PCI BIOS requires the BIOS area 0x0A0000-0x0FFFFFF to be mapped W+X for
various legacy reasons. When CONFIG_DEBUG_WX is enabled, this triggers the
WX warning, but this is misleading because the mapping is required and is
not a result of an accidental oversight.
Prevent the full warning when PCI BIOS is enabled and the detected WX
mapping is in the BIOS area. Just emit a pr_warn() which denotes the
fact. This is partially duplicating the info which the PCI BIOS code emits
when it maps the area as executable, but that info is not in the context of
the WX checking output.
Remove the extra %p printout in the WARN_ONCE() while at it. %pS is enough.
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1810082151160.2455@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Spurious faults only ever occur in the kernel's address space. They
are also constrained specifically to faults with one of these error codes:
X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_PROT
X86_PF_INSTR | X86_PF_PROT
So, it's never even possible to reach spurious_kernel_fault_check() with
X86_PF_PK set.
In addition, the kernel's address space never has pages with user-mode
protections. Protection Keys are only enforced on pages with user-mode
protection.
This gives us lots of reasons to not check for protection keys in our
sprurious kernel fault handling.
But, let's also add some warnings to ensure that these assumptions about
protection keys hold true.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160231.243A0D6A@viggo.jf.intel.com
The vsyscall page is weird. It is in what is traditionally part of
the kernel address space. But, it has user permissions and we handle
faults on it like we would on a user page: interrupts on.
Right now, we handle vsyscall emulation in the "bad_area" code, which
is used for both user-address-space and kernel-address-space faults.
Move the handling to the user-address-space code *only* and ensure we
get there by "excluding" the vsyscall page from the kernel address
space via a check in fault_in_kernel_space().
Since the fault_in_kernel_space() check is used on 32-bit, also add a
64-bit check to make it clear we only use this path on 64-bit. Also
move the unlikely() to be in is_vsyscall_vaddr() itself.
This helps clean up the kernel fault handling path by removing a case
that can happen in normal[1] operation. (Yeah, yeah, we can argue
about the vsyscall page being "normal" or not.) This also makes
sanity checks easier, like the "we never take pkey faults in the
kernel address space" check in the next patch.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160230.6E9336EE@viggo.jf.intel.com
We will shortly be using this check in two locations. Put it in
a helper before we do so.
Let's also insert PAGE_MASK instead of the open-coded ~0xfff.
It is easier to read and also more obviously correct considering
the implicit type conversion that has to happen when it is not
an implicit 'unsigned long'.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160228.C593509B@viggo.jf.intel.com
The comments here are wrong. They are too absolute about where
faults can occur when running in the kernel. The comments are
also a bit hard to match up with the code.
Trim down the comments, and make them more precise.
Also add a comment explaining why we are doing the
bad_area_nosemaphore() path here.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160227.077DDD7A@viggo.jf.intel.com
The SMAP and Reserved checking do not have nice comments. Add
some to clarify and make it match everything else.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160225.FFD44B8D@viggo.jf.intel.com
The last patch broke out kernel address space handing into its own
helper. Now, do the same for user address space handling.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160223.9C4F6440@viggo.jf.intel.com
The page fault handler (__do_page_fault()) basically has two sections:
one for handling faults in the kernel portion of the address space
and another for faults in the user portion of the address space.
But, these two parts don't stick out that well. Let's make that more
clear from code separation and naming. Pull kernel fault
handling into its own helper, and reflect that naming by renaming
spurious_fault() -> spurious_kernel_fault().
Also, rewrite the vmalloc() handling comment a bit. It was a bit
stale and also glossed over the reserved bit handling.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160222.401F4E10@viggo.jf.intel.com
We pass around a variable called "error_code" all around the page
fault code. Sounds simple enough, especially since "error_code" looks
like it exactly matches the values that the hardware gives us on the
stack to report the page fault error code (PFEC in SDM parlance).
But, that's not how it works.
For part of the page fault handler, "error_code" does exactly match
PFEC. But, during later parts, it diverges and starts to mean
something a bit different.
Give it two names for its two jobs.
The place it diverges is also really screwy. It's only in a spot
where the hardware tells us we have kernel-mode access that occurred
while we were in usermode accessing user-controlled address space.
Add a warning in there.
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160220.4A2272C9@viggo.jf.intel.com
Lazy TLB mode can result in an idle CPU being woken up by a TLB flush,
when all it really needs to do is reload %CR3 at the next context switch,
assuming no page table pages got freed.
Memory ordering is used to prevent race conditions between switch_mm_irqs_off,
which checks whether .tlb_gen changed, and the TLB invalidation code, which
increments .tlb_gen whenever page table entries get invalidated.
The atomic increment in inc_mm_tlb_gen is its own barrier; the context
switch code adds an explicit barrier between reading tlbstate.is_lazy and
next->context.tlb_gen.
CPUs in lazy TLB mode remain part of the mm_cpumask(mm), both because
that allows TLB flush IPIs to be sent at page table freeing time, and
because the cache line bouncing on the mm_cpumask(mm) was responsible
for about half the CPU use in switch_mm_irqs_off().
We can change native_flush_tlb_others() without touching other
(paravirt) implementations of flush_tlb_others() because we'll be
flushing less. The existing implementations flush more and are
therefore still correct.
Cc: npiggin@gmail.com
Cc: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180926035844.1420-8-riel@surriel.com
Move some code that will be needed for the lazy -> !lazy state
transition when a lazy TLB CPU has gotten out of date.
No functional changes, since the if (real_prev == next) branch
always returns.
(cherry picked from commit 61d0beb579)
Cc: npiggin@gmail.com
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: songliubraving@fb.com
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-4-riel@surriel.com
On most workloads, the number of context switches far exceeds the
number of TLB flushes sent. Optimizing the context switches, by always
using lazy TLB mode, speeds up those workloads.
This patch results in about a 1% reduction in CPU use on a two socket
Broadwell system running a memcache like workload.
Cc: npiggin@gmail.com
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 95b0e6357d)
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-7-riel@surriel.com
Use the new tlb_get_unmap_shift() to determine the stride of the
INVLPG loop.
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Arnd Bergmann reported that turning on -Wvla found a new (unintended) VLA usage:
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c: In function 'pgd_alloc':
include/linux/build_bug.h:29:45: error: ISO C90 forbids variable length array 'u_pmds' [-Werror=vla]
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:190:34: note: in expansion of macro 'static_cpu_has'
#define PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? \
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:431:16: note: in expansion of macro 'PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS'
pmd_t *u_pmds[PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS];
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Use the actual size of the array that is used for X86_FEATURE_PTI,
which is known at build time, instead of the variable size.
[ mingo: Squashed original fix with followup fix to avoid bisection breakage, wrote new changelog. ]
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Original-written-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Fixes: 1be3f247c288 ("x86/mm: Avoid VLA in pgd_alloc()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008235434.GA35035@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When SME is enabled, the memory is encrypted in the first kernel. In
this case, SME also needs to be enabled in the kdump kernel, and we have
to remap the old memory with the memory encryption mask.
The case of concern here is if SME is active in the first kernel,
and it is active too in the kdump kernel. There are four cases to be
considered:
a. dump vmcore
It is encrypted in the first kernel, and needs be read out in the
kdump kernel.
b. crash notes
When dumping vmcore, the people usually need to read useful
information from notes, and the notes is also encrypted.
c. iommu device table
It's encrypted in the first kernel, kdump kernel needs to access its
content to analyze and get information it needs.
d. mmio of AMD iommu
not encrypted in both kernels
Add a new bool parameter @encrypted to __ioremap_caller(). If set,
memory will be remapped with the SME mask.
Add a new function ioremap_encrypted() to explicitly pass in a true
value for @encrypted. Use ioremap_encrypted() for the above a, b, c
cases.
[ bp: cleanup commit message, extern defs in io.h and drop forgotten
include. ]
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: bhelgaas@google.com
Cc: baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: jroedel@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927071954.29615-2-lijiang@redhat.com
If we IPI for WBINDV, then we might as well kill the entire TLB too.
But if we don't have to invalidate cache, there is no reason not to
use a range TLB flush.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085948.195633798@infradead.org
The start of cpa_flush_range() and cpa_flush_array() is the same, use
a common function.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085948.138859183@infradead.org
Rather than guarding cpa_flush_array() users with a CLFLUSH test, put
it inside.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085948.087848187@infradead.org
Rather than guarding all cpa_flush_range() uses with a CLFLUSH test,
put it inside.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085948.036195503@infradead.org
Both cpa_flush_range() and cpa_flush_array() have a well specified
range, use that to do a range based TLB invalidate.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085947.985193217@infradead.org
CAT has happened, WBINDV is bad (even before CAT blowing away the
entire cache on a multi-core platform wasn't nice), try not to use it
ever.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085947.933674526@infradead.org
There is an atom errata, where we do a local TLB invalidate right
before we return and then do a global TLB invalidate.
Move the global invalidate up a little bit and avoid the local
invalidate entirely.
This does put the global invalidate under pgd_lock, but that shouldn't
matter.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085947.882287392@infradead.org
Instead of open-coding it..
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180919085947.831102058@infradead.org
The extra loop which tries hard to preserve large pages in case of conflicts
with static protection regions turns out to be not preserving anything, at
least not in the experiments which have been conducted.
There might be corner cases in which the code would be able to preserve a
large page oaccsionally, but it's really not worth the extra code and the
cycles wasted in the common case.
Before:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 541
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages checked: 514
4K pages set-checked: 7668
After:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 538
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages set-checked: 7668
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143546.589642503@linutronix.de
To avoid excessive 4k wise checks in the common case do a quick check first
whether the requested new page protections conflict with a static
protection area in the large page. If there is no conflict then the
decision whether to preserve or to split the page can be made immediately.
If the requested range covers the full large page, preserve it. Otherwise
split it up. No point in doing a slow crawl in 4k steps.
Before:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 538
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages checked: 560642
4K pages set-checked: 7668
After:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 541
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages checked: 514
4K pages set-checked: 7668
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143546.507259989@linutronix.de
When the existing mapping is correct and the new requested page protections
are the same as the existing ones, then further checks can be omitted and the
large page can be preserved. The slow path 4k wise check will not come up with
a different result.
Before:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 540
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages checked: 800709
4K pages set-checked: 7668
After:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 538
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages checked: 560642
4K pages set-checked: 7668
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143546.424477581@linutronix.de
With the range check it is possible to do a quick verification that the
current mapping is correct vs. the static protection areas.
In case a incorrect mapping is detected a warning is emitted and the large
page is split up. If the large page is a 2M page, then the split code is
forced to check the static protections for the PTE entries to fix up the
incorrectness. For 1G pages this can't be done easily because that would
require to either find the offending 2M areas before the split or
afterwards. For now just warn about that case and revisit it when reported.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143546.331408643@linutronix.de
The large page preservation mechanism is just magic and provides no
information at all. Add optional statistic output in debugfs so the magic can
be evaluated. Defaults is off.
Output:
1G pages checked: 2
1G pages sameprot: 0
1G pages preserved: 0
2M pages checked: 540
2M pages sameprot: 466
2M pages preserved: 47
4K pages checked: 800770
4K pages set-checked: 7668
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143546.160867778@linutronix.de
The whole static protection magic is silently fixing up anything which is
handed in. That's just wrong. The offending call sites need to be fixed.
Add a debug mechanism which emits a warning if a requested mapping needs to be
fixed up. The DETECT debug mechanism is really not meant to be enabled except
for developers, so limit the output hard to the protection fixups.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143546.078998733@linutronix.de
Checking static protections only page by page is slow especially for huge
pages. To allow quick checks over a complete range, add the ability to do
that.
Make the checks inclusive so the ranges can be directly used for debug output
later.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143545.995734490@linutronix.de
static_protections() is pretty unreadable. Split it up into separate checks
for each protection area.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143545.913005317@linutronix.de
Avoid the extra variable and gotos by splitting the function into the
actual algorithm and a callable function which contains the lock
protection.
Rename it to should_split_large_page() while at it so the return values make
actually sense.
Clean up the code flow, comments and general whitespace damage while at it. No
functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143545.830507216@linutronix.de
The sequence of marking text and rodata read-only in 32bit init is:
set_ro(text);
kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
set_ro(rodata);
When kernel_set_to_readonly is 1 it enables the protection mechanism in CPA
for the read only regions. With the upcoming checks for existing mappings
this consequently triggers the warning about an existing mapping being
incorrect vs. static protections because rodata has not been converted yet.
There is no technical reason to split the two, so just combine the RO
protection to convert text and rodata in one go.
Convert the printks to pr_info while at it.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Bin Yang <bin.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180917143545.731701535@linutronix.de
- Add support for enlisting the help of the EFI firmware to create memory
reservations that persist across kexec.
- Add page fault handling to the runtime services support code on x86 so
we can gracefully recover from buggy EFI firmware.
- Fix command line handling on x86 for the boot path that omits the stub's
PE/COFF entry point.
