Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to
specify sub-directories for building.
Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Back when we had half ass LSM stacking we had to link capabilities.o
after bigger LSMs so that on initialization the bigger LSM would
register first and the capabilities module would be the one stacked as
the 'seconday'. Somewhere around 6f0f0fd496 (back in 2008) we
finally removed the last of the kinda module stacking code but this
comment in the makefile still lives today.
Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to be
skipped by the compiler. We do this as the minimum mmap address doesn't make
any sense in NOMMU mode.
mmap_min_addr and round_hint_to_min() can be discarded entirely in NOMMU mode.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and
increasingly broken in various ways.
Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
avc_audit_data
- eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version
behaves the same way as the unpatched version.
Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
unpatched.
I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.
The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability and for less code duplication.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
avc_audit_data
- eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and
after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions.
This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does.
As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \
It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch :
0: no logging
1: log denied (default)
2: log accepted
3: log denied&accepted
Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
LSMs need to be linked before root_plug to ensure the security=
boot parameter works with them. Do this for Tomoyo.
(root_plug probably needs to be taken out and shot at some point,
too).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for
file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires,
IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the
integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap
hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the
TPM, measurements can not be removed.
In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which
can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The
TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to
itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that
cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software.
- alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template()
- log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure
- removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN
- replaced hard coded string length with #define name
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support
but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of
securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the
full LSM needs to be built to build this fs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Implement a cgroup to track and enforce open and mknod restrictions on device
files. A device cgroup associates a device access whitelist with each cgroup.
A whitelist entry has 4 fields. 'type' is a (all), c (char), or b (block).
'all' means it applies to all types and all major and minor numbers. Major
and minor are either an integer or * for all. Access is a composition of r
(read), w (write), and m (mknod).
The root device cgroup starts with rwm to 'all'. A child devcg gets a copy of
the parent. Admins can then remove devices from the whitelist or add new
entries. A child cgroup can never receive a device access which is denied its
parent. However when a device access is removed from a parent it will not
also be removed from the child(ren).
An entry is added using devices.allow, and removed using
devices.deny. For instance
echo 'c 1:3 mr' > /cgroups/1/devices.allow
allows cgroup 1 to read and mknod the device usually known as
/dev/null. Doing
echo a > /cgroups/1/devices.deny
will remove the default 'a *:* mrw' entry.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to change permissions or move another task to a new
cgroup. A cgroup may not be granted more permissions than the cgroup's parent
has. Any task can move itself between cgroups. This won't be sufficient, but
we can decide the best way to adequately restrict movement later.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix may-be-used-uninitialized warning]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Looks-good-to: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Daniel Hokka Zakrisson <daniel@hozac.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer
attention. Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around. It
is time to remove this one.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Here's a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual
fs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own. The fs should
be mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point.
This will make the LSB people happy that we aren't creating a new
/my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM.
It has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from
Mike Waychison.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Kees Cook
Casey Schaufler
Sam Ravnborg
Eric Paris
Mimi Zohar
John Johansen
David Howells
James Morris
Thomas Liu
Etienne Basset
Kentaro Takeda
Miklos Szeredi
Serge E. Hallyn
Chris Wright
Greg KH
Linus Torvalds