зеркало из https://github.com/microsoft/docker.git
1c4202a614
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely on writing some file in those filesystems. This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts) are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers. Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs. All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication. Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo) |
||
---|---|---|
.. | ||
build_tests/TestBuildSixtySteps | ||
run_tests/TestVolumeWithSymlink | ||
docker_cli_attach_test.go | ||
docker_cli_build_test.go | ||
docker_cli_commit_test.go | ||
docker_cli_diff_test.go | ||
docker_cli_export_import_test.go | ||
docker_cli_images_test.go | ||
docker_cli_import_test.go | ||
docker_cli_info_test.go | ||
docker_cli_kill_test.go | ||
docker_cli_logs_test.go | ||
docker_cli_nat_test.go | ||
docker_cli_pull_test.go | ||
docker_cli_push_test.go | ||
docker_cli_rm_test.go | ||
docker_cli_run_test.go | ||
docker_cli_save_load_test.go | ||
docker_cli_search_test.go | ||
docker_cli_tag_test.go | ||
docker_cli_top_test.go | ||
docker_cli_version_test.go | ||
docker_test_vars.go | ||
docker_utils.go | ||
utils.go |