commit abfed87e2a upstream.
This is used by code that doesn't need CONFIG_CRYPTO, so move this into
lib/ with a Kconfig option so that it can be selected by whatever needs
it.
This fixes a linker error Zheng pointed out when
CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS!=y and CRYPTO=m:
lib/crypto/curve25519-selftest.o: In function `curve25519_selftest':
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x60): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0xec): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x114): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
curve25519-selftest.c:(.init.text+0x154): undefined reference to `__crypto_memneq'
Reported-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa127963f1 ("crypto: lib/curve25519 - re-add selftests")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 91e8bcd7b4 ]
The access to cryptd_queue::cpu_queue is synchronized by disabling
preemption in cryptd_enqueue_request() and disabling BH in
cryptd_queue_worker(). This implies that access is allowed from BH.
If cryptd_enqueue_request() is invoked from preemptible context _and_
soft interrupt then this can lead to list corruption since
cryptd_enqueue_request() is not protected against access from
soft interrupt.
Replace get_cpu() in cryptd_enqueue_request() with local_bh_disable()
to ensure BH is always disabled.
Remove preempt_disable() from cryptd_queue_worker() since it is not
needed because local_bh_disable() ensures synchronisation.
Fixes: 254eff7714 ("crypto: cryptd - Per-CPU thread implementation...")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 074bcd4000 upstream.
get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG
instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG
implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn
schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has
sufficient entropy available.
For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in
the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is:
commit 16b369a91d ("random: Blocking API for accessing
nonblocking_pool")
commit 4c7879907e ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation")
commit 205a525c33 ("random: Add callback API for random pool
readiness")
commit 57225e6797 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random
readiness")
commit c2719503f5 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API")
However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes()
has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit
9a47249d44 ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now
allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by
replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from
random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in
drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart
from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG
users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial
seeding has completed, if desired.
The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to
record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when
rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by
->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL.
All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this
condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in
the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so.
Make this move:
- rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge
of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to
"drbg_seed_from_random()",
- change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct
drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from
"void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from
e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers,
- make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it
encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by
the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and
- prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based
mechanism.
As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with
the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it
once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now
drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now
report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily
switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a
failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to
drbg_generate(). Don't do it then.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 262d83a429 upstream.
Since commit 42ea507fae ("crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is
degraded"), the maximum seed lifetime represented by ->reseed_threshold
gets temporarily lowered if the get_random_bytes() source cannot provide
sufficient entropy yet, as is common during boot, and restored back to
the original value again once that has changed.
More specifically, if the add_random_ready_callback() invoked from
drbg_prepare_hrng() in the course of DRBG instantiation does not return
-EALREADY, that is, if get_random_bytes() has not been fully initialized
at this point yet, drbg_prepare_hrng() will lower ->reseed_threshold
to a value of 50. The drbg_async_seed() scheduled from said
random_ready_callback will eventually restore the original value.
A future patch will replace the random_ready_callback based notification
mechanism and thus, there will be no add_random_ready_callback() return
value anymore which could get compared to -EALREADY.
However, there's __drbg_seed() which gets invoked in the course of both,
the DRBG instantiation as well as the eventual reseeding from
get_random_bytes() in aforementioned drbg_async_seed(), if any. Moreover,
it knows about the get_random_bytes() initialization state by the time the
seed data had been obtained from it: the new_seed_state argument introduced
with the previous patch would get set to DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL in case
get_random_bytes() had not been fully initialized yet and to
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL otherwise. Thus, __drbg_seed() provides a convenient
alternative for managing that ->reseed_threshold lowering and restoring at
a central place.
Move all ->reseed_threshold adjustment code from drbg_prepare_hrng() and
drbg_async_seed() respectively to __drbg_seed(). Make __drbg_seed()
lower the ->reseed_threshold to 50 in case its new_seed_state argument
equals DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL and let it restore the original value
otherwise.
There is no change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2bcd254438 upstream.
Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from
random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from
get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available.
However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by
means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this
asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple
by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate()
once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true.
Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which
it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since
the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not
the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when
rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false.
As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation
of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full
reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as
well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL
state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a
!->pr DRBG variant.
Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for
representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when
rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state
implies that
- the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy
source (if enabled)
- and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes()
*only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true.
Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's
->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument
allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead.
Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate
value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller,
drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized()
is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new
argument to __drbg_seed().
There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in
drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which
had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to
false.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ce8ce31b2c upstream.
There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded
from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes().
At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have
collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG
implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once
that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG
instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered
during their lifetime.
Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive
operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work
restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense
amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full
(estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes()
once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself.
With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing
the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a
subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related
logic already present in drbg_generate().
However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy
source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes()
would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded
member must become a tristate value.
Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change
struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type.
For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain
two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true
resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A
third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy
only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch.
There is no change in behaviour at this point.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e56e189855 upstream.
Commit 6048fdcc5f ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in") took
away a number of prompt texts from other crypto libraries. This makes
values flip from built-in to module when oldconfig runs, and causes
problems when these crypto libs need to be built in for thingslike
BIG_KEYS.
Fixes: 6048fdcc5f ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in")
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
[Jason: - moved menu into submenu of lib/ instead of root menu
- fixed chacha sub-dependencies for CONFIG_CRYPTO]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5acd35487d upstream.
We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only
has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard
atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also
unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional
builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification
handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but
given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this
anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the
simplification we receive here.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
[Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d2a02e3c8b upstream.
blake2s_compress_generic is weakly aliased by blake2s_compress. The
current harness for function selection uses a function pointer, which is
ordinarily inlined and resolved at compile time. But when Clang's CFI is
enabled, CFI still triggers when making an indirect call via a weak
symbol. This seems like a bug in Clang's CFI, as though it's bucketing
weak symbols and strong symbols differently. It also only seems to
trigger when "full LTO" mode is used, rather than "thin LTO".
[ 0.000000][ T0] Kernel panic - not syncing: CFI failure (target: blake2s_compress_generic+0x0/0x1444)
[ 0.000000][ T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.16.0-mainline-06981-g076c855b846e #1
[ 0.000000][ T0] Hardware name: MT6873 (DT)
[ 0.000000][ T0] Call trace:
[ 0.000000][ T0] dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x1dc
[ 0.000000][ T0] dump_stack_lvl+0xa8/0x11c
[ 0.000000][ T0] panic+0x194/0x464
[ 0.000000][ T0] __cfi_check_fail+0x54/0x58
[ 0.000000][ T0] __cfi_slowpath_diag+0x354/0x4b0
[ 0.000000][ T0] blake2s_update+0x14c/0x178
[ 0.000000][ T0] _extract_entropy+0xf4/0x29c
[ 0.000000][ T0] crng_initialize_primary+0x24/0x94
[ 0.000000][ T0] rand_initialize+0x2c/0x6c
[ 0.000000][ T0] start_kernel+0x2f8/0x65c
[ 0.000000][ T0] __primary_switched+0xc4/0x7be4
[ 0.000000][ T0] Rebooting in 5 seconds..
Nonetheless, the function pointer method isn't so terrific anyway, so
this patch replaces it with a simple boolean, which also gets inlined
away. This successfully works around the Clang bug.
In general, I'm not too keen on all of the indirection involved here; it
clearly does more harm than good. Hopefully the whole thing can get
cleaned up down the road when lib/crypto is overhauled more
comprehensively. But for now, we go with a simple bandaid.
Fixes: 6048fdcc5f ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1567
Reported-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6048fdcc5f upstream.
In preparation for using blake2s in the RNG, we change the way that it
is wired-in to the build system. Instead of using ifdefs to select the
right symbol, we use weak symbols. And because ARM doesn't need the
generic implementation, we make the generic one default only if an arch
library doesn't need it already, and then have arch libraries that do
need it opt-in. So that the arch libraries can remain tristate rather
than bool, we then split the shash part from the glue code.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit dfe085d8dc ]
The xts module needs ecb to be present as it's meant to work
on top of ecb. This patch adds a softdep so ecb can be included
automatically into the initramfs.
Reported-by: rftc <rftc@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 66eae85033 ]
The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags
argument and always relies on the flags from the original request
when starting its sub-request.
This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be
set when it shouldn't.
Fixes: 92d95ba917 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a24611ea35 upstream.
Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to
check that there are enough bytes remaining.
Fixes: a49de377e0 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d3481accd9 upstream.
