Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool
rather than int.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages:
(1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.
(2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).
(3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means
that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.
(4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Make use of key preparsing in the DNS resolver so that quota size determination
can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation
in the file header comment. Resolve by replacing the address with
the URL <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> so that we do not have to keep
updating the header comments anytime the address changes.
CC: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
CC: Alex Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
CC: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
CC: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance
updates."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs
Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig
Yama: remove locking from delete path
Yama: add RCU to drop read locking
drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup
KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent
key: Fix resource leak
keys: Fix unreachable code
KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
Pull module signing support from Rusty Russell:
"module signing is the highlight, but it's an all-over David Howells frenzy..."
Hmm "Magrathea: Glacier signing key". Somebody has been reading too much HHGTTG.
* 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (37 commits)
X.509: Fix indefinite length element skip error handling
X.509: Convert some printk calls to pr_devel
asymmetric keys: fix printk format warning
MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking
MODSIGN: Make mrproper should remove generated files.
MODSIGN: Use utf8 strings in signer's name in autogenerated X.509 certs
MODSIGN: Use the same digest for the autogen key sig as for the module sig
MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process
MODSIGN: Provide a script for generating a key ID from an X.509 cert
MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking
MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel
MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing
MODSIGN: Provide Kconfig options
MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files
MODSIGN: Add FIPS policy
module: signature checking hook
X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates
MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an MPI
X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder
X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler
...
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
provision of two new key type operations:
int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
was called.
preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
void *type_data[2];
void *payload;
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
};
Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.
The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
ops.
The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
to tell the upcall about the key to be created.
This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.
The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:
int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings now that it has a permissions
parameter rather than using key_alloc() + key_instantiate_and_link().
Also document and export keyring_alloc() so that modules can use it too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c and net/rxrpc/ar-key.c make them
work with user namespaces enabled where key_alloc takes kuids and kgids.
Pass GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID instead of bare 0's.
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
provision of two new key type operations:
int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
was called.
preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
void *type_data[2];
void *payload;
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
};
Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.
The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
ops.
The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
to tell the upcall about the key to be created.
This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.
The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:
int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"New notable features:
- The seccomp work from Will Drewry
- PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
- Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
- Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
Smack: recursive tramsmute
Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
KEYS: Add invalidation support
KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
Yama: remove an unused variable
samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
...
Announce the (un)registration of a key type in the core key code rather than
in the callers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
resolver keyring :
2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty
It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
flushed by root (cache invalidation).
Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
the keyring.
Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Improve /proc/keys by:
(1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have
one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
instantiated).
(2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
check.
Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
fails.
Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
or without this patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When a DNS resolver key is instantiated with an error indication, attempts to
read that key will result in an oops because user_read() is expecting there to
be a payload - and there isn't one [CVE-2011-1076].
Give the DNS resolver key its own read handler that returns the error cached in
key->type_data.x[0] as an error rather than crashing.
Also make the kenter() at the beginning of dns_resolver_instantiate() limit the
amount of data it prints, since the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated.
The buggy code was added in:
commit 4a2d789267
Author: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Date: Wed Aug 11 09:37:58 2010 +0100
Subject: DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]
This can trivially be reproduced by any user with the following program
compiled with -lkeyutils:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
static char payload[] = "#dnserror=6";
int main()
{
key_serial_t key;
key = add_key("dns_resolver", "a", payload, sizeof(payload),
KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
if (key == -1)
err(1, "add_key");
if (keyctl_read(key, NULL, 0) == -1)
err(1, "read_key");
return 0;
}
What should happen is that keyctl_read() reports error 6 (ENXIO) to the user:
dns-break: read_key: No such device or address
but instead the kernel oopses.
This cannot be reproduced with the 'keyutils add' or 'keyutils padd' commands
as both of those cut the data down below the NUL termination that must be
included in the data. Without this dns_resolver_instantiate() will return
-EINVAL and the key will not be instantiated such that it can be read.
