There are non-root X.509 v3 certificates in use out there that contain
no Authority Key Identifier extension (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1). For
trust verification purposes the kernel asymmetric key type keeps two
struct asymmetric_key_id instances that the key can be looked up by,
and another two to look up the key's issuer. The x509 public key type
and the PKCS7 type generate them from the SKID and AKID extensions in
the certificate. In effect current code has no way to look up the
issuer certificate for verification without the AKID.
To remedy this, add a third asymmetric_key_id blob to the arrays in
both asymmetric_key_id's (for certficate subject) and in the
public_keys_signature's auth_ids (for issuer lookup), using just raw
subject and issuer DNs from the certificate. Adapt
asymmetric_key_ids() and its callers to use the third ID for lookups
when none of the other two are available. Attempt to keep the logic
intact when they are, to minimise behaviour changes. Adapt the
restrict functions' NULL-checks to include that ID too. Do not modify
the lookup logic in pkcs7_verify.c, the AKID extensions are still
required there.
Internally use a new "dn:" prefix to the search specifier string
generated for the key lookup in find_asymmetric_key(). This tells
asymmetric_key_match_preparse to only match the data against the raw
DN in the third ID and shouldn't conflict with search specifiers
already in use.
In effect implement what (2) in the struct asymmetric_key_id comment
(include/keys/asymmetric-type.h) is probably talking about already, so
do not modify that comment. It is also how "openssl verify" looks up
issuer certificates without the AKID available. Lookups by the raw
DN are unambiguous only provided that the CAs respect the condition in
RFC5280 4.2.1.1 that the AKID may only be omitted if the CA uses
a single signing key.
The following is an example of two things that this change enables.
A self-signed ceritficate is generated following the example from
https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificates-for-localhost/, and can be
looked up by an identifier and verified against itself by linking to a
restricted keyring -- both things not possible before due to the missing
AKID extension:
$ openssl req -x509 -out localhost.crt -outform DER -keyout localhost.key \
-newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 \
-subj '/CN=localhost' -extensions EXT -config <( \
echo -e "[dn]\nCN=localhost\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\n[EXT]\n" \
"subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\n" \
"extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth")
$ keyring=`keyctl newring test @u`
$ trusted=`keyctl padd asymmetric trusted $keyring < localhost.crt`; \
echo $trusted
39726322
$ keyctl search $keyring asymmetric dn:3112301006035504030c096c6f63616c686f7374
39726322
$ keyctl restrict_keyring $keyring asymmetric key_or_keyring:$trusted
$ keyctl padd asymmetric verified $keyring < localhost.crt
Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Previously, the ChaCha constants for the primary pool were only
initialized in crng_initialize_primary(), called by rand_initialize().
However, some randomness is actually extracted from the primary pool
beforehand, e.g. by kmem_cache_create(). Therefore, statically
initialize the ChaCha constants for the primary pool.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
In preparation for using blake2s in the RNG, we change the way that it
is wired-in to the build system. Instead of using ifdefs to select the
right symbol, we use weak symbols. And because ARM doesn't need the
generic implementation, we make the generic one default only if an arch
library doesn't need it already, and then have arch libraries that do
need it opt-in. So that the arch libraries can remain tristate rather
than bool, we then split the shash part from the glue code.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
When kernel.h is used in the headers it adds a lot into dependency hell,
especially when there are circular dependencies are involved.
Replace kernel.h inclusion with the list of what is really being used.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
SP800-108 defines three KDFs - this patch provides the counter KDF
implementation.
The KDF is implemented as a service function where the caller has to
maintain the hash / HMAC state. Apart from this hash/HMAC state, no
additional state is required to be maintained by either the caller or
the KDF implementation.
The key for the KDF is set with the crypto_kdf108_setkey function which
is intended to be invoked before the caller requests a key derivation
operation via crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate.
SP800-108 allows the use of either a HMAC or a hash as crypto primitive
for the KDF. When a HMAC primtive is intended to be used,
crypto_kdf108_setkey must be used to set the HMAC key. Otherwise, for a
hash crypto primitve crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate can be used immediately
after allocating the hash handle.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As a preparation to add the key derivation implementations, the
self-test data structure definition and the common test code is made
available.
The test framework follows the testing applied by the NIST CAVP test
approach.
The structure of the test code follows the implementations found in
crypto/testmgr.c|h. In case the KDF implementations will be made
available via a kernel crypto API templates, the test code is intended
to be merged into testmgr.c|h.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In contrast to the fully prediction resistant 'pr' DRBGs, the 'nopr'
variants get seeded once at boot and reseeded only rarely thereafter,
namely only after 2^20 requests have been served each. AFAICT, this
reseeding based on the number of requests served is primarily motivated
by information theoretic considerations, c.f. NIST SP800-90Ar1,
sec. 8.6.8 ("Reseeding").
However, given the relatively large seed lifetime of 2^20 requests, the
'nopr' DRBGs can hardly be considered to provide any prediction resistance
whatsoever, i.e. to protect against threats like side channel leaks of the
internal DRBG state (think e.g. leaked VM snapshots). This is expected and
completely in line with the 'nopr' naming, but as e.g. the
"drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512" implementation is potentially being used for
providing the "stdrng" and thus, the crypto_default_rng serving the
in-kernel crypto, it would certainly be desirable to achieve at least the
same level of prediction resistance as get_random_bytes() does.
Note that the chacha20 rngs underlying get_random_bytes() get reseeded
every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL == 5min: the secondary, per-NUMA node rngs from
the primary one and the primary rng in turn from the entropy pool, provided
sufficient entropy is available.
The 'nopr' DRBGs do draw randomness from get_random_bytes() for their
initial seed already, so making them to reseed themselves periodically from
get_random_bytes() in order to let them benefit from the latter's
prediction resistance is not such a big change conceptually.
In principle, it would have been also possible to make the 'nopr' DRBGs to
periodically invoke a full reseeding operation, i.e. to also consider the
jitterentropy source (if enabled) in addition to get_random_bytes() for the
seed value. However, get_random_bytes() is relatively lightweight as
compared to the jitterentropy generation process and thus, even though the
'nopr' reseeding is supposed to get invoked infrequently, it's IMO still
worthwhile to avoid occasional latency spikes for drbg_generate() and
stick to get_random_bytes() only. As an additional remark, note that
drawing randomness from the non-SP800-90B-conforming get_random_bytes()
only won't adversely affect SP800-90A conformance either: the very same is
being done during boot via drbg_seed_from_random() already once
rng_is_initialized() flips to true and it follows that if the DRBG
implementation does conform to SP800-90A now, it will continue to do so.
Make the 'nopr' DRBGs to reseed themselves periodically from
get_random_bytes() every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL == 5min.
More specifically, introduce a new member ->last_seed_time to struct
drbg_state for recording in units of jiffies when the last seeding
operation had taken place. Make __drbg_seed() maintain it and let
drbg_generate() invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() via
drbg_seed_from_random() if more than 5min have passed by since the last
seeding operation. Be careful to not to reseed if in testing mode though,
or otherwise the drbg related tests in crypto/testmgr.c would fail to
reproduce the expected output.
In order to keep the formatting clean in drbg_generate() wrap the logic
for deciding whether or not a reseed is due in a new helper,
drbg_nopr_reseed_interval_elapsed().
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG
instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG
implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn
schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has
sufficient entropy available.
For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in
the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is:
commit 16b369a91d ("random: Blocking API for accessing
nonblocking_pool")
commit 4c7879907e ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation")
commit 205a525c33 ("random: Add callback API for random pool
readiness")
commit 57225e6797 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random
readiness")
commit c2719503f5 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API")
However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes()
has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit
9a47249d44 ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now
allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by
replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from
random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in
drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart
from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG
users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial
seeding has completed, if desired.