- Other assorted fixes.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEnNKg2mrY9zMBdeK7wjcgfpV0+n0FAlurXR8ACgkQwjcgfpV0
+n2CGwf/V4exixXjTDwkqE6gY5bq0Y3AL8tp89wdbJzjgGOIJLKh3CrGr8xEFHrv
oYObcvB3SfNEIyGeBjc/8ZMw1P/j98s6ucsMm0u+V52k7xxu/xJoIPw3bX2R8LLc
QhedUmKWLFQXxottaqzRFi1m0rP9TlAlc2n2pjIPCywjTPzeT/jBTtnRGRRdpDkN
uxwv59eXc6MXuwJGhM9lGIBCu8ra54SiSByJSKoMwNYXQRCLtiBUg5iibWkKigHp
9rQiimQnDOuPiZ6JGFx6pwSu7cqv3d8LYk5EnU3zYfzxAvHRfxuf40joSeZzySby
vZ4zRog79DxkSnuvaQ0+phQHiq+yQg==
=HZGk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI updates for v4.20 from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Add support for enlisting the help of the EFI firmware to create memory
reservations that persist across kexec.
- Add page fault handling to the runtime services support code on x86 so
we can gracefully recover from buggy EFI firmware.
- Fix command line handling on x86 for the boot path that omits the stub's
PE/COFF entry point.
- Other assorted fixes.
Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.
This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.
In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).
[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
fine-grained ]
Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Memory accesses performed by UEFI runtime services should be limited to:
- reading/executing from EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE memory regions
- reading/writing from/to EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA memory regions
- reading/writing by-ref arguments
- reading/writing from/to the stack.
Accesses outside these regions may cause the kernel to hang because the
memory region requested by the firmware isn't mapped in efi_pgd, which
causes a page fault in ring 0 and the kernel fails to handle it, leading
to die(). To save kernel from hanging, add an EFI specific page fault
handler which recovers from such faults by
1. If the efi runtime service is efi_reset_system(), reboot the machine
through BIOS.
2. If the efi runtime service is _not_ efi_reset_system(), then freeze
efi_rts_wq and schedule a new process.
The EFI page fault handler offers us two advantages:
1. Avoid potential hangs caused by buggy firmware.
2. Shout loud that the firmware is buggy and hence is not a kernel bug.
Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Based-on-code-from: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[ardb: clarify commit log]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Now that si_code == SEGV_PKUERR is the flag indicating that a pkey
is present there is no longer a need to pass a pointer to a local
pkey value, instead pkey can be passed more efficiently by value.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that the pkey handling has been removed force_sig_info_fault and
force_sig_fault perform identical work. Just the type of the address
paramter is different. So replace calls to force_sig_info_fault with
calls to force_sig_fault, and remove force_sig_info_fault.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There is only one code path that can generate a pkuerr signal. That
code path calls __bad_area_nosemaphore and can be dectected by testing
if si_code == SEGV_PKUERR. It can be seen from inspection that all of
the other tests in fill_sig_info_pkey are unnecessary.
Therefore call force_sig_pkuerr directly from __bad_area_semaphore and
remove fill_sig_info_pkey.
At the same time move the comment above force_sig_info_pkey into
bad_area_access_error, so that the documentation about pkey generation
races is not lost.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There is only one caller of __bad_area that passes in PKUERR and thus
will generate a siginfo with si_pkey set. Therefore simplify the
logic and hoist reading of vma_pkey up into that caller, and just
pass *pkey into __bad_area.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There are no more users of the computed pkey value in __do_page_fault
so stop computing the value.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
After the previous cleanups to do_sigbus and and bad_area_nosemaphore
mm_fault_error no now longer uses it's pkey parameter. Therefore
remove the unused parameter.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The function do_sigbus never sets si_code to PKUERR so it can never
return a pkey to userspace. Therefore remove the unusable pkey
parameter from do_sigbus.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The function bad_area_nosemaphore always sets si_code to SEGV_MAPERR
and as such can never return a pkey parameter. Therefore remove the
unusable pkey parameter from bad_area_nosemaphore.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
We met a kernel panic when enabling earlycon, which is due to the fixmap
address of earlycon is not statically setup.
Currently the static fixmap setup in head_64.S only covers 2M virtual
address space, while it actually could be in 4M space with different
kernel configurations, e.g. when VSYSCALL emulation is disabled.
So increase the static space to 4M for now by defining FIXMAP_PMD_NUM to 2,
and add a build time check to ensure that the fixmap is covered by the
initial static page tables.
Fixes: 1ad83c858c ("x86_64,vsyscall: Make vsyscall emulation configurable")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> (Xen parts)
Cc: H Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180920025828.23699-1-feng.tang@intel.com
This separates the logic of generating the signal from the logic of
gathering the information about the bounds violation.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Only the call from do_sigbus will send SIGBUS due to a memory machine
check error. Consolidate all of the machine check signal generation
code in do_sigbus and remove the now unnecessary fault parameter from
force_sig_info_fault.
Explicitly use the now constant si_code BUS_ADRERR in the call
to force_sig_info_fault from do_sigbus.
This makes the code in arch/x86/mm/fault.c easier to follower and
simpler to maintain.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
kvmclock defines few static variables which are shared with the
hypervisor during the kvmclock initialization.
When SEV is active, memory is encrypted with a guest-specific key, and
if the guest OS wants to share the memory region with the hypervisor
then it must clear the C-bit before sharing it.
Currently, we use kernel_physical_mapping_init() to split large pages
before clearing the C-bit on shared pages. But it fails when called from
the kvmclock initialization (mainly because the memblock allocator is
not ready that early during boot).
Add a __bss_decrypted section attribute which can be used when defining
such shared variable. The so-defined variables will be placed in the
.bss..decrypted section. This section will be mapped with C=0 early
during boot.
The .bss..decrypted section has a big chunk of memory that may be unused
when memory encryption is not active, free it when memory encryption is
not active.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář<rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536932759-12905-2-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com
The SYSCALL64 trampoline has a couple of nice properties:
- The usual sequence of SWAPGS followed by two GS-relative accesses to
set up RSP is somewhat slow because the GS-relative accesses need
to wait for SWAPGS to finish. The trampoline approach allows
RIP-relative accesses to set up RSP, which avoids the stall.
- The trampoline avoids any percpu access before CR3 is set up,
which means that no percpu memory needs to be mapped in the user
page tables. This prevents using Meltdown to read any percpu memory
outside the cpu_entry_area and prevents using timing leaks
to directly locate the percpu areas.
The downsides of using a trampoline may outweigh the upsides, however.
It adds an extra non-contiguous I$ cache line to system calls, and it
forces an indirect jump to transfer control back to the normal kernel
text after CR3 is set up. The latter is because x86 lacks a 64-bit
direct jump instruction that could jump from the trampoline to the entry
text. With retpolines enabled, the indirect jump is extremely slow.
Change the code to map the percpu TSS into the user page tables to allow
the non-trampoline SYSCALL64 path to work under PTI. This does not add a
new direct information leak, since the TSS is readable by Meltdown from the
cpu_entry_area alias regardless. It does allow a timing attack to locate
the percpu area, but KASLR is more or less a lost cause against local
attack on CPUs vulnerable to Meltdown regardless. As far as I'm concerned,
on current hardware, KASLR is only useful to mitigate remote attacks that
try to attack the kernel without first gaining RCE against a vulnerable
user process.
On Skylake, with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and KPTI on, this reduces syscall
overhead from ~237ns to ~228ns.
There is a possible alternative approach: Move the trampoline within 2G of
the entry text and make a separate copy for each CPU. This would allow a
direct jump to rejoin the normal entry path. There are pro's and con's for
this approach:
+ It avoids a pipeline stall
- It executes from an extra page and read from another extra page during
the syscall. The latter is because it needs to use a relative
addressing mode to find sp1 -- it's the same *cacheline*, but accessed
using an alias, so it's an extra TLB entry.
- Slightly more memory. This would be one page per CPU for a simple
implementation and 64-ish bytes per CPU or one page per node for a more
complex implementation.
- More code complexity.
The current approach is chosen for simplicity and because the alternative
does not provide a significant benefit, which makes it worth.
[ tglx: Added the alternative discussion to the changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8c7c6e483612c3e4e10ca89495dc160b1aa66878.1536015544.git.luto@kernel.org
When page-table entries are set, the compiler might optimize their
assignment by using multiple instructions to set the PTE. This might
turn into a security hazard if the user somehow manages to use the
interim PTE. L1TF does not make our lives easier, making even an interim
non-present PTE a security hazard.
Using WRITE_ONCE() to set PTEs and friends should prevent this potential
security hazard.
I skimmed the differences in the binary with and without this patch. The
differences are (obviously) greater when CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n as more
code optimizations are possible. For better and worse, the impact on the
binary with this patch is pretty small. Skimming the code did not cause
anything to jump out as a security hazard, but it seems that at least
move_soft_dirty_pte() caused set_pte_at() to use multiple writes.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180902181451.80520-1-namit@vmware.com
There have been multiple kernel vulnerabilities that permitted userspace to
pass completely unchecked pointers through to userspace accessors:
- the waitid() bug - commit 96ca579a1e ("waitid(): Add missing
access_ok() checks")
- the sg/bsg read/write APIs
- the infiniband read/write APIs
These don't happen all that often, but when they do happen, it is hard to
test for them properly; and it is probably also hard to discover them with
fuzzing. Even when an unmapped kernel address is supplied to such buggy
code, it just returns -EFAULT instead of doing a proper BUG() or at least
WARN().
Try to make such misbehaving code a bit more visible by refusing to do a
fixup in the pagefault handler code when a userspace accessor causes a #PF
on a kernel address and the current context isn't whitelisted.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-7-jannh@google.com
This is preparation for looking at trap number and fault address in the
handlers for uaccess errors. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-6-jannh@google.com
Currently, most fixups for attempting to access userspace memory are
handled using _ASM_EXTABLE, which is also used for various other types of
fixups (e.g. safe MSR access, IRET failures, and a bunch of other things).
In order to make it possible to add special safety checks to uaccess fixups
(in particular, checking whether the fault address is actually in
userspace), introduce a new exception table handler ex_handler_uaccess()
and wire it up to all the user access fixups (excluding ones that
already use _ASM_EXTABLE_EX).
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-5-jannh@google.com
This is an extension of commit b506a9d08b ("x86: code clarification patch
to Kprobes arch code"). As that commit explains, even though
kprobe_running() can't be called with preemption enabled, preemption does
not need to be disabled. If preemption is enabled, then this can't be
originate from a kprobe.
Also, use X86_TRAP_PF instead of 14.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-2-jannh@google.com
Fix the section mismatch warning in arch/x86/mm/pti.c:
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x6972a): Section mismatch in reference from the function pti_clone_pgtable() to the function .init.text:pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte()
The function pti_clone_pgtable() references
the function __init pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte().
This is often because pti_clone_pgtable lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte is wrong.
FATAL: modpost: Section mismatches detected.
Fixes: 85900ea515 ("x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/43a6d6a3-d69d-5eda-da09-0b1c88215a2a@infradead.org
The trick with flipping bit 63 to avoid loading the address of the 1:1
mapping of the poisoned page while the 1:1 map is updated used to work when
unmapping the page. But it falls down horribly when attempting to directly
set the page as uncacheable.
The problem is that when the cache mode is changed to uncachable, the pages
needs to be flushed from the cache first. But the decoy address is
non-canonical due to bit 63 flipped, and the CLFLUSH instruction throws a
#GP fault.
Add code to change_page_attr_set_clr() to fix the address before calling
flush.
Fixes: 284ce4011b ("x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831165506.GA9605@agluck-desk
A NMI can hit in the middle of context switching or in the middle of
switch_mm_irqs_off(). In either case, CR3 might not match current->mm,
which could cause copy_from_user_nmi() and friends to read the wrong
memory.
Fix it by adding a new nmi_uaccess_okay() helper and checking it in
copy_from_user_nmi() and in __copy_from_user_nmi()'s callers.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/dd956eba16646fd0b15c3c0741269dfd84452dac.1535557289.git.luto@kernel.org
show_opcodes() is used both for dumping kernel instructions and for dumping
user instructions. If userspace causes #PF by jumping to a kernel address,
show_opcodes() can be reached with regs->ip controlled by the user,
pointing to kernel code. Make sure that userspace can't trick us into
dumping kernel memory into dmesg.
Fixes: 7cccf0725c ("x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828154901.112726-1-jannh@google.com
Pull perf updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Kernel:
- Improve kallsyms coverage
- Add x86 entry trampolines to kcore
- Fix ARM SPE handling
- Correct PPC event post processing
Tools:
- Make the build system more robust
- Small fixes and enhancements all over the place
- Update kernel ABI header copies
- Preparatory work for converting libtraceevnt to a shared library
- License cleanups"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (100 commits)
tools arch: Update arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S copy used in 'perf bench mem memcpy'
tools arch x86: Update tools's copy of cpufeatures.h
perf python: Fix pyrf_evlist__read_on_cpu() interface
perf mmap: Store real cpu number in 'struct perf_mmap'
perf tools: Remove ext from struct kmod_path
perf tools: Add gzip_is_compressed function
perf tools: Add lzma_is_compressed function
perf tools: Add is_compressed callback to compressions array
perf tools: Move the temp file processing into decompress_kmodule
perf tools: Use compression id in decompress_kmodule()
perf tools: Store compression id into struct dso
perf tools: Add compression id into 'struct kmod_path'
perf tools: Make is_supported_compression() static
perf tools: Make decompress_to_file() function static
perf tools: Get rid of dso__needs_decompress() call in __open_dso()
perf tools: Get rid of dso__needs_decompress() call in symbol__disassemble()
perf tools: Get rid of dso__needs_decompress() call in read_object_code()
tools lib traceevent: Change to SPDX License format
perf llvm: Allow passing options to llc in addition to clang
perf parser: Improve error message for PMU address filters
...
