A recent commit factored out a series of annoying (unsigned long) casts
into a single variable declaration, but made the pointer type a
`uintptr_t` rather than the usual `unsigned long`. This patch changes it
to be the integer type more typically used by the kernel to represent
addresses.
Fixes: 35fb9ae4aa ("usercopy: Cast pointer to an integer once")
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220616143617.449094-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
If 'n' is so large that it's negative, we might wrap around and mistakenly
think that the copy is OK when it's not. Such a copy would probably
crash, but just doing the arithmetic in a more simple way lets us detect
and refuse this case.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220612213227.3881769-4-willy@infradead.org
Get rid of a lot of annoying casts by setting 'addr' once at the top
of the function.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220612213227.3881769-3-willy@infradead.org
vmalloc does not allocate a vm_struct for vm_map_ram() areas. That causes
us to deny usercopies from those areas. This affects XFS which uses
vm_map_ram() for its directories.
Fix this by calling find_vmap_area() instead of find_vm_area().
Fixes: 0aef499f31 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220612213227.3881769-2-willy@infradead.org
The is_kmap_addr() and the is_vmalloc_addr() in the check_heap_object()
will not work, because the virt_addr_valid() will exclude the kmap and
vmalloc regions. So let's move the virt_addr_valid() below
the is_vmalloc_addr().
Signed-off-by: Yuanzheng Song <songyuanzheng@huawei.com>
Fixes: 4e140f59d2 ("mm/usercopy: Check kmap addresses properly")
Fixes: 0aef499f31 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns")
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505071037.4121100-1-songyuanzheng@huawei.com
There isn't enough information to make this a useful check any more;
the useful parts of it were moved in earlier patches, so remove this
set of checks now.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-5-willy@infradead.org
Move the compound page overrun detection out of
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN and convert it to use folios so it's
enabled for more people.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-4-willy@infradead.org
If you have a vmalloc() allocation, or an address from calling vmap(),
you cannot overrun the vm_area which describes it, regardless of the
size of the underlying allocation. This probably doesn't do much for
security because vmalloc comes with guard pages these days, but it
prevents usercopy aborts when copying to a vmap() of smaller pages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-3-willy@infradead.org
If you are copying to an address in the kmap region, you may not copy
across a page boundary, no matter what the size of the underlying
allocation. You can't kmap() a slab page because slab pages always
come from low memory.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-2-willy@infradead.org
__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment). This prevents:
Unknown kernel command line parameters \
"BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 hardened_usercopy=off", will be \
passed to user space.
Run /sbin/init as init process
with arguments:
/sbin/init
with environment:
HOME=/
TERM=linux
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
hardened_usercopy=off
or
hardened_usercopy=on
but when "hardened_usercopy=foo" is used, there is no Unknown kernel
command line parameter.
Return 1 to indicate that the boot option has been handled.
Print a warning if strtobool() returns an error on the option string,
but do not mark this as in unknown command line option and do not cause
init's environment to be polluted with this string.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222034249.14795-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: b5cb15d937 ("usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Acked-by: Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One of the things that CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY sanity-checks is whether
an object that is about to be copied to/from userspace is overlapping
the stack at all. If it is, it performs a number of inexpensive
bounds checks. One of the finer-grained checks is whether an object
crosses stack frames within the stack region. Doing this on x86 with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER was cheap/easy. Doing it with ORC was deemed too
heavy, and was left out (a while ago), leaving the courser whole-stack
check.
The LKDTM tests USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO and USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM
try to exercise these cross-frame cases to validate the defense is
working. They have been failing ever since ORC was added (which was
expected). While Muhammad was investigating various LKDTM failures[1],
he asked me for additional details on them, and I realized that when
exact stack frame boundary checking is not available (i.e. everything
except x86 with FRAME_POINTER), it could check if a stack object is at
least "current depth valid", in the sense that any object within the
stack region but not between start-of-stack and current_stack_pointer
should be considered unavailable (i.e. its lifetime is from a call no
longer present on the stack).