The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to
record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when
rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by
->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL.
All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this
condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in
the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so.
Make this move:
- rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge
of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to
"drbg_seed_from_random()",
- change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct
drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from
"void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from
e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers,
- make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it
encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by
the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and
- prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based
mechanism.
As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with
the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it
once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now
drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now
report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily
switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a
failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to
drbg_generate(). Don't do it then.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from
random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from
get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available.
However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by
means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this
asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple
by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate()
once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true.
Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which
it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since
the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not
the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when
rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false.
As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation
of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full
reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as
well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL
state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a
!->pr DRBG variant.
Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for
representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when
rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state
implies that
- the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy
source (if enabled)
- and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes()
*only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true.
Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's
->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument
allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead.
Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate
value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller,
drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized()
is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new
argument to __drbg_seed().
There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in
drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which
had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to
false.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded
from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes().
At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have
collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG
implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once
that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG
instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered
during their lifetime.
Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive
operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work
restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense
amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full
(estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes()
once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself.
With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing
the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a
subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related
logic already present in drbg_generate().
However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy
source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes()
would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded
member must become a tristate value.
Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change
struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type.
For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain
two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true
resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A
third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy
only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch.
There is no change in behaviour at this point.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Export the following additional ECC helper functions:
- ecc_alloc_point()
- ecc_free_point()
- vli_num_bits()
- ecc_point_is_zero()
This is done to allow future ECC device drivers to re-use existing code,
thus simplifying their implementation.
Functions are exported using EXPORT_SYMBOL() (instead of
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()) to be consistent with the functions already
exported by crypto/ecc.c.
Exported functions are documented in include/crypto/internal/ecc.h.
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move ecc.h header file to 'include/crypto/internal' so that it can be
easily imported from everywhere in the kernel tree.
This change is done to allow crypto device drivers to re-use the symbols
exported by 'crypto/ecc.c', thus avoiding code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add KPP support to the crypto engine queue manager, so that it can be
used to simplify the logic of KPP device drivers as done for other
crypto drivers.
Signed-off-by: Prabhjot Khurana <prabhjot.khurana@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Algorithms:
- Add AES-NI/AVX/x86_64 implementation of SM4.
Drivers:
- Add Arm SMCCC TRNG based driver"
[ And obviously a lot of random fixes and updates - Linus]
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (84 commits)
crypto: sha512 - remove imaginary and mystifying clearing of variables
crypto: aesni - xts_crypt() return if walk.nbytes is 0
padata: Remove repeated verbose license text
crypto: ccp - Add support for new CCP/PSP device ID
crypto: x86/sm4 - add AES-NI/AVX2/x86_64 implementation
crypto: x86/sm4 - export reusable AESNI/AVX functions
crypto: rmd320 - remove rmd320 in Makefile
crypto: skcipher - in_irq() cleanup
crypto: hisilicon - check _PS0 and _PR0 method
crypto: hisilicon - change parameter passing of debugfs function
crypto: hisilicon - support runtime PM for accelerator device
crypto: hisilicon - add runtime PM ops
crypto: hisilicon - using 'debugfs_create_file' instead of 'debugfs_create_regset32'
crypto: tcrypt - add GCM/CCM mode test for SM4 algorithm
crypto: testmgr - Add GCM/CCM mode test of SM4 algorithm
crypto: tcrypt - Fix missing return value check
crypto: hisilicon/sec - modify the hardware endian configuration
crypto: hisilicon/sec - fix the abnormal exiting process
crypto: qat - store vf.compatible flag
crypto: qat - do not export adf_iov_putmsg()
...
SM4 library is abstracted from sm4-generic algorithm, sm4-ce can depend on
the SM4 library instead of sm4-generic, and some functions in sm4-generic
do not need to be exported.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Take the existing small footprint and mostly time invariant C code
and turn it into a SM4 library that can be used for non-performance
critical, casual use of SM4, and as a fallback for, e.g., SIMD code
that needs a secondary path that can be taken in contexts where the
SIMD unit is off limits.
Secondly, some codes have been optimized, such as unrolling small
times loop, removing unnecessary memory shifts, exporting sbox, fk,
ck arrays, and basic encryption and decryption functions.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it is now legal to call flush_dcache_page on slab pages we
no longer need to do the check in the Crypto API.
Reported-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The definitions for crypto_attr-related types and enums are not
needed by most Crypto API users. This patch moves them out of
crypto.h and into algapi.h/internal.h depending on the extent of
their use.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
According to the advice of Eric and Herbert, type CRYPTOA_U32
has been unused for over a decade, so remove the code related to
CRYPTOA_U32.
After removing CRYPTOA_U32, the type of the variable attrs can be
changed from union to struct.
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is implemented by testing whether the
.setkey() member of a struct shash_alg points to the default version,
called shash_no_setkey(). As crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is a static
inline, this requires shash_no_setkey() to be exported to modules.
Unfortunately, when building with CFI, function pointers are routed
via CFI stubs which are private to each module (or to the kernel proper)
and so this function pointer comparison may fail spuriously.
Let's fix this by turning crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() into an out of
line function.
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
gcc-11 points out a mismatch between the declaration and the definition
of poly1305_core_setkey():
lib/crypto/poly1305-donna32.c:13:67: error: argument 2 of type ‘const u8[16]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[16]’} with mismatched bound [-Werror=array-parameter=]
13 | void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_core_key *key, const u8 raw_key[16])
| ~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from lib/crypto/poly1305-donna32.c:11:
include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h:21:68: note: previously declared as ‘const u8 *’ {aka ‘const unsigned char *’}
21 | void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_core_key *key, const u8 *raw_key);
This is harmless in principle, as the calling conventions are the same,
but the more specific prototype allows better type checking in the
caller.
Change the declaration to match the actual function definition.
The poly1305_simd_init() is a bit suspicious here, as it previously
had a 32-byte argument type, but looks like it needs to take the
16-byte POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE array instead.
Fixes: 1c08a10436 ("crypto: poly1305 - add new 32 and 64-bit generic versions")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
On big endian CPUs, the ChaCha20-based CRNG is using the wrong
endianness for the ChaCha20 constants.
This doesn't matter cryptographically, but technically it means it's not
ChaCha20 anymore. Fix it to always use the standard constants.
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add the parameters for the NIST P384 curve and define a new curve ID
for it. Make the curve available in ecc_get_curve.
Summary of changes:
* crypto/ecc_curve_defs.h
- add nist_p384 params
* include/crypto/ecdh.h
- add ECC_CURVE_NIST_P384
* crypto/ecc.c
- change ecc_get_curve to accept nist_p384
Signed-off-by: Saulo Alessandre <saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
1. Add curve 25519 parameters in 'crypto/ecc_curve_defs.h';
2. Add curve25519 interface 'ecc_get_curve25519_param' in
'include/crypto/ecc_curve.h', to make its parameters be
exposed to everyone in kernel tree.
Signed-off-by: Meng Yu <yumeng18@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move 'ecc_get_curve' to 'include/crypto/ecc_curve.h', so everyone
in kernel tree can easily get ecc curve params;
Signed-off-by: Meng Yu <yumeng18@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
1. crypto and crypto/atmel-ecc:
Move curve id of ECDH from the key into the algorithm name instead
in crypto and atmel-ecc, so ECDH algorithm name change form 'ecdh'
to 'ecdh-nist-pxxx', and we cannot use 'curve_id' in 'struct ecdh';
2. crypto/testmgr and net/bluetooth:
Modify 'testmgr.c', 'testmgr.h' and 'net/bluetooth' to adapt
the modification.
