use-after-free situation and be exploitable.
The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter. Convert
it to refcount_t and fix up the operations.
**Important note for maintainers:
Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c have
different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts.
The full comparison can be seen in https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57
and it is hopefully soon in state to be merged to the documentation
tree. Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t
provides enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in
some rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't
have some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage.
For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference
in following places:
- kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only
provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success
vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547634429-772-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When calling debugfs functions, there is no need to ever check the
return value. The function can work or not, but the code logic should
never do something different based on this.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190122152151.16139-46-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 is marked as notrace, the
function called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 shouldn't be
traceable either. ftrace_graph_caller() gets called every time func
write_comp_data() gets called if it isn't marked 'notrace'. This is the
backtrace from gdb:
#0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179
#1 0xffffff8010201920 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151
#2 0xffffff8010439714 in write_comp_data (type=5, arg1=0, arg2=0, ip=18446743524224276596) at ../kernel/kcov.c:116
#3 0xffffff8010439894 in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (arg1=<optimized out>, arg2=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/kcov.c:188
#4 0xffffff8010201874 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743524226602768, parent=0xffffff801014b918, frame_pointer=18446743524223531344) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:27
#5 0xffffff801020194c in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182
Rework so that write_comp_data() that are called from
__sanitizer_cov_trace_*_cmp*() are marked as 'notrace'.
Commit 903e8ff867 ("kernel/kcov.c: mark funcs in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() as notrace")
missed to mark write_comp_data() as 'notrace'. When that patch was
created gcc-7 was used. In lib/Kconfig.debug
config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp)
That code path isn't hit with gcc-7. However, it were that with gcc-8.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206143011.23719-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is marked as notrace, function calls in
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() shouldn't be traced either.
ftrace_graph_caller() gets called for each function that isn't marked
'notrace', like canonicalize_ip(). This is the call trace from a run:
[ 139.644550] ftrace_graph_caller+0x1c/0x24
[ 139.648352] canonicalize_ip+0x18/0x28
[ 139.652313] __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x14/0x58
[ 139.656184] sched_clock+0x34/0x1e8
[ 139.659759] trace_clock_local+0x40/0x88
[ 139.663722] ftrace_push_return_trace+0x8c/0x1f0
[ 139.667767] prepare_ftrace_return+0xa8/0x100
[ 139.671709] ftrace_graph_caller+0x1c/0x24
Rework so that check_kcov_mode() and canonicalize_ip() that are called
from __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() are also marked as notrace.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181128081239.18317-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signen-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
During a context switch, we first switch_mm() to the next task's mm,
then switch_to() that new task. This means that vmalloc'd regions which
had previously been faulted in can transiently disappear in the context
of the prev task.
Functions instrumented by KCOV may try to access a vmalloc'd kcov_area
during this window, and as the fault handling code is instrumented, this
results in a recursive fault.
We must avoid accessing any kcov_area during this window. We can do so
with a new flag in kcov_mode, set prior to switching the mm, and cleared
once the new task is live. Since task_struct::kcov_mode isn't always a
specific enum kcov_mode value, this is made an unsigned int.
The manipulation is hidden behind kcov_{prepare,finish}_switch() helpers,
which are empty for !CONFIG_KCOV kernels.
The code uses macros because I can't use static inline functions without a
circular include dependency between <linux/sched.h> and <linux/kcov.h>,
since the definition of task_struct uses things defined in <linux/kcov.h>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On many architectures the vmalloc area is lazily faulted in upon first
access. This is problematic for KCOV, as __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc
accesses the (vmalloc'd) kcov_area, and fault handling code may be
instrumented. If an access to kcov_area faults, this will result in
mutual recursion through the fault handling code and
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), eventually leading to stack corruption
and/or overflow.
We can avoid this by faulting in the kcov_area before
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is permitted to access it. Once it has been
faulted in, it will remain present in the process page tables, and will
not fault again.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: code cleanup]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment explaining kcov_fault_in_area()]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fancier code comment from Mark]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kcov: fix unexpected faults".
These patches fix a few issues where KCOV code could trigger recursive
faults, discovered while debugging a patch enabling KCOV for arch/arm:
* On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels, there's a small race window where
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() can see a bogus kcov_area.
* Lazy faulting of the vmalloc area can cause mutual recursion between
fault handling code and __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().
* During the context switch, switching the mm can cause the kcov_area to
be transiently unmapped.
These are prerequisites for enabling KCOV on arm, but the issues
themsevles are generic -- we just happen to avoid them by chance rather
than design on x86-64 and arm64.
This patch (of 3):
For kernels built with CONFIG_PREEMPT, some C code may execute before or
after the interrupt handler, while the hardirq count is zero. In these
cases, in_task() can return true.
