HCTR2 is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode that is intended
for use on CPUs with dedicated crypto instructions. HCTR2 has the
property that a bitflip in the plaintext changes the entire ciphertext.
This property fixes a known weakness with filename encryption: when two
filenames in the same directory share a prefix of >= 16 bytes, with
AES-CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common substring, leaking
information. HCTR2 does not have this problem.
More information on HCTR2 can be found here: "Length-preserving
encryption with HCTR2": https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1441.pdf
Signed-off-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Unfortunately the design of fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() doesn't
work properly for the new mount API, as it combines too many steps into
one function:
- Parse the argument to test_dummy_encryption
- Check the setting against the filesystem instance
- Apply the setting to the filesystem instance
The new mount API has split these into separate steps. ext4 partially
worked around this by duplicating some of the logic, but it still had
some bugs. To address this, add some new helper functions that split up
the steps of fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption():
- fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption()
- fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal()
- fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key()
While we're add it, also add a function fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set()
which will be useful to avoid some #ifdef's.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220501050857.538984-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Factor out a function that builds the fscrypt_key_specifier for an
fscrypt_policy. Before this was only needed when finding the key for a
file, but now it will also be needed for test_dummy_encryption support.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220501050857.538984-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
When inline encryption is used, the usual message "fscrypt: AES-256-XTS
using implementation <impl>" doesn't appear in the kernel log. Add a
similar message for the blk-crypto case that indicates that inline
encryption was used, and whether blk-crypto-fallback was used or not.
This can be useful for debugging performance problems.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414053415.158986-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE is neither the filesystem block size nor the
granularity of encryption. Rather, it defines two logically separate
constraints that both arise from the block size of the AES cipher:
- The alignment required for the lengths of file contents blocks
- The minimum input/output length for the filenames encryption modes
Since there are way too many things called the "block size", and the
connection with the AES block size is not easily understood, split
FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE into two constants FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT and
FSCRYPT_FNAME_MIN_MSG_LEN that more clearly describe what they are.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405010914.18519-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
All filesystems have now been converted to use ->readahead, so
remove the ->readpages operation and fix all the comments that
used to refer to it.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add support for direct I/O on encrypted files when blk-crypto (inline
encryption) is being used for file contents encryption.
There will be a merge conflict with the block pull request in
fs/iomap/direct-io.c, due to some bio interface cleanups. The merge
resolution is straightforward and can be found in linux-next.
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Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt
Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers:
"Add support for direct I/O on encrypted files when blk-crypto (inline
encryption) is being used for file contents encryption"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt:
fscrypt: update documentation for direct I/O support
f2fs: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto
ext4: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto
iomap: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto
fscrypt: add functions for direct I/O support
Encrypted files traditionally haven't supported DIO, due to the need to
encrypt/decrypt the data. However, when the encryption is implemented
using inline encryption (blk-crypto) instead of the traditional
filesystem-layer encryption, it is straightforward to support DIO.
In preparation for supporting this, add the following functions:
- fscrypt_dio_supported() checks whether a DIO request is supported as
far as encryption is concerned. Encrypted files will only support DIO
when inline encryption is used and the I/O request is properly
aligned; this function checks these preconditions.
- fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() limits the length of a bio to avoid crossing
a place in the file that a bio with an encryption context cannot
cross due to a DUN discontiguity. This function is needed by
filesystems that use the iomap DIO implementation (which operates
directly on logical ranges, so it won't use fscrypt_mergeable_bio())
and that support FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32.
Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220128233940.79464-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Pass the block_device that we plan to use this bio for and the
operation to bio_reset to optimize the assigment. A NULL block_device
can be passed, both for the passthrough case on a raw request_queue and
to temporarily avoid refactoring some nasty code.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220124091107.642561-20-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Pass the block_device and operation that we plan to use this bio for to
bio_alloc to optimize the assignment. NULL/0 can be passed, both for the
passthrough case on a raw request_queue and to temporarily avoid
refactoring some nasty code.