Signed-off-by: Meng Yu <yumeng18@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Given that crypto_alloc_tfm() may return ERR pointers, and to avoid
crashes on obscure error paths where such pointers are presented to
crypto_destroy_tfm() (such as [0]), add an ERR_PTR check there
before dereferencing the second argument as a struct crypto_tfm
pointer.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/000000000000de949705bc59e0f6@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
Unlike many other structure types defined in the crypto API, the
'shash_desc' structure is permitted to live on the stack, which
implies its contents may not be accessed by DMA masters. (This is
due to the fact that the stack may be located in the vmalloc area,
which requires a different virtual-to-physical translation than the
one implemented by the DMA subsystem)
Our definition of CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR is based on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN,
which may take DMA constraints into account on architectures that support
non-cache coherent DMA such as ARM and arm64. In this case, the value is
chosen to reflect the largest cacheline size in the system, in order to
ensure that explicit cache maintenance as required by non-coherent DMA
masters does not affect adjacent, unrelated slab allocations. On arm64,
this value is currently set at 128 bytes.
This means that applying CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR to struct shash_desc is both
unnecessary (as it is never used for DMA), and undesirable, given that it
wastes stack space (on arm64, performing the alignment costs 112 bytes in
the worst case, and the hole between the 'tfm' and '__ctx' members takes
up another 120 bytes, resulting in an increased stack footprint of up to
232 bytes.) So instead, let's switch to the minimum SLAB alignment, which
does not take DMA constraints into account.
Note that this is a no-op for x86.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The akcipher.h header file was originally introduced in SM2, and
then the definition of SM2 was moved to the existing code. This
header file is left and should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
All dependencies on the x86 glue helper module have been replaced by
local instantiations of the new ECB/CBC preprocessor helper macros, so
the glue helper module can be retired.
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Sync the BLAKE2b code with the BLAKE2s code as much as possible:
- Move a lot of code into new headers <crypto/blake2b.h> and
<crypto/internal/blake2b.h>, and adjust it to be like the
corresponding BLAKE2s code, i.e. like <crypto/blake2s.h> and
<crypto/internal/blake2s.h>.
- Rename constants, e.g. BLAKE2B_*_DIGEST_SIZE => BLAKE2B_*_HASH_SIZE.
- Use a macro BLAKE2B_ALG() to define the shash_alg structs.
- Export blake2b_compress_generic() for use as a fallback.
This makes it much easier to add optimized implementations of BLAKE2b,
as optimized implementations can use the helper functions
crypto_blake2b_{setkey,init,update,final}() and
blake2b_compress_generic(). The ARM implementation will use these.
But this change is also helpful because it eliminates unnecessary
differences between the BLAKE2b and BLAKE2s code, so that the same
improvements can easily be made to both. (The two algorithms are
basically identical, except for the word size and constants.) It also
makes it straightforward to add a library API for BLAKE2b in the future
if/when it's needed.
This change does make the BLAKE2b code slightly more complicated than it
needs to be, as it doesn't actually provide a library API yet. For
example, __blake2b_update() doesn't really need to exist yet; it could
just be inlined into crypto_blake2b_update(). But I believe this is
outweighed by the benefits of keeping the code in sync.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Address the following checkpatch warning:
WARNING: Use #include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use the full path in the include guards for the BLAKE2s headers to avoid
ambiguity and to match the convention for most files in include/crypto/.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The first three fields of 'struct blake2s_state' are used in assembly
code, which isn't immediately obvious, so add a comment to this effect.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If no key was provided, then don't waste time initializing the block
buffer, as its initial contents won't be used.
Also, make crypto_blake2s_init() and blake2s() call a single internal
function __blake2s_init() which treats the key as optional, rather than
conditionally calling blake2s_init() or blake2s_init_key(). This
reduces the compiled code size, as previously both blake2s_init() and
blake2s_init_key() were being inlined into these two callers, except
when the key size passed to blake2s() was a compile-time constant.
These optimizations aren't that significant for BLAKE2s. However, the
equivalent optimizations will be more significant for BLAKE2b, as
everything is twice as big in BLAKE2b. And it's good to keep things
consistent rather than making optimizations for BLAKE2b but not BLAKE2s.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add helper functions for shash implementations of BLAKE2s to
include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h, taking advantage of
__blake2s_update() and __blake2s_final() that were added by the previous
patch to share more code between the library and shash implementations.
crypto_blake2s_setkey() and crypto_blake2s_init() are usable as
shash_alg::setkey and shash_alg::init directly, while
crypto_blake2s_update() and crypto_blake2s_final() take an extra
'blake2s_compress_t' function pointer parameter. This allows the
implementation of the compression function to be overridden, which is
the only part that optimized implementations really care about.
The new functions are inline functions (similar to those in sha1_base.h,
sha256_base.h, and sm3_base.h) because this avoids needing to add a new
module blake2s_helpers.ko, they aren't *too* long, and this avoids
indirect calls which are expensive these days. Note that they can't go
in blake2s_generic.ko, as that would require selecting CRYPTO_BLAKE2S
from CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86, which would cause a recursive dependency.
Finally, use these new helper functions in the x86 implementation of
BLAKE2s. (This part should be a separate patch, but unfortunately the
x86 implementation used the exact same function names like
"crypto_blake2s_update()", so it had to be updated at the same time.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move most of blake2s_update() and blake2s_final() into new inline
functions __blake2s_update() and __blake2s_final() in
include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h so that this logic can be shared by
the shash helper functions. This will avoid duplicating this logic
between the library and shash implementations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The cipher routines in the crypto API are mostly intended for templates
implementing skcipher modes generically in software, and shouldn't be
used outside of the crypto subsystem. So move the prototypes and all
related definitions to a new header file under include/crypto/internal.
Also, let's use the new module namespace feature to move the symbol
exports into a new namespace CRYPTO_INTERNAL.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch fixes a missing prototype warning on blake2s_selftest.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch moves the curve25519_selftest into curve25519.h so
we don't get a warning from gcc complaining about a missing
prototype.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add crypto_aead_driver_name(), which is analogous to
crypto_skcipher_driver_name().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Without the barrier_data() inside memzero_explicit(), the compiler may
optimize away the state-clearing if it can tell that the state is not
used afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The sm2 code was split out of public_key.c in a way that breaks
modular builds. This patch moves the code back into the same file
as the original motivation was to minimise ifdefs and that has
nothing to do with splitting the code out.
Fixes: 2155256396 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3...")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as
specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption
Management Bureau, China.
The method of generating Other User Information is defined as
ZA=H256(ENTLA || IDA || a || b || xG || yG || xA || yA), it also
specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.
The x509 certificate supports SM2-with-SM3 type certificate
verification. Because certificate verification requires ZA
in addition to tbs data, ZA also depends on elliptic curve
parameters and public key data, so you need to access tbs in sig
and calculate ZA. Finally calculate the digest of the
signature and complete the verification work. The calculation
process of ZA is declared in specifications GM/T 0009-2012
and GM/T 0003.2-2012.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This new module implement the SM2 public key algorithm. It was
published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China.
List of specifications for SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptography:
* GM/T 0003.1-2012
* GM/T 0003.2-2012
* GM/T 0003.3-2012
* GM/T 0003.4-2012
* GM/T 0003.5-2012
IETF: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
oscca: http://www.oscca.gov.cn/sca/xxgk/2010-12/17/content_1002386.shtml
scctc: http://www.gmbz.org.cn/main/bzlb.html
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Both crypto_sm3_update and crypto_sm3_finup have been
exported, exporting crypto_sm3_final, to avoid having to
use crypto_sm3_finup(desc, NULL, 0, dgst) to calculate
the hash in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Extend the user-space RNG interface:
1. Add entropy input via ALG_SET_DRBG_ENTROPY setsockopt option;
2. Add additional data input via sendmsg syscall.
This allows DRBG to be tested with test vectors, for example for the
purpose of CAVP testing, which otherwise isn't possible.