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Correct the L1TF fallout on 32bit and the off by one in the 'too much
RAM for protection' calculation.
- Add a helpful kernel message for the 'too much RAM' case
- Unbreak the VDSO in case that the compiler desides to use indirect
jumps/calls and emits retpolines which cannot be resolved because the
kernel uses its own thunks, which does not work for the VDSO. Make it
use the builtin thunks.
- Re-export start_thread() which was unexported when the 32/64bit
implementation was unified. start_thread() is required by modular
binfmt handlers.
- Trivial cleanups
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation/l1tf: Suggest what to do on systems with too much RAM
x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix off-by-one error when warning that system has too much RAM
x86/kvm/vmx: Remove duplicate l1d flush definitions
x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix overflow in l1tf_pfn_limit() on 32bit
x86/process: Re-export start_thread()
x86/mce: Add notifier_block forward declaration
x86/vdso: Fix vDSO build if a retpoline is emitted
* memory_failure() gets confused by dev_pagemap backed mappings. The
recovery code has specific enabling for several possible page states
that needs new enabling to handle poison in dax mappings. Teach
memory_failure() about ZONE_DEVICE pages.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Ftop
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.19_dax-memory-failure' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm memory-failure update from Dave Jiang:
"As it stands, memory_failure() gets thoroughly confused by dev_pagemap
backed mappings. The recovery code has specific enabling for several
possible page states and needs new enabling to handle poison in dax
mappings.
In order to support reliable reverse mapping of user space addresses:
1/ Add new locking in the memory_failure() rmap path to prevent races
that would typically be handled by the page lock.
2/ Since dev_pagemap pages are hidden from the page allocator and the
"compound page" accounting machinery, add a mechanism to determine
the size of the mapping that encompasses a given poisoned pfn.
3/ Given pmem errors can be repaired, change the speculatively
accessed poison protection, mce_unmap_kpfn(), to be reversible and
otherwise allow ongoing access from the kernel.
A side effect of this enabling is that MADV_HWPOISON becomes usable
for dax mappings, however the primary motivation is to allow the
system to survive userspace consumption of hardware-poison via dax.
Specifically the current behavior is:
mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200
{1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action
mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
{1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected
Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users
[..]
Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed
mce: Memory error not recovered
<reboot>
...and with these changes:
Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x20cb00 at process virtual address 0x7f763dd00000
Memory failure: 0x20cb00: Killing dax-pmd:5421 due to hardware memory corruption
Memory failure: 0x20cb00: recovery action for dax page: Recovered
Given all the cross dependencies I propose taking this through
nvdimm.git with acks from Naoya, x86/core, x86/RAS, and of course dax
folks"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.19_dax-memory-failure' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm:
libnvdimm, pmem: Restore page attributes when clearing errors
x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()
x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages
filesystem-dax: Introduce dax_lock_mapping_entry()
mm, memory_failure: Collect mapping size in collect_procs()
mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference
mm, dev_pagemap: Do not clear ->mapping on final put
mm, madvise_inject_error: Disable MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE for ZONE_DEVICE pages
filesystem-dax: Set page->index
device-dax: Set page->index
device-dax: Enable page_mapping()
device-dax: Convert to vmf_insert_mixed and vm_fault_t
Two users have reported [1] that they have an "extremely unlikely" system
with more than MAX_PA/2 memory and L1TF mitigation is not effective. In
fact it's a CPU with 36bits phys limit (64GB) and 32GB memory, but due to
holes in the e820 map, the main region is almost 500MB over the 32GB limit:
[ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000081effffff] usable
Suggestions to use 'mem=32G' to enable the L1TF mitigation while losing the
500MB revealed, that there's an off-by-one error in the check in
l1tf_select_mitigation().
l1tf_pfn_limit() returns the last usable pfn (inclusive) and the range
check in the mitigation path does not take this into account.
Instead of amending the range check, make l1tf_pfn_limit() return the first
PFN which is over the limit which is less error prone. Adjust the other
users accordingly.
[1] https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1105536
Fixes: 17dbca1193 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Reported-by: George Anchev <studio@anchev.net>
Reported-by: Christopher Snowhill <kode54@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180823134418.17008-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Merge fixes for missing TLB shootdowns.
This fixes a couple of cases that involved us possibly freeing page
table structures before the required TLB shootdown had been done.
There are a few cleanup patches to make the code easier to follow, and
to avoid some of the more problematic cases entirely when not necessary.
To make this easier for backports, it undoes the recent lazy TLB
patches, because the cleanups and fixes are more important, and Rik is
ok with re-doing them later when things have calmed down.
The missing TLB flush was only delayed, and the wrong ordering only
happened under memory pressure (and in theory under a couple of other
fairly theoretical situations), so this may have been all very unlikely
to have hit people in practice.
But getting the TLB shootdown wrong is _so_ hard to debug and see that I
consider this a crticial fix.
Many thanks to Jann Horn for having debugged this.
* tlb-fixes:
x86/mm: Only use tlb_remove_table() for paravirt
mm: mmu_notifier fix for tlb_end_vma
mm/tlb, x86/mm: Support invalidating TLB caches for RCU_TABLE_FREE
mm/tlb: Remove tlb_remove_table() non-concurrent condition
mm: move tlb_table_flush to tlb_flush_mmu_free
x86/mm/tlb: Revert the recent lazy TLB patches
If we don't use paravirt; don't play unnecessary and complicated games
to free page-tables.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Revert commits:
95b0e6357d x86/mm/tlb: Always use lazy TLB mode
64482aafe5 x86/mm/tlb: Only send page table free TLB flush to lazy TLB CPUs
ac03158969 x86/mm/tlb: Make lazy TLB mode lazier
61d0beb579 x86/mm/tlb: Restructure switch_mm_irqs_off()
2ff6ddf19c x86/mm/tlb: Leave lazy TLB mode at page table free time
In order to simplify the TLB invalidate fixes for x86 and unify the
parts that need backporting. We'll try again later.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 7b25b9cb0d ("x86/xen/time: Initialize pv xen time in
init_hypervisor_platform()") moved the mapping of the shared info area
before pagetable_init(). This breaks booting as 32-bit PV guest as the
use of set_fixmap isn't possible at this time on 32-bit.
This can be worked around by populating the needed PMD on 32-bit
kernel earlier.
In order not to reimplement populate_extra_pte() using extend_brk()
for allocating new page tables extend alloc_low_pages() to do that in
case the early page table pool is not yet available.
Fixes: 7b25b9cb0d ("x86/xen/time: Initialize pv xen time in init_hypervisor_platform()")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
In preparation for using set_memory_uc() instead set_memory_np() for
isolating poison from speculation, teach the memtype code to sanitize
physical addresses vs __PHYSICAL_MASK.
The motivation for using set_memory_uc() for this case is to allow
ongoing access to persistent memory pages via the pmem-driver +
memcpy_mcsafe() until the poison is repaired.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
On 32bit PAE kernels on 64bit hardware with enough physical bits,
l1tf_pfn_limit() will overflow unsigned long. This in turn affects
max_swapfile_size() and can lead to swapon returning -EINVAL. This has been
observed in a 32bit guest with 42 bits physical address size, where
max_swapfile_size() overflows exactly to 1 << 32, thus zero, and produces
the following warning to dmesg:
[ 6.396845] Truncating oversized swap area, only using 0k out of 2047996k
Fix this by using unsigned long long instead.
Fixes: 17dbca1193 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Fixes: 377eeaa8e1 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Reported-by: Dominique Leuenberger <dimstar@suse.de>
Reported-by: Adrian Schroeter <adrian@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180820095835.5298-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just
documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an
errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a
distinct type.
Ref-> commit 1c8f422059 ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t")
In this patch all the caller of handle_mm_fault() are changed to return
vm_fault_t type.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180617084810.GA6730@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PC
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)" <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Without program headers for PTI entry trampoline pages, the trampoline
virtual addresses do not map to anything.
Example before:
sudo gdb --quiet vmlinux /proc/kcore
Reading symbols from vmlinux...done.
[New process 1]
Core was generated by `BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.16.0 root=UUID=a6096b83-b763-4101-807e-f33daff63233'.
#0 0x0000000000000000 in irq_stack_union ()
(gdb) x /21ib 0xfffffe0000006000
0xfffffe0000006000: Cannot access memory at address 0xfffffe0000006000
(gdb) quit
After:
sudo gdb --quiet vmlinux /proc/kcore
[sudo] password for ahunter:
Reading symbols from vmlinux...done.
[New process 1]
Core was generated by `BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.16.0-fix-4-00005-gd6e65a8b4072 root=UUID=a6096b83-b7'.
#0 0x0000000000000000 in irq_stack_union ()
(gdb) x /21ib 0xfffffe0000006000
0xfffffe0000006000: swapgs
0xfffffe0000006003: mov %rsp,-0x3e12(%rip) # 0xfffffe00000021f8
0xfffffe000000600a: xchg %ax,%ax
0xfffffe000000600c: mov %cr3,%rsp
0xfffffe000000600f: bts $0x3f,%rsp
0xfffffe0000006014: and $0xffffffffffffe7ff,%rsp
0xfffffe000000601b: mov %rsp,%cr3
0xfffffe000000601e: mov -0x3019(%rip),%rsp # 0xfffffe000000300c
0xfffffe0000006025: pushq $0x2b
0xfffffe0000006027: pushq -0x3e35(%rip) # 0xfffffe00000021f8
0xfffffe000000602d: push %r11
0xfffffe000000602f: pushq $0x33
0xfffffe0000006031: push %rcx
0xfffffe0000006032: push %rdi
0xfffffe0000006033: mov $0xffffffff91a00010,%rdi
0xfffffe000000603a: callq 0xfffffe0000006046
0xfffffe000000603f: pause
0xfffffe0000006041: lfence
0xfffffe0000006044: jmp 0xfffffe000000603f
0xfffffe0000006046: mov %rdi,(%rsp)
0xfffffe000000604a: retq
(gdb) quit
In addition, entry trampolines all map to the same page. Represent that
by giving the corresponding program headers in kcore the same offset.
This has the benefit that, when perf tools uses /proc/kcore as a source
for kernel object code, samples from different CPU trampolines are
aggregated together. Note, such aggregation is normal for profiling
i.e. people want to profile the object code, not every different virtual
address the object code might be mapped to (across different processes
for example).
Notes by PeterZ:
This also adds the KCORE_REMAP functionality.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1528289651-4113-4-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Currently, the addresses of PTI entry trampolines are not exported to
user space. Kernel profiling tools need these addresses to identify the
kernel code, so add a symbol and address for each CPU's PTI entry
trampoline.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1528289651-4113-3-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
The introduction of generic_max_swapfile_size and arch-specific versions has
broken linking on x86 with CONFIG_SWAP=n due to undefined reference to
'generic_max_swapfile_size'. Fix it by compiling the x86-specific
max_swapfile_size() only with CONFIG_SWAP=y.
Reported-by: Tomas Pruzina <pruzinat@gmail.com>
Fixes: 377eeaa8e1 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
other reserved bits set.
If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
and accessible.
While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
loading the data and making it available to other speculative
instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.
While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646
The mitigations provided by this pull request include:
- Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.
- Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.
- SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs
- Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
and at runtime via sysfs
- Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
mitigations.
Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
heated, but at the end constructive discussions.
There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
complexity and limitations"
* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
...
Pull x86 PTI updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The Speck brigade sadly provides yet another large set of patches
destroying the perfomance which we carefully built and preserved
- PTI support for 32bit PAE. The missing counter part to the 64bit
PTI code implemented by Joerg.
- A set of fixes for the Global Bit mechanics for non PCID CPUs which
were setting the Global Bit too widely and therefore possibly
exposing interesting memory needlessly.
- Protection against userspace-userspace SpectreRSB
- Support for the upcoming Enhanced IBRS mode, which is preferred
over IBRS. Unfortunately we dont know the performance impact of
this, but it's expected to be less horrible than the IBRS
hammering.
- Cleanups and simplifications"
* 'x86/pti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
x86/mm/pti: Move user W+X check into pti_finalize()
x86/relocs: Add __end_rodata_aligned to S_REL
x86/mm/pti: Clone kernel-image on PTE level for 32 bit
x86/mm/pti: Don't clear permissions in pti_clone_pmd()
x86/mm/pti: Fix 32 bit PCID check
x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping
x86/mm/init: Add helper for freeing kernel image pages
x86/mm/init: Pass unconverted symbol addresses to free_init_pages()
mm: Allow non-direct-map arguments to free_reserved_area()
x86/mm/pti: Clear Global bit more aggressively
x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs
x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
x86/kexec: Allocate 8k PGDs for PTI
Revert "perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables"
x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from vmalloc_fault()
x86/entry/32: Check for VM86 mode in slow-path check
perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables
x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd()
x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d()
x86/entry/32: Add debug code to check entry/exit CR3
...