Also move the gfp_mask argument after the nr_vecs argument for a much
more logical calling convention matching what most of the kernel does.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220124091107.642561-18-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
fscrypt currently requires a 512-bit master key when AES-256-XTS is
used, since AES-256-XTS keys are 512-bit and fscrypt requires that the
master key be at least as long any key that will be derived from it.
However, this is overly strict because AES-256-XTS doesn't actually have
a 512-bit security strength, but rather 256-bit. The fact that XTS
takes twice the expected key size is a quirk of the XTS mode. It is
sufficient to use 256 bits of entropy for AES-256-XTS, provided that it
is first properly expanded into a 512-bit key, which HKDF-SHA512 does.
Therefore, relax the check of the master key size to use the security
strength of the derived key rather than the size of the derived key
(except for v1 encryption policies, which don't use HKDF).
Besides making things more flexible for userspace, this is needed in
order for the use of a KDF which only takes a 256-bit key to be
introduced into the fscrypt key hierarchy. This will happen with
hardware-wrapped keys support, as all known hardware which supports that
feature uses an SP800-108 KDF using AES-256-CMAC, so the wrapped keys
are wrapped 256-bit AES keys. Moreover, there is interest in fscrypt
supporting the same type of AES-256-CMAC based KDF in software as an
alternative to HKDF-SHA512. There is no security problem with such
features, so fix the key length check to work properly with them.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921030303.5598-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The file comment in bio.c is almost completely irrelevant to the actual
contents of the file; it was originally copied from crypto.c. Fix it
up, and also add a kerneldoc comment for fscrypt_decrypt_bio().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210909190737.140841-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The max_namelen field is unnecessary, as it is set to 255 (NAME_MAX) on
all filesystems that support fscrypt (or plan to support fscrypt). For
simplicity, just use NAME_MAX directly instead.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210909184513.139281-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
fscrypt uses a Base64 encoding to encode no-key filenames (the filenames
that are presented to userspace when a directory is listed without its
encryption key). There are many variants of Base64, but the most common
ones are specified by RFC 4648. fscrypt can't use the regular RFC 4648
"base64" variant because "base64" uses the '/' character, which isn't
allowed in filenames. However, RFC 4648 also specifies a "base64url"
variant for use in URLs and filenames. "base64url" is less common than
"base64", but it's still implemented in many programming libraries.
Unfortunately, what fscrypt actually uses is a custom Base64 variant
that differs from "base64url" in several ways:
- The binary data is divided into 6-bit chunks differently.
- Values 62 and 63 are encoded with '+' and ',' instead of '-' and '_'.
- '='-padding isn't used. This isn't a problem per se, as the padding
isn't technically necessary, and RFC 4648 doesn't strictly require it.
But it needs to be properly documented.
There have been two attempts to copy the fscrypt Base64 code into lib/
(https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821182813.52570-6-jlayton@kernel.org and
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210716110428.9727-5-hare@suse.de), and both
have been caught up by the fscrypt Base64 variant being nonstandard and
not properly documented. Also, the planned use of the fscrypt Base64
code in the CephFS storage back-end will prevent it from being changed
later (whereas currently it can still be changed), so we need to choose
an encoding that we're happy with before it's too late.
Therefore, switch the fscrypt Base64 variant to base64url, in order to
align more closely with RFC 4648 and other implementations and uses of
Base64. However, I opted not to implement '='-padding, as '='-padding
adds complexity, is unnecessary, and isn't required by the RFC.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210718000125.59701-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add a helper function fscrypt_symlink_getattr() which will be called
from the various filesystems' ->getattr() methods to read and decrypt
the target of encrypted symlinks in order to report the correct st_size.
Detailed explanation:
As required by POSIX and as documented in various man pages, st_size for
a symlink is supposed to be the length of the symlink target.
Unfortunately, st_size has always been wrong for encrypted symlinks
because st_size is populated from i_size from disk, which intentionally
contains the length of the encrypted symlink target. That's slightly
greater than the length of the decrypted symlink target (which is the
symlink target that userspace usually sees), and usually won't match the
length of the no-key encoded symlink target either.
