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Andy Lutomirski 58319057b7 capabilities: ambient capabilities
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn.  This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.

===== The status quo =====

On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel.  To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.

Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X).  When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE.  The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.

Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time.  If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.

Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities.  A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.

A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e.  the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value.  The rules are:

  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
  X is unchanged

For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior.  Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set).  For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.

As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.

This is rather messy.  We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.

===== The problem =====

Capability inheritance is basically useless.

If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'.  This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.

On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files.  This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works.  No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.

If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.

This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.

===== The proposed change =====

This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.

pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI.  Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA.  This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication.  Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities.  Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set.  Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.

The capability evolution rules are changed:

  pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
  X is unchanged

If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA.  If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE.  For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports.  Hallelujah!

Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees.  This is currently more or less
impossible.  Hallelujah!

You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.

Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability.  If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.

It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems.  Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities.  This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects.  (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route.  We can revisit this later.

An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities.  I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.

===== Footnotes =====

[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.

[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong.  fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit.  This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.

[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me.  The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.

Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2

Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):

/*
 * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
 * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
 *
 * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
 * Released under: GPL v3 or later.
 *
 *
 * Compile using:
 *
 *	gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
 *
 * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
 * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
 *
 * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
 *
 *	setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
 *
 *
 * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
 *
 *	./ambient_test /bin/bash
 *
 *
 * Verifying that it works:
 *
 * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
 *
 *	cat /proc/$$/status
 *
 * and have a look at the capabilities.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>

/*
 * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
 * when the /usr/include files have these defined.
 */
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4

static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
	int rc;

	capng_get_caps_process();
	rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
	if (rc) {
		printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
		exit(2);
	}
	capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);

	/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
	if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
		perror("Cannot set cap");
		exit(1);
	}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int rc;

	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);

	printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
	if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
		perror("Cannot exec");

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00
David Howells 0c903ab64f KEYS: Make the key matching functions return bool
Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool
rather than int.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16 17:36:08 +01:00
David Howells 462919591a KEYS: Preparse match data
Preparse the match data.  This provides several advantages:

 (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.

 (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
     asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).

 (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed.  This means
     that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.

 (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16 17:36:02 +01:00
Mimi Zohar c124bde28b KEYS: initialize root uid and session keyrings early
In order to create the integrity keyrings (eg. _evm, _ima), root's
uid and session keyrings need to be initialized early.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-25 17:17:01 +01:00
David Howells ccc3e6d9c9 KEYS: Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc()
Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 10:35:16 +01:00
David Howells 4bdf0bc300 KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied
with each call.  Introduce a search context structure to hold these.

Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search
should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all
keys looking for a non-description match.

This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic
routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed
through to the iterator callback function.

Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is
separated from the description pointer in the search context.  This makes it
clear which is being supplied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 10:35:15 +01:00
David Howells 61ea0c0ba9 KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession
Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
for possession.  Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.

This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6 reduced the
initial permissions granted to a key.

The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 10:35:13 +01:00
David Howells 0da9dfdd2c keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.

There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created.  It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.

Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.

	THREAD A			THREAD B
	===============================	===============================
					==>call install_user_keyrings();
	if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
	==>call install_user_keyrings()
					...
					user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
	if (user->uid_keyring)
		return 0;
	<==
	key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
					user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
	atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]

At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.

The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.

This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel.  However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.

Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-03-12 16:44:31 +11:00
Eric W. Biederman ba0e3427b0 userns: Stop oopsing in key_change_session_keyring
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> writes:
> Just hit this on Linus' current tree.
>
> [   89.621770] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8
> [   89.623111] IP: [<ffffffff810784b0>] commit_creds+0x250/0x2f0
> [   89.624062] PGD 122bfd067 PUD 122bfe067 PMD 0
> [   89.624901] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> [   89.625678] Modules linked in: caif_socket caif netrom bridge hidp 8021q garp stp mrp rose llc2 af_rxrpc phonet af_key binfmt_misc bnep l2tp_ppp can_bcm l2tp_core pppoe pppox can_raw scsi_transport_iscsi ppp_generic slhc nfnetlink can ipt_ULOG ax25 decnet irda nfc rds x25 crc_ccitt appletalk atm ipx p8023 psnap p8022 llc lockd sunrpc ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables btusb bluetooth snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm vhost_net snd_page_alloc snd_timer tun macvtap usb_debug snd rfkill microcode macvlan edac_core pcspkr serio_raw kvm_amd soundcore kvm r8169 mii
> [   89.637846] CPU 2
> [   89.638175] Pid: 782, comm: trinity-main Not tainted 3.8.0+ #63 Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. GA-MA78GM-S2H/GA-MA78GM-S2H
> [   89.639850] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810784b0>]  [<ffffffff810784b0>] commit_creds+0x250/0x2f0
> [   89.641161] RSP: 0018:ffff880115657eb8  EFLAGS: 00010207
> [   89.641984] RAX: 00000000000003e8 RBX: ffff88012688b000 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [   89.643069] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81c32960 RDI: ffff880105839600
> [   89.644167] RBP: ffff880115657ed8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> [   89.645254] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff880105839600
> [   89.646340] R13: ffff88011beea490 R14: ffff88011beea490 R15: 0000000000000000
> [   89.647431] FS:  00007f3ac063b740(0000) GS:ffff88012b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [   89.648660] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> [   89.649548] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 0000000122bfc000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
> [   89.650635] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> [   89.651723] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> [   89.652812] Process trinity-main (pid: 782, threadinfo ffff880115656000, task ffff88011beea490)
> [   89.654128] Stack:
> [   89.654433]  0000000000000000 ffff8801058396a0 ffff880105839600 ffff88011beeaa78
> [   89.655769]  ffff880115657ef8 ffffffff812c7d9b ffffffff82079be0 0000000000000000
> [   89.657073]  ffff880115657f28 ffffffff8106c665 0000000000000002 ffff880115657f58
> [   89.658399] Call Trace:
> [   89.658822]  [<ffffffff812c7d9b>] key_change_session_keyring+0xfb/0x140
> [   89.659845]  [<ffffffff8106c665>] task_work_run+0xa5/0xd0
> [   89.660698]  [<ffffffff81002911>] do_notify_resume+0x71/0xb0
> [   89.661581]  [<ffffffff816c9a4a>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
> [   89.662385] Code: 24 90 00 00 00 48 8b b3 90 00 00 00 49 8b 4c 24 40 48 39 f2 75 08 e9 83 00 00 00 48 89 ca 48 81 fa 60 29 c3 81 0f 84 41 fe ff ff <48> 8b 8a c8 00 00 00 48 39 ce 75 e4 3b 82 d0 00 00 00 0f 84 4b
> [   89.667778] RIP  [<ffffffff810784b0>] commit_creds+0x250/0x2f0
> [   89.668733]  RSP <ffff880115657eb8>
> [   89.669301] CR2: 00000000000000c8
>
> My fastest trinity induced oops yet!
>
>
> Appears to be..
>
>                 if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent)  &&
>      850:       48 8b 8a c8 00 00 00    mov    0xc8(%rdx),%rcx
>
> from the inlined cred_cap_issubset

By historical accident we have been reading trying to set new->user_ns
from new->user_ns.  Which is totally silly as new->user_ns is NULL (as
is every other field in new except session_keyring at that point).

The intent is clearly to copy all of the fields from old to new so copy
old->user_ns into  into new->user_ns.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-03 19:35:38 -08:00
David Howells fe9453a1dc KEYS: Revert one application of "Fix unreachable code" patch
A patch to fix some unreachable code in search_my_process_keyrings() got
applied twice by two different routes upstream as commits e67eab39be
and b010520ab3 (both "fix unreachable code").

Unfortunately, the second application removed something it shouldn't
have and this wasn't detected by GIT.  This is due to the patch not
having sufficient lines of context to distinguish the two places of
application.

The effect of this is relatively minor: inside the kernel, the keyring
search routines may search multiple keyrings and then prioritise the
errors if no keys or negative keys are found in any of them.  With the
extra deletion, the presence of a negative key in the thread keyring
(causing ENOKEY) is incorrectly overridden by an error searching the
process keyring.

So revert the second application of the patch.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-21 07:56:25 -08:00
Alan Cox e67eab39be keys: fix unreachable code
We set ret to NULL then test it. Remove the bogus test

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-20 17:40:21 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 2a74dbb9a8 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance
  updates."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs
  Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig
  Yama: remove locking from delete path
  Yama: add RCU to drop read locking
  drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup
  KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings
  KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
  KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
  seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent
  key: Fix resource leak
  keys: Fix unreachable code
  KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
2012-12-16 15:40:50 -08:00
Jiri Kosina 3bd7bf1f0f Merge branch 'master' into for-next
Sync up with Linus' tree to be able to apply Cesar's patch
against newer version of the code.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2012-10-28 19:29:19 +01:00
Alan Cox b010520ab3 keys: Fix unreachable code
We set ret to NULL then test it. Remove the bogus test

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2012-10-25 18:00:27 +02:00
David Howells 96b5c8fea6 KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything,
view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and
nothing else.