Pull x86 mm updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Make lazy TLB mode even lazier to avoid pointless switch_mm()
operations, which reduces CPU load by 1-2% for memcache workloads
- Small cleanups and improvements all over the place
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm: Remove redundant check for kmem_cache_create()
arm/asm/tlb.h: Fix build error implicit func declaration
x86/mm/tlb: Make clear_asid_other() static
x86/mm/tlb: Skip atomic operations for 'init_mm' in switch_mm_irqs_off()
x86/mm/tlb: Always use lazy TLB mode
x86/mm/tlb: Only send page table free TLB flush to lazy TLB CPUs
x86/mm/tlb: Make lazy TLB mode lazier
x86/mm/tlb: Restructure switch_mm_irqs_off()
x86/mm/tlb: Leave lazy TLB mode at page table free time
mm: Allocate the mm_cpumask (mm->cpu_bitmap[]) dynamically based on nr_cpu_ids
x86/mm: Add TLB purge to free pmd/pte page interfaces
ioremap: Update pgtable free interfaces with addr
x86/mm: Disable ioremap free page handling on x86-PAE
The user page-table gets the updated kernel mappings in pti_finalize(),
which runs after the RO+X permissions got applied to the kernel page-table
in mark_readonly().
But with CONFIG_DEBUG_WX enabled, the user page-table is already checked in
mark_readonly() for insecure mappings. This causes false-positive
warnings, because the user page-table did not get the updated mappings yet.
Move the W+X check for the user page-table into pti_finalize() after it
updated all required mappings.
[ tglx: Folded !NX supported fix ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533727000-9172-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The mmio tracer sets io mapping PTEs and PMDs to non present when enabled
without inverting the address bits, which makes the PTE entry vulnerable
for L1TF.
Make it use the right low level macros to actually invert the address bits
to protect against L1TF.
In principle this could be avoided because MMIO tracing is not likely to be
enabled on production machines, but the fix is straigt forward and for
consistency sake it's better to get rid of the open coded PTE manipulation.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
set_memory_np() is used to mark kernel mappings not present, but it has
it's own open coded mechanism which does not have the L1TF protection of
inverting the address bits.
Replace the open coded PTE manipulation with the L1TF protecting low level
PTE routines.
Passes the CPA self test.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
On 32 bit the kernel sections are not huge-page aligned. When we clone
them on PMD-level we unevitably map some areas that are normal kernel
memory and may contain secrets to user-space. To prevent that we need to
clone the kernel-image on PTE-level for 32 bit.
Also make the page-table cloning code more general so that it can handle
PMD and PTE level cloning. This can be generalized further in the future to
also handle clones on the P4D-level.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533637471-30953-4-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The function sets the global-bit on cloned PMD entries, which only makes
sense when the permissions are identical between the user and the kernel
page-table. Further, only write-permissions are cleared for entry-text and
kernel-text sections, which are not writeable at the end of the boot
process.
The reason why this RW clearing exists is that in the early PTI
implementations the cloned kernel areas were set up during early boot
before the kernel text is set to read only and not touched afterwards.
This is not longer true. The cloned areas are still set up early to get the
entry code working for interrupts and other things, but after the kernel
text has been set RO the clone is repeated which copies the RO PMD/PTEs
over to the user visible clone. That means the initial clearing of the
writable bit can be avoided.
[ tglx: Amended changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533637471-30953-3-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The kernel image is mapped into two places in the virtual address space
(addresses without KASLR, of course):
1. The kernel direct map (0xffff880000000000)
2. The "high kernel map" (0xffffffff81000000)
We actually execute out of #2. If we get the address of a kernel symbol,
it points to #2, but almost all physical-to-virtual translations point to
Parts of the "high kernel map" alias are mapped in the userspace page
tables with the Global bit for performance reasons. The parts that we map
to userspace do not (er, should not) have secrets. When PTI is enabled then
the global bit is usually not set in the high mapping and just used to
compensate for poor performance on systems which lack PCID.
This is fine, except that some areas in the kernel image that are adjacent
to the non-secret-containing areas are unused holes. We free these holes
back into the normal page allocator and reuse them as normal kernel memory.
The memory will, of course, get *used* via the normal map, but the alias
mapping is kept.
This otherwise unused alias mapping of the holes will, by default keep the
Global bit, be mapped out to userspace, and be vulnerable to Meltdown.
Remove the alias mapping of these pages entirely. This is likely to
fracture the 2M page mapping the kernel image near these areas, but this
should affect a minority of the area.
The pageattr code changes *all* aliases mapping the physical pages that it
operates on (by default). We only want to modify a single alias, so we
need to tweak its behavior.
This unmapping behavior is currently dependent on PTI being in place.
Going forward, we should at least consider doing this for all
configurations. Having an extra read-write alias for memory is not exactly
ideal for debugging things like random memory corruption and this does
undercut features like DEBUG_PAGEALLOC or future work like eXclusive Page
Frame Ownership (XPFO).
Before this patch:
current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000 6M RW PSE NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82e00000 2M RW NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffff83200000 4M RW PSE NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffa0000000 462M pmd
current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW NX pte
current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000 474M pmd
After this patch:
current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82400000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff82488000 544K ro NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82488000-0xffffffff82600000 1504K pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000 6M RW PSE NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82c0d000 52K RW NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c0d000-0xffffffff82dc0000 1740K pte
current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K pte
current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82400000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_user-0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff82488000 544K ro NX pte
current_user-0xffffffff82488000-0xffffffff82600000 1504K pte
current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000 474M pmd
[ tglx: Do not unmap on 32bit as there is only one mapping ]
Fixes: 0f561fce4d ("x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802225831.5F6A2BFC@viggo.jf.intel.com
When chunks of the kernel image are freed, free_init_pages() is used
directly. Consolidate the three sites that do this. Also update the
string to give an incrementally better description of that memory versus
what was there before.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: aarcange@redhat.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802225829.FE0E32EA@viggo.jf.intel.com
The x86 code has several places where it frees parts of kernel image:
1. Unused SMP alternative
2. __init code
3. The hole between text and rodata
4. The hole between rodata and data
We call free_init_pages() to do this. Strangely, we convert the symbol
addresses to kernel direct map addresses in some cases (#3, #4) but not
others (#1, #2).
The virt_to_page() and the other code in free_reserved_area() now works
fine for for symbol addresses on x86, so don't bother converting the
addresses to direct map addresses before freeing them.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: aarcange@redhat.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802225828.89B2D0E2@viggo.jf.intel.com
The kernel image starts out with the Global bit set across the entire
kernel image. The bit is cleared with set_memory_nonglobal() in the
configurations with PCIDs where the performance benefits of the Global bit
are not needed.
However, this is fragile. It means that we are stuck opting *out* of the
less-secure (Global bit set) configuration, which seems backwards. Let's
start more secure (Global bit clear) and then let things opt back in if
they want performance, or are truly mapping common data between kernel and
userspace.
This fixes a bug. Before this patch, there are areas that are unmapped
from the user page tables (like like everything above 0xffffffff82600000 in
the example below). These have the hallmark of being a wrong Global area:
they are not identical in the 'current_kernel' and 'current_user' page
table dumps. They are also read-write, which means they're much more
likely to contain secrets.
Before this patch:
current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW GLB NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000 6M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82e00000 2M RW GLB NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffff83200000 4M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffa0000000 462M pmd
current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW GLB NX pte
current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000 474M pmd
After this patch:
current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000 6M RW PSE NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82e00000 2M RW NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffff83200000 4M RW PSE NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffa0000000 462M pmd
current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd
current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte
current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW NX pte
current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd
current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000 474M pmd
Fixes: 0f561fce4d ("x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas")
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: aarcange@redhat.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802225825.A100C071@viggo.jf.intel.com
The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().
Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
dependencies like
asm/smp.h
asm/apic.h
asm/hardirq.h
linux/irq.h
linux/topology.h
linux/smp.h
asm/smp.h
or
linux/gfp.h
linux/mmzone.h
asm/mmzone.h
asm/mmzone_64.h
asm/smp.h
asm/apic.h
asm/hardirq.h
linux/irq.h
linux/irqdesc.h
linux/kobject.h
linux/sysfs.h
linux/kernfs.h
linux/idr.h
linux/gfp.h
and others.
This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
anymore.
A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
asm/apic.h.
However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
asm/hardirq.h.
Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.
Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
files as needed.
Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
at all.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
It is perfectly okay to take page-faults, especially on the
vmalloc area while executing an NMI handler. Remove the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: David H. Gutteridge <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532533683-5988-2-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Define INIT_PGD to point to the correct initial page-table for 32 and 64
bit and use it where needed. This fixes the build on 32 bit with
CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION enabled.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-32-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The mapping for entry-text might have changed in the kernel after it was
cloned to the user page-table. Clone again to update the user page-table to
bring the mapping in sync with the kernel again.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-31-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Introduce a new function to finalize the kernel mappings for the userspace
page-table after all ro/nx protections have been applied to the kernel
mappings.
Also move the call to pti_clone_kernel_text() to that function so that it
will run on 32 bit kernels too.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-30-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Mapping the kernel text area to user-space makes only sense if it has the
same permissions as in the kernel page-table. If permissions are different
this will cause a TLB reload when using the kernel page-table, which is as
good as not mapping it at all.
On 64-bit kernels this patch makes no difference, as the whole range cloned
by pti_clone_kernel_text() is mapped RO anyway. On 32 bit there are
writeable mappings in the range, so just keep the permissions as they are.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-29-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The pti_clone_kernel_text() function references __end_rodata_hpage_align,
which is only present on x86-64. This makes sense as the end of the rodata
section is not huge-page aligned on 32 bit.
Nevertheless a symbol is required for the function that points at the right
address for both 32 and 64 bit. Introduce __end_rodata_aligned for that
purpose and use it in pti_clone_kernel_text().
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-28-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The addr counter will overflow if the last PMD of the address space is
cloned, resulting in an endless loop.
Check for that and bail out of the loop when it happens.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-25-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Allocate a kernel and a user page-table root when PTI is enabled. Also
allocate a full page per root for PAE because otherwise the bit to flip in
CR3 to switch between them would be non-constant, which creates a lot of
hassle. Keep that for a later optimization.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-18-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
The way page-table folding is implemented on 32 bit, these functions are
not only setting, but also PUDs and even PMDs. Give the function a more
generic name to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-16-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Song Liu noticed switch_mm_irqs_off() taking a lot of CPU time in recent
kernels,using 1.8% of a 48 CPU system during a netperf to localhost run.
Digging into the profile, we noticed that cpumask_clear_cpu and
cpumask_set_cpu together take about half of the CPU time taken by
switch_mm_irqs_off().
However, the CPUs running netperf end up switching back and forth
between netperf and the idle task, which does not require changes
to the mm_cpumask. Furthermore, the init_mm cpumask ends up being
the most heavily contended one in the system.
Simply skipping changes to mm_cpumask(&init_mm) reduces overhead.
Reported-and-tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-8-riel@surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now that CPUs in lazy TLB mode no longer receive TLB shootdown IPIs, except
at page table freeing time, and idle CPUs will no longer get shootdown IPIs
for things like mprotect and madvise, we can always use lazy TLB mode.
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-7-riel@surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CPUs in !is_lazy have either received TLB flush IPIs earlier on during
the munmap (when the user memory was unmapped), or have context switched
and reloaded during that stage of the munmap.
Page table free TLB flushes only need to be sent to CPUs in lazy TLB
mode, which TLB contents might not yet be up to date yet.
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-6-riel@surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Lazy TLB mode can result in an idle CPU being woken up by a TLB flush,
when all it really needs to do is reload %CR3 at the next context switch,
assuming no page table pages got freed.
Memory ordering is used to prevent race conditions between switch_mm_irqs_off,
which checks whether .tlb_gen changed, and the TLB invalidation code, which
increments .tlb_gen whenever page table entries get invalidated.
The atomic increment in inc_mm_tlb_gen is its own barrier; the context
switch code adds an explicit barrier between reading tlbstate.is_lazy and
next->context.tlb_gen.
Unlike the 2016 version of this patch, CPUs with cpu_tlbstate.is_lazy set
are not removed from the mm_cpumask(mm), since that would prevent the TLB
flush IPIs at page table free time from being sent to all the CPUs
that need them.
This patch reduces total CPU use in the system by about 1-2% for a
memcache workload on two socket systems, and by about 1% for a heavily
multi-process netperf between two systems.
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-5-riel@surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Move some code that will be needed for the lazy -> !lazy state
transition when a lazy TLB CPU has gotten out of date.
No functional changes, since the if (real_prev == next) branch
always returns.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-4-riel@surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Andy discovered that speculative memory accesses while in lazy
TLB mode can crash a system, when a CPU tries to dereference a
speculative access using memory contents that used to be valid
page table memory, but have since been reused for something else
and point into la-la land.