To prevent erroneous use of entropy input, it is hidden under
CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG_CAVP config option and requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN to
succeed.
Signed-off-by: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that crypto/cbc.h is only used by the generic cbc template,
we can merge it back into the CBC code.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch removes AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK which is unused.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds the helper ahash_alg_instance which is used to
convert a crypto_ahash object into its corresponding ahash_instance.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds the type-safe init_tfm/exit_tfm functions to the
ahash interface. This is meant to replace the unsafe cra_init and
cra_exit interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Revert "crypto: hash - Add real ahash walk interface"
This reverts commit 75ecb231ff.
The callers of the functions in this commit were removed in ab8085c130
Remove these unused calls.
Fixes: ab8085c130 ("crypto: x86 - remove SHA multibuffer routines and mcryptd")
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The header file algapi.h includes skbuff.h unnecessarily since
all we need is a forward declaration for struct sk_buff. This
patch removes that inclusion.
Unfortunately skbuff.h pulls in a lot of things and drivers over
the years have come to rely on it so this patch adds a lot of
missing inclusions that result from this.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch moves crypto_yield into internal.h as it's only used
by internal code such as skcipher. It also adds a missing inclusion
of sched.h which is required for cond_resched.
The header files in internal.h have been cleaned up to remove some
ancient junk and add some more specific inclusions.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
while to come. Changes include:
- Some new Chinese translations
- Progress on the battle against double words words and non-HTTPS URLs
- Some block-mq documentation
- More RST conversions from Mauro. At this point, that task is
essentially complete, so we shouldn't see this kind of churn again for a
while. Unless we decide to switch to asciidoc or something...:)
- Lots of typo fixes, warning fixes, and more.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a busy cycle for documentation - hopefully the busiest for a
while to come. Changes include:
- Some new Chinese translations
- Progress on the battle against double words words and non-HTTPS
URLs
- Some block-mq documentation
- More RST conversions from Mauro. At this point, that task is
essentially complete, so we shouldn't see this kind of churn again
for a while. Unless we decide to switch to asciidoc or
something...:)
- Lots of typo fixes, warning fixes, and more"
* tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (195 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: optionally treat warnings as errors
docs: ia64: correct typo
mailmap: add entry for <alobakin@marvell.com>
doc/zh_CN: add cpu-load Chinese version
Documentation/admin-guide: tainted-kernels: fix spelling mistake
MAINTAINERS: adjust kprobes.rst entry to new location
devices.txt: document rfkill allocation
PCI: correct flag name
docs: filesystems: vfs: correct flag name
docs: filesystems: vfs: correct sync_mode flag names
docs: path-lookup: markup fixes for emphasis
docs: path-lookup: more markup fixes
docs: path-lookup: fix HTML entity mojibake
CREDITS: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
docs: process: Add an example for creating a fixes tag
doc/zh_CN: add Chinese translation prefer section
doc/zh_CN: add clearing-warn-once Chinese version
doc/zh_CN: add admin-guide index
doc:it_IT: process: coding-style.rst: Correct __maybe_unused compiler label
futex: MAINTAINERS: Re-add selftests directory
...
Drop the doubled word "request" in a kernel-doc comment.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Drop the doubled word "in" in a comment.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Introduce a new algorithm flag CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY. If this
flag is set, then the driver allocates memory in its request routine.
Such drivers are not suitable for disk encryption because GFP_ATOMIC
allocation can fail anytime (causing random I/O errors) and GFP_KERNEL
allocation can recurse into the block layer, causing a deadlock.
For now, this flag is only implemented for some algorithm types. We
also assume some usage constraints for it to be meaningful, since there
are lots of edge cases the crypto API allows (e.g., misaligned or
fragmented scatterlists) that mean that nearly any crypto algorithm can
allocate memory in some case. See the comment for details.
Also add this flag to CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS so that when a template
is instantiated, this flag is set on the template instance if it is set
on any algorithm the instance uses.
Based on a patch by Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2006301414580.30526@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK is handled inconsistently. When it's requested
to be clear, some templates propagate that request to child algorithms,
while others don't.
It's apparently desired for NEED_FALLBACK to be propagated, to avoid
deadlocks where a module tries to load itself while it's being
initialized, and to avoid unnecessarily complex fallback chains where we
have e.g. cbc-aes-$driver falling back to cbc(aes-$driver) where
aes-$driver itself falls back to aes-generic, instead of cbc-aes-$driver
simply falling back to cbc(aes-generic). There have been a number of
fixes to this effect:
commit 89027579bc ("crypto: xts - Propagate NEED_FALLBACK bit")
commit d2c2a85cfe ("crypto: ctr - Propagate NEED_FALLBACK bit")
commit e6c2e65c70 ("crypto: cbc - Propagate NEED_FALLBACK bit")
But it seems that other templates can have the same problems too.
To avoid this whack-a-mole, just add NEED_FALLBACK to INHERITED_FLAGS so
that it's always inherited.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The flag CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is "inherited" in the sense that when a
template is instantiated, the template will have CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set if
any of the algorithms it uses has CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set.
We'd like to add a second flag (CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY) that gets
"inherited" in the same way. This is difficult because the handling of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is hardcoded everywhere. Address this by:
- Add CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS, which contains the set of flags that
have these inheritance semantics.
- Add crypto_algt_inherited_mask(), for use by template ->create()
methods. It returns any of these flags that the user asked to be
unset and thus must be passed in the 'mask' to crypto_grab_*().
- Also modify crypto_check_attr_type() to handle computing the 'mask'
so that most templates can just use this.
- Make crypto_grab_*() propagate these flags to the template instance
being created so that templates don't have to do this themselves.
Make crypto/simd.c propagate these flags too, since it "wraps" another
algorithm, similar to a template.
Based on a patch by Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2006301414580.30526@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The type and mask arguments to aead_geniv_alloc() are always 0, so
remove them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a function sha256() which computes a SHA-256 digest in one step,
combining sha256_init() + sha256_update() + sha256_final().
This is similar to how we also have blake2s().
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the fact that the x86 port does not support allocating objects
on the stack with an alignment that exceeds 8 bytes, we have a rather
ugly hack in the x86 code for ChaCha to ensure that the state array is
aligned to 16 bytes, allowing the SSE3 implementation of the algorithm
to use aligned loads.
Given that the performance benefit of using of aligned loads appears to
be limited (~0.25% for 1k blocks using tcrypt on a Corei7-8650U), and
the fact that this hack has leaked into generic ChaCha code, let's just
remove it.
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For a Linux server with NUMA, there are possibly multiple (de)compressors
which are either local or remote to some NUMA node. Some drivers will
automatically use the (de)compressor near the CPU calling acomp_alloc().
However, it is not necessarily correct because users who send acomp_req
could be from different NUMA node with the CPU which allocates acomp.
Just like kernel has kmalloc() and kmalloc_node(), here crypto can have
same support.
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitaly.wool@konsulko.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes
were needed:
- Adjust document and titles markups;
- Adjust numbered list markups;
- Add a comments markup for the Contents section;
- Add markups for literal blocks.
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
AEAD does not support partial requests so we must not wake up
while ctx->more is set. In order to distinguish between the
case of no data sent yet and a zero-length request, a new init
flag has been added to ctx.
SKCIPHER has also been modified to ensure that at least a block
of data is available if there is more data to come.
Fixes: 2d97591ef4 ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The locking in af_alg_release_parent is broken as the BH socket
lock can only be taken if there is a code-path to handle the case
where the lock is owned by process-context. Instead of adding
such handling, we can fix this by changing the ref counts to
atomic_t.