This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other
processes can access the new key or create a link to it.

To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than
setting the permissions itself.

The following permissions are now set:

 (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full
     permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR.

 (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but
     only grant the user VIEW.  This permits the user to see them in
     /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them.

 (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only
     grant the user VIEW and READ.  This means that the user can see them in
     /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else.  Possibly READ shouldn't
     be provided either.

 (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does,
     plus they grant the user LINK permission.  The whole point of named
     session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them.  Possibly this
     should be a separate permission to LINK.

 (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the
     same permissions as an anonymous session keyring.

 (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the
     possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them.  The used
     only gets VIEW now.

 (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by
     add_key().

Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 19:24:56 +01:00
David Howells 3a50597de8 KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still
inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm.

The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the
session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before
it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the
session keyring.  See:

	https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211

The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring
under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other
thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program.  The
problems are such as:

 (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from
     racing.

 (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process.

 (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the
     appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky.

 (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get
     another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for
     each thread.

A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather
than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring,
you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation
anyway.

Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way.  This
means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code.

Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about
inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring.

Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
2012-10-02 19:24:29 +01:00
Alan Cox 631527703d keys: Fix unreachable code
We set ret to NULL then test it. Remove the bogus test

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-09-28 12:20:02 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman 9a56c2db49 userns: Convert security/keys to the new userns infrastructure
- Replace key_user ->user_ns equality checks with kuid_has_mapping checks.
- Use from_kuid to generate key descriptions
- Use kuid_t and kgid_t and the associated helpers instead of uid_t and gid_t
- Avoid potential problems with file descriptor passing by displaying
  keys in the user namespace of the opener of key status proc files.

Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-13 18:28:02 -07:00
Al Viro 67d1214551 merge task_work and rcu_head, get rid of separate allocation for keyring case
task_work and rcu_head are identical now; merge them (calling the result
struct callback_head, rcu_head #define'd to it), kill separate allocation
in security/keys since we can just use cred->rcu now.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-22 23:57:56 +04:00
Al Viro 41f9d29f09 trimming task_work: kill ->data
get rid of the only user of ->data; this is _not_ the final variant - in the
end we'll have task_work and rcu_head identical and just use cred->rcu,
at which point the separate allocation will be gone completely.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-22 23:57:54 +04:00
Oleg Nesterov 413cd3d9ab keys: change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add()
Change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() and move
key_replace_session_keyring() logic into task_work->func().

Note that we do task_work_cancel() before task_work_add() to ensure that
only one work can be pending at any time.  This is important, we must not
allow user-space to abuse the parent's ->task_works list.

The callback, replace_session_keyring(), checks PF_EXITING.  I guess this
is not really needed but looks better.

As a side effect, this fixes the (unlikely) race.  The callers of
key_replace_session_keyring() and keyctl_session_to_parent() lack the
necessary barriers, the parent can miss the request.

Now we can remove task_struct->replacement_session_keyring and related
code.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-23 22:11:23 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 644473e9c6 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
2012-05-23 17:42:39 -07:00
David Howells 31d5a79d7f KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
Do an LRU discard in keyrings that are full rather than returning ENFILE.  To
perform this, a time_t is added to the key struct and updated by the creation
of a link to a key and by a key being found as the result of a search.  At the
completion of a successful search, the keyrings in the path between the root of
the search and the first found link to it also have their last-used times
updated.

Note that discarding a link to a key from a keyring does not necessarily
destroy the key as there may be references held by other places.

An alternate discard method that might suffice is to perform FIFO discard from
the keyring, using the spare 2-byte hole in the keylist header as the index of
the next link to be discarded.

This is useful when using a keyring as a cache for DNS results or foreign
filesystem IDs.


This can be tested by the following.  As root do:

	echo 1000 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys

	kr=`keyctl newring foo @s`
	for ((i=0; i<2000; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a $kr; done

Without this patch ENFILE should be reported when the keyring fills up.  With
this patch, the keyring discards keys in an LRU fashion.  Note that the stored
LRU time has a granularity of 1s.