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA
key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2).
Commit a49de377e0 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the
kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the
change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit.
Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct.
We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures
(which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given
that they would have been broken since commit c7381b0128
("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms").
Fixes: a49de377e0 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e316f7179b upstream.
Commit c7381b0128 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key
algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature
and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just
return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do
this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are
concatenated with each other in one scatterlist.
Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to
correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given.
Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where
the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the
signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix
of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*.
(Note, the case of a signature longer than the RSA key size should not
be allowed in the first place; a separate patch will fix that.)
It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security
properties.
Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist.
Fixes: c7381b0128 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9b30430ea3 upstream.
The pkcs1pad template can be instantiated with an arbitrary akcipher
algorithm, which doesn't make sense; it is specifically an RSA padding
scheme. Make it check that the underlying algorithm really is RSA.
Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 590bfb57b2 upstream.
It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature
encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably,
ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't
disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of
hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used).
Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature
algorithms, and is not supposed to vary.
Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by
software_key_determine_akcipher().
Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to
put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it
often determines everything else.
Fixes: 299f561a66 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
Fixes: 2155256396 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification")
Fixes: 0d7a78643f ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2abc9c246e upstream.
Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect
callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(),
don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches
public_key::pkey_algo. These should always match. However, a malicious
signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm. It is
essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the
algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as
that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used.
Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's
algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate. That's good.
However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do
the first step of SM2, which is incorrect. Also, v4.19 and older
kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process.
Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that
the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm.
Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c6ce9c5831 upstream.
The soft dependency on cryptomgr is only needed in algapi because
if algapi isn't present then no algorithms can be loaded. This
also fixes the case where api is built-in but algapi is built as
a module as the soft dependency would otherwise get lost.
Fixes: 8ab23d547f ("crypto: api - Add softdep on cryptomgr")
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 552d03a223 ]
The APT compares the current time stamp with a pre-set value. The
current code only considered the 4 LSB only. Yet, after reviews by
mathematicians of the user space Jitter RNG version >= 3.1.0, it was
concluded that the APT can be calculated on the 32 LSB of the time
delta. Thi change is applied to the kernel.
This fixes a bug where an AMD EPYC fails this test as its RDTSC value
contains zeros in the LSB. The most appropriate fix would have been to
apply a GCD calculation and divide the time stamp by the GCD. Yet, this
is a significant code change that will be considered for a future
update. Note, tests showed that constantly the GCD always was 32 on
these systems, i.e. the 5 LSB were always zero (thus failing the APT
since it only considered the 4 LSB for its calculation).
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 68b6dea802 ]
These three events can race when pcrypt is used multiple times in a
template ("pcrypt(pcrypt(...))"):
1. [taskA] The caller makes the crypto request via crypto_aead_encrypt()
2. [kworkerB] padata serializes the inner pcrypt request
3. [kworkerC] padata serializes the outer pcrypt request
3 might finish before the call to crypto_aead_encrypt() returns in 1,
resulting in two possible issues.
First, a use-after-free of the crypto request's memory when, for
example, taskA writes to the outer pcrypt request's padata->info in
pcrypt_aead_enc() after kworkerC completes the request.
Second, the outer pcrypt request overwrites the inner pcrypt request's
return code with -EINPROGRESS, making a successful request appear to
fail. For instance, kworkerB writes the outer pcrypt request's
padata->info in pcrypt_aead_done() and then taskA overwrites it
in pcrypt_aead_enc().
Avoid both situations by delaying the write of padata->info until after
the inner crypto request's return code is checked. This prevents the
use-after-free by not touching the crypto request's memory after the
next-inner crypto request is made, and stops padata->info from being
overwritten.
Fixes: 5068c7a883 ("crypto: pcrypt - Add pcrypt crypto parallelization wrapper")
Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3ae88f676a ]
Commit ad6d66bcac ("crypto: tcrypt - include 1420 byte blocks in aead and skcipher benchmarks")
mentions:
> power-of-2 block size. So let's add 1420 bytes explicitly, and round
> it up to the next blocksize multiple of the algo in question if it
> does not support 1420 byte blocks.
but misses updating skcipher multi-buffer tests.
Fix this by using the proper (rounded) input size.
