2005-07-09 03:20:59 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* I'm tired of doing "vsnprintf()" etc just to open a
|
|
|
|
* file, so here's a "return static buffer with printf"
|
|
|
|
* interface for paths.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* It's obviously not thread-safe. Sue me. But it's quite
|
|
|
|
* useful for doing things like
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* f = open(mkpath("%s/%s.git", base, name), O_RDONLY);
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* which is what it's designed for.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "cache.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-11 23:03:15 +04:00
|
|
|
static char *get_pathname(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static char pathname_array[4][PATH_MAX];
|
|
|
|
static int index;
|
|
|
|
return pathname_array[3 & ++index];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-09 03:20:59 +04:00
|
|
|
static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Clean it up */
|
|
|
|
if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
|
|
|
|
path += 2;
|
|
|
|
while (*path == '/')
|
|
|
|
path++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return path;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *mkpath(const char *fmt, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
|
|
unsigned len;
|
2006-09-11 23:03:15 +04:00
|
|
|
char *pathname = get_pathname();
|
2005-07-09 03:20:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
va_start(args, fmt);
|
|
|
|
len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
|
|
|
|
va_end(args);
|
|
|
|
if (len >= PATH_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return bad_path;
|
|
|
|
return cleanup_path(pathname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-09-27 00:54:01 +04:00
|
|
|
const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
|
2006-09-11 23:03:15 +04:00
|
|
|
char *pathname = get_pathname();
|
2005-07-09 03:20:59 +04:00
|
|
|
va_list args;
|
|
|
|
unsigned len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(git_dir);
|
|
|
|
if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
|
|
|
|
return bad_path;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pathname, git_dir, len);
|
|
|
|
if (len && git_dir[len-1] != '/')
|
|
|
|
pathname[len++] = '/';
|
|
|
|
va_start(args, fmt);
|
|
|
|
len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
|
|
|
|
va_end(args);
|
|
|
|
if (len >= PATH_MAX)
|
|
|
|
return bad_path;
|
|
|
|
return cleanup_path(pathname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-08-05 00:43:03 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
|
|
|
|
int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2007-07-26 08:34:53 +04:00
|
|
|
const char *tmp;
|
|
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
|
|
|
|
if (!tmp)
|
|
|
|
tmp = "/tmp";
|
|
|
|
n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
|
|
|
|
if (len <= n) {
|
|
|
|
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2005-08-09 00:33:08 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-08-05 00:43:03 +04:00
|
|
|
return mkstemp(path);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007-01-02 10:31:08 +03:00
|
|
|
int validate_headref(const char *path)
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
|
|
char *buf, buffer[256];
|
2007-01-02 10:31:08 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned char sha1[20];
|
2008-04-27 22:21:58 +04:00
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
|
|
ssize_t len;
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
|
|
|
|
if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-01-08 18:58:08 +03:00
|
|
|
len = read_in_full(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Is it a symbolic ref?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-01-02 10:31:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len < 4)
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2007-01-02 10:31:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4)) {
|
|
|
|
buf = buffer + 4;
|
|
|
|
len -= 4;
|
|
|
|
while (len && isspace(*buf))
|
|
|
|
buf++, len--;
|
|
|
|
if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Is this a detached HEAD?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!get_sha1_hex(buffer, sha1))
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-01-02 10:31:08 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
|
|
char *slash;
|
|
|
|
int len, baselen;
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!path || path[0] != '~')
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
path++;
|
|
|
|
slash = strchr(path, '/');
|
|
|
|
if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
|
|
|
|
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
if (slash) {
|
|
|
|
*slash = 0;
|
|
|
|
pw = getpwnam(path);
|
|
|
|
*slash = '/';
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
pw = getpwnam(path);
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
|
|
|
|
while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
|
|
|
|
buf[baselen-1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
baselen--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (slash && slash[1]) {
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(slash);
|
|
|
|
if (sz <= baselen + len)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
|
|
|
|
* done. Otherwise:
|
|
|
|
* (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
|
|
|
|
* (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
|
|
|
|
* (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
|
|
|
|
* (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
|
|
|
|
* "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
|
|
|
|
* what we try.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
|
|
|
|
* Upon failure, we return NULL.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
|
|
|
|
* before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
|
|
|
|
* links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
|
|
|
|
* except DWIM suffixing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
|
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
|
|
|
|
static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!path)
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!strict) {
|
|
|
|
static const char *suffix[] = {
|
|
|
|
".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int len = strlen(path);
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
|
|
|
|
path[len-1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PATH_MAX <= len)
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (path[0] == '~') {
|
|
|
|
if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
strcpy(validated_path, path);
|
|
|
|
path = used_path;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
path = strcpy(used_path, path);
|
|
|
|
strcpy(validated_path, path);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(path);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
|
|
|
|
strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
|
|
|
|
strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
path = validated_path;
|
2005-11-19 01:59:34 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
else if (chdir(path))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
|
2007-01-02 10:31:08 +03:00
|
|
|
validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
|
2007-06-28 18:15:25 +04:00
|
|
|
setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1);
|
2005-11-25 21:48:26 +03:00
|
|
|
check_repository_format();
|
[PATCH] daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation.