This hadn't been fixed yet because reporting the correct st_size would
require reading the symlink target from disk and decrypting or encoding
it, which historically has been considered too heavyweight to do in
->getattr(). Also historically, the wrong st_size had only broken a
test (LTP lstat03) and there were no known complaints from real users.
(This is probably because the st_size of symlinks isn't used too often,
and when it is, typically it's for a hint for what buffer size to pass
to readlink() -- which a slightly-too-large size still works for.)
However, a couple things have changed now. First, there have recently
been complaints about the current behavior from real users:
- Breakage in rpmbuild:
https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/issues/1682https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/305
- Breakage in toybox cpio:
https://www.mail-archive.com/toybox@lists.landley.net/msg07193.html
- Breakage in libgit2: https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/189629152
(on Android public issue tracker, requires login)
Second, we now cache decrypted symlink targets in ->i_link. Therefore,
taking the performance hit of reading and decrypting the symlink target
in ->getattr() wouldn't be as big a deal as it used to be, since usually
it will just save having to do the same thing later.
Also note that eCryptfs ended up having to read and decrypt symlink
targets in ->getattr() as well, to fix this same issue; see
commit 3a60a1686f ("eCryptfs: Decrypt symlink target for stat size").
So, let's just bite the bullet, and read and decrypt the symlink target
in ->getattr() in order to report the correct st_size. Add a function
fscrypt_symlink_getattr() which the filesystems will call to do this.
(Alternatively, we could store the decrypted size of symlinks on-disk.
But there isn't a great place to do so, and encryption is meant to hide
the original size to some extent; that property would be lost.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Typically, the cryptographic APIs that fscrypt uses take keys as byte
arrays, which avoids endianness issues. However, siphash_key_t is an
exception. It is defined as 'u64 key[2];', i.e. the 128-bit key is
expected to be given directly as two 64-bit words in CPU endianness.
fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key() and fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
forgot to take this into account. Therefore, the SipHash keys used to
index encrypted+casefolded directories differ on big endian vs. little
endian platforms, as do the SipHash keys used to hash inode numbers for
IV_INO_LBLK_32-encrypted directories. This makes such directories
non-portable between these platforms.
Fix this by always using the little endian order. This is a breaking
change for big endian platforms, but this should be fine in practice
since these features (encrypt+casefold support, and the IV_INO_LBLK_32
flag) aren't known to actually be used on any big endian platforms yet.
Fixes: aa408f835d ("fscrypt: derive dirhash key for casefolded directories")
Fixes: e3b1078bed ("fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210605075033.54424-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
When initializing a no-key name, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() sets the
minor_hash to 0 if the (major) hash is 0.
This doesn't make sense because 0 is a valid hash code, so we shouldn't
ignore the filesystem-provided minor_hash in that case. Fix this by
removing the special case for 'hash == 0'.
This is an old bug that appears to have originated when the encryption
code in ext4 and f2fs was moved into fs/crypto/. The original ext4 and
f2fs code passed the hash by pointer instead of by value. So
'if (hash)' actually made sense then, as it was checking whether a
pointer was NULL. But now the hashes are passed by value, and
filesystems just pass 0 for any hashes they don't have. There is no
need to handle this any differently from the hashes actually being 0.
It is difficult to reproduce this bug, as it only made a difference in
the case where a filename's 32-bit major hash happened to be 0.
However, it probably had the largest chance of causing problems on
ubifs, since ubifs uses minor_hash to do lookups of no-key names, in
addition to using it as a readdir cookie. ext4 only uses minor_hash as
a readdir cookie, and f2fs doesn't use minor_hash at all.