This patch also modifies the main refcnt to include both normal
and nokey sockets. This way we don't have to fudge the nokey
ref count when a socket changes from nokey to normal.
Credits go to Mauricio Faria de Oliveira who diagnosed this bug
and sent a patch for it:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200605161657.535043-1-mfo@canonical.com/
Reported-by: Brian Moyles <bmoyles@netflix.com>
Reported-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Fixes: 37f96694cf ("crypto: af_alg - Use bh_lock_sock in...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
<linux/cryptohash.h> sounds very generic and important, like it's the
header to include if you're doing cryptographic hashing in the kernel.
But actually it only includes the library implementation of the SHA-1
compression function (not even the full SHA-1). This should basically
never be used anymore; SHA-1 is no longer considered secure, and there
are much better ways to do cryptographic hashing in the kernel.
Remove this header and fold it into <crypto/sha.h> which already
contains constants and functions for SHA-1 (along with SHA-2).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently the simplest use of the shash API is to use
crypto_shash_digest() to digest a whole buffer. However, this still
requires allocating a hash descriptor (struct shash_desc). Many users
don't really want to preallocate one and instead just use a one-off
descriptor on the stack like the following:
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
int err;
desc->tfm = tfm;
err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, data, len, out);
shash_desc_zero(desc);
}
Wrap this in a new helper function crypto_shash_tfm_digest() that can be
used instead of the above.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The SHA-256 / SHA-224 library functions can't fail, so remove the
useless return value.
Also long as the declarations are being changed anyway, also fix some
parameter names in the declarations to match the definitions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
users may call crypto_has_acomp to confirm the existence of acomp before using
crypto_acomp APIs. Right now, many acomp have scomp backend, for example, lz4,
lzo, deflate etc. crypto_has_acomp will return false for them even though they
support acomp APIs.
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added support for batch requests, per crypto engine.
A new callback is added, do_batch_requests, which executes a
batch of requests. This has the crypto_engine structure as argument
(for cases when more than one crypto-engine is used).
The crypto_engine_alloc_init_and_set function, initializes
crypto-engine, but also, sets the do_batch_requests callback.
On crypto_pump_requests, if do_batch_requests callback is
implemented in a driver, this will be executed. The link between
the requests will be done in driver, if possible.
do_batch_requests is available only if the hardware has support
for multiple request.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added support for executing multiple requests, in parallel,
for crypto engine based on a retry mechanism.
If hardware was unable to execute a backlog request, enqueue it
back in front of crypto-engine queue, to keep the order
of requests.
A new variable is added, retry_support (this is to keep the
backward compatibility of crypto-engine) , which keeps track
whether the hardware has support for retry mechanism and,
also, if can run multiple requests.
If do_one_request() returns:
>= 0: hardware executed the request successfully;
< 0: this is the old error path. If hardware has support for retry
mechanism, the request is put back in front of crypto-engine queue.
For backwards compatibility, if the retry support is not available,
the crypto-engine will work as before.
If hardware queue is full (-ENOSPC), requeue request regardless
of MAY_BACKLOG flag.
If hardware throws any other error code (like -EIO, -EINVAL,
-ENOMEM, etc.) only MAY_BACKLOG requests are enqueued back into
crypto-engine's queue, since the others can be dropped.
The new crypto_engine_alloc_init_and_set function, initializes
crypto-engine, sets the maximum size for crypto-engine software
queue (not hardcoded anymore) and the retry_support variable
is set, by default, to false.
On crypto_pump_requests(), if do_one_request() returns >= 0,
a new request is send to hardware, until there is no space in
hardware and do_one_request() returns < 0.
By default, retry_support is false and crypto-engine will
work as before - will send requests to hardware,
one-by-one, on crypto_pump_requests(), and complete it, on
crypto_finalize_request(), and so on.
To support multiple requests, in each driver, retry_support
must be set on true, and if do_one_request() returns an error
the request must not be freed, since it will be enqueued back
into crypto-engine's queue.
When all drivers, that use crypto-engine now, will be updated for
retry mechanism, the retry_support variable can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add crypto_enqueue_request_head function that enqueues a
request in front of queue.
This will be used in crypto-engine, on error path. In case a request
was not executed by hardware, enqueue it back in front of queue (to
keep the order of requests).
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As the Jitter RNG provides an SP800-90B compliant noise source, use this
noise source always for the (re)seeding of the DRBG.
To make sure the DRBG is always properly seeded, the reseed threshold
is reduced to 1<<20 generate operations.
The Jitter RNG may report health test failures. Such health test
failures are treated as transient as follows. The DRBG will not reseed
from the Jitter RNG (but from get_random_bytes) in case of a health
test failure. Though, it produces the requested random number.
The Jitter RNG has a failure counter where at most 1024 consecutive
resets due to a health test failure are considered as a transient error.
If more consecutive resets are required, the Jitter RNG will return
a permanent error which is returned to the caller by the DRBG. With this
approach, the worst case reseed threshold is significantly lower than
mandated by SP800-90A in order to seed with an SP800-90B noise source:
the DRBG has a reseed threshold of 2^20 * 1024 = 2^30 generate requests.
Yet, in case of a transient Jitter RNG health test failure, the DRBG is
seeded with the data obtained from get_random_bytes.
However, if the Jitter RNG fails during the initial seeding operation
even due to a health test error, the DRBG will send an error to the
caller because at that time, the DRBG has received no seed that is
SP800-90B compliant.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since we're doing a static inline dispatch here, we normally branch
based on whether or not there's an arch implementation. That would have
been fine in general, except the crypto Makefile prior used to turn
things off -- despite the Kconfig -- resulting in us needing to also
hard code various assembler things into the dispatcher too. The horror!
Now that the assembler config options are done by Kconfig, we can get
rid of the inconsistency.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Fix out-of-sync IVs in self-test for IPsec AEAD algorithms
Algorithms:
- Use formally verified implementation of x86/curve25519
Drivers:
- Enhance hwrng support in caam
- Use crypto_engine for skcipher/aead/rsa/hash in caam
- Add Xilinx AES driver
- Add uacce driver
- Register zip engine to uacce in hisilicon
- Add support for OCTEON TX CPT engine in marvell"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
crypto: af_alg - bool type cosmetics
crypto: arm[64]/poly1305 - add artifact to .gitignore files
crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes
crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
bus: fsl-mc: add api to retrieve mc version
crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization
crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed
crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation
crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization
crypto: caam - allocate RNG instantiation descriptor with GFP_DMA
crypto: ccree - remove duplicated include from cc_aead.c
crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'adap'
crypto: marvell - enable OcteonTX cpt options for build
crypto: marvell - add the Virtual Function driver for CPT
crypto: marvell - add support for OCTEON TX CPT engine
crypto: marvell - create common Kconfig and Makefile for Marvell
crypto: arm/neon - memzero_explicit aes-cbc key
crypto: bcm - Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow
crypto: atmel-i2c - Fix wakeup fail
...
Properly document the scatterlist layout for AEAD ciphers.
Reported-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo array[];
};
By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.
Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:
"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some older version of GAS do not support the ADX instructions, similarly
to how they also don't support AVX and such. This commit adds the same
build-time detection mechanisms we use for AVX and others for ADX, and
then makes sure that the curve25519 library dispatcher calls the right
functions.
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
These two C implementations from Zinc -- a 32x32 one and a 64x64 one,
depending on the platform -- come from Andrew Moon's public domain
poly1305-donna portable code, modified for usage in the kernel. The
precomputation in the 32-bit version and the use of 64x64 multiplies in
the 64-bit version make these perform better than the code it replaces.
Moon's code is also very widespread and has received many eyeballs of
scrutiny.