A task can be interrupted in the middle of a KCOV_DISABLE ioctl while it
resets the task's kcov data via kcov_task_init(). Instrumented code
executed during this period will call __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), and as
in_task() returns true, will inspect t->kcov_mode before trying to write
to t->kcov_area.
In kcov_init_task() we update t->kcov_{mode,area,size} with plain stores,
which may be re-ordered, torn, etc. Thus __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() may
see bogus values for any of these fields, and may attempt to write to
memory which is not mapped.
Let's avoid this by using WRITE_ONCE() to set t->kcov_mode, with a
barrier() to ensure this is ordered before we clear t->kov_{area,size}.
This ensures that any code execute while kcov_init_task() is preempted
will either see valid values for t->kcov_{area,size}, or will see that
t->kcov_mode is KCOV_MODE_DISABLED, and bail out without touching
t->kcov_area.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently KCOV_ENABLE does not check if the current task is already
associated with another kcov descriptor. As the result it is possible
to associate a single task with more than one kcov descriptor, which
later leads to a memory leak of the old descriptor. This relation is
really meant to be one-to-one (task has only one back link).
Extend validation to detect such misuse.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122082520.15716-1-dvyukov@google.com
Fixes: 5c9a8750a6 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Shankara Pailoor <sp3485@columbia.edu>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Enables kcov to collect comparison operands from instrumented code.
This is done by using Clang's -fsanitize=trace-cmp instrumentation
(currently not available for GCC).
The comparison operands help a lot in fuzz testing. E.g. they are used
in Syzkaller to cover the interiors of conditional statements with way
less attempts and thus make previously unreachable code reachable.
To allow separate collection of coverage and comparison operands two
different work modes are implemented. Mode selection is now done via a
KCOV_ENABLE ioctl call with corresponding argument value.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171011095459.70721-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Victor Chibotaru <tchibo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is a hot code, so it's worth to remove
pointless '!current' check. Current is never NULL.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929162221.32500-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Support compat processes in KCOV by providing compat_ioctl callback.
Compat mode uses the same ioctl callback: we have 2 commands that do not
use the argument and 1 that already checks that the arg does not overflow
INT_MAX. This allows to use KCOV-guided fuzzing in compat processes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823100553.55812-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
in_interrupt() semantics are confusing and wrong for most users as it
also returns true when bh is disabled. Thus we open coded a proper
check for interrupts in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() with a lengthy
explanatory comment.
Use the new in_task() predicate instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170321091026.139655-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is fragile that some definitions acquired via transitive
dependencies, as shown in below:
atomic_* (<linux/atomic.h>)
ENOMEM/EN* (<linux/errno.h>)
EXPORT_SYMBOL (<linux/export.h>)
device_initcall (<linux/init.h>)
preempt_* (<linux/preempt.h>)
Include them to prevent possible issues.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481163221-40170-1-git-send-email-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc we use task_struct and fields within it, but
as we haven't included <linux/sched.h>, it is not guaranteed to be
defined. While we usually happen to acquire the definition through a
transitive include, this is fragile (and hasn't been true in the past,
causing issues with backports).
Include <linux/sched.h> to avoid any fragility.
[mark.rutland@arm.com: rewrote changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481007384-27529-1-git-send-email-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
in_interrupt() returns a nonzero value when we are either in an
interrupt or have bh disabled via local_bh_disable(). Since we are
interested in only ignoring coverage from actual interrupts, do a proper
check instead of just calling in_interrupt().
As a result of this change, kcov will start to collect coverage from
within local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() sections.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476115803-20712-1-git-send-email-andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since commit 49d200deaa ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files'
private data"), a debugfs file's file_operations methods get proxied
through lifetime aware wrappers.
However, only a certain subset of the file_operations members is supported
by debugfs and ->mmap isn't among them -- it appears to be NULL from the
VFS layer's perspective.
This behaviour breaks the /sys/kernel/debug/kcov file introduced
concurrently with commit 5c9a8750a6 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage").
Since that file never gets removed, there is no file removal race and thus,
a lifetime checking proxy isn't needed.
Avoid the proxying for /sys/kernel/debug/kcov by creating it via
debugfs_create_file_unsafe() rather than debugfs_create_file().
Fixes: 49d200deaa ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data")
Fixes: 5c9a8750a6 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage")
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kcov causes the compiler to add a call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() in
every basic block. Ftrace patches in a call to _mcount() to each
function it has annotated.
Letting these mechanisms annotate each other is a bad thing. Break the
loop by adding 'notrace' to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() so that ftrace
won't try to patch this code.
This patch lets arm64 with KCOV and STACK_TRACER boot.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Aleksandr Nogikh
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Wei Yongjun
Andrey Konovalov
Maciej Grochowski
Elena Reshetova
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Anders Roxell
Mark Rutland
Dmitry Vyukov
Victor Chibotaru
Andrey Ryabinin
Alexander Popov
Kefeng Wang
Nicolai Stange
James Morse