Fixes: 0b81d07790 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527235236.2376556-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- crypto_destroy_tfm now ignores errors as well as NULL pointers
Algorithms:
- Add explicit curve IDs in ECDH algorithm names
- Add NIST P384 curve parameters
- Add ECDSA
Drivers:
- Add support for Green Sardine in ccp
- Add ecdh/curve25519 to hisilicon/hpre
- Add support for AM64 in sa2ul"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (184 commits)
fsverity: relax build time dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256
fscrypt: relax Kconfig dependencies for crypto API algorithms
crypto: camellia - drop duplicate "depends on CRYPTO"
crypto: s5p-sss - consistently use local 'dev' variable in probe()
crypto: s5p-sss - remove unneeded local variable initialization
crypto: s5p-sss - simplify getting of_device_id match data
ccp: ccp - add support for Green Sardine
crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functions
crypto: octeontx2 - add support for OcteonTX2 98xx CPT block.
crypto: chelsio/chcr - Remove useless MODULE_VERSION
crypto: ux500/cryp - Remove duplicate argument
crypto: chelsio - remove unused function
crypto: sa2ul - Add support for AM64
crypto: sa2ul - Support for per channel coherency
dt-bindings: crypto: ti,sa2ul: Add new compatible for AM64
crypto: hisilicon - enable new error types for QM
crypto: hisilicon - add new error type for SEC
crypto: hisilicon - support new error types for ZIP
crypto: hisilicon - dynamic configuration 'err_info'
crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c
...
Even if FS encryption has strict functional dependencies on various
crypto algorithms and chaining modes. those dependencies could potentially
be satisified by other implementations than the generic ones, and no link
time dependency exists on the 'depends on' claused defined by
CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_ALGS.
So let's relax these clauses to 'imply', so that the default behavior
is still to pull in those generic algorithms, but in a way that permits
them to be disabled again in Kconfig.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Ever since the addition of multipage bio_vecs BIO_MAX_PAGES has been
horribly confusingly misnamed. Rename it to BIO_MAX_VECS to stop
confusing users of the bio API.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311110137.1132391-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
In this round, we've made more work into per-file compression support. For
example, F2FS_IOC_GET|SET_COMPRESS_OPTION provides a way to change the
algorithm or cluster size per file. F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS|DECOMPRESS_FILE provides
a way to compress and decompress the existing normal files manually along with
a new mount option, compress_mode=fs|user, which can control who compresses the
data. Chao also added a checksum feature with a mount option so that we are able
to detect any corrupted cluster. In addition, Daniel contributed casefolding
with encryption patch, which will be used for Android devices.
Enhancement:
- add ioctls and mount option to manage per-file compression feature
- support casefolding with encryption
- support checksum for compressed cluster
- avoid IO starvation by replacing mutex with rwsem
- add sysfs, max_io_bytes, to control max bio size
Bug fix:
- fix use-after-free issue when compression and fsverity are enabled
- fix consistency corruption during fault injection test
- fix data offset for lseek
- get rid of buffer_head which has 32bits limit in fiemap
- fix some bugs in multi-partitions support
- fix nat entry count calculation in shrinker
- fix some stat information
And, we've refactored some logics and fix minor bugs as well.
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Merge tag 'f2fs-for-5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
"In this round, we've made more work into per-file compression support.
For example, F2FS_IOC_GET | SET_COMPRESS_OPTION provides a way to
change the algorithm or cluster size per file. F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS |
DECOMPRESS_FILE provides a way to compress and decompress the existing
normal files manually.
There is also a new mount option, compress_mode=fs|user, which can
control who compresses the data.
Chao also added a checksum feature with a mount option so that
we are able to detect any corrupted cluster.
In addition, Daniel contributed casefolding with encryption patch,
which will be used for Android devices.
