WSL2-Linux-Kernel/fs/attr.c

501 строка
15 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* linux/fs/attr.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
* changes by Thomas Schoebel-Theuer
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include "internal.h"
/**
* setattr_should_drop_sgid - determine whether the setgid bit needs to be
* removed
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
* @inode: inode to check
*
* This function determines whether the setgid bit needs to be removed.
* We retain backwards compatibility and require setgid bit to be removed
* unconditionally if S_IXGRP is set. Otherwise we have the exact same
* requirements as setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy().
*
* Return: ATTR_KILL_SGID if setgid bit needs to be removed, 0 otherwise.
*/
int setattr_should_drop_sgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct inode *inode)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
if (!(mode & S_ISGID))
return 0;
if (mode & S_IXGRP)
return ATTR_KILL_SGID;
if (!in_group_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode,
i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return ATTR_KILL_SGID;
return 0;
}
/**
* setattr_should_drop_suidgid - determine whether the set{g,u}id bit needs to
* be dropped
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
* @inode: inode to check
*
* This function determines whether the set{g,u}id bits need to be removed.
* If the setuid bit needs to be removed ATTR_KILL_SUID is returned. If the
* setgid bit needs to be removed ATTR_KILL_SGID is returned. If both
* set{g,u}id bits need to be removed the corresponding mask of both flags is
* returned.
*
* Return: A mask of ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID indicating which - if any - setid bits
* to remove, 0 otherwise.
*/
int setattr_should_drop_suidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int kill = 0;
/* suid always must be killed */
if (unlikely(mode & S_ISUID))
kill = ATTR_KILL_SUID;
kill |= setattr_should_drop_sgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
return kill;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_should_drop_suidgid);
/**
* chown_ok - verify permissions to chown inode
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
* @inode: inode to check permissions on
* @uid: uid to chown @inode to
*
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
static bool chown_ok(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct inode *inode,
kuid_t uid)
{
kuid_t kuid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), kuid) && uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
return true;
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return true;
if (uid_eq(kuid, INVALID_UID) &&
ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
return true;
return false;
}
/**
* chgrp_ok - verify permissions to chgrp inode
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount @inode was found from
* @inode: inode to check permissions on
* @gid: gid to chown @inode to
*
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
static bool chgrp_ok(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
{
kgid_t kgid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) {
kgid_t mapped_gid;
if (gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid))
return true;
mapped_gid = mapped_kgid_fs(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode), gid);
if (in_group_p(mapped_gid))
return true;
}
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return true;
if (gid_eq(kgid, INVALID_GID) &&
ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
return true;
return false;
}
/**
* setattr_prepare - check if attribute changes to a dentry are allowed
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @dentry: dentry to check
* @attr: attributes to change
*
* Check if we are allowed to change the attributes contained in @attr
* in the given dentry. This includes the normal unix access permission
* checks, as well as checks for rlimits and others. The function also clears
* SGID bit from mode if user is not allowed to set it. Also file capabilities
* and IMA extended attributes are cleared if ATTR_KILL_PRIV is set.
*
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*
* Should be called as the first thing in ->setattr implementations,
* possibly after taking additional locks.
*/
int setattr_prepare(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
/*
* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
* ATTR_FORCE.
*/
if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (error)
return error;
}
/* If force is set do it anyway. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
goto kill_priv;
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(mnt_userns, inode, attr->ia_uid))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !chgrp_ok(mnt_userns, inode, attr->ia_gid))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
kgid_t mapped_gid;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
mapped_gid = mapped_kgid_fs(mnt_userns,
i_user_ns(inode), attr->ia_gid);
else
mapped_gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode, mapped_gid))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
/* Check for setting the inode time. */
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
}
kill_priv:
/* User has permission for the change */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
int error;
error = security_inode_killpriv(mnt_userns, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_prepare);
/**
* inode_newsize_ok - may this inode be truncated to a given size
* @inode: the inode to be truncated
* @offset: the new size to assign to the inode
*
* inode_newsize_ok must be called with i_mutex held.
*
* inode_newsize_ok will check filesystem limits and ulimits to check that the
* new inode size is within limits. inode_newsize_ok will also send SIGXFSZ
* when necessary. Caller must not proceed with inode size change if failure is
* returned. @inode must be a file (not directory), with appropriate
* permissions to allow truncate (inode_newsize_ok does NOT check these
* conditions).