Introduce ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER to track which architectures
have actually implemented the common global register alias.
Additionally report usercopy bounds checking failures with an offset
from current_stack_pointer, which may assist with diagnosing failures.
The LKDTM USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO and USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM tests
(once slightly adjusted in a separate patch) pass again with this fixed.
[1] https://github.com/kernelci/kernelci-project/issues/84
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220216201449.2087956-1-keescook@chromium.org
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220224060342.1855457-1-keescook@chromium.org
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220225173345.3358109-1-keescook@chromium.org
v4: - improve commit log (akpm)
Ensure that we're not seeing a tail page inside __check_heap_object() by
converting to a slab instead of a page. Take the opportunity to mark
the slab as const since we're not modifying it. Also move the
declaration of __check_heap_object() to mm/slab.h so it's not available
to the wider kernel.
[ vbabka@suse.cz: in check_heap_object() only convert to struct slab for
actual PageSlab pages; use folio as intermediate step instead of page ]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Drop the repeated word "the".
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200801173822.14973-13-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When running on a system with >512MB RAM with a 32-bit kernel built with:
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y
CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
all execve()s will fail due to argv copying into kmap()ed pages, and on
usercopy checking the calls ultimately of virt_to_page() will be looking
for "bad" kmap (highmem) pointers due to CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:83!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc8 #6
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 1318/0C236D, BIOS A04 01/15/2009
EIP: __phys_addr+0xaf/0x100
...
Call Trace:
__check_object_size+0xaf/0x3c0
? __might_sleep+0x80/0xa0
copy_strings+0x1c2/0x370
copy_strings_kernel+0x2b/0x40
__do_execve_file+0x4ca/0x810
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c7/0x370
do_execve+0x1b/0x20
...
The check is from arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:
VIRTUAL_BUG_ON((phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) > max_low_pfn);
Due to the kmap() in fs/exec.c:
kaddr = kmap(kmapped_page);
...
if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) ...
Now we can fetch the correct page to avoid the pfn check. In both cases,
hardened usercopy will need to walk the page-span checker (if enabled)
to do sanity checking.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/201909171056.7F2FFD17@keescook
Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at address
"ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses, the check in
check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is incorrect, as the
range of addresses that will be accessed is [ptr, ptr + (n - 1)].
This can lead to incorrectly detecting a wraparound in the memory
address, when trying to read 4 KB from memory that is mapped to the the
last possible page in the virtual address space, when in fact, accessing
that range of memory would not cause a wraparound to occur.
Use the memory range that will actually be accessed when considering if
accessing a certain amount of bytes will cause the memory address to
wrap around.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564509253-23287-1-git-send-email-isaacm@codeaurora.org
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacm@codeaurora.org>
Co-developed-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Trilok Soni <tsoni@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
It is easy to trigger this with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y,
usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages (offset 0, size 23)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
For example,
print_worker_info
char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { };
char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { };
probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);
probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1);
__copy_from_user_inatomic
check_object_size
check_heap_object
check_page_span
This is because on-stack variables could cross PAGE_SIZE boundary, and
failed this check,
if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
ptr = FFFF889007D7EFF8
end = FFFF889007D7F00E
Hence, fix it by checking if it is a stack object first.
[keescook@chromium.org: improve comments after reorder]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103165151.GA32845@beast
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231030254.99441-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Enabling HARDENED_USERCOPY may cause measurable regressions in networking
performance: up to 8% under UDP flood.
I ran a small packet UDP flood using pktgen vs. a host b2b connected. On
the receiver side the UDP packets are processed by a simple user space
process that just reads and drops them:
https://github.com/netoptimizer/network-testing/blob/master/src/udp_sink.c
Not very useful from a functional PoV, but it helps to pin-point
bottlenecks in the networking stack.
