Sync with 2.32.6

* maint-2.32:
  Git 2.32.6
  Git 2.31.7
  Git 2.30.8
  apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links
  dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS
  clone: delay picking a transport until after get_repo_path()
  t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport

Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Git v2.30.8 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release addresses the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and
+CVE-2023-23946.
+
+
+Fixes since v2.30.7
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2023-22490:
+
+   Using a specially-crafted repository, Git can be tricked into using
+   its local clone optimization even when using a non-local transport.
+   Though Git will abort local clones whose source $GIT_DIR/objects
+   directory contains symbolic links (c.f., CVE-2022-39253), the objects
+   directory itself may still be a symbolic link.
+
+   These two may be combined to include arbitrary files based on known
+   paths on the victim's filesystem within the malicious repository's
+   working copy, allowing for data exfiltration in a similar manner as
+   CVE-2022-39253.
+
+ * CVE-2023-23946:
+
+   By feeding a crafted input to "git apply", a path outside the
+   working tree can be overwritten as the user who is running "git
+   apply".
+
+ * A mismatched type in `attr.c::read_attr_from_index()` which could
+   cause Git to errantly reject attributes on Windows and 32-bit Linux
+   has been corrected.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2023-22490 goes to yvvdwf, and the fix was
+developed by Taylor Blau, with additional help from others on the
+Git security mailing list.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2023-23946 goes to Joern Schneeweisz, and the
+fix was developed by Patrick Steinhardt.
+
+
+Johannes Schindelin (1):
+      attr: adjust a mismatched data type
+
+Patrick Steinhardt (1):
+      apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links
+
+Taylor Blau (3):
+      t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport
+      clone: delay picking a transport until after get_repo_path()
+      dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS
+

Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Git v2.31.7 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.8 to
+address the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946;
+see the release notes for that version for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Git v2.32.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.8 and v2.31.7
+to address the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946;
+see the release notes for these versions for details.

apply.c

@@ -4424,6 +4424,33 @@ static int create_one_file(struct apply_state *state,
 	if (state->cached)
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * We already try to detect whether files are beyond a symlink in our
+	 * up-front checks. But in the case where symlinks are created by any
+	 * of the intermediate hunks it can happen that our up-front checks
+	 * didn't yet see the symlink, but at the point of arriving here there
+	 * in fact is one. We thus repeat the check for symlinks here.
+	 *
+	 * Note that this does not make the up-front check obsolete as the
+	 * failure mode is different:
+	 *
+	 * - The up-front checks cause us to abort before we have written
+	 *   anything into the working directory. So when we exit this way the
+	 *   working directory remains clean.
+	 *
+	 * - The checks here happen in the middle of the action where we have
+	 *   already started to apply the patch. The end result will be a dirty
+	 *   working directory.
+	 *
+	 * Ideally, we should update the up-front checks to catch what would
+	 * happen when we apply the patch before we damage the working tree.
+	 * We have all the information necessary to do so.  But for now, as a
+	 * part of embargoed security work, having this check would serve as a
+	 * reasonable first step.
+	 */
+	if (path_is_beyond_symlink(state, path))
+		return error(_("affected file '%s' is beyond a symbolic link"), path);
+
 	res = try_create_file(state, path, mode, buf, size);
 	if (res < 0)
 		return -1;

builtin/clone.c

@@ -1220,10 +1220,6 @@ int cmd_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 	refspec_appendf(&remote->fetch, "+%s*:%s*", src_ref_prefix,
 			branch_top.buf);
 
-	transport = transport_get(remote, remote->url[0]);
-	transport_set_verbosity(transport, option_verbosity, option_progress);
-	transport->family = family;
-
 	path = get_repo_path(remote->url[0], &is_bundle);
 	is_local = option_local != 0 && path && !is_bundle;
 	if (is_local) {
@@ -1245,6 +1241,10 @@ int cmd_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
 	}
 	if (option_local > 0 && !is_local)
 		warning(_("--local is ignored"));
+
+	transport = transport_get(remote, path ? path : remote->url[0]);
+	transport_set_verbosity(transport, option_verbosity, option_progress);
+	transport->family = family;
 	transport->cloning = 1;
 
 	transport_set_option(transport, TRANS_OPT_KEEP, "yes");

dir-iterator.c

@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator_begin(const char *path, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct dir_iterator_int *iter = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*iter));
 	struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator = &iter->base;
-	int saved_errno;
+	int saved_errno, err;
 
 	strbuf_init(&iter->base.path, PATH_MAX);
 	strbuf_addstr(&iter->base.path, path);
@@ -213,10 +213,15 @@ struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator_begin(const char *path, unsigned int flags)
 	iter->flags = flags;
 
 	/*
-	 * Note: stat already checks for NULL or empty strings and
-	 * inexistent paths.
+	 * Note: stat/lstat already checks for NULL or empty strings and
+	 * nonexistent paths.
 	 */
-	if (stat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st) < 0) {
+	if (iter->flags & DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS)
+		err = stat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st);
+	else
+		err = lstat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st);
+
+	if (err < 0) {
 		saved_errno = errno;
 		goto error_out;
 	}

dir-iterator.h

@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@
  *   not the symlinks themselves, which is the default behavior. Broken
  *   symlinks are ignored.
  *
+ *   Note: setting DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS affects resolving the
+ *   starting path as well (e.g., attempting to iterate starting at a
+ *   symbolic link pointing to a directory without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS will
+ *   result in an error).
+ *
  * Warning: circular symlinks are also followed when
  * DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS is set. The iteration may end up with
  * an ELOOP if they happen and DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC is set.