Fixes: ad6d66bcac ("crypto: tcrypt - include 1420 byte blocks in aead and skcipher benchmarks")
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 38aa192a05 ]
The ecc.c file started out as part of the ECDH algorithm but got
moved out into a standalone module later. It does not build without
CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG, so now that other modules are using it as well we
can run into this link error:
aarch64-linux-ld: ecc.c:(.text+0xfc8): undefined reference to `crypto_default_rng'
aarch64-linux-ld: ecc.c:(.text+0xff4): undefined reference to `crypto_put_default_rng'
Move the 'select CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG' statement into the correct symbol.
Fixes: 0d7a78643f ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm")
Fixes: 4e6602916b ("crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Algorithms:
- Add AES-NI/AVX/x86_64 implementation of SM4.
Drivers:
- Add Arm SMCCC TRNG based driver"
[ And obviously a lot of random fixes and updates - Linus]
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (84 commits)
crypto: sha512 - remove imaginary and mystifying clearing of variables
crypto: aesni - xts_crypt() return if walk.nbytes is 0
padata: Remove repeated verbose license text
crypto: ccp - Add support for new CCP/PSP device ID
crypto: x86/sm4 - add AES-NI/AVX2/x86_64 implementation
crypto: x86/sm4 - export reusable AESNI/AVX functions
crypto: rmd320 - remove rmd320 in Makefile
crypto: skcipher - in_irq() cleanup
crypto: hisilicon - check _PS0 and _PR0 method
crypto: hisilicon - change parameter passing of debugfs function
crypto: hisilicon - support runtime PM for accelerator device
crypto: hisilicon - add runtime PM ops
crypto: hisilicon - using 'debugfs_create_file' instead of 'debugfs_create_regset32'
crypto: tcrypt - add GCM/CCM mode test for SM4 algorithm
crypto: testmgr - Add GCM/CCM mode test of SM4 algorithm
crypto: tcrypt - Fix missing return value check
crypto: hisilicon/sec - modify the hardware endian configuration
crypto: hisilicon/sec - fix the abnormal exiting process
crypto: qat - store vf.compatible flag
crypto: qat - do not export adf_iov_putmsg()
...
The function sha512_transform() assigns all local variables to 0 before
returning to its caller with the intent to erase sensitive data.
However, make clang-analyzer warns that all these assignments are dead
stores, and as commit 7a4295f6c9 ("crypto: lib/sha256 - Don't clear
temporary variables") already points out for sha256_transform():
The assignments to clear a through h and t1/t2 are optimized out by the
compiler because they are unused after the assignments.
Clearing individual scalar variables is unlikely to be useful, as they
may have been assigned to registers, and even if stack spilling was
required, there may be compiler-generated temporaries that are
impossible to clear in any case.
This applies here again as well. Drop meaningless clearing of local
variables and avoid this way that the code suggests that data is erased,
which simply does not happen.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like the implementation of AESNI/AVX, this patch adds an accelerated
implementation of AESNI/AVX2. In terms of code implementation, by
reusing AESNI/AVX mode-related codes, the amount of code is greatly
reduced. From the benchmark data, it can be seen that when the block
size is 1024, compared to AVX acceleration, the performance achieved
by AVX2 has increased by about 70%, it is also 7.7 times of the pure
software implementation of sm4-generic.
The main algorithm implementation comes from SM4 AES-NI work by
libgcrypt and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen at:
https://github.com/mjosaarinen/sm4ni
This optimization supports the four modes of SM4, ECB, CBC, CFB,
and CTR. Since CBC and CFB do not support multiple block parallel
encryption, the optimization effect is not obvious.