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ve errno on failure
*/
int inode_newsize_ok(const struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
{
if (offset < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (inode->i_size < offset) {
unsigned long limit;
limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
goto out_sig;
if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
goto out_big;
} else {
/*
* truncation of in-use swapfiles is disallowed - it would
* cause subsequent swapout to scribble on the now-freed
* blocks.
*/
if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
return -ETXTBSY;
}
return 0;
out_sig:
send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
out_big:
return -EFBIG;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_newsize_ok);
/**
* setattr_copy - copy simple metadata updates into the generic inode
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: the inode to be updated
* @attr: the new attributes
*
* setattr_copy must be called with i_mutex held.
*
* setattr_copy updates the inode's metadata with that specified
* in attr on idmapped mounts. If file ownership is changed setattr_copy
* doesn't map ia_uid and ia_gid. It will asssume the caller has already
* provided the intended values. Necessary permission checks to determine
* whether or not the S_ISGID property needs to be removed are performed with
* the correct idmapped mount permission helpers.
* Noticeably missing is inode size update, which is more complex
* as it requires pagecache updates.
*
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*
* The inode is not marked as dirty after this operation. The rationale is
* that for "simple" filesystems, the struct inode is the inode storage.
* The caller is free to mark the inode dirty afterwards if needed.
*/
void setattr_copy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
inode->i_uid = attr->ia_uid;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
inode->i_gid = attr->ia_gid;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
inode->i_atime = attr->ia_atime;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
inode->i_mtime = attr->ia_mtime;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
inode->i_ctime = attr->ia_ctime;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
kgid_t kgid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!in_group_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode, kgid))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
int may_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int ia_valid)
{
int error;
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
* times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
*/
if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode)) {
error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(may_setattr);
/**
* notify_change - modify attributes of a filesytem object
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @dentry: object affected
* @attr: new attributes
* @delegated_inode: returns inode, if the inode is delegated
*
* The caller must hold the i_mutex on the affected object.
*
* If notify_change discovers a delegation in need of breaking,
* it will return -EWOULDBLOCK and return a reference to the inode in
* delegated_inode. The caller should then break the delegation and
* retry. Because breaking a delegation may take a long time, the
* caller should drop the i_mutex before doing so.
*
* If file ownership is changed notify_change() doesn't map ia_uid and
* ia_gid. It will asssume the caller has already provided the intended values.
*
* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
* to be NFS exported. Also, passing NULL is fine for callers holding
* the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
* that case.
*
* If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
* the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
* take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
* permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
* performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
int notify_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int error;
struct timespec64 now;
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
error = may_setattr(mnt_userns, inode, ia_valid);
if (error)
return error;
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode;
/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
if (is_sxid(amode))
inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
}
now = current_time(inode);
attr->ia_ctime = now;
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
attr->ia_atime = now;
else
attr->ia_atime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_atime, inode);
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET))
attr->ia_mtime = now;
else
attr->ia_mtime = timestamp_truncate(attr->ia_mtime, inode);
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (error == 0)
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
}
/*
* We now pass ATTR_KILL_S*ID to the lower level setattr function so
* that the function has the ability to reinterpret a mode change
* that's due to these bits. This adds an implicit restriction that
* no function will ever call notify_change with both ATTR_MODE and
* ATTR_KILL_S*ID set.
*/
if ((ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) &&
(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE))
BUG();
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SUID) {
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
}
}
if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_SGID) {
if (mode & S_ISGID) {
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE;
attr->ia_mode = inode->i_mode;
}
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
}
if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)))
return 0;
/*
* Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target
* namespace of the superblock.
*/
if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
!kuid_has_mapping(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_uid))
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
!kgid_has_mapping(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_gid))
return -EOVERFLOW;
/* Don't allow modifications of files with invalid uids or
* gids unless those uids & gids are being made valid.
*/
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
!gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
if (error)
return error;
error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
if (error)
return error;
if (inode->i_op->setattr)
error = inode->i_op->setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
else
error = simple_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
ima_inode_post_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry);
evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
}
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);