TDX guest driver exposes IOCTL interfaces to service TDX guest
user-specific requests. Currently, it is only used to allow the user to
get the TDREPORT to support TDX attestation.
Details about the TDX attestation process are documented in
Documentation/x86/tdx.rst, and the IOCTL details are documented in
Documentation/virt/coco/tdx-guest.rst.
Operations like getting TDREPORT involves sending a blob of data as
input and getting another blob of data as output. It was considered
to use a sysfs interface for this, but it doesn't fit well into the
standard sysfs model for configuring values. It would be possible to
do read/write on files, but it would need multiple file descriptors,
which would be somewhat messy. IOCTLs seem to be the best fitting
and simplest model for this use case. The AMD sev-guest driver also
uses the IOCTL interface to support attestation.
[Bagas Sanjaya: Ack is for documentation portion]
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221116223820.819090-3-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy%40linux.intel.com
Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
hypervisor.
At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
appropriate action.
In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP
guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.
And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
not just bolted on.
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Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov:
"The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested
Paging.
Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
hypervisor.
At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
appropriate action.
In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a
SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.
And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
not just bolted on"
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation
x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap
x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler
x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info
x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning
x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page
x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines
virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest
virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support
x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section
x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor
virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value
virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages()
x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate()
virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
...
The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco)
EFI secret area via securityfs interface.
When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in
securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name
of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is
the secret data.
This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to
read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection
mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).
Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out
the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is
removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.
The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
specified through a struct snp_guest_platform_data descriptor.
Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
report.
See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.
[ bp: Remove the "what" from the commit message, massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-44-brijesh.singh@amd.com
VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at
<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by
Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper,
<https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as:
If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most
hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind
the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running
a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious
security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows
10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve
a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root
RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the
vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG
system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous
instantiation of the same VM state.
Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by
multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution.
So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly
added add_vmfork_randomness() function.
It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter.
After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state,
then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this
driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is
described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>.
And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in
<https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>.
Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be
an accidental QEMU nuance, per
<https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>,
so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary
blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway,
considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end.
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
ACRN Hypervisor Service Module (HSM) is a kernel module in Service VM
which communicates with ACRN userspace through ioctls and talks to ACRN
Hypervisor through hypercalls.
Add a basic HSM driver which allows Service VM userspace to communicate
with ACRN. The following patches will add more ioctls, guest VM memory
mapping caching, I/O request processing, ioeventfd and irqfd into this
module. HSM exports a char device interface (/dev/acrn_hsm) to userspace.
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yu Wang <yu1.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuo Liu <shuo.a.liu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210207031040.49576-6-shuo.a.liu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add kernel config entry for Nitro Enclaves, including dependencies.
Changelog
v9 -> v10
* Update commit message to include the changelog before the SoB tag(s).
v8 -> v9
* No changes.
v7 -> v8
* No changes.
v6 -> v7
* Remove, for now, the dependency on ARM64 arch. x86 is currently
supported, with Arm to come afterwards. The NE kernel driver can be
built for aarch64 arch.
v5 -> v6
* No changes.
v4 -> v5
* Add arch dependency for Arm / x86.
v3 -> v4
* Add PCI and SMP dependencies.
v2 -> v3
* Remove the GPL additional wording as SPDX-License-Identifier is
already in place.
v1 -> v2
* Update path to Kconfig to match the drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves
directory.
* Update help in Kconfig.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200921121732.44291-15-andraprs@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since commit 84af7a6194 ("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over
'---help---'"), the number of '---help---' has been gradually
decreasing, but there are still more than 2400 instances.
This commit finishes the conversion. While I touched the lines,
I also fixed the indentation.
There are a variety of indentation styles found.
a) 4 spaces + '---help---'
b) 7 spaces + '---help---'
c) 8 spaces + '---help---'
d) 1 space + 1 tab + '---help---'
e) 1 tab + '---help---' (correct indentation)
f) 1 tab + 1 space + '---help---'
g) 1 tab + 2 spaces + '---help---'
In order to convert all of them to 1 tab + 'help', I ran the
following commend:
$ find . -name 'Kconfig*' | xargs sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*---help---/\thelp/'
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit adds a driver for the Virtual Box Guest PCI device used in
Virtual Box virtual machines. Enabling this driver will add support for
Virtual Box Guest integration features such as copy-and-paste, seamless
mode and OpenGL pass-through.
This driver also offers vboxguest IPC functionality which is needed
for the vboxfs driver which offers folder sharing support.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add the drivers/virt directory, which houses drivers that support
virtualization environments, and add the Freescale hypervisor management
driver.
The Freescale hypervisor management driver provides several services to
drivers and applications related to the Freescale hypervisor:
1. An ioctl interface for querying and managing partitions
2. A file interface to reading incoming doorbells
3. An interrupt handler for shutting down the partition upon receiving the
shutdown doorbell from a manager partition
4. A kernel interface for receiving callbacks when a managed partition
shuts down.
Signed-off-by: Timur Tabi <timur@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org>
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
Linus Torvalds
Tom Lendacky
Dov Murik
Brijesh Singh
Jason A. Donenfeld
Shuo Liu
Andra Paraschiv
Masahiro Yamada
Thomas Gleixner
Hans de Goede
Stuart Yoder
Timur Tabi