Benchmark on Intel i5-6200U 2.30GHz, performance data of three
implementation methods, pure software sm4-generic, aesni/avx
acceleration, and aesni/avx2 acceleration, the data comes from
the 218 mode and 518 mode of tcrypt. The abscissas are blocks of
different lengths. The data is tabulated and the unit is Mb/s:
block-size | 16 64 128 256 1024 1420 4096
sm4-generic
ECB enc | 60.94 70.41 72.27 73.02 73.87 73.58 73.59
ECB dec | 61.87 70.53 72.15 73.09 73.89 73.92 73.86
CBC enc | 56.71 66.31 68.05 69.84 70.02 70.12 70.24
CBC dec | 54.54 65.91 68.22 69.51 70.63 70.79 70.82
CFB enc | 57.21 67.24 69.10 70.25 70.73 70.52 71.42
CFB dec | 57.22 64.74 66.31 67.24 67.40 67.64 67.58
CTR enc | 59.47 68.64 69.91 71.02 71.86 71.61 71.95
CTR dec | 59.94 68.77 69.95 71.00 71.84 71.55 71.95
sm4-aesni-avx
ECB enc | 44.95 177.35 292.06 316.98 339.48 322.27 330.59
ECB dec | 45.28 178.66 292.31 317.52 339.59 322.52 331.16
CBC enc | 57.75 67.68 69.72 70.60 71.48 71.63 71.74
CBC dec | 44.32 176.83 284.32 307.24 328.61 312.61 325.82
CFB enc | 57.81 67.64 69.63 70.55 71.40 71.35 71.70
CFB dec | 43.14 167.78 282.03 307.20 328.35 318.24 325.95
CTR enc | 42.35 163.32 279.11 302.93 320.86 310.56 317.93
CTR dec | 42.39 162.81 278.49 302.37 321.11 310.33 318.37
sm4-aesni-avx2
ECB enc | 45.19 177.41 292.42 316.12 339.90 322.53 330.54
ECB dec | 44.83 178.90 291.45 317.31 339.85 322.55 331.07
CBC enc | 57.66 67.62 69.73 70.55 71.58 71.66 71.77
CBC dec | 44.34 176.86 286.10 501.68 559.58 483.87 527.46
CFB enc | 57.43 67.60 69.61 70.52 71.43 71.28 71.65
CFB dec | 43.12 167.75 268.09 499.33 558.35 490.36 524.73
CTR enc | 42.42 163.39 256.17 493.95 552.45 481.58 517.19
CTR dec | 42.49 163.11 256.36 493.34 552.62 481.49 516.83
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add support for using elliptic curve keys for signing modules. It uses
a NIST P384 (secp384r1) key if the user chooses an elliptic curve key
and will have ECDSA support built into the kernel.
Note: A developer choosing an ECDSA key for signing modules should still
delete the signing key (rm certs/signing_key.*) when building an older
version of a kernel that only supports RSA keys. Unless kbuild automati-
cally detects and generates a new kernel module key, ECDSA-signed kernel
modules will fail signature verification.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Replace the obsolete and ambiguos macro in_irq() with new
macro in_hardirq().
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
tcrypt supports GCM/CCM mode, CMAC, CBCMAC, and speed test of
SM4 algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The GCM/CCM mode of the SM4 algorithm is defined in the rfc 8998
specification, and the test case data also comes from rfc 8998.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There are several places where the return value check of crypto_aead_setkey
and crypto_aead_setauthsize were lost. It is necessary to add these checks.
At the same time, move the crypto_aead_setauthsize() call out of the loop,
and only need to call it once after load transform.
Fixee: 53f52d7aec ("crypto: tcrypt - Added speed tests for AEAD crypto alogrithms in tcrypt test suite")
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Don't use "/**" to begin a comment that is not kernel-doc notation.
crypto/wp512.c:779: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Refer Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst
* The core Whirlpool transform.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
ecdsa_set_pub_key() makes an u64 pointer at 1 byte offset of the key.
This results in an unaligned u64 pointer. This pointer is passed to
ecc_swap_digits() which assumes natural alignment.
This causes a kernel crash on an armv7 platform:
[ 0.409022] Unhandled fault: alignment exception (0x001) at 0xc2a0a6a9
...
[ 0.416982] PC is at ecdsa_set_pub_key+0xdc/0x120
...
[ 0.491492] Backtrace:
[ 0.492059] [<c07c266c>] (ecdsa_set_pub_key) from [<c07c75d4>] (test_akcipher_one+0xf4/0x6c0)
Handle unaligned input buffer in ecc_swap_digits() by replacing
be64_to_cpu() to get_unaligned_be64(). Change type of in pointer to
void to reflect it doesn’t necessarily need to be aligned.
