58 строки
2.0 KiB
Plaintext
58 строки
2.0 KiB
Plaintext
menu "Kernel hacking"
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source "lib/Kconfig.debug"
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config FRAME_POINTER
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bool
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default y
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config STRICT_DEVMEM
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bool "Filter access to /dev/mem"
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depends on MMU
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help
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If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
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of memory, including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental
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access to this is obviously disastrous, but specific access can
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be used by people debugging the kernel.
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If this option is switched on, the /dev/mem file only allows
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userspace access to memory mapped peripherals.
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If in doubt, say Y.
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config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
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bool "Write the current PID to the CONTEXTIDR register"
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help
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Enabling this option causes the kernel to write the current PID to
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the CONTEXTIDR register, at the expense of some additional
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instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you are
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planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
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config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
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bool "Randomize TEXT_OFFSET at build time"
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help
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Say Y here if you want the image load offset (AKA TEXT_OFFSET)
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of the kernel to be randomized at build-time. When selected,
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this option will cause TEXT_OFFSET to be randomized upon any
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build of the kernel, and the offset will be reflected in the
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text_offset field of the resulting Image. This can be used to
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fuzz-test bootloaders which respect text_offset.
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This option is intended for bootloader and/or kernel testing
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only. Bootloaders must make no assumptions regarding the value
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of TEXT_OFFSET and platforms must not require a specific
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value.
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config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
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bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
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depends on MODULES
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help
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This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
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kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
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of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
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patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
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against certain classes of kernel exploits.
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If in doubt, say "N".
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endmenu
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