The oops looks like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
PGD 3bdf8067 PUD 385b9067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:19.0/irq
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2150, comm: dns-break Not tainted 2.6.38-rc7-cachefs+ #468 /DG965RY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b99f7>] [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP: 0018:ffff88003bf47f08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88003b5ea378 RCX: ffffffff81972368
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88003b5ea378
RBP: ffff88003bf47f28 R08: ffff88003be56620 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000395 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffa1
FS: 00007feab5751700(0000) GS:ffff88003e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000003de40000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process dns-break (pid: 2150, threadinfo ffff88003bf46000, task ffff88003be56090)
Stack:
ffff88003b5ea378 ffff88003b5ea3a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
ffff88003bf47f68 ffffffff811b708e ffff88003c442bc8 0000000000000000
00000000004005a0 00007fffba368060 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811b708e>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811b7c07>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001f7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 75 1f 48 83 7b 28 00 75 18 c6 05 58 2b fb 00 01 be bb 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 76 1c 75 81 e8 13 c2 e9 ff 4c 8b b3 e0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed <41> 0f b7 5e 10 74 2d 4d 85 e4 74 28 e8 98 79 ee ff 49 39 dd 48
RIP [<ffffffff811b99f7>] user_read+0x4f/0x8f
RSP <ffff88003bf47f08>
CR2: 0000000000000010
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached in the DNS resolver
key in lieu of a value. Userspace passes the desired error number as an option
in the payload:
"#dnserror=<number>"
Userspace must map h_errno from the name resolution routines to an appropriate
Linux error before passing it up. Something like the following mapping is
recommended:
[HOST_NOT_FOUND] = ENODATA,
[TRY_AGAIN] = EAGAIN,
[NO_RECOVERY] = ECONNREFUSED,
[NO_DATA] = ENODATA,
in lieu of Linux errors specifically for representing name service errors. The
filesystem must map these errors appropropriately before passing them to
userspace. AFS is made to map ENODATA and EAGAIN to EDESTADDRREQ for the
return to userspace; ECONNREFUSED is allowed to stand as is.
The error can be seen in /proc/keys as a negative number after the description
of the key. Compare, for example, the following key entries:
2f97238c I--Q-- 1 53s 3f010000 0 0 dns_resol afsdb:grand.centrall.org: -61
338bfbbe I--Q-- 1 59m 3f010000 0 0 dns_resol afsdb:grand.central.org: 37
If the error option is supplied in the payload, the main part of the payload is
discarded. The key should have an expiry time set by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Fixes build errors:
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c: In function 'init_dns_resolver':
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c:170: error: implicit declaration of function 'IS_ERR'
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c:171: error: implicit declaration of function 'PTR_ERR'
net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c: In function 'dns_query':
net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c:126: error: implicit declaration of function 'IS_ERR'
net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c:127: error: implicit declaration of function 'PTR_ERR'
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Separate out the DNS resolver key type from the CIFS filesystem into its own
module so that it can be made available for general use, including the AFS
filesystem module.
This facility makes it possible for the kernel to upcall to userspace to have
it issue DNS requests, package up the replies and present them to the kernel
in a useful form. The kernel is then able to cache the DNS replies as keys
can be retained in keyrings.
Resolver keys are of type "dns_resolver" and have a case-insensitive
description that is of the form "[<type>:]<domain_name>". The optional <type>
indicates the particular DNS lookup and packaging that's required. The
<domain_name> is the query to be made.
If <type> isn't given, a basic hostname to IP address lookup is made, and the
result is stored in the key in the form of a printable string consisting of a
comma-separated list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
This key type is supported by userspace helpers driven from /sbin/request-key
and configured through /etc/request-key.conf. The cifs.upcall utility is
invoked for UNC path server name to IP address resolution.
The CIFS functionality is encapsulated by the dns_resolve_unc_to_ip() function,
which is used to resolve a UNC path to an IP address for CIFS filesystem. This
part remains in the CIFS module for now.
See the added Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt for more information.
Signed-off-by: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
David Howells
Jeff Kirsher
“Cosmin
Linus Torvalds
Eric W. Biederman
Eric Dumazet
Wang Lei
Stephen Rothwell