Summary:
Enhancements:
- add ioctls and mount option to manage per-file compression feature
- support casefolding with encryption
- support checksum for compressed cluster
- avoid IO starvation by replacing mutex with rwsem
- add sysfs, max_io_bytes, to control max bio size
Bug fixes:
- fix use-after-free issue when compression and fsverity are enabled
- fix consistency corruption during fault injection test
- fix data offset for lseek
- get rid of buffer_head which has 32bits limit in fiemap
- fix some bugs in multi-partitions support
- fix nat entry count calculation in shrinker
- fix some stat information
And, we've refactored some logics and fix minor bugs as well"
* tag 'f2fs-for-5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (36 commits)
f2fs: compress: fix compression chksum
f2fs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in sanity_check_raw_super()
f2fs: fix race of pending_pages in decompression
f2fs: fix to account inline xattr correctly during recovery
f2fs: inline: fix wrong inline inode stat
f2fs: inline: correct comment in f2fs_recover_inline_data
f2fs: don't check PAGE_SIZE again in sanity_check_raw_super()
f2fs: convert to F2FS_*_INO macro
f2fs: introduce max_io_bytes, a sysfs entry, to limit bio size
f2fs: don't allow any writes on readonly mount
f2fs: avoid race condition for shrinker count
f2fs: add F2FS_IOC_DECOMPRESS_FILE and F2FS_IOC_COMPRESS_FILE
f2fs: add compress_mode mount option
f2fs: Remove unnecessary unlikely()
f2fs: init dirty_secmap incorrectly
f2fs: remove buffer_head which has 32bits limit
f2fs: fix wrong block count instead of bytes
f2fs: use new conversion functions between blks and bytes
f2fs: rename logical_to_blk and blk_to_logical
f2fs: fix kbytes written stat for multi-device case
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add speed testing on 1420-byte blocks for networking
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of chacha on ARM for network packets
- Improve performance of aegis128 on ARM for network packets
Drivers:
- Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
- Add support for QAT 4xxx devices
- Enable crypto-engine retry mechanism in caam
- Enable support for crypto engine on sdm845 in qce
- Add HiSilicon PRNG driver support"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (161 commits)
crypto: qat - add capability detection logic in qat_4xxx
crypto: qat - add AES-XTS support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: qat - add AES-CTR support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: atmel-i2c - select CONFIG_BITREVERSE
crypto: hisilicon/trng - replace atomic_add_return()
crypto: keembay - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
dt-bindings: Add Keem Bay OCS AES bindings
crypto: aegis128 - avoid spurious references crypto_aegis128_update_simd
crypto: seed - remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: x86/sha512 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: cpt - Fix sparse warnings in cptpf
hwrng: ks-sa - Add dependency on IOMEM and OF
crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
crypto: arm/aes-ce - work around Cortex-A57/A72 silion errata
crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
crypto: ccree - rework cache parameters handling
crypto: cavium - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
...
This shifts the responsibility of setting up dentry operations from
fscrypt to the individual filesystems, allowing them to have their own
operations while still setting fscrypt's d_revalidate as appropriate.
Most filesystems can just use generic_set_encrypted_ci_d_ops, unless
they have their own specific dentry operations as well. That operation
will set the minimal d_ops required under the circumstances.
Since the fscrypt d_ops are set later on, we must set all d_ops there,
since we cannot adjust those later on. This should not result in any
change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Currently it's impossible to delete files that use an unsupported
encryption policy, as the kernel will just return an error when
performing any operation on the top-level encrypted directory, even just
a path lookup into the directory or opening the directory for readdir.
More specifically, this occurs in any of the following cases:
- The encryption context has an unrecognized version number. Current
kernels know about v1 and v2, but there could be more versions in the
future.
- The encryption context has unrecognized encryption modes
(FSCRYPT_MODE_*) or flags (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_*), an unrecognized
combination of modes, or reserved bits set.
- The encryption key has been added and the encryption modes are
recognized but aren't available in the crypto API -- for example, a
directory is encrypted with FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM but the kernel
doesn't have CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM enabled.
It's desirable to return errors for most operations on files that use an
unsupported encryption policy, but the current behavior is too strict.
We need to allow enough to delete files, so that people can't be stuck
with undeletable files when downgrading kernel versions. That includes
allowing directories to be listed and allowing dentries to be looked up.
Fix this by modifying the key setup logic to treat an unsupported
encryption policy in the same way as "key unavailable" in the cases that
are required for a recursive delete to work: preparing for a readdir or
a dentry lookup, revalidating a dentry, or checking whether an inode has
the same encryption policy as its parent directory.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-10-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Now that fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is only called from files in
fs/crypto/ (due to all key setup now being handled by higher-level
helper functions instead of directly by filesystems), unexport it and
move its declaration to fscrypt_private.h.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-9-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
fscrypt_require_key() is now only used by files in fs/crypto/. So
reduce its visibility to fscrypt_private.h. This is also a prerequsite
for unexporting fscrypt_get_encryption_info().