Fixes: 4e6602916b ("crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification")
Reported-by: Guillaume Gardet <guillaume.gardet@arm.com>
Suggested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
tcrypt supports testing of SM4 cipher algorithms that use avx
instruction set acceleration. The implementation of sm4 instruction
set acceleration supports up to 8 blocks in parallel encryption and
decryption, which is 128 bytes. Therefore, the 128-byte block size
is also added to block_sizes.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds AES-NI/AVX/x86_64 assembler implementation of SM4
block cipher. Through two affine transforms, we can use the AES S-Box
to simulate the SM4 S-Box to achieve the effect of instruction
acceleration.
The main algorithm implementation comes from SM4 AES-NI work by
libgcrypt and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen at:
https://github.com/mjosaarinen/sm4ni
This optimization supports the four modes of SM4, ECB, CBC, CFB, and
CTR. Since CBC and CFB do not support multiple block parallel
encryption, the optimization effect is not obvious.
Benchmark on Intel Xeon Cascadelake, the data comes from the 218 mode
and 518 mode of tcrypt. The abscissas are blocks of different lengths.
The data is tabulated and the unit is Mb/s:
sm4-generic | 16 64 128 256 1024 1420 4096
ECB enc | 40.99 46.50 48.05 48.41 49.20 49.25 49.28
ECB dec | 41.07 46.99 48.15 48.67 49.20 49.25 49.29
CBC enc | 37.71 45.28 46.77 47.60 48.32 48.37 48.40
CBC dec | 36.48 44.82 46.43 47.45 48.23 48.30 48.36
CFB enc | 37.94 44.84 46.12 46.94 47.57 47.46 47.68
CFB dec | 37.50 42.84 43.74 44.37 44.85 44.80 44.96
CTR enc | 39.20 45.63 46.75 47.49 48.09 47.85 48.08
CTR dec | 39.64 45.70 46.72 47.47 47.98 47.88 48.06
sm4-aesni-avx
ECB enc | 33.75 134.47 221.64 243.43 264.05 251.58 258.13
ECB dec | 34.02 134.92 223.11 245.14 264.12 251.04 258.33
CBC enc | 38.85 46.18 47.67 48.34 49.00 48.96 49.14
CBC dec | 33.54 131.29 223.88 245.27 265.50 252.41 263.78
CFB enc | 38.70 46.10 47.58 48.29 49.01 48.94 49.19
CFB dec | 32.79 128.40 223.23 244.87 265.77 253.31 262.79
CTR enc | 32.58 122.23 220.29 241.16 259.57 248.32 256.69
CTR dec | 32.81 122.47 218.99 241.54 258.42 248.58 256.61
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
SM4 library is abstracted from sm4-generic algorithm, sm4-ce can depend on
the SM4 library instead of sm4-generic, and some functions in sm4-generic
do not need to be exported.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Take the existing small footprint and mostly time invariant C code
and turn it into a SM4 library that can be used for non-performance
critical, casual use of SM4, and as a fallback for, e.g., SIMD code
that needs a secondary path that can be taken in contexts where the
SIMD unit is off limits.
Secondly, some codes have been optimized, such as unrolling small
times loop, removing unnecessary memory shifts, exporting sbox, fk,
ck arrays, and basic encryption and decryption functions.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
With the swtich to use HMAC(SHA-512) as the default DRBG type, the
configuration must now also select SHA-512.
Fixes: 9b7b94683a "crypto: DRBG - switch to HMAC SHA512 DRBG as default
DRBG"
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
- Regression fix in drbg due to missing self-test for new default
algorithm
- Add ratelimit on user-triggerable message in qat
- Fix build failure due to missing dependency in sl3516
- Remove obsolete PageSlab checks
- Fix bogus hardware register writes on Kunpeng920 in hisilicon/sec
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: hisilicon/sec - fix the process of disabling sva prefetching
crypto: sl3516 - Add dependency on ARCH_GEMINI
crypto: sl3516 - Typo s/Stormlink/Storlink/
crypto: drbg - self test for HMAC(SHA-512)
crypto: omap - Drop obsolete PageSlab check
crypto: scatterwalk - Remove obsolete PageSlab check
crypto: qat - ratelimit invalid ioctl message and print the invalid cmd
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Algorithms:
- Fix rmmod crash with x86/curve25519
- Add ECDH NIST P384
- Generate assembly files at build-time with perl scripts on arm
- Switch to HMAC SHA512 DRBG as default DRBG
Drivers:
- Add sl3516 crypto engine
- Add ECDH NIST P384 support in hisilicon/hpre
- Add {ofb,cfb,ctr} over {aes,sm4} in hisilicon/sec
- Add {ccm,gcm} over {aes,sm4} in hisilicon/sec
- Enable omap hwrng driver for TI K3 family
- Add support for AEAD algorithms in qce"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (142 commits)
crypto: sl3516 - depends on HAS_IOMEM
crypto: hisilicon/qm - implement for querying hardware tasks status.