There's a bit of interference between the x86 implementation, which
relies on internal details of the old scalar implementation. In the next
commit, the x86 implementation will be replaced with a faster one that
doesn't rely on this, so none of this matters much. But for now, to keep
this passing the tests, we inline the bits of the old implementation
that the x86 implementation relied on. Also, since we now support a
slightly larger key space, via the union, some offsets had to be fixed
up.
Nonce calculation was folded in with the emit function, to take
advantage of 64x64 arithmetic. However, Adiantum appeared to rely on no
nonce handling in emit, so this path was conditionalized. We also
introduced a new struct, poly1305_core_key, to represent the precise
amount of space that particular implementation uses.
Testing with kbench9000, depending on the CPU, the update function for
the 32x32 version has been improved by 4%-7%, and for the 64x64 by
19%-30%. The 32x32 gains are small, but I think there's great value in
having a parallel implementation to the 64x64 one so that the two can be
compared side-by-side as nice stand-alone units.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all templates provide a ->create() method which creates an
instance, installs a strongly-typed ->free() method directly to it, and
registers it, the older ->alloc() and ->free() methods in
'struct crypto_template' are no longer used. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert shash_free_instance() and its users to the new way of freeing
instances, where a ->free() method is installed to the instance struct
itself. This replaces the weakly-typed method crypto_template::free().
This will allow removing support for the old way of freeing instances.
Also give shash_free_instance() a more descriptive name to reflect that
it's only for instances with a single spawn, not for any instance.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the "seqiv" template to the new way of freeing instances where a
->free() method is installed to the instance struct itself. Also remove
the unused implementation of the old way of freeing instances from the
"echainiv" template, since it's already using the new way too.
In doing this, also simplify the code by making the helper function
aead_geniv_alloc() install the ->free() method, instead of making seqiv
and echainiv do this themselves. This is analogous to how
skcipher_alloc_instance_simple() works.
This will allow removing support for the old way of freeing instances.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add support to shash and ahash for the new way of freeing instances
(already used for skcipher, aead, and akcipher) where a ->free() method
is installed to the instance struct itself. These methods are more
strongly-typed than crypto_template::free(), which they replace.
This will allow removing support for the old way of freeing instances.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that crypto_init_spawn() is only called by crypto_grab_spawn(),
simplify things by moving its functionality into crypto_grab_spawn().
In the process of doing this, also be more consistent about when the
spawn and instance are updated, and remove the crypto_spawn::dropref
flag since now it's always set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all the templates that need ahash spawns have been converted to
use crypto_grab_ahash() rather than look up the algorithm directly,
crypto_ahash_type is no longer used outside of ahash.c. Make it static.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove lots of helper functions that were previously used for
instantiating crypto templates, but are now unused:
- crypto_get_attr_alg() and similar functions looked up an inner
algorithm directly from a template parameter. These were replaced
with getting the algorithm's name, then calling crypto_grab_*().
- crypto_init_spawn2() and similar functions initialized a spawn, given
an algorithm. Similarly, these were replaced with crypto_grab_*().
- crypto_alloc_instance() and similar functions allocated an instance
with a single spawn, given the inner algorithm. These aren't useful
anymore since crypto_grab_*() need the instance allocated first.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all users of single-block cipher spawns have been converted to
use 'struct crypto_cipher_spawn' rather than the less specifically typed
'struct crypto_spawn', make crypto_spawn_cipher() take a pointer to a
'struct crypto_cipher_spawn' rather than a 'struct crypto_spawn'.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Make skcipher_alloc_instance_simple() use the new function
crypto_grab_cipher() to initialize its cipher spawn.
This is needed to make all spawns be initialized in a consistent way.
Also simplify the error handling by taking advantage of crypto_drop_*()
now accepting (as a no-op) spawns that haven't been initialized yet, and
by taking advantage of crypto_grab_*() now handling ERR_PTR() names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, "cipher" (single-block cipher) spawns are usually initialized
by using crypto_get_attr_alg() to look up the algorithm, then calling
crypto_init_spawn(). In one case, crypto_grab_spawn() is used directly.
The former way is different from how skcipher, aead, and akcipher spawns
are initialized (they use crypto_grab_*()), and for no good reason.
This difference introduces unnecessary complexity.
The crypto_grab_*() functions used to have some problems, like not
holding a reference to the algorithm and requiring the caller to
initialize spawn->base.inst. But those problems are fixed now.
Also, the cipher spawns are not strongly typed; e.g., the API requires
that the user manually specify the flags CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER and
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK. Though the "cipher" algorithm type itself isn't
yet strongly typed, we can start by making the spawns strongly typed.
So, let's introduce a new 'struct crypto_cipher_spawn', and functions
crypto_grab_cipher() and crypto_drop_cipher() to grab and drop them.
Later patches will convert all cipher spawns to use these, then make
crypto_spawn_cipher() take 'struct crypto_cipher_spawn' as well, instead
of a bare 'struct crypto_spawn' as it currently does.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, ahash spawns are initialized by using ahash_attr_alg() or
crypto_find_alg() to look up the ahash algorithm, then calling
crypto_init_ahash_spawn().
This is different from how skcipher, aead, and akcipher spawns are
initialized (they use crypto_grab_*()), and for no good reason. This
difference introduces unnecessary complexity.
The crypto_grab_*() functions used to have some problems, like not
holding a reference to the algorithm and requiring the caller to
initialize spawn->base.inst. But those problems are fixed now.
So, let's introduce crypto_grab_ahash() so that we can convert all
templates to the same way of initializing their spawns.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, shash spawns are initialized by using shash_attr_alg() or
crypto_alg_mod_lookup() to look up the shash algorithm, then calling
crypto_init_shash_spawn().
This is different from how skcipher, aead, and akcipher spawns are
initialized (they use crypto_grab_*()), and for no good reason. This
difference introduces unnecessary complexity.
The crypto_grab_*() functions used to have some problems, like not
holding a reference to the algorithm and requiring the caller to
initialize spawn->base.inst. But those problems are fixed now.
So, let's introduce crypto_grab_shash() so that we can convert all
templates to the same way of initializing their spawns.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, crypto_spawn::inst is first used temporarily to pass the
instance to crypto_grab_spawn(). Then crypto_init_spawn() overwrites it
with crypto_spawn::next, which shares the same union. Finally,
crypto_spawn::inst is set again when the instance is registered.
Make this less convoluted by just passing the instance as an argument to
crypto_grab_spawn() instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Initializing a crypto_akcipher_spawn currently requires:
1. Set spawn->base.inst to point to the instance.
2. Call crypto_grab_akcipher().
But there's no reason for these steps to be separate, and in fact this
unneeded complication has caused at least one bug, the one fixed by
commit 6db4341017 ("crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst")
So just make crypto_grab_akcipher() take the instance as an argument.
To keep the function call from getting too unwieldy due to this extra
argument, also introduce a 'mask' variable into pkcs1pad_create().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Initializing a crypto_aead_spawn currently requires:
1. Set spawn->base.inst to point to the instance.
2. Call crypto_grab_aead().
But there's no reason for these steps to be separate, and in fact this
unneeded complication has caused at least one bug, the one fixed by
commit 6db4341017 ("crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst")
So just make crypto_grab_aead() take the instance as an argument.
To keep the function calls from getting too unwieldy due to this extra
argument, also introduce a 'mask' variable into the affected places
which weren't already using one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Initializing a crypto_skcipher_spawn currently requires:
1. Set spawn->base.inst to point to the instance.
2. Call crypto_grab_skcipher().
But there's no reason for these steps to be separate, and in fact this
unneeded complication has caused at least one bug, the one fixed by
commit 6db4341017 ("crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst")
So just make crypto_grab_skcipher() take the instance as an argument.