The latter problem can be prevented in two ways. The first is to
always send a TLB shootdown IPI to CPUs in lazy TLB mode, while
the second one is to only send the TLB shootdown at page table
freeing time.
The second should result in fewer IPIs, since operationgs like
mprotect and madvise are very common with some workloads, but
do not involve page table freeing. Also, on munmap, batching
of page table freeing covers much larger ranges of virtual
memory than the batching of unmapped user pages.
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-3-riel@surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Without this change the distance table calculation for emulated nodes
may use the wrong numa node and report an incorrect distance.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153089328103.27680.14778434392225818887.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
ioremap() calls pud_free_pmd_page() / pmd_free_pte_page() when it creates
a pud / pmd map. The following preconditions are met at their entry.
- All pte entries for a target pud/pmd address range have been cleared.
- System-wide TLB purges have been peformed for a target pud/pmd address
range.
The preconditions assure that there is no stale TLB entry for the range.
Speculation may not cache TLB entries since it requires all levels of page
entries, including ptes, to have P & A-bits set for an associated address.
However, speculation may cache pud/pmd entries (paging-structure caches)
when they have P-bit set.
Add a system-wide TLB purge (INVLPG) to a single page after clearing
pud/pmd entry's P-bit.
SDM 4.10.4.1, Operation that Invalidate TLBs and Paging-Structure Caches,
states that:
INVLPG invalidates all paging-structure caches associated with the
current PCID regardless of the liner addresses to which they correspond.
Fixes: 28ee90fe60 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: cpandya@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-4-toshi.kani@hpe.com
The following kernel panic was observed on ARM64 platform due to a stale
TLB entry.
1. ioremap with 4K size, a valid pte page table is set.
2. iounmap it, its pte entry is set to 0.
3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, update its pmd entry with
a new value.
4. CPU may hit an exception because the old pmd entry is still in TLB,
which leads to a kernel panic.
Commit b6bdb7517c ("mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page
table") has addressed this panic by falling to pte mappings in the above
case on ARM64.
To support pmd mappings in all cases, TLB purge needs to be performed
in this case on ARM64.
Add a new arg, 'addr', to pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page()
so that TLB purge can be added later in seprate patches.
[toshi.kani@hpe.com: merge changes, rewrite patch description]
Fixes: 28ee90fe60 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-3-toshi.kani@hpe.com
ioremap() supports pmd mappings on x86-PAE. However, kernel's pmd
tables are not shared among processes on x86-PAE. Therefore, any
update to sync'd pmd entries need re-syncing. Freeing a pte page
also leads to a vmalloc fault and hits the BUG_ON in vmalloc_sync_one().
Disable free page handling on x86-PAE. pud_free_pmd_page() and
pmd_free_pte_page() simply return 0 if a given pud/pmd entry is present.
This assures that ioremap() does not update sync'd pmd entries at the
cost of falling back to pte mappings.
Fixes: 28ee90fe60 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces")
Reported-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: cpandya@codeaurora.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
- Remove 'nx_warning' and 'smep_warning', which are just pointless obfuscation.
- Also convert to pr_crit().
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627090715.28076-1-dvyukov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The PAE 3-level paging code currently doesn't mitigate L1TF by flipping the
offset bits, and uses the high PTE word, thus bits 32-36 for type, 37-63 for
offset. The lower word is zeroed, thus systems with less than 4GB memory are
safe. With 4GB to 128GB the swap type selects the memory locations vulnerable
to L1TF; with even more memory, also the swap offfset influences the address.
This might be a problem with 32bit PAE guests running on large 64bit hosts.
By continuing to keep the whole swap entry in either high or low 32bit word of
PTE we would limit the swap size too much. Thus this patch uses the whole PAE
PTE with the same layout as the 64bit version does. The macros just become a
bit tricky since they assume the arch-dependent swp_entry_t to be 32bit.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
KERN_CONT leads to split lines in kernel output
and complicates useful changes to printk like
printing context before each line.
Only acceptable use of continuations is basically
boot-time testing.
Get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625123808.227417-1-dvyukov@gmail.com
[ Removed unnecessary parentheses and prettified the printk statement. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The previous patch has limited swap file size so that large offsets cannot
clear bits above MAX_PA/2 in the pte and interfere with L1TF mitigation.
It assumed that offsets are encoded starting with bit 12, same as pfn. But
on x86_64, offsets are encoded starting with bit 9.
Thus the limit can be raised by 3 bits. That means 16TB with 42bit MAX_PA
and 256TB with 46bit MAX_PA.
Fixes: 377eeaa8e1 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add a new function to "adjust" the current fixed UV memory block size
of 2GB so it can be changed to a different physical boundary. This is
out of necessity so arch dependent code can accommodate specific BIOS
requirements which can align these new PMEM modules at less than the
default boundaries.
A "set order" type of function was used to insure that the memory block
size will be a power of two value without requiring a validity check.
64GB was chosen as the upper limit for memory block size values to
accommodate upcoming 4PB systems which have 6 more bits of physical
address space (46 becoming 52).
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Banman <andrew.banman@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: mhocko@suse.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20180524201711.609546602@stormcage.americas.sgi.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.
Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.
The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.
In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.
Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.
To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.
Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.
It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.
For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().
For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
With PHYS_ADDR_MAX there is now a type safe variant for all bits set.
Make use of it.
Patch created using a semantic patch as follows:
// <smpl>
@@
typedef phys_addr_t;
@@
-(phys_addr_t)ULLONG_MAX
+PHYS_ADDR_MAX
// </smpl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180419214204.19322-1-stefan@agner.ch
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Hussam reports:
I was poking around and for no real reason, I did cat /dev/mem and
strings /dev/mem. Then I saw the following warning in dmesg. I saved it
and rebooted immediately.
memremap attempted on mixed range 0x000000000009c000 size: 0x1000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11810 at kernel/memremap.c:98 memremap+0x104/0x170
[..]
Call Trace:
xlate_dev_mem_ptr+0x25/0x40
read_mem+0x89/0x1a0
__vfs_read+0x36/0x170
The memremap() implementation checks for attempts to remap System RAM
with MEMREMAP_WB and instead redirects those mapping attempts to the
linear map. However, that only works if the physical address range
being remapped is page aligned. In low memory we have situations like
the following:
00000000-00000fff : Reserved
00001000-0009fbff : System RAM
0009fc00-0009ffff : Reserved
...where System RAM intersects Reserved ranges on a sub-page page
granularity.
Given that devmem_is_allowed() special cases any attempt to map System
RAM in the first 1MB of memory, replace page_is_ram() with the more
precise region_intersects() to trap attempts to map disallowed ranges.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199999
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152856436164.18127.2847888121707136898.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Fixes: 92281dee82 ("arch: introduce memremap()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reported-by: Hussam Al-Tayeb <me@hussam.eu.org>
Tested-by: Hussam Al-Tayeb <me@hussam.eu.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 updates and fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Fix the (late) fallout from the vector management rework causing
hlist corruption and irq descriptor reference leaks caused by a
missing sanity check.
The straight forward fix triggered another long standing issue to
surface. The pre rework code hid the issue due to being way slower,
but now the chance that user space sees an EBUSY error return when
updating irq affinities is way higher, though quite a bunch of
userspace tools do not handle it properly despite the fact that EBUSY
could be returned for at least 10 years.
It turned out that the EBUSY return can be avoided completely by
utilizing the existing delayed affinity update mechanism for irq
remapped scenarios as well. That's a bit more error handling in the
kernel, but avoids fruitless fingerpointing discussions with tool
developers.
- Decouple PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME as its going to be required for
the upcoming Intel memory encryption support as well.
- Handle legacy device ACPI detection properly for newer platforms
- Fix the wrong argument ordering in the vector allocation tracepoint
- Simplify the IDT setup code for the APIC=n case
- Use the proper string helpers in the MTRR code
- Remove a stale unused VDSO source file
- Convert the microcode update lock to a raw spinlock as its used in
atomic context.
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/intel_rdt: Enable CMT and MBM on new Skylake stepping
x86/apic/vector: Print APIC control bits in debugfs
genirq/affinity: Defer affinity setting if irq chip is busy
x86/platform/uv: Use apic_ack_irq()
x86/ioapic: Use apic_ack_irq()
irq_remapping: Use apic_ack_irq()
x86/apic: Provide apic_ack_irq()
genirq/migration: Avoid out of line call if pending is not set
genirq/generic_pending: Do not lose pending affinity update
x86/apic/vector: Prevent hlist corruption and leaks
x86/vector: Fix the args of vector_alloc tracepoint
x86/idt: Simplify the idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates()
x86/platform/uv: Remove extra parentheses
x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME
x86: Mark native_set_p4d() as __always_inline
x86/microcode: Make the late update update_lock a raw lock for RT
x86/mtrr: Convert to use strncpy_from_user() helper
x86/mtrr: Convert to use match_string() helper
x86/vdso: Remove unused file
x86/i8237: Register device based on FADT legacy boot flag
For pgd page table pages, x86 overloads the page->index field to store a
pointer to the mm_struct. Rename this to pt_mm so it's visible to other
users.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518194519.3820-13-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
AMD SME claims one bit from physical address to indicate whether the
page is encrypted or not. To achieve that we clear out the bit from
__PHYSICAL_MASK.
The capability to adjust __PHYSICAL_MASK is required beyond AMD SME.
For instance for upcoming Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption.
Factor it out into a separate feature with own Kconfig handle.
It also helps with overhead of AMD SME. It saves more than 3k in .text
on defconfig + AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT:
add/remove: 3/2 grow/shrink: 5/110 up/down: 189/-3753 (-3564)
We would need to return to this once we have infrastructure to patch
constants in code. That's good candidate for it.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518113028.79825-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Pull x86 debug updates from Ingo Molnar:
"This contains the x86 oops code printing reorganization and cleanups
from Borislav Betkov, with a particular focus in enhancing opcode
dumping all around"
* 'x86-debug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/dumpstack: Explain the reasoning for the prologue and buffer size
x86/dumpstack: Save first regs set for the executive summary
x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function
x86/fault: Dump user opcode bytes on fatal faults
x86/dumpstack: Add loglevel argument to show_opcodes()
x86/dumpstack: Improve opcodes dumping in the code section
x86/dumpstack: Carve out code-dumping into a function
x86/dumpstack: Unexport oops_begin()
x86/dumpstack: Remove code_bytes
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc cleanups"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/apm: Fix spelling mistake: "caculate" -> "calculate"
x86/mtrr: Rename main.c to mtrr.c and remove duplicate prefixes
x86: Remove pr_fmt duplicate logging prefixes
x86/early-quirks: Rename duplicate define of dev_err
x86/bpf: Clean up non-standard comments, to make the code more readable
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Centaur CPU updates (David Wang)
- AMD and other CPU topology enumeration improvements and fixes
(Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Suravee Suthikulpanit)
- Continued 5-level paging work (Kirill A. Shutemov)
* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata
x86/mm: Mark p4d_offset() __always_inline
x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter
x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variable
x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot code
x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix trampoline page table address calculation
x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores()
x86/Centaur: Report correct CPU/cache topology
x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo()
x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() generic
x86/CPU: Move cpu local function declarations to local header
x86/CPU/AMD: Derive CPU topology from CPUID function 0xB when available
x86/CPU: Modify detect_extended_topology() to return result
x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads
x86/CPU: Rename intel_cacheinfo.c to cacheinfo.c
perf/events/amd/uncore: Fix amd_uncore_llc ID to use pre-defined cpu_llc_id
x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present
x86/Centaur: Initialize supported CPU features properly
Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman:
"This set of changes close the known issues with setting si_code to an
invalid value, and with not fully initializing struct siginfo. There
remains work to do on nds32, arc, unicore32, powerpc, arm, arm64, ia64
and x86 to get the code that generates siginfo into a simpler and more
maintainable state. Most of that work involves refactoring the signal
handling code and thus careful code review.
Also not included is the work to shrink the in kernel version of
struct siginfo. That depends on getting the number of places that
directly manipulate struct siginfo under control, as it requires the
introduction of struct kernel_siginfo for the in kernel things.
Overall this set of changes looks like it is making good progress, and
with a little luck I will be wrapping up the siginfo work next
development cycle"
* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
signal/sh: Stop gcc warning about an impossible case in do_divide_error
signal/mips: Report FPE_FLTUNK for undiagnosed floating point exceptions
signal/um: More carefully relay signals in relay_signal.
signal: Extend siginfo_layout with SIL_FAULT_{MCEERR|BNDERR|PKUERR}
signal: Remove unncessary #ifdef SEGV_PKUERR in 32bit compat code
signal/signalfd: Add support for SIGSYS
signal/signalfd: Remove __put_user from signalfd_copyinfo
signal/xtensa: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/xtensa: Consistenly use SIGBUS in do_unaligned_user
signal/um: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/sparc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/sparc: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/sh: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/s390: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/riscv: Replace do_trap_siginfo with force_sig_fault
signal/riscv: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/parisc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/parisc: Use force_sig_mceerr where appropriate
signal/openrisc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/nios2: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
...
pgtable_l5_enabled is defined using cpu_feature_enabled() but we refer
to it as a variable. This is misleading.
Make pgtable_l5_enabled() a function.