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-8-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
In preparation for reducing the visibility of fscrypt_require_key() by
moving it to fscrypt_private.h, move the call to it from
fscrypt_prepare_setattr() to an out-of-line function.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-7-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The last remaining use of fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from filesystems
is for readdir (->iterate_shared()). Every other call is now in
fs/crypto/ as part of some other higher-level operation.
We need to add a new argument to fscrypt_get_encryption_info() to
indicate whether the encryption policy is allowed to be unrecognized or
not. Doing this is easier if we can work with high-level operations
rather than direct filesystem use of fscrypt_get_encryption_info().
So add a function fscrypt_prepare_readdir() which wraps the call to
fscrypt_get_encryption_info() for the readdir use case.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203022041.230976-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The stated reasons for separating fscrypt_master_key::mk_secret_sem from
the standard semaphore contained in every 'struct key' no longer apply.
First, due to commit a992b20cd4 ("fscrypt: add
fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context()"),
fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is no longer called from within a
filesystem transaction.
Second, due to commit d3ec10aa95 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace
while holding key semaphore"), the semaphore for the "keyring" key type
no longer ranks above page faults.
That leaves performance as the only possible reason to keep the separate
mk_secret_sem. Specifically, having mk_secret_sem reduces the
contention between setup_file_encryption_key() and
FS_IOC_{ADD,REMOVE}_ENCRYPTION_KEY. However, these ioctls aren't
executed often, so this doesn't seem to be worth the extra complexity.
Therefore, simplify the locking design by just using key->sem instead of
mk_secret_sem.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117032626.320275-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
In an encrypted directory, a regular dentry (one that doesn't have the
no-key name flag) can only be created if the directory's encryption key
is available.
Therefore the calls to fscrypt_require_key() in __fscrypt_prepare_link()
and __fscrypt_prepare_rename() are unnecessary, as these functions
already check that the dentries they're given aren't no-key names.
Remove these unnecessary calls to fscrypt_require_key().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory
by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key.
Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or
sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's
encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key
dentry. The VFS then calls ->create() (or ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), or
->symlink()) because the dentry is negative. Normally, ->create() would
return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable. However,
if the key was added between the dentry lookup and ->create(), then the
filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file.
If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a
no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory.
In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent
->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), and ->symlink() on no-key names.
(->rename() and ->link() need it too, but those are already handled
correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().)
In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name()
that filesystems can use to do this check. Use this helper function for
the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are
only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in
the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel
developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags.
In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com
there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a
user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if
__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition
available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem.
So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly
in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to
fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only
present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and
comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync.
Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for
longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source
compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in
an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build.
However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags
with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it
clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it.
Fixes: 2336d0deb2 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The new helper function fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() runs before
S_ENCRYPTED has been set on the new inode. This accidentally made
fscrypt_select_encryption_impl() never enable inline encryption on newly
created files, due to its use of fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption()
which only returns true when S_ENCRYPTED is set.
Fix this by using S_ISREG() directly instead of
fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(), analogous to what
select_encryption_mode() does.
I didn't notice this earlier because by design, the user-visible
behavior is the same (other than performance, potentially) regardless of
whether inline encryption is used or not.
Fixes: a992b20cd4 ("fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context()")
Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111015224.303073-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
I_CREATING isn't actually set until the inode has been assigned an inode
number and inserted into the inode hash table. So the WARN_ON() in
fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key() is wrong, and it can trigger when
creating an encrypted file on ext4. Remove it.
This was sometimes causing xfstest generic/602 to fail on ext4. I
didn't notice it before because due to a separate oversight, new inodes
that haven't been assigned an inode number yet don't necessarily have
i_ino == 0 as I had thought, so by chance I never saw the test fail.
Fixes: a992b20cd4 ("fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context()")
Reported-by: Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201031004556.87862-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Dentries that represent no-key names must have a dentry_operations that
includes fscrypt_d_revalidate(). Currently, this is handled by
fscrypt_prepare_lookup() installing fscrypt_d_ops.