After doing this, /proc/key-users can be observed and should show that most of
the 2000 keys have been discarded:

	[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/key-users
	    0:   517 516/516 513/1000 5249/20000

The "513/1000" here is the number of quota-accounted keys present for this user
out of the maximum permitted.

In /proc/keys, the keyring shows the number of keys it has and the number of
slots it has allocated:

	[root@andromeda ~]# grep foo /proc/keys
	200c64c4 I--Q--     1 perm 3b3f0000     0     0 keyring   foo: 509/509

The maximum is (PAGE_SIZE - header) / key pointer size.  That's typically 509
on a 64-bit system and 1020 on a 32-bit system.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-05-11 10:56:56 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman 0093ccb68f cred: Refcount the user_ns pointed to by the cred.
struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference
so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete
with reference counting.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-07 16:55:52 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman c4a4d60379 userns: Use cred->user_ns instead of cred->user->user_ns
Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference
from user_struct.  Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and
instead go straight to cred->user_ns.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-07 16:55:51 -07:00
Dan Carpenter f67dabbdde KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
The test for "if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {"
should actually testing that the (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) bit is set.
The current code actually checks for KEY_FLAG_DEAD.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-03-07 11:12:06 +11:00
David Howells 3ecf1b4f34 KEYS: keyctl_get_keyring_ID() should create a session keyring if create flag set
The keyctl call:

	keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1)

should create a session keyring if the process doesn't have one of its own
because the create flag argument is set - rather than subscribing to and
returning the user-session keyring as:

	keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)

will do.

This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>
	int main(int argc, char *argv[])
	{
		key_serial_t uk, usk, sk, nsk;
		uk  = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
		usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
		sk  = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
		nsk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1);
		printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk, nsk);
		return 0;
	}

Without this patch, I see:

	keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
	keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66

With this patch, I see:

	keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 17db2ce3
	keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 39f3c73e

As can be seen, the session keyring starts off the same as the user-session
keyring each time, but with the patch a new session keyring is created when
the create flag is set.

Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-08-23 09:57:34 +10:00
David Howells 995995378f KEYS: If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install it
If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install it rather
than just creating a new one anyway.  This was accidentally broken in:

	commit d84f4f992c
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100
	Subject: CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials

The impact of that commit is that pam_keyinit no longer works correctly if
'force' isn't specified against a login process. This is because:

	keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)

now always creates a new session keyring and thus the check whether the session
keyring and the user-session keyring are the same is always false.  This leads
pam_keyinit to conclude that a session keyring is installed and it shouldn't be
revoked by pam_keyinit here if 'revoke' is specified.

Any system that specifies 'force' against pam_keyinit in the PAM configuration
files for login methods (login, ssh, su -l, kdm, etc.) is not affected since
that bypasses the broken check and forces the creation of a new session keyring
anyway (for which the revoke flag is not cleared) - and any subsequent call to
pam_keyinit really does have a session keyring already installed, and so the
check works correctly there.

Reverting to the previous behaviour will cause the kernel to subscribe the
process to the user-session keyring as its session keyring if it doesn't have a
session keyring of its own.  pam_keyinit will detect this and install a new
session keyring anyway (and won't clear the revert flag).

This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>
	int main(int argc, char *argv[])
	{
		key_serial_t uk, usk, sk;
		uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
		usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
		sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
		printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk);
		return 0;
	}

Without the patch, I see:

	keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 22825f8e
	keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 068772be

With the patch, I see:

	keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
	keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0

As can be seen, with the patch, the session keyring is the same as the
user-session keyring each time; without the patch a new session keyring is
generated each time.

Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-08-23 09:57:33 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn f7285b5d63 Set cred->user_ns in key_replace_session_keyring
Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get
initialized.  Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
can lead to a NULL deref.  Thanks to Robert for finding this.

But introduced by commit 47a150edc2 ("Cache user_ns in struct cred").

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-26 13:49:19 -07:00
David Howells 78b7280cce KEYS: Improve /proc/keys
Improve /proc/keys by:

 (1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key.  It won't have
     one.  To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
     added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
     instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
     instantiated).

 (2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
     them.  This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
     search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
     check.

     Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
     permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
     fails.

     Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
     or without this patch.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-17 11:59:32 +11:00
David Howells 973c9f4f49 KEYS: Fix up comments in key management code
Fix up comments in the key management code.  No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-21 14:59:30 -08:00
David Howells a8b17ed019 KEYS: Do some style cleanup in the key management code.
Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code.  No functional
changes.