We cannot literally define it as a function due to circular dependencies
between header files. Function-alike macros is close enough.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Usually pgtable_l5_enabled is defined using cpu_feature_enabled().
cpu_feature_enabled() is not available in early boot code. We use
several different preprocessor tricks to get around it. It's messy.
Unify them all.
If cpu_feature_enabled() is not yet available, USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 can
be defined before all includes. It makes pgtable_l5_enabled rely on
__pgtable_l5_enabled variable instead. This approach fits all early
users.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
I got a bug report that the following code (roughly) was
causing a SIGSEGV:
mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC);
mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ);
*ptr = 100;
The problem is hit when the mprotect(PROT_EXEC)
is implicitly assigned a protection key to the VMA, and made
that key ACCESS_DENY|WRITE_DENY. The PROT_NONE mprotect()
failed to remove the protection key, and the PROT_NONE->
PROT_READ left the PTE usable, but the pkey still in place
and left the memory inaccessible.
To fix this, we ensure that we always "override" the pkee
at mprotect() if the VMA does not have execute-only
permissions, but the VMA has the execute-only pkey.
We had a check for PROT_READ/WRITE, but it did not work
for PROT_NONE. This entirely removes the PROT_* checks,
which ensures that PROT_NONE now works.
Reported-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 62b5f7d013 ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171351.084C5A71@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Sometimes it is useful to see which user opcode bytes RIP points to
when a fault happens: be it to rule out RIP corruption, to dump info
early during boot, when doing core dumps is impossible due to not having
a writable filesystem yet.
Sometimes it is useful if debugging an issue and one doesn't have access
to the executable which caused the fault in order to disassemble it.
That last aspect might have some security implications so
show_unhandled_signals could be revisited for that or a new config option
added.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-7-bp@alien8.de
Call clear_siginfo to ensure every stack allocated siginfo is properly
initialized before being passed to the signal sending functions.
Note: It is not safe to depend on C initializers to initialize struct
siginfo on the stack because C is allowed to skip holes when
initializing a structure.
The initialization of struct siginfo in tracehook_report_syscall_exit
was moved from the helper user_single_step_siginfo into
tracehook_report_syscall_exit itself, to make it clear that the local
variable siginfo gets fully initialized.
In a few cases the scope of struct siginfo has been reduced to make it
clear that siginfo siginfo is not used on other paths in the function
in which it is declared.
Instances of using memset to initialize siginfo have been replaced
with calls clear_siginfo for clarity.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
commit 26d35ca6c3776784f8156e1d6f80cc60d9a2a915
RANDSTRUCT derives its hardening benefits from the attacker's lack of
knowledge about the layout of kernel data structures. Keep the kernel
image non-global in cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the
layout a secret.
Fixes: 8c06c7740 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID)
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222026.D0B4AAC9@viggo.jf.intel.com
commit abb67605203687c8b7943d760638d0301787f8d9
Kees reported to me that I made too much of the kernel image global.
It was far more than just text:
I think this is too much set global: _end is after data,
bss, and brk, and all kinds of other stuff that could
hold secrets. I think this should match what
mark_rodata_ro() is doing.
This does exactly that. We use __end_rodata_hpage_align as our
marker both because it is huge-page-aligned and it does not contain
any sections we expect to hold secrets.
Kees's logic was that r/o data is in the kernel image anyway and,
in the case of traditional distributions, can be freely downloaded
from the web, so there's no reason to hide it.
Fixes: 8c06c7740 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID)
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222023.1C8B2B20@viggo.jf.intel.com
commit 231df823c4f04176f607afc4576c989895cff40e
The pageattr.c code attempts to process "faults" when it goes looking
for PTEs to change and finds non-present entries. It allows these
faults in the linear map which is "expected to have holes", but
WARN()s about them elsewhere, like when called on the kernel image.
However, change_page_attr_clear() is now called on the kernel image in the
process of trying to clear the Global bit.
This trips the warning in __cpa_process_fault() if a non-present PTE is
encountered in the kernel image. The "holes" in the kernel image result
from free_init_pages()'s use of set_memory_np(). These holes are totally
fine, and result from normal operation, just as they would be in the kernel
linear map.
Just silence the warning when holes in the kernel image are encountered.
Fixes: 39114b7a7 (x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image)
Reported-by: Mariusz Ceier <mceier@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222021.1C7D2B3F@viggo.jf.intel.com
commit 16dce603adc9de4237b7bf2ff5c5290f34373e7b
Part of the global bit _setting_ patches also includes clearing the
Global bit when it should not be enabled. That is done with
set_memory_nonglobal(), which uses change_page_attr_clear() in
pageattr.c under the covers.
The TLB flushing code inside pageattr.c has has checks like
BUG_ON(irqs_disabled()), looking for interrupt disabling that might
cause deadlocks. But, these also trip in early boot on certain
preempt configurations. Just copy the existing BUG_ON() sequence from
cpa_flush_range() to the other two sites and check for early boot.
Fixes: 39114b7a7 (x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image)
Reported-by: Mariusz Ceier <mceier@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222019.20C4A410@viggo.jf.intel.com
Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Another series of PTI related changes:
- Remove the manual stack switch for user entries from the idtentry
code. This debloats entry by 5k+ bytes of text.
- Use the proper types for the asm/bootparam.h defines to prevent
user space compile errors.
- Use PAGE_GLOBAL for !PCID systems to gain back performance
- Prevent setting of huge PUD/PMD entries when the entries are not
leaf entries otherwise the entries to which the PUD/PMD points to
and are populated get lost"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/pgtable: Don't set huge PUD/PMD on non-leaf entries
x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID
x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image
x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas
x86/mm: Do not forbid _PAGE_RW before init for __ro_after_init
x86/mm: Comment _PAGE_GLOBAL mystery
x86/mm: Remove extra filtering in pageattr code
x86/mm: Do not auto-massage page protections
x86/espfix: Document use of _PAGE_GLOBAL
x86/mm: Introduce "default" kernel PTE mask
x86/mm: Undo double _PAGE_PSE clearing
x86/mm: Factor out pageattr _PAGE_GLOBAL setting
x86/entry/64: Drop idtentry's manual stack switch for user entries
x86/uapi: Fix asm/bootparam.h userspace compilation errors
The pmd_set_huge() and pud_set_huge() functions are used from
the generic ioremap() code to establish large mappings where this
is possible.
But the generic ioremap() code does not check whether the
PMD/PUD entries are already populated with a non-leaf entry,
so that any page-table pages these entries point to will be
lost.
Further, on x86-32 with SHARED_KERNEL_PMD=0, this causes a
BUG_ON() in vmalloc_sync_one() when PMD entries are synced
from swapper_pg_dir to the current page-table. This happens
because the PMD entry from swapper_pg_dir was promoted to a
huge-page entry while the current PGD still contains the
non-leaf entry. Because both entries are present and point
to a different page, the BUG_ON() triggers.
This was actually triggered with pti-x32 enabled in a KVM
virtual machine by the graphics driver.
A real and better fix for that would be to improve the
page-table handling in the generic ioremap() code. But that is
out-of-scope for this patch-set and left for later work.
Reported-by: David H. Gutteridge <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180411152437.GC15462@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Global pages are bad for hardening because they potentially let an
exploit read the kernel image via a Meltdown-style attack which
makes it easier to find gadgets.
But, global pages are good for performance because they reduce TLB
misses when making user/kernel transitions, especially when PCIDs
are not available, such as on older hardware, or where a hypervisor
has disabled them for some reason.
This patch implements a basic, sane policy: If you have PCIDs, you
only map a minimal amount of kernel text global. If you do not have
PCIDs, you map all kernel text global.
This policy effectively makes PCIDs something that not only adds
performance but a little bit of hardening as well.
I ran a simple "lseek" microbenchmark[1] to test the benefit on
a modern Atom microserver. Most of the benefit comes from applying
the series before this patch ("entry only"), but there is still a
signifiant benefit from this patch.
No Global Lines (baseline ): 6077741 lseeks/sec
88 Global Lines (entry only): 7528609 lseeks/sec (+23.9%)
94 Global Lines (this patch): 8433111 lseeks/sec (+38.8%)
[1.] https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/blob/master/tests/lseek1.c
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205518.E3D989EB@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Summary:
In current kernels, with PTI enabled, no pages are marked Global. This
potentially increases TLB misses. But, the mechanism by which the Global
bit is set and cleared is rather haphazard. This patch makes the process
more explicit. In the end, it leaves us with Global entries in the page
tables for the areas truly shared by userspace and kernel and increases
TLB hit rates.
The place this patch really shines in on systems without PCIDs. In this
case, we are using an lseek microbenchmark[1] to see how a reasonably
non-trivial syscall behaves. Higher is better:
No Global pages (baseline): 6077741 lseeks/sec
88 Global Pages (this set): 7528609 lseeks/sec (+23.9%)
On a modern Skylake desktop with PCIDs, the benefits are tangible, but not
huge for a kernel compile (lower is better):
No Global pages (baseline): 186.951 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.35% )
28 Global pages (this set): 185.756 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.09% )
-1.195 seconds (-0.64%)
I also re-checked everything using the lseek1 test[1]:
No Global pages (baseline): 15783951 lseeks/sec
28 Global pages (this set): 16054688 lseeks/sec
+270737 lseeks/sec (+1.71%)
The effect is more visible, but still modest.
Details:
The kernel page tables are inherited from head_64.S which rudely marks
them as _PAGE_GLOBAL. For PTI, we have been relying on the grace of
$DEITY and some insane behavior in pageattr.c to clear _PAGE_GLOBAL.
This patch tries to do better.
First, stop filtering out "unsupported" bits from being cleared in the
pageattr code. It's fine to filter out *setting* these bits but it
is insane to keep us from clearing them.
Then, *explicitly* go clear _PAGE_GLOBAL from the kernel identity map.
Do not rely on pageattr to do it magically.
After this patch, we can see that "GLB" shows up in each copy of the
page tables, that we have the same number of global entries in each
and that they are the *same* entries.
/sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/current_kernel:11
/sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/current_user:11
/sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/kernel:11
9caae8ad6a1fb53aca2407ec037f612d current_kernel.GLB
9caae8ad6a1fb53aca2407ec037f612d current_user.GLB
9caae8ad6a1fb53aca2407ec037f612d kernel.GLB
A quick visual audit also shows that all the entries make sense.
0xfffffe0000000000 is the cpu_entry_area and 0xffffffff81c00000
is the entry/exit text:
0xfffffe0000000000-0xfffffe0000002000 8K ro GLB NX pte
0xfffffe0000002000-0xfffffe0000003000 4K RW GLB NX pte
0xfffffe0000003000-0xfffffe0000006000 12K ro GLB NX pte
0xfffffe0000006000-0xfffffe0000007000 4K ro GLB x pte
0xfffffe0000007000-0xfffffe000000d000 24K RW GLB NX pte
0xfffffe000002d000-0xfffffe000002e000 4K ro GLB NX pte
0xfffffe000002e000-0xfffffe000002f000 4K RW GLB NX pte
0xfffffe000002f000-0xfffffe0000032000 12K ro GLB NX pte
0xfffffe0000032000-0xfffffe0000033000 4K ro GLB x pte
0xfffffe0000033000-0xfffffe0000039000 24K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81c00000-0xffffffff81e00000 2M ro PSE GLB x pmd
[1.] https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/blob/master/tests/lseek1.c
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205517.C80FBE05@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The entry/exit text and cpu_entry_area are mapped into userspace and
the kernel. But, they are not _PAGE_GLOBAL. This creates unnecessary
TLB misses.
Add the _PAGE_GLOBAL flag for these areas.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205515.2977EE7D@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
__ro_after_init data gets stuck in the .rodata section. That's normally
fine because the kernel itself manages the R/W properties.
But, if we run __change_page_attr() on an area which is __ro_after_init,
the .rodata checks will trigger and force the area to be immediately
read-only, even if it is early-ish in boot. This caused problems when
trying to clear the _PAGE_GLOBAL bit for these area in the PTI code:
it cleared _PAGE_GLOBAL like I asked, but also took it up on itself
to clear _PAGE_RW. The kernel then oopses the next time it wrote to
a __ro_after_init data structure.
To fix this, add the kernel_set_to_readonly check, just like we have
for kernel text, just a few lines below in this function.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205514.8D898241@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The pageattr code has a mode where it can set or clear PTE bits in
existing PTEs, so the page protections of the *new* PTEs come from
one of two places:
1. The set/clear masks: cpa->mask_clr / cpa->mask_set
2. The existing PTE
We filter ->mask_set/clr for supported PTE bits at entry to
__change_page_attr() so we never need to filter them again.
The only other place permissions can come from is an existing PTE
and those already presumably have good bits. We do not need to filter
them again.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205511.BC072352@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
A PTE is constructed from a physical address and a pgprotval_t.
__PAGE_KERNEL, for instance, is a pgprot_t and must be converted
into a pgprotval_t before it can be used to create a PTE. This is
done implicitly within functions like pfn_pte() by massage_pgprot().
However, this makes it very challenging to set bits (and keep them
set) if your bit is being filtered out by massage_pgprot().