However, ceph support for encryption
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914191707.380444-1-jlayton@kernel.org)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops, since ceph already has its own
dentry_operations.
Similarly, ext4 and f2fs support for directories that are both encrypted
and casefolded
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200923010151.69506-1-drosen@google.com)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops either, since casefolding requires some dentry
operations too.
To satisfy both users, we need to move the responsibility of installing
the dentry_operations to filesystems.
In preparation for this, export fscrypt_d_revalidate() and give it a
!CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION stub.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924054721.187797-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Originally we used the term "encrypted name" or "ciphertext name" to
mean the encoded filename that is shown when an encrypted directory is
listed without its key. But these terms are ambiguous since they also
mean the filename stored on-disk. "Encrypted name" is especially
ambiguous since it could also be understood to mean "this filename is
encrypted on-disk", similar to "encrypted file".
So we've started calling these encoded names "no-key names" instead.
Therefore, rename DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME to DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME to avoid
confusion about what this flag means.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924042624.98439-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Currently we're using the term "ciphertext name" ambiguously because it
can mean either the actual ciphertext filename, or the encoded filename
that is shown when an encrypted directory is listed without its key.
The latter we're now usually calling the "no-key name"; and while it's
derived from the ciphertext name, it's not the same thing.
To avoid this ambiguity, rename fscrypt_name::is_ciphertext_name to
fscrypt_name::is_nokey_name, and update comments that say "ciphertext
name" (or "encrypted name") to say "no-key name" instead when warranted.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924042624.98439-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Now that there's a library function that calculates the SHA-256 digest
of a buffer in one step, use it instead of sha256_init() +
sha256_update() + sha256_final().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917045341.324996-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() requires that the optional argument
to the test_dummy_encryption mount option be specified as a substring_t.
That doesn't work well with filesystems that use the new mount API,
since the new way of parsing mount options doesn't use substring_t.
Make it take the argument as a 'const char *' instead.
Instead of moving the match_strdup() into the callers in ext4 and f2fs,
make them just use arg->from directly. Since the pattern is
"test_dummy_encryption=%s", the argument will be null-terminated.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-14-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The behavior of the test_dummy_encryption mount option is that when a
new file (or directory or symlink) is created in an unencrypted
directory, it's automatically encrypted using a dummy encryption policy.
That's it; in particular, the encryption (or lack thereof) of existing
files (or directories or symlinks) doesn't change.
Unfortunately the implementation of test_dummy_encryption is a bit weird
and confusing. When test_dummy_encryption is enabled and a file is
being created in an unencrypted directory, we set up an encryption key
(->i_crypt_info) for the directory. This isn't actually used to do any
encryption, however, since the directory is still unencrypted! Instead,
->i_crypt_info is only used for inheriting the encryption policy.
One consequence of this is that the filesystem ends up providing a
"dummy context" (policy + nonce) instead of a "dummy policy". In
commit ed318a6cc0 ("fscrypt: support test_dummy_encryption=v2"), I
mistakenly thought this was required. However, actually the nonce only
ends up being used to derive a key that is never used.
Another consequence of this implementation is that it allows for
'inode->i_crypt_info != NULL && !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)', which is an edge
case that can be forgotten about. For example, currently
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY on an unencrypted directory may return the
dummy encryption policy when the filesystem is mounted with
test_dummy_encryption. That seems like the wrong thing to do, since
again, the directory itself is not actually encrypted.
Therefore, switch to a more logical and maintainable implementation
where the dummy encryption policy inheritance is done without setting up
keys for unencrypted directories. This involves:
- Adding a function fscrypt_policy_to_inherit() which returns the
encryption policy to inherit from a directory. This can be a real
policy, a dummy policy, or no policy.
- Replacing struct fscrypt_dummy_context, ->get_dummy_context(), etc.
with struct fscrypt_dummy_policy, ->get_dummy_policy(), etc.
- Making fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() take an fscrypt_policy instead
of an inode.
Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-13-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
In preparation for moving the logic for "get the encryption policy
inherited by new files in this directory" to a single place, make
fscrypt_prepare_symlink() a regular function rather than an inline
function that wraps __fscrypt_prepare_symlink().
This way, the new function fscrypt_policy_to_inherit() won't need to be
exported to filesystems.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-12-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The fscrypt UAPI header defines fscrypt_policy to fscrypt_policy_v1,
for source compatibility with old userspace programs.
Internally, the kernel doesn't want that compatibility definition.
Instead, fscrypt_private.h #undefs it and re-defines it to a union.
That works for now. However, in order to add
fscrypt_operations::get_dummy_policy(), we'll need to forward declare
'union fscrypt_policy' in include/linux/fscrypt.h. That would cause
build errors because "fscrypt_policy" is used in ioctl numbers.
To avoid this, modify the UAPI header to make the fscrypt_policy
compatibility definition conditional on !__KERNEL__, and make the ioctls
use fscrypt_policy_v1 instead of fscrypt_policy.
Note that this doesn't change the actual ioctl numbers.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-11-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
fscrypt_get_encryption_info() has never actually been safe to call in a
context that needs GFP_NOFS, since it calls crypto_alloc_skcipher().
crypto_alloc_skcipher() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe, even if called under
memalloc_nofs_save(). This is because it may load kernel modules, and
also because it internally takes crypto_alg_sem. Other tasks can do
GFP_KERNEL allocations while holding crypto_alg_sem for write.
The use of fscrypt_init_mutex isn't GFP_NOFS-safe either.
So, stop pretending that fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is nofs-safe.
I.e., when it allocates memory, just use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_NOFS.
Note, another reason to do this is that GFP_NOFS is deprecated in favor
of using memalloc_nofs_save() in the proper places.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-10-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use
fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(), the encryption key for new symlink inodes
is now already set up whenever we try to encrypt the symlink target.
Enforce this rather than try to set up the key again when it may be too
late to do so safely.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-9-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use
fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context(),
fscrypt_inherit_context() is no longer used. Remove it.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-8-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Now that a fscrypt_info may be set up for inodes that are currently
being created and haven't yet had an inode number assigned, avoid
logging confusing messages about "inode 0".
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-7-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is intended to be GFP_NOFS-safe. But
actually it isn't, since it uses functions like crypto_alloc_skcipher()
which aren't GFP_NOFS-safe, even when called under memalloc_nofs_save().
Therefore it can deadlock when called from a context that needs
GFP_NOFS, e.g. during an ext4 transaction or between f2fs_lock_op() and
f2fs_unlock_op(). This happens when creating a new encrypted file.
We can't fix this by just not setting up the key for new inodes right
away, since new symlinks need their key to encrypt the symlink target.
So we need to set up the new inode's key before starting the
transaction. But just calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info() earlier
doesn't work, since it assumes the encryption context is already set,
and the encryption context can't be set until the transaction.
The recently proposed fscrypt support for the ceph filesystem
(https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fscrypt/20200821182813.52570-1-jlayton@kernel.org/T/#u)
will have this same ordering problem too, since ceph will need to
encrypt new symlinks before setting their encryption context.
Finally, f2fs can deadlock when the filesystem is mounted with
'-o test_dummy_encryption' and a new file is created in an existing
unencrypted directory. Similarly, this is caused by holding too many
locks when calling fscrypt_get_encryption_info().
To solve all these problems, add new helper functions:
- fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() sets up a new inode's encryption key
(fscrypt_info), using the parent directory's encryption policy and a
new random nonce. It neither reads nor writes the encryption context.
- fscrypt_set_context() persists the encryption context of a new inode,
using the information from the fscrypt_info already in memory. This
replaces fscrypt_inherit_context().
Temporarily keep fscrypt_inherit_context() around until all filesystems
have been converted to use fscrypt_set_context().
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Nathan Huckleberry
Eric Biggers
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Linus Torvalds
Christoph Hellwig
Ard Biesheuvel
Christian Brauner
Daniel Rosenberg