ext4 and f2fs have duplicated the guts of the readahead code so they can
read past i_size. Instead, separate out the guts of the readahead code
so they can call it directly.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Cc: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25@huawei.com>
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414150233.24495-14-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When fs-verity verifies data pages, currently it reads each Merkle tree
page synchronously using read_mapping_page().
Therefore, when the Merkle tree pages aren't already cached, fs-verity
causes an extra 4 KiB I/O request for every 512 KiB of data (assuming
that the Merkle tree uses SHA-256 and 4 KiB blocks). This results in
more I/O requests and performance loss than is strictly necessary.
Therefore, implement readahead of the Merkle tree pages.
For simplicity, we take advantage of the fact that the kernel already
does readahead of the file's *data*, just like it does for any other
file. Due to this, we don't really need a separate readahead state
(struct file_ra_state) just for the Merkle tree, but rather we just need
to piggy-back on the existing data readahead requests.
We also only really need to bother with the first level of the Merkle
tree, since the usual fan-out factor is 128, so normally over 99% of
Merkle tree I/O requests are for the first level.
Therefore, make fsverity_verify_bio() enable readahead of the first
Merkle tree level, for up to 1/4 the number of pages in the bio, when it
sees that the REQ_RAHEAD flag is set on the bio. The readahead size is
then passed down to ->read_merkle_tree_page() for the filesystem to
(optionally) implement if it sees that the requested page is uncached.
While we're at it, also make build_merkle_tree_level() set the Merkle
tree readahead size, since it's easy to do there.
However, for now don't set the readahead size in fsverity_verify_page(),
since currently it's only used to verify holes on ext4 and f2fs, and it
would need parameters added to know how much to read ahead.
This patch significantly improves fs-verity sequential read performance.
Some quick benchmarks with 'cat'-ing a 250MB file after dropping caches:
On an ARM64 phone (using sha256-ce):
Before: 217 MB/s
After: 263 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 357 MB/s)
In an x86_64 VM (using sha256-avx2):
Before: 173 MB/s
After: 215 MB/s
(compare to sha256sum of non-verity file: 223 MB/s)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106205533.137005-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that
enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only
files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle
tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It
is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation.
The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of:
- Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity.
- Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an
inode and reading/writing the verity metadata.
- Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files
and to support reading verity metadata pages.
- Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support
writing verity metadata pages.
- Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl().
Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K
boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files
are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to
userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some
relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used
because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to
4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree
block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity
metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes
of the plaintext data.
Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Eric Biggers