This moves the bit filtering out of pfn_pte() and friends. For
users of PAGE_KERNEL*, filtering will be done automatically inside
those macros but for users of __PAGE_KERNEL*, they need to do their
own filtering now.
Note that we also just move pfn_pte/pmd/pud() over to check_pgprot()
instead of massage_pgprot(). This way, we still *look* for
unsupported bits and properly warn about them if we find them. This
might happen if an unfiltered __PAGE_KERNEL* value was passed in,
for instance.
- printk format warning fix from: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
- boot crash fix from: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
- crash bisected by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-fixed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Bisected-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205509.77E1D7F6@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Juergen Gross noticed that commit f7f99100d8 ("mm: stop zeroing memory
during allocation in vmemmap") broke XEN PV domains when deferred struct
page initialization is enabled.
This is because the xen's PagePinned() flag is getting erased from
struct pages when they are initialized later in boot.
Juergen fixed this problem by disabling deferred pages on xen pv
domains. It is desirable, however, to have this feature available as it
reduces boot time. This fix re-enables the feature for pv-dmains, and
fixes the problem the following way:
The fix is to delay setting PagePinned flag until struct pages for all
allocated memory are initialized, i.e. until after free_all_bootmem().
A new x86_init.hyper op init_after_bootmem() is called to let xen know
that boot allocator is done, and hence struct pages for all the
allocated memory are now initialized. If deferred page initialization
is enabled, the rest of struct pages are going to be initialized later
in boot once page_alloc_init_late() is called.
xen_after_bootmem() walks page table's pages and marks them pinned.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226160112.24724-2-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".
Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues
around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements
the approach.
[1] 04e35f4495 ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
[2] 779f4e1c6c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
[3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"
This patch (of 3):
Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
finalized.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The __PAGE_KERNEL_* page permissions are "raw". They contain bits
that may or may not be supported on the current processor. They need
to be filtered by a mask (currently __supported_pte_mask) to turn them
into a value that we can actually set in a PTE.
These __PAGE_KERNEL_* values all contain _PAGE_GLOBAL. But, with PTI,
we want to be able to support _PAGE_GLOBAL (have the bit set in
__supported_pte_mask) but not have it appear in any of these masks by
default.
This patch creates a new mask, __default_kernel_pte_mask, and applies
it when creating all of the PAGE_KERNEL_* masks. This makes
PAGE_KERNEL_* safe to use anywhere (they only contain supported bits).
It also ensures that PAGE_KERNEL_* contains _PAGE_GLOBAL on PTI=n
kernels but clears _PAGE_GLOBAL when PTI=y.
We also make __default_kernel_pte_mask a non-GPL exported symbol
because there are plenty of driver-available interfaces that take
PAGE_KERNEL_* permissions.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205506.030DB6B6@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When clearing _PAGE_PRESENT on a huge page, we need to be careful
to also clear _PAGE_PSE, otherwise it might still get confused
for a valid large page table entry.
We do that near the spot where we *set* _PAGE_PSE. That's fine,
but it's unnecessary. pgprot_large_2_4k() already did it.
BTW, I also noticed that pgprot_large_2_4k() and
pgprot_4k_2_large() are not symmetric. pgprot_large_2_4k() clears
_PAGE_PSE (because it is aliased to _PAGE_PAT) but
pgprot_4k_2_large() does not put _PAGE_PSE back. Bummer.
Also, add some comments and change "promote" to "move". "Promote"
seems an odd word to move when we are logically moving a bit to a
lower bit position. Also add an extra line return to make it clear
to which line the comment applies.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205504.9B0F44A9@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The pageattr code has a pattern repeated where it sets _PAGE_GLOBAL
for present PTEs but clears it for non-present PTEs. The intention
is to keep _PAGE_GLOBAL from getting confused with _PAGE_PROTNONE
since _PAGE_GLOBAL is for present PTEs and _PAGE_PROTNONE is for
non-present
But, this pattern makes no sense. Effectively, it says, if you use
the pageattr code, always set _PAGE_GLOBAL when _PAGE_PRESENT.
canon_pgprot() will clear it if unsupported (because it masks the
value with __supported_pte_mask) but we *always* set it. Even if
canon_pgprot() did not filter _PAGE_GLOBAL, it would be OK.
_PAGE_GLOBAL is ignored when CR4.PGE=0 by the hardware.
This unconditional setting of _PAGE_GLOBAL is a problem when we have
PTI and non-PTI and we want some areas to have _PAGE_GLOBAL and some
not.
This updated version of the code says:
1. Clear _PAGE_GLOBAL when !_PAGE_PRESENT
2. Never set _PAGE_GLOBAL implicitly
3. Allow _PAGE_GLOBAL to be in cpa.set_mask
4. Allow _PAGE_GLOBAL to be inherited from previous PTE
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205502.86E199DA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Memory sections are combined into "memory block" chunks. These chunks
are the units upon which memory can be added and removed.
On x86, the new memory may be added after the end of the boot memory,
therefore, if block size does not align with end of boot memory, memory
hot-plugging/hot-removing can be broken.
Memory sections are combined into "memory block" chunks. These chunks
are the units upon which memory can be added and removed.
On x86 the new memory may be added after the end of the boot memory,
therefore, if block size does not align with end of boot memory, memory
hotplugging/hotremoving can be broken.
Currently, whenever machine is booted with more than 64G the block size
is unconditionally increased to 2G from the base 128M. This is done in
order to reduce number of memory device files in sysfs:
/sys/devices/system/memory/memoryXXX
We must use the largest allowed block size that aligns to the next
address to be able to hotplug the next block of memory.
So, when memory is larger or equal to 64G, we check the end address and
find the largest block size that is still power of two but smaller or
equal to 2G.
Before, the fix:
Run qemu with:
-m 64G,slots=2,maxmem=66G -object memory-backend-ram,id=mem1,size=2G
(qemu) device_add pc-dimm,id=dimm1,memdev=mem1
Block size [0x80000000] unaligned hotplug range: start 0x1040000000,
size 0x80000000
acpi PNP0C80:00: add_memory failed
acpi PNP0C80:00: acpi_memory_enable_device() error
acpi PNP0C80:00: Enumeration failure
With the fix memory is added successfully as the block size is set to
1G, and therefore aligns with start address 0x1040000000.
[pasha.tatashin@oracle.com: v4]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215165920.8570-3-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213193159.14606-3-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main EFI changes in this cycle were:
- Fix the apple-properties code (Andy Shevchenko)
- Add WARN() on arm64 if UEFI Runtime Services corrupt the reserved
x18 register (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Use efi_switch_mm() on x86 instead of manipulating %cr3 directly
(Sai Praneeth)
- Fix early memremap leak in ESRT code (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Switch to L"xxx" notation for wide string literals (Ard Biesheuvel)
- ... plus misc other cleanups and bugfixes"
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3
x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
efi: Use string literals for efi_char16_t variable initializers
efi/esrt: Fix handling of early ESRT table mapping
efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
efi: Make const array 'apple' static
efi/apple-properties: Use memremap() instead of ioremap()
efi: Reorder pr_notice() with add_device_randomness() call
x86/efi: Replace GFP_ATOMIC with GFP_KERNEL in efi_query_variable_store()
efi/arm64: Check whether x18 is preserved by runtime services calls
efi/arm*: Stop printing addresses of virtual mappings
efi/apple-properties: Remove redundant attribute initialization from unmarshal_key_value_pairs()
efi/arm*: Only register page tables when they exist
Pull x86 dma mapping updates from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree, by Christoph Hellwig, switches over the x86 architecture to
the generic dma-direct and swiotlb code, and also unifies more of the
dma-direct code between architectures. The now unused x86-only
primitives are removed"
* 'x86-dma-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
dma-mapping: Don't clear GFP_ZERO in dma_alloc_attrs
swiotlb: Make swiotlb_{alloc,free}_buffer depend on CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_OPS
dma/swiotlb: Remove swiotlb_{alloc,free}_coherent()
dma/direct: Handle force decryption for DMA coherent buffers in common code
dma/direct: Handle the memory encryption bit in common code
dma/swiotlb: Remove swiotlb_set_mem_attributes()
set_memory.h: Provide set_memory_{en,de}crypted() stubs
x86/dma: Remove dma_alloc_coherent_gfp_flags()
iommu/intel-iommu: Enable CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_OPS=y and clean up intel_{alloc,free}_coherent()
iommu/amd_iommu: Use CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_OPS=y and dma_direct_{alloc,free}()
x86/dma/amd_gart: Use dma_direct_{alloc,free}()
x86/dma/amd_gart: Look at dev->coherent_dma_mask instead of GFP_DMA
x86/dma: Use generic swiotlb_ops
x86/dma: Use DMA-direct (CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_OPS=y)
x86/dma: Remove dma_alloc_coherent_mask()
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Extend the memmap= boot parameter syntax to allow the redeclaration
and dropping of existing ranges, and to support all e820 range types
(Jan H. Schönherr)
- Improve the W+X boot time security checks to remove false positive
warnings on Xen (Jan Beulich)
- Support booting as Xen PVH guest (Juergen Gross)
- Improved 5-level paging (LA57) support, in particular it's possible
now to have a single kernel image for both 4-level and 5-level
hardware (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- AMD hardware RAM encryption support (SME/SEV) fixes (Tom Lendacky)
- Preparatory commits for hardware-encrypted RAM support on Intel CPUs.
(Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Improved Intel-MID support (Andy Shevchenko)
- Show EFI page tables in page_tables debug files (Andy Lutomirski)
- ... plus misc fixes and smaller cleanups
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (56 commits)
x86/cpu/tme: Fix spelling: "configuation" -> "configuration"
x86/boot: Fix SEV boot failure from change to __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT
x86/mm: Update comment in detect_tme() regarding x86_phys_bits
x86/mm/32: Remove unused node_memmap_size_bytes() & CONFIG_NEED_NODE_MEMMAP_SIZE logic
x86/mm: Remove pointless checks in vmalloc_fault
x86/platform/intel-mid: Add special handling for ACPI HW reduced platforms
ACPI, x86/boot: Introduce the ->reduced_hw_early_init() ACPI callback
ACPI, x86/boot: Split out acpi_generic_reduce_hw_init() and export
x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf
x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets
x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS
x86/boot/compressed/64: Handle 5-level paging boot if kernel is above 4G
x86/boot/compressed/64: Use page table in trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Use stack from trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Make sure we have a 32-bit code segment
x86/mm: Do not use paravirtualized calls in native_set_p4d()
kdump, vmcoreinfo: Export pgtable_l5_enabled value
x86/boot/compressed/64: Prepare new top-level page table for trampoline
x86/boot/compressed/64: Set up trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Save and restore trampoline memory
...
Pull x86 cleanups and msr updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main change is a performance/latency improvement to /dev/msr
access. The rest are misc cleanups"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/msr: Make rdmsrl_safe_on_cpu() scheduling safe as well
x86/cpuid: Allow cpuid_read() to schedule
x86/msr: Allow rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() to schedule
x86/rtc: Stop using deprecated functions
x86/dumpstack: Unify show_regs()
x86/fault: Do not print IP in show_fault_oops()
x86/MSR: Move native_* variants to msr.h
node_memmap_size_bytes() has been unused since the v3.9 kernel, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Fixes: f03574f2d5 ("x86-32, mm: Rip out x86_32 NUMA remapping code")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1803262325540.256524@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"13 fixes"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
mm, thp: do not cause memcg oom for thp
mm/vmscan: wake up flushers for legacy cgroups too
Revert "mm: page_alloc: skip over regions of invalid pfns where possible"
mm/shmem: do not wait for lock_page() in shmem_unused_huge_shrink()
mm/thp: do not wait for lock_page() in deferred_split_scan()
mm/khugepaged.c: convert VM_BUG_ON() to collapse fail
x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces
mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page table
h8300: remove extraneous __BIG_ENDIAN definition
hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
lockdep: fix fs_reclaim warning
MAINTAINERS: update Mark Fasheh's e-mail
mm/mempolicy.c: avoid use uninitialized preferred_node
Pull libnvdimm fixes from Dan Williams:
"Two regression fixes, two bug fixes for older issues, two fixes for
new functionality added this cycle that have userspace ABI concerns,
and a small cleanup. These have appeared in a linux-next release and
have a build success report from the 0day robot.
* The 4.16 rework of altmap handling led to some configurations
leaking page table allocations due to freeing from the altmap
reservation rather than the page allocator.
The impact without the fix is leaked memory and a WARN() message
when tearing down libnvdimm namespaces. The rework also missed a
place where error handling code needed to be removed that can lead
to a crash if devm_memremap_pages() fails.
* acpi_map_pxm_to_node() had a latent bug whereby it could
misidentify the closest online node to a given proximity domain.
* Block integrity handling was reworked several kernels back to allow
calling add_disk() after setting up the integrity profile.
The nd_btt and nd_blk drivers are just now catching up to fix
automatic partition detection at driver load time.
* The new peristence_domain attribute, a platform indicator of
whether cpu caches are powerfail protected for example, is meant to
be a single value enum and not a set of flags.
This oversight was caught while reviewing new userspace code in
libndctl to communicate the attribute.
