Defining static shadow call stacks is not architecture-specific, so move
the DEFINE_SCS() macro into the core header file.
Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
There is nothing architecture-specific about scs_overflow_check() as
it's just a trivial wrapper around scs_corrupted().
For parity with task_stack_end_corrupted(), rename scs_corrupted() to
task_scs_end_corrupted() and call it from schedule_debug() when
CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK_is enabled, which better reflects its
purpose as a debug feature to catch inadvertent overflow of the SCS.
Finally, remove the unused scs_overflow_check() function entirely.
This has absolutely no impact on architectures that do not support SCS
(currently arm64 only).
Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Storing the SCS information in thread_info as a {base,offset} pair
introduces an additional load instruction on the ret-to-user path,
since the SCS stack pointer in x18 has to be converted back to an offset
by subtracting the base.
Replace the offset with the absolute SCS stack pointer value instead
and avoid the redundant load.
Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of
shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading
and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack
control flow by modifying the stacks.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
[will: Numerous cosmetic changes]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Will Deacon
Sami Tolvanen