To keep the function calls from getting too unwieldy due to this extra
argument, also introduce a 'mask' variable into the affected places
which weren't already using one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Define struct ahash_instance in a way analogous to struct
skcipher_instance, struct aead_instance, and struct akcipher_instance,
where the struct is defined to include both the algorithm structure at
the beginning and the additional crypto_instance fields at the end.
This is needed to allow allocating ahash instances directly using
kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), ...) in the same way as skcipher,
aead, and akcipher instances. In turn, that's needed to make spawns be
initialized in a consistent way everywhere.
Also take advantage of the addition of the base instance to struct
ahash_instance by simplifying the ahash_crypto_instance() and
ahash_instance() functions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Define struct shash_instance in a way analogous to struct
skcipher_instance, struct aead_instance, and struct akcipher_instance,
where the struct is defined to include both the algorithm structure at
the beginning and the additional crypto_instance fields at the end.
This is needed to allow allocating shash instances directly using
kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), ...) in the same way as skcipher,
aead, and akcipher instances. In turn, that's needed to make spawns be
initialized in a consistent way everywhere.
Also take advantage of the addition of the base instance to struct
shash_instance by simplifying the shash_crypto_instance() and
shash_instance() functions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY flag was apparently meant as a way to make
the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
There are also no tests that verify that all algorithms actually set (or
don't set) it correctly.
This is also the last remaining CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flag, which means that
it's the only thing still needing all the boilerplate code which
propagates these flags around from child => parent tfms.
And if someone ever needs to distinguish this error in the future (which
is somewhat unlikely, as it's been unneeded for a long time), it would
be much better to just define a new return value like -EKEYREJECTED.
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
skcipher_walk_aead() is unused and is identical to
skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(), so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch introduces the skcipher_ialg_simple helper which fetches
the crypto_alg structure from a simple skcipher instance's spawn.
This allows us to remove the third argument from the function
skcipher_alloc_instance_simple.
In doing so the reference count to the algorithm is now maintained
by the Crypto API and the caller no longer needs to drop the alg
refcount.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch changes crypto_grab_spawn to retain the reference count
on the algorithm. This is because the caller needs to access the
algorithm parameters and without the reference count the algorithm
can be freed at any time.
The reference count will be subsequently dropped by the crypto API
once the instance has been registered. The helper crypto_drop_spawn
will also conditionally drop the reference count depending on whether
it has been registered.
Note that the code is actually added to crypto_init_spawn. However,
unless the caller activates this by setting spawn->dropref beforehand
then nothing happens. The only caller that sets dropref is currently
crypto_grab_spawn.
Once all legacy users of crypto_init_spawn disappear, then we can
kill the dropref flag.
Internally each instance will maintain a list of its spawns prior
to registration. This memory used by this list is shared with
other fields that are only used after registration. In order for
this to work a new flag spawn->registered is added to indicate
whether spawn->inst can be used.
Fixes: d6ef2f198d ("crypto: api - Add crypto_grab_spawn primitive")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some of the algorithm unregistration functions return -ENOENT when asked
to unregister a non-registered algorithm, while others always return 0
or always return void. But no users check the return value, except for
two of the bulk unregistration functions which print a message on error
but still always return 0 to their caller, and crypto_del_alg() which
calls crypto_unregister_instance() which always returns 0.
Since unregistering a non-registered algorithm is always a kernel bug
but there isn't anything callers should do to handle this situation at
runtime, let's simplify things by making all the unregistration
functions return void, and moving the error message into
crypto_unregister_alg() and upgrading it to a WARN().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch switches hmac over to the new init_tfm/exit_tfm interface
as opposed to cra_init/cra_exit. This way the shash API can make
sure that descsize does not exceed the maximum.
This patch also adds the API helper shash_alg_instance.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The shash interface supports a dynamic descsize field because of
the presence of fallbacks (it's just padlock-sha actually, perhaps
we can remove it one day). As it is the API does not verify the
setting of descsize at all. It is up to the individual algorithms
to ensure that descsize does not exceed the specified maximum value
of HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (going above would cause stack corruption).
In order to allow the API to impose this limit directly, this patch
adds init_tfm/exit_tfm hooks to the shash_alg structure. We can
then verify the descsize setting in the API directly.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently when a spawn is removed we will zap its alg field.
This is racy because the spawn could belong to an unregistered
instance which may dereference the spawn->alg field.
This patch fixes this by keeping spawn->alg constant and instead
adding a new spawn->dead field to indicate that a spawn is going
away.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Building with W=1 causes a warning:
CC [M] arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.o
In file included from arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c:10:
./include/crypto/internal/chacha.h:37:1: warning: 'inline' is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
37 | static int inline chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
| ^~~~~~
Straighten out the order to match the rest of the header file.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a helper function crypto_skcipher_min_keysize() to mirror
crypto_skcipher_max_keysize().
This will be used by the self-tests.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move crypto_aead_maxauthsize() to <crypto/aead.h> so that it's available
to users of the API, not just AEAD implementations.
This will be used by the self-tests.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The essiv and hmac templates refuse to use any hash algorithm that has a
->setkey() function, which includes not just algorithms that always need
a key, but also algorithms that optionally take a key.
Previously the only optionally-keyed hash algorithms in the crypto API
were non-cryptographic algorithms like crc32, so this didn't really
matter. But that's changed with BLAKE2 support being added. BLAKE2
should work with essiv and hmac, just like any other cryptographic hash.
Fix this by allowing the use of both algorithms without a ->setkey()
function and algorithms that have the OPTIONAL_KEY flag set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::decrypt is now redundant since it always equals
crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->decrypt.
Remove it and update crypto_skcipher_decrypt() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::encrypt is now redundant since it always equals
crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->encrypt.
Remove it and update crypto_skcipher_encrypt() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::setkey now always points to skcipher_setkey().
Simplify by removing this function pointer and instead just making
skcipher_setkey() be crypto_skcipher_setkey() directly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::keysize is now redundant since it always equals
crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->max_keysize.
Remove it and update crypto_skcipher_default_keysize() accordingly.
Also rename crypto_skcipher_default_keysize() to
crypto_skcipher_max_keysize() to clarify that it specifically returns
the maximum key size, not some unspecified "default".
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::ivsize is now redundant since it always equals
crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->ivsize.
Remove it and update crypto_skcipher_ivsize() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The crypto glue performed function prototype casting via macros to make
indirect calls to assembly routines. Instead of performing casts at the
call sites (which trips Control Flow Integrity prototype checking), switch
each prototype to a common standard set of arguments which allows the
removal of the existing macros. In order to keep pointer math unchanged,
internal casting between u128 pointers and u8 pointers is added.
Co-developed-by: João Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: João Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all users of the deprecated ablkcipher interface have been
moved to the skcipher interface, ablkcipher is no longer used and
can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reimplement the library routines to perform chacha20poly1305 en/decryption
on scatterlists, without [ab]using the [deprecated] blkcipher interface,
which is rather heavyweight and does things we don't really need.
Instead, we use the sg_miter API in a novel and clever way, to iterate
over the scatterlist in-place (i.e., source == destination, which is the
only way this library is expected to be used). That way, we don't have to
iterate over two scatterlists in parallel.
Another optimization is that, instead of relying on the blkcipher walker
to present the input in suitable chunks, we recognize that ChaCha is a
streamcipher, and so we can simply deal with partial blocks by keeping a
block of cipherstream on the stack and use crypto_xor() to mix it with
the in/output.
Finally, we omit the scatterwalk_and_copy() call if the last element of
the scatterlist covers the MAC as well (which is the common case),
avoiding the need to walk the scatterlist and kmap() the page twice.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This incorporates the chacha20poly1305 from the Zinc library, retaining
the library interface, but replacing the implementation with calls into
the code that already existed in the kernel's crypto API.