Fix this new enabling up so that we are not stuck with an unwanted
userspace ABI"
* 'libnvdimm-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm:
libnvdimm, nfit: fix persistence domain reporting
libnvdimm, region: hide persistence_domain when unknown
acpi, numa: fix pxm to online numa node associations
x86, memremap: fix altmap accounting at free
libnvdimm: remove redundant assignment to pointer 'dev'
libnvdimm, {btt, blk}: do integrity setup before add_disk()
kernel/memremap: Remove stale devres_free() call
Implement pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page() on x86, which
clear a given pud/pmd entry and free up lower level page table(s).
The address range associated with the pud/pmd entry must have been
purged by INVLPG.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314180155.19492-3-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Fixes: e61ce6ade4 ("mm: change ioremap to set up huge I/O mappings")
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reported-by: Lei Li <lious.lilei@hisilicon.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On architectures with CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP set, ioremap() may
create pud/pmd mappings. A kernel panic was observed on arm64 systems
with Cortex-A75 in the following steps as described by Hanjun Guo.
1. ioremap a 4K size, valid page table will build,
2. iounmap it, pte0 will set to 0;
3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, pgd/pmd is unchanged,
then set the a new value for pmd;
4. pte0 is leaked;
5. CPU may meet exception because the old pmd is still in TLB,
which will lead to kernel panic.
This panic is not reproducible on x86. INVLPG, called from iounmap,
purges all levels of entries associated with purged address on x86. x86
still has memory leak.
The patch changes the ioremap path to free unmapped page table(s) since
doing so in the unmap path has the following issues:
- The iounmap() path is shared with vunmap(). Since vmap() only
supports pte mappings, making vunmap() to free a pte page is an
overhead for regular vmap users as they do not need a pte page freed
up.
- Checking if all entries in a pte page are cleared in the unmap path
is racy, and serializing this check is expensive.
- The unmap path calls free_vmap_area_noflush() to do lazy TLB purges.
Clearing a pud/pmd entry before the lazy TLB purges needs extra TLB
purge.
Add two interfaces, pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page(), which
clear a given pud/pmd entry and free up a page for the lower level
entries.
This patch implements their stub functions on x86 and arm64, which work
as workaround.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo in pmd_free_pte_page() stub]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314180155.19492-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Fixes: e61ce6ade4 ("mm: change ioremap to set up huge I/O mappings")
Reported-by: Lei Li <lious.lilei@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Wang Xuefeng <wxf.wang@hisilicon.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With that in place the generic DMA-direct routines can be used to
allocate non-encrypted bounce buffers, and the x86 SEV case can use
the generic swiotlb ops including nice features such as using CMA
allocations.
Note that I'm not too happy about using sev_active() in DMA-direct, but
I couldn't come up with a good enough name for a wrapper to make it
worth adding.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-14-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Give the basic phys_to_dma() and dma_to_phys() helpers a __-prefix and add
the memory encryption mask to the non-prefixed versions. Use the
__-prefixed versions directly instead of clearing the mask again in
various places.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-13-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now that set_memory_decrypted() is always available we can just call it
directly.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-12-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
All dma_ops implementations used on x86 now take care of setting their own
required GFP_ masks for the allocation. And given that the common code
now clears harmful flags itself that means we can stop the flags in all
the IOMMU implementations as well.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-10-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
These days all devices (including the ISA fallback device) have a coherent
DMA mask set, so remove the workaround.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
vmalloc_fault() sets user's pgd or p4d from the kernel page table. Once
it's set, all tables underneath are identical. There is no point of
following the same page table with two separate pointers and make sure they
see the same with BUG().
Remove the pointless checks in vmalloc_fault(). Also rename the kernel
pgd/p4d pointers to pgd_k/p4d_k so that their names are consistent in the
file.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314205932.7193-1-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Commit 24b6d41643 "mm: pass the vmem_altmap to vmemmap_free" converted
the vmemmap_free() path to pass the altmap argument all the way through
the call chain rather than looking it up based on the page.
Unfortunately that ends up over freeing altmap allocated pages in some
cases since free_pagetable() is used to free both memmap space and pte
space, where only the memmap stored in huge pages uses altmap
allocations.
Given that altmap allocations for memmap space are special cased in
vmemmap_populate_hugepages() add a symmetric / special case
free_hugepage_table() to handle altmap freeing, and cleanup the unneeded
passing of altmap to leaf functions that do not require it.
Without this change the sanity check accounting in
devm_memremap_pages_release() will throw a warning with the following
signature.
nd_pmem pfn10.1: devm_memremap_pages_release: failed to free all reserved pages
WARNING: CPU: 44 PID: 3539 at kernel/memremap.c:310 devm_memremap_pages_release+0x1c7/0x220
CPU: 44 PID: 3539 Comm: ndctl Tainted: G L 4.16.0-rc1-linux-stable #7
RIP: 0010:devm_memremap_pages_release+0x1c7/0x220
[..]
Call Trace:
release_nodes+0x225/0x270
device_release_driver_internal+0x15d/0x210
bus_remove_device+0xe2/0x160
device_del+0x130/0x310
? klist_release+0x56/0x100
? nd_region_notify+0xc0/0xc0 [libnvdimm]
device_unregister+0x16/0x60
This was missed in testing since not all configurations will trigger
this warning.
Fixes: 24b6d41643 ("mm: pass the vmem_altmap to vmemmap_free")
Reported-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Gratian Crisan reported that vmalloc_fault() crashes when CONFIG_HUGETLBFS
is not set since the function inadvertently uses pXn_huge(), which always
return 0 in this case. ioremap() does not depend on CONFIG_HUGETLBFS.
Fix vmalloc_fault() to call pXd_large() instead.
Fixes: f4eafd8bcd ("x86/mm: Fix vmalloc_fault() to handle large pages properly")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313170347.3829-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
This commit in x86/mm changed EFI code:
116fef640859: x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Add the EFI pagetable to the debugfs 'page_tables' directory
So merge in that commit plus its dependencies, before continuing with
EFI work.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another pile of melted spectrum related updates:
- Drop native vsyscall support finally as it causes more trouble than
benefit.
- Make microcode loading more robust. There were a few issues
especially related to late loading which are now surfacing because
late loading of the IB* microcodes addressing spectre issues has
become more widely used.
- Simplify and robustify the syscall handling in the entry code
- Prevent kprobes on the entry trampoline code which lead to kernel
crashes when the probe hits before CR3 is updated
- Don't check microcode versions when running on hypervisors as they
are considered as lying anyway.
- Fix the 32bit objtool build and a coment typo"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/kprobes: Fix kernel crash when probing .entry_trampoline code
x86/pti: Fix a comment typo
x86/microcode: Synchronize late microcode loading
x86/microcode: Request microcode on the BSP
x86/microcode/intel: Look into the patch cache first
x86/microcode: Do not upload microcode if CPUs are offline
x86/microcode/intel: Writeback and invalidate caches before updating microcode
x86/microcode/intel: Check microcode revision before updating sibling threads
x86/microcode: Get rid of struct apply_microcode_ctx
x86/spectre_v2: Don't check microcode versions when running under hypervisors
x86/vsyscall/64: Drop "native" vsyscalls
x86/entry/64/compat: Save one instruction in entry_INT80_compat()
x86/entry: Do not special-case clone(2) in compat entry
x86/syscalls: Use COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macros for x86-only compat syscalls
x86/syscalls: Use proper syscall definition for sys_ioperm()
x86/entry: Remove stale syscall prototype
x86/syscalls/32: Simplify $entry == $compat entries
objtool: Fix 32-bit build
Pull x86/pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Three fixes related to melted spectrum:
- Sync the cpu_entry_area page table to initial_page_table on 32 bit.
Otherwise suspend/resume fails because resume uses
initial_page_table and triggers a triple fault when accessing the
cpu entry area.
- Zero the SPEC_CTL MRS on XEN before suspend to address a
shortcoming in the hypervisor.
- Fix another switch table detection issue in objtool"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu_entry_area: Sync cpu_entry_area to initial_page_table
objtool: Fix another switch table detection issue
x86/xen: Zero MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL before suspend
The separation of the cpu_entry_area from the fixmap missed the fact that
on 32bit non-PAE kernels the cpu_entry_area mapping might not be covered in
initial_page_table by the previous synchronizations.
This results in suspend/resume failures because 32bit utilizes initial page
table for resume. The absence of the cpu_entry_area mapping results in a
triple fault, aka. insta reboot.
With PAE enabled this works by chance because the PGD entry which covers
the fixmap and other parts incindentally provides the cpu_entry_area
mapping as well.
Synchronize the initial page table after setting up the cpu entry
area. Instead of adding yet another copy of the same code, move it to a
function and invoke it from the various places.
It needs to be investigated if the existing calls in setup_arch() and
setup_per_cpu_areas() can be replaced by the later invocation from
setup_cpu_entry_areas(), but that's beyond the scope of this fix.
Fixes: 92a0f81d89 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
Reported-by: Woody Suwalski <terraluna977@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Woody Suwalski <terraluna977@gmail.com>
Cc: William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1802282137290.1392@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Stack protection is not compatible with early boot code. All of the early
SME boot code is now isolated in a separate file, mem_encrypt_identity.c,
so arch/x86/mm/Makefile can be updated to turn off stack protection for
the entire file. This eliminates the need to worry about other functions
within the file being instrumented with stack protection (as was seen
when a newer version of GCC instrumented sme_encrypt_kernel() where an
older version hadn't). It also allows removal of the __nostackprotector
attribute from individual functions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226232554.14108.16881.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another pile of melted spectrum related changes:
- sanitize the array_index_nospec protection mechanism: Remove the
overengineered array_index_nospec_mask_check() magic and allow
const-qualified types as index to avoid temporary storage in a
non-const local variable.
- make the microcode loader more robust by properly propagating error
codes. Provide information about new feature bits after micro code
was updated so administrators can act upon.
- optimizations of the entry ASM code which reduce code footprint and
make the code simpler and faster.
- fix the {pmd,pud}_{set,clear}_flags() implementations to work
properly on paravirt kernels by removing the address translation
operations.
- revert the harmful vmexit_fill_RSB() optimization
- use IBRS around firmware calls
- teach objtool about retpolines and add annotations for indirect
jumps and calls.
- explicitly disable jumplabel patching in __init code and handle
patching failures properly instead of silently ignoring them.
- remove indirect paravirt calls for writing the speculation control
MSR as these calls are obviously proving the same attack vector
which is tried to be mitigated.
- a few small fixes which address build issues with recent compiler
and assembler versions"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
KVM/VMX: Optimize vmx_vcpu_run() and svm_vcpu_run() by marking the RDMSR path as unlikely()
KVM/x86: Remove indirect MSR op calls from SPEC_CTRL
objtool, retpolines: Integrate objtool with retpoline support more closely
x86/entry/64: Simplify ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
extable: Make init_kernel_text() global
jump_label: Warn on failed jump_label patching attempt
jump_label: Explicitly disable jump labels in __init code
x86/entry/64: Open-code switch_to_thread_stack()
x86/entry/64: Move ASM_CLAC to interrupt_entry()
x86/entry/64: Remove 'interrupt' macro
x86/entry/64: Move the switch_to_thread_stack() call to interrupt_entry()
x86/entry/64: Move ENTER_IRQ_STACK from interrupt macro to interrupt_entry
x86/entry/64: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from interrupt macro to helper function
x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP
objtool: Add module specific retpoline rules
objtool: Add retpoline validation
objtool: Use existing global variables for options
x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute()
x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()
x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls
...
Using just the leaf page table entry flags would cause a false warning
in case _PAGE_RW is clear or _PAGE_NX is set in a higher level entry.
Hand through both the current entry's flags as well as the accumulated
effective value (the latter as pgprotval_t instead of pgprot_t, as it's
not an actual entry's value).
This in particular eliminates the false W+X warning when running under
Xen, as commit:
2cc42bac1c ("x86-64/Xen: eliminate W+X mappings")
had to make the necessary adjustment in L2 rather than L1 (the reason is
explained there). I.e. _PAGE_RW is clear there in L1, but _PAGE_NX is
set in L2.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A8FDE8902000078001AABBB@prv-mh.provo.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This is boot code and thus Spectre-safe: we run this _way_ before userspace
comes along to have a chance to poison our branch predictor.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner
Dave Hansen
Rik van Riel
Peter Zijlstra
Kees Cook
Lianbo Jiang
Ingo Molnar
Takuya Yamamoto
Jiri Kosina
Sai Praneeth
Eric W. Biederman
Feng Tang
Brijesh Singh
Andy Lutomirski
Nadav Amit
Juergen Gross
Jann Horn
Randy Dunlap
LuckTony
Linus Torvalds
Vlastimil Babka
Dan Williams
Souptick Joarder
Adrian Hunter
Alexander Shishkin
Joerg Roedel
Andi Kleen
Nicolai Stange
Chengguang Xu
zhong jiang
Jiang Biao
Toshi Kani
Chintan Pandya
Dmitry Vyukov
mike.travis@hpe.com
Stefan Agner
Matthew Wilcox
Kirill A. Shutemov
Joe Perches
Borislav Petkov
Joerg Roedel
Pavel Tatashin
David Rientjes
Christoph Hellwig
Seunghun Han
Tom Lendacky
Jan Beulich