When running a kernel with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, I see a 5-8%
regression in the receive tput, compared to the same kernel without this
option enabled.
With CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, perf shows ~6% of CPU time spent
cumulatively in __check_object_size (~4%) and __virt_addr_valid (~2%).
The call-chain is:
__GI___libc_recvfrom
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
do_syscall_64
__x64_sys_recvfrom
__sys_recvfrom
inet_recvmsg
udp_recvmsg
__check_object_size
udp_recvmsg() actually calls copy_to_iter() (inlined) and the latters
calls check_copy_size() (again, inlined).
A generic distro may want to enable HARDENED_USERCOPY in their default
kernel config, but at the same time, such distro may want to be able to
avoid the performance penalties in with the default configuration and
disable the stricter check on a per-boot basis.
This change adds a boot parameter that conditionally disables
HARDENED_USERCOPY via "hardened_usercopy=off".
Signed-off-by: Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified
from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the
last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations
in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's
defined usercopy region.
Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This refactors the hardened usercopy code so that failure reporting can
happen within the checking functions instead of at the top level. This
simplifies the return value handling and allows more details and offsets
to be included in the report. Having the offset can be much more helpful
in understanding hardened usercopy bugs.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Using %p was already mostly useless in the usercopy overflow reports,
so this removes it entirely to avoid confusion now that %p-hashing
is enabled.
Fixes: ad67b74d24 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Previously virt_addr_valid() was insufficient to validate if virt_to_page()
could be called on an address on arm64. This has since been fixed up so
there is no need for the extra check. Drop it.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch moves the arch_within_stack_frames() return value enum up in
the header files so that per-architecture implementations can reuse the
same return values.
Signed-off-by: Sahara <keun-o.park@darkmatter.ae>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[kees: adjusted naming and commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The usercopy checking code currently calls __va(__pa(...)) to check for
aliases on symbols. Switch to using lm_alias instead.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
While running a compile on arm64, I hit a memory exposure
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from fffffc0000f3b1a8 (buffer_head) (1 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT
nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_broute bridge stp
llc ebtable_nat ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_nat
nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle
iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle
ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables vfat fat xgene_edac
xgene_enet edac_core i2c_xgene_slimpro i2c_core at803x realtek xgene_dma
mdio_xgene gpio_dwapb gpio_xgene_sb xgene_rng mailbox_xgene_slimpro nfsd
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sdhci_of_arasan
sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core xhci_plat_hcd gpio_keys
CPU: 0 PID: 19744 Comm: updatedb Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc3-threadinfo+ #1
Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016
task: fffffe03df944c00 task.stack: fffffe00d128c000
PC is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
LR is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
...
[<fffffc00082b4280>] __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
[<fffffc00082cdc30>] filldir64+0x158/0x1a0
[<fffffc0000f327e8>] __fat_readdir+0x4a0/0x558 [fat]
[<fffffc0000f328d4>] fat_readdir+0x34/0x40 [fat]
[<fffffc00082cd8f8>] iterate_dir+0x190/0x1e0
[<fffffc00082cde58>] SyS_getdents64+0x88/0x120
[<fffffc0008082c70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
fffffc0000f3b1a8 is a module address. Modules may have compiled in
strings which could get copied to userspace. In this instance, it
looks like "." which matches with a size of 1 byte. Extend the
is_vmalloc_addr check to be is_vmalloc_or_module_addr to cover
all possible cases.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been
found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker
by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be
tracked down later.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326
Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org>
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
ptr + n < ptr
Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
(long)n < 0
Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.
This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
- object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
- object must not extend before/after the current process stack
- object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Jason A. Donenfeld
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Yuanzheng Song
Linus Torvalds
Randy Dunlap
Christophe Leroy
Kees Cook
Isaac J. Manjarres
Thomas Gleixner
Qian Cai
Chris von Recklinghausen
Laura Abbott
Sahara
Ingo Molnar
Josh Poimboeuf
Eric Biggers