Note that this library API does not implement RFC7539 fully, given that
it is limited to 64-bit nonces. (The 96-bit nonce version that was part
of the selftest only has been removed, along with the 96-bit nonce test
vectors that only tested the selftest but not the actual library itself)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This contains two formally verified C implementations of the Curve25519
scalar multiplication function, one for 32-bit systems, and one for
64-bit systems whose compiler supports efficient 128-bit integer types.
Not only are these implementations formally verified, but they are also
the fastest available C implementations. They have been modified to be
friendly to kernel space and to be generally less horrendous looking,
but still an effort has been made to retain their formally verified
characteristic, and so the C might look slightly unidiomatic.
The 64-bit version comes from HACL*: https://github.com/project-everest/hacl-star
The 32-bit version comes from Fiat: https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto
Information: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
[ardb: - move from lib/zinc to lib/crypto
- replace .c #includes with Kconfig based object selection
- drop simd handling and simplify support for per-arch versions ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Wire up our newly added Blake2s implementation via the shash API.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The C implementation was originally based on Samuel Neves' public
domain reference implementation but has since been heavily modified
for the kernel. We're able to do compile-time optimizations by moving
some scaffolding around the final function into the header file.
Information: https://blake2.net/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
[ardb: - move from lib/zinc to lib/crypto
- remove simd handling
- rewrote selftest for better coverage
- use fixed digest length for blake2s_hmac() and rename to
blake2s256_hmac() ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the dependency on the generic Poly1305 driver. Instead, depend
on the generic library so that we only reuse code without pulling in
the generic skcipher implementation as well.
While at it, remove the logic that prefers the non-SIMD path for short
inputs - this is no longer necessary after recent FPU handling changes
on x86.
Since this removes the last remaining user of the routines exported
by the generic shash driver, unexport them and make them static.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Expose the existing generic Poly1305 code via a init/update/final
library interface so that callers are not required to go through
the crypto API's shash abstraction to access it. At the same time,
make some preparations so that the library implementation can be
superseded by an accelerated arch-specific version in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation of exposing a Poly1305 library interface directly from
the accelerated x86 driver, align the state descriptor of the x86 code
with the one used by the generic driver. This is needed to make the
library interface unified between all implementations.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the core Poly1305 routines shared between the generic Poly1305
shash driver and the Adiantum and NHPoly1305 drivers into a separate
library so that using just this pieces does not pull in the crypto
API pieces of the generic Poly1305 routine.
In a subsequent patch, we will augment this generic library with
init/update/final routines so that Poyl1305 algorithm can be used
directly without the need for using the crypto API's shash abstraction.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all users of generic ChaCha code have moved to the core library,
there is no longer a need for the generic ChaCha skcpiher driver to
export parts of it implementation for reuse by other drivers. So drop
the exports, and make the symbols static.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Wire the existing x86 SIMD ChaCha code into the new ChaCha library
interface, so that users of the library interface will get the
accelerated version when available.
Given that calls into the library API will always go through the
routines in this module if it is enabled, switch to static keys
to select the optimal implementation available (which may be none
at all, in which case we defer to the generic implementation for
all invocations).
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, our generic ChaCha implementation consists of a permute
function in lib/chacha.c that operates on the 64-byte ChaCha state
directly [and which is always included into the core kernel since it
is used by the /dev/random driver], and the crypto API plumbing to
expose it as a skcipher.
In order to support in-kernel users that need the ChaCha streamcipher
but have no need [or tolerance] for going through the abstractions of
the crypto API, let's expose the streamcipher bits via a library API
as well, in a way that permits the implementation to be superseded by
an architecture specific one if provided.
So move the streamcipher code into a separate module in lib/crypto,
and expose the init() and crypt() routines to users of the library.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all "blkcipher" algorithms have been converted to "skcipher",
remove the blkcipher algorithm type.
The skcipher (symmetric key cipher) algorithm type was introduced a few
years ago to replace both blkcipher and ablkcipher (synchronous and
asynchronous block cipher). The advantages of skcipher include:
- A much less confusing name, since none of these algorithm types have
ever actually been for raw block ciphers, but rather for all
length-preserving encryption modes including block cipher modes of
operation, stream ciphers, and other length-preserving modes.
- It unified blkcipher and ablkcipher into a single algorithm type
which supports both synchronous and asynchronous implementations.
Note, blkcipher already operated only on scatterlists, so the fact
that skcipher does too isn't a regression in functionality.
- Better type safety by using struct skcipher_alg, struct
crypto_skcipher, etc. instead of crypto_alg, crypto_tfm, etc.
- It sometimes simplifies the implementations of algorithms.
Also, the blkcipher API was no longer being tested.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_has_skcipher() and crypto_has_skcipher2() do the same thing: they
check for the availability of an algorithm of type skcipher, blkcipher,
or ablkcipher, which also meets any non-type constraints the caller
specified. And they have exactly the same prototype.
Therefore, eliminate the redundancy by removing crypto_has_skcipher()
and renaming crypto_has_skcipher2() to crypto_has_skcipher().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When algif_skcipher does a partial operation it always process data
that is a multiple of blocksize. However, for algorithms such as
CTR this is wrong because even though it can process any number of
bytes overall, the partial block must come at the very end and not
in the middle.
This is exactly what chunksize is meant to describe so this patch
changes blocksize to chunksize.
Fixes: 8ff590903d ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
After starting a skcipher walk, the only way to ensure that all
resources it has tied up are released is to complete it. In some
cases, it will be useful to be able to abort a walk cleanly after
it has started, so add this ability to the skcipher walk API.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
lib/crypto/sha256.c and include/crypto/sha256_base.h define
99% identical functions to init a sha256_state struct for sha224 or
sha256 use.
This commit moves the functions from lib/crypto/sha256.c to
include/crypto/sha.h (making them static inline) and makes the
sha224/256_base_init static inline functions from
include/crypto/sha256_base.h wrappers around the now also
static inline include/crypto/sha.h functions.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The generic sha256 implementation from lib/crypto/sha256.c uses data
structs defined in crypto/sha.h, so lets move the function prototypes
there too.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add sha224 support to the lib/crypto/sha256 library code. This will allow
us to replace both the sha256 and sha224 parts of crypto/sha256_generic.c
when we remove the code duplication in further patches in this series.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Before this commit lib/crypto/sha256.c has only been used in the s390 and
x86 purgatory code, make it suitable for generic use:
* Export interesting symbols
* Add -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS to CFLAGS_sha256.o for purgatory builds to
avoid the exports for the purgatory builds
* Add to lib/crypto/Makefile and crypto/Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Generic crypto implementations belong under lib/crypto not directly in
lib, likewise the header should be in include/crypto, not include/linux.
Note that the code in lib/crypto/sha256.c is not yet available for
generic use after this commit, it is still only used by the s390 and x86
purgatory code. Making it suitable for generic use is done in further
patches in this series.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Another one for the cipher museum: split off DES core processing into
a separate module so other drivers (mostly for crypto accelerators)
can reuse the code without pulling in the generic DES cipher itself.
This will also permit the cipher interface to be made private to the
crypto API itself once we move the only user in the kernel (CIFS) to
this library interface.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Andrew Zaborowski
Dominik Brodowski
Jason A. Donenfeld
Andy Shevchenko
Stephan Müller
Nicolai Stange
Daniele Alessandrelli
Prabhjot Khurana
Linus Torvalds
zhenwei pi
Tianjia Zhang
Herbert Xu
Liu Shixin
Ard Biesheuvel
Zhen Lei
Arnd Bergmann
Eric Biggers
Saulo Alessandre
Meng Yu
Arvind Sankar
Elena Petrova
Ira Weiny
Waiman Long
Randy Dunlap
Barry Song
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Iuliana Prodan
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Valdis Klētnieks
Kees Cook
Ard Biesheuvel
Hans de Goede