crypto: sl3516 - Fix build warning without CONFIG_PM
MAINTAINERS: update caam crypto driver maintainers list
crypto: nx - Fix numerous sparse byte-order warnings
crypto: nx - Fix RCU warning in nx842_OF_upd_status
crypto: api - Move crypto attr definitions out of crypto.h
crypto: nx - Fix memcpy() over-reading in nonce
crypto: hisilicon/sec - Fix spelling mistake "fallbcak" -> "fallback"
crypto: sa2ul - Remove unused auth_len variable
crypto: sl3516 - fix duplicated inclusion
crypto: hisilicon/zip - adds the max shaper type rate
crypto: hisilicon/hpre - adds the max shaper type rate
crypto: hisilicon/sec - adds the max shaper type rate
crypto: hisilicon/qm - supports to inquiry each function's QoS
crypto: hisilicon/qm - add pf ping single vf function
crypto: hisilicon/qm - merges the work initialization process into a single function
crypto: hisilicon/qm - add the "alg_qos" file node
crypto: hisilicon/qm - supports writing QoS int the host
crypto: api - remove CRYPTOA_U32 and related functions
...
Considering that the HMAC(SHA-512) DRBG is the default DRBG now, a self
test is to be provided.
The test vector is obtained from a successful NIST ACVP test run.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The definitions for crypto_attr-related types and enums are not
needed by most Crypto API users. This patch moves them out of
crypto.h and into algapi.h/internal.h depending on the extent of
their use.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
According to the advice of Eric and Herbert, type CRYPTOA_U32
has been unused for over a decade, so remove the code related to
CRYPTOA_U32.
After removing CRYPTOA_U32, the type of the variable attrs can be
changed from union to struct.
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is implemented by testing whether the
.setkey() member of a struct shash_alg points to the default version,
called shash_no_setkey(). As crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is a static
inline, this requires shash_no_setkey() to be exported to modules.
Unfortunately, when building with CFI, function pointers are routed
via CFI stubs which are private to each module (or to the kernel proper)
and so this function pointer comparison may fail spuriously.
Let's fix this by turning crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() into an out of
line function.
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
SM2 module alloc ec->Q in sm2_set_pub_key(), when doing alg test in
test_akcipher_one(), it will set public key for every test vector,
and don't free ec->Q. This will cause a memory leak.
This patch alloc ec->Q in sm2_ec_ctx_init().
Fixes: ea7ecb6644 ("crypto: sm2 - introduce OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When PAGE_SIZE is greater than 4kB, multiple stripes may share the same
page. Thus, src_offs is added to async_xor_offs() with array of offsets.
However, async_xor() passes NULL src_offs to async_xor_offs(). In such
case, src_offs should not be updated. Add a check before the update.
Fixes: ceaf2966ab08(async_xor: increase src_offs when dropping destination page)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Reported-by: Oleksandr Shchirskyi <oleksandr.shchirskyi@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Oleksandr Shchirskyi <oleksandr.shchirskyi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Replace open coded divisor calculations with the DIV_ROUND_UP kernel
macro for better readability.
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <wubo40@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add test vector params for NIST P384, add test vector for
NIST P384 on vector of tests.
Vector param from:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5903#section-3.1
Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Jason A. Donenfeld
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Vitaly Chikunov
Nicolai Stange
Justin M. Forbes
Herbert Xu
Eric Biggers
Stephan Müller
Daniel Jordan
Horia Geantă
Arnd Bergmann
Linus Torvalds
Lukas Bulwahn
Tianjia Zhang
Stefan Berger
Changbin Du
Randy Dunlap
Mian Yousaf Kaukab
Liu Shixin
Ard Biesheuvel
Hongbo Li
Xiao Ni
Wu Bo
Hui Tang