The following build error for powerpc64 was reported by Nathan Chancellor:
"$ scripts/config --file arch/powerpc/configs/powernv_defconfig -e KERNEL_XZ
$ make -skj"$(nproc)" ARCH=powerpc CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64le-linux- distclean powernv_defconfig zImage
...
In file included from arch/powerpc/boot/../../../lib/decompress_unxz.c:234,
from arch/powerpc/boot/decompress.c:38:
arch/powerpc/boot/../../../lib/xz/xz_dec_stream.c: In function 'dec_main':
arch/powerpc/boot/../../../lib/xz/xz_dec_stream.c:586:4: error: 'fallthrough' undeclared (first use in this function)
586 | fallthrough;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
This will end up affecting distribution configurations such as Debian
and OpenSUSE according to my testing. I am not sure what the solution
is, the PowerPC wrapper does not set -D__KERNEL__ so I am not sure
that compiler_attributes.h can be safely included."
In order to avoid these sort of problems, it seems that the best
solution is to use /* fall through */ comments instead of the
fallthrough pseudo-keyword macro in lib/, for now.
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Fixes: df561f6688 ("treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch aims to suppress up to 18 missing-break-in-switch false
positives on some architectures.
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
HalfSipHash, or hsiphash, is a shortened version of SipHash, which
generates 32-bit outputs using a weaker 64-bit key. It has *much* lower
security margins, and shouldn't be used for anything too sensitive, but
it could be used as a hashtable key function replacement, if the output
is never exposed, and if the security requirement is not too high.
The goal is to make this something that performance-critical jhash users
would be willing to use.
On 64-bit machines, HalfSipHash1-3 is slower than SipHash1-3, so we alias
SipHash1-3 to HalfSipHash1-3 on those systems.
64-bit x86_64:
[ 0.509409] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 4049181
[ 0.510650] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 2512884
[ 0.512205] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3429920
[ 0.512904] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 978267
So, we map hsiphash() -> SipHash1-3
32-bit x86:
[ 0.509868] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 14812892
[ 0.513601] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 9510710
[ 0.515263] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3856157
[ 0.515952] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 1148567
So, we map hsiphash() -> HalfSipHash1-3
hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(), but comes with a
considerable security improvement.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Stephen Rothwell
Jason A. Donenfeld