Done using:

  perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c
  perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c
  sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c

To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a
function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing
brace of a function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-21 14:59:29 -08:00
Andi Kleen 27d6379894 Fix install_process_keyring error handling
Fix an incorrect error check that returns 1 for error instead of the
expected error code.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-10-28 09:02:15 -07:00
David Howells 927942aabb KEYS: Make /proc/keys check to see if a key is possessed before security check
Make /proc/keys check to see if the calling process possesses each key before
performing the security check.  The possession check can be skipped if the key
doesn't have the possessor-view permission bit set.

This causes the keys a process possesses to show up in /proc/keys, even if they
don't have matching user/group/other view permissions.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02 15:34:27 +10:00
Oleg Nesterov 685bfd2c48 umh: creds: convert call_usermodehelper_keys() to use subprocess_info->init()
call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change
subprocess_info->cred in advance.  Now that we have info->init() we can
change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing
kernel thread.

Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with
UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup()
are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred()
which does key_get() on success.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27 09:12:45 -07:00
Dan Carpenter 4d09ec0f70 KEYS: Return more accurate error codes
We were using the wrong variable here so the error codes weren't being returned
properly.  The original code returns -ENOKEY.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-05-18 08:50:55 +10:00
Tejun Heo 5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
David Howells ee18d64c1f KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:22 +10:00
David Howells 5593122eec KEYS: Deal with dead-type keys appropriately [try #6]
Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked.  Currently
dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings
that point to them.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:04 +10:00
Oleg Nesterov 5bb459bb45 kernel: rename is_single_threaded(task) to current_is_single_threaded(void)
- is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current,
  we can't use task->signal or task->mm.

- it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can
  fork right after the check.

Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-17 09:10:42 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn 1d1e97562e keys: distinguish per-uid keys in different namespaces
per-uid keys were looked by uid only.  Use the user namespace
to distinguish the same uid in different namespaces.

This does not address key_permission.  So a task can for instance
try to join a keyring owned by the same uid in another namespace.
That will be handled by a separate patch.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-27 12:35:06 +11:00
David Howells a6f76f23d2 CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
     replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
     all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
     of no return with no possibility of failure.

     I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

	cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

     but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
     (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
     be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

     The following sequence of events now happens:

     (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
     	 locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
     	 creds that we make.

     (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
     	 task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
     	 bprm->cred.

  	 This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
     	 unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

     (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
     	 after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
     	 bprm->unsafe for future reference.

     (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

     	 (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
     	     attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
     	     but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
     	     fail.

         (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
	     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

	     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
	     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
	     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

         (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

	     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
	     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
	     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
	     not on the interpreter.

     (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
     	 performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

	 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
	     may not be covered by commit_creds().

         (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
             (c.i).

     (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
     	 new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
     	 credentials:

         (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
             requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
             must be done before the credentials are changed.

	     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
	     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
	     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
	     must have been done in (c.ii).

         (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
             assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
             should be part of struct creds.

	 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
	     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

         (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
             are now immutable.

         (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
             alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
             SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

     (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
     	 to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
     	 cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
     	 made.

 (2) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
     (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

     	 Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

     	 Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
     	 security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

     	 Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

     	 New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
     	 as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
     	 second and subsequent calls.

     (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

     	 New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
     	 includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
     	 fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
     	 to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

 	 The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

 (3) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
     	 the credentials-under-construction approach.

     (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
     	 to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:24 +11:00
David Howells d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells bb952bb98a CRED: Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct
Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor
from the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:20 +11:00
David Howells c69e8d9c01 CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:19 +11:00
David Howells 86a264abe5 CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:18 +11:00
David Howells b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells 8bbf4976b5 KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments.  Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist.  This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.

This patch alters the behaviour such that:

 (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
     keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.

 (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
     special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
     (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then:

     (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
     	 key will be attached to that keyring.

     (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
     	 instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
     	 keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().

 (3) No extra link will be made.

Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.

Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained.  This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:

	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	| Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	           request_key()           request_key()

This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch.  The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator.  To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00
David Howells 69664cf16a keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:17 -07:00
David Howells e231c2ee64 Convert ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(p)) instances to ERR_CAST(p)
Convert instances of ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(p)) to ERR_CAST(p) using:

perl -spi -e 's/ERR_PTR[(]PTR_ERR[(](.*)[)][)]/ERR_CAST(\1)/' `grep -rl 'ERR_PTR[(]*PTR_ERR' fs crypto net security`

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-07 08:42:26 -08:00