The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from
enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained
from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed
earier (mid October 2005).
Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped.
For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to
its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the
administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time
/pub needs to point at a different partition for storage
allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using
/pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property.
So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir()
and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the
directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path,
it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still
reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to
do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git).
What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user
relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user
home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say
/home if the advertised way to access user home directories are
~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid
unnecessary aliasing issues.
Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to
guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor
does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting
/../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the
belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose.
This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally,
because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to
honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack
and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2005-12-03 12:45:57 +03:00
|
|
|
return path;
|
2005-11-17 22:37:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-10 09:07:23 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int adjust_shared_perm(const char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!shared_repository)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
mode = st.st_mode;
|
2008-04-16 12:34:24 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (shared_repository) {
|
|
|
|
int tweak = shared_repository;
|
|
|
|
if (!(mode & S_IWUSR))
|
|
|
|
tweak &= ~0222;
|
|
|
|
mode = (mode & ~0777) | tweak;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Preserve old PERM_UMASK behaviour */
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_IWUSR)
|
|
|
|
mode |= S_IWGRP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
|
2008-03-05 02:15:39 +03:00
|
|
|
mode |= FORCE_DIR_SET_GID;
|
2008-04-16 12:34:24 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy read bits to execute bits */
|
|
|
|
mode |= (shared_repository & 0444) >> 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-04 23:24:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((mode & st.st_mode) != mode && chmod(path, mode) < 0)
|
2006-06-10 09:07:23 +04:00
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-01 04:28:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We allow "recursive" symbolic links. Only within reason, though. */
|
|
|
|
#define MAXDEPTH 5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *make_absolute_path(const char *path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static char bufs[2][PATH_MAX + 1], *buf = bufs[0], *next_buf = bufs[1];
|
|
|
|
char cwd[1024] = "";
|
|
|
|
int buf_index = 1, len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int depth = MAXDEPTH;
|
|
|
|
char *last_elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strlcpy(buf, path, PATH_MAX) >= PATH_MAX)
|
|
|
|
die ("Too long path: %.*s", 60, path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (depth--) {
|
|
|
|
if (stat(buf, &st) || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
char *last_slash = strrchr(buf, '/');
|
|
|
|
if (last_slash) {
|
|
|
|
*last_slash = '\0';
|
|
|
|
last_elem = xstrdup(last_slash + 1);
|
2008-03-02 10:40:33 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2007-08-01 04:28:59 +04:00
|
|
|
last_elem = xstrdup(buf);
|
2008-03-02 10:40:33 +03:00
|
|
|
*buf = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-01 04:28:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*buf) {
|
|
|
|
if (!*cwd && !getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)))
|
|
|
|
die ("Could not get current working directory");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (chdir(buf))
|
|
|
|
die ("Could not switch to '%s'", buf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!getcwd(buf, PATH_MAX))
|
|
|
|
die ("Could not get current working directory");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (last_elem) {
|
|
|
|
int len = strlen(buf);
|
|
|
|
if (len + strlen(last_elem) + 2 > PATH_MAX)
|
|
|
|
die ("Too long path name: '%s/%s'",
|
|
|
|
buf, last_elem);
|
|
|
|
buf[len] = '/';
|
|
|
|
strcpy(buf + len + 1, last_elem);
|
|
|
|
free(last_elem);
|
|
|
|
last_elem = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!lstat(buf, &st) && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
len = readlink(buf, next_buf, PATH_MAX);
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
|
|
die ("Invalid symlink: %s", buf);
|
|
|
|
next_buf[len] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
buf = next_buf;
|
|
|
|
buf_index = 1 - buf_index;
|
|
|
|
next_buf = bufs[buf_index];
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*cwd && chdir(cwd))
|
|
|
|
die ("Could not change back to '%s'", cwd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|