t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh

@@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup dirs with symlinks' '
 	mkdir -p dir5/a/c &&
 	ln -s ../c dir5/a/b/d &&
 	ln -s ../ dir5/a/b/e &&
-	ln -s ../../ dir5/a/b/f
+	ln -s ../../ dir5/a/b/f &&
+
+	ln -s dir4 dir6
 '
 
 test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator should not follow symlinks by default' '
@@ -145,4 +147,27 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator should follow symlinks w/ follow flag
 	test_cmp expected-follow-sorted-output actual-follow-sorted-output
 '
 
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator does not resolve top-level symlinks' '
+	test_must_fail test-tool dir-iterator ./dir6 >out &&
+
+	grep "ENOTDIR" out
+'
+
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator resolves top-level symlinks w/ follow flag' '
+	cat >expected-follow-sorted-output <<-EOF &&
+	[d] (a) [a] ./dir6/a
+	[d] (a/f) [f] ./dir6/a/f
+	[d] (a/f/c) [c] ./dir6/a/f/c
+	[d] (b) [b] ./dir6/b
+	[d] (b/c) [c] ./dir6/b/c
+	[f] (a/d) [d] ./dir6/a/d
+	[f] (a/e) [e] ./dir6/a/e
+	EOF
+
+	test-tool dir-iterator --follow-symlinks ./dir6 >out &&
+	sort out >actual-follow-sorted-output &&
+
+	test_cmp expected-follow-sorted-output actual-follow-sorted-output
+'
+
 test_done

t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh

@@ -44,4 +44,85 @@ test_expect_success 'apply --index symlink patch' '
 
 '
 
+test_expect_success 'symlink setup' '
+	ln -s .git symlink &&
+	git add symlink &&
+	git commit -m "add symlink"
+'
+
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when creating new files' '
+	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx" &&
+
+	cat >patch <<-EOF &&
+	diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink
+	similarity index 100%
+	rename from symlink
+	rename to renamed-symlink
+	--
+	diff --git /dev/null b/renamed-symlink/create-me
+	new file mode 100644
+	index 0000000..039727e
+	--- /dev/null
+	+++ b/renamed-symlink/create-me
+	@@ -0,0 +1,1 @@
+	+busted
+	EOF
+
+	test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr &&
+	cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF &&
+	error: affected file ${SQ}renamed-symlink/create-me${SQ} is beyond a symbolic link
+	EOF
+	test_cmp expected_stderr stderr &&
+	! test_path_exists .git/create-me
+'
+
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when modifying file' '
+	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx" &&
+	touch .git/modify-me &&
+
+	cat >patch <<-EOF &&
+	diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink
+	similarity index 100%
+	rename from symlink
+	rename to renamed-symlink
+	--
+	diff --git a/renamed-symlink/modify-me b/renamed-symlink/modify-me
+	index 1111111..2222222 100644
+	--- a/renamed-symlink/modify-me
+	+++ b/renamed-symlink/modify-me
+	@@ -0,0 +1,1 @@
+	+busted
+	EOF
+
+	test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr &&
+	cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF &&
+	error: renamed-symlink/modify-me: No such file or directory
+	EOF
+	test_cmp expected_stderr stderr &&
+	test_must_be_empty .git/modify-me
+'
+
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when deleting file' '
+	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx && rm .git/delete-me" &&
+	touch .git/delete-me &&
+
+	cat >patch <<-EOF &&
+	diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink
+	similarity index 100%
+	rename from symlink
+	rename to renamed-symlink
+	--
+	diff --git a/renamed-symlink/delete-me b/renamed-symlink/delete-me
+	deleted file mode 100644
+	index 1111111..0000000 100644
+	EOF
+
+	test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr &&
+	cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF &&
+	error: renamed-symlink/delete-me: No such file or directory
+	EOF
+	test_cmp expected_stderr stderr &&
+	test_path_is_file .git/delete-me
+'
+
 test_done

t/t5604-clone-reference.sh

@@ -344,4 +344,20 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked or unknown files at obje
 	test_must_be_empty T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw
 '
 
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked objects directory' '
+	test_when_finished "rm -fr sensitive malicious" &&
+
+	mkdir -p sensitive &&
+	echo "secret" >sensitive/file &&
+
+	git init malicious &&
+	rm -fr malicious/.git/objects &&
+	ln -s "$(pwd)/sensitive" ./malicious/.git/objects &&
+
+	test_must_fail git clone --local malicious clone 2>err &&
+
+	test_path_is_missing clone &&
+	grep "failed to start iterator over" err
+'
+
 test_done

t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test local clone with ambiguous transport'
+
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh"
+
+if ! test_have_prereq SYMLINKS
+then
+	skip_all='skipping test, symlink support unavailable'
+	test_done
+fi
+
+start_httpd
+
+REPO="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/sub.git"
+URI="$HTTPD_URL/dumb/sub.git"
+
+test_expect_success 'setup' '
+	mkdir -p sensitive &&
+	echo "secret" >sensitive/secret &&
+
+	git init --bare "$REPO" &&
+	test_commit_bulk -C "$REPO" --ref=main 1 &&
+
+	git -C "$REPO" update-ref HEAD main &&
+	git -C "$REPO" update-server-info &&
+
+	git init malicious &&
+	(
+		cd malicious &&
+
+		git submodule add "$URI" &&
+
+		mkdir -p repo/refs &&
+		touch repo/refs/.gitkeep &&
+		printf "ref: refs/heads/a" >repo/HEAD &&
+		ln -s "$(cd .. && pwd)/sensitive" repo/objects &&
+
+		mkdir -p "$HTTPD_URL/dumb" &&
+		ln -s "../../../.git/modules/sub/../../../repo/" "$URI" &&
+
+		git add . &&
+		git commit -m "initial commit"
+	) &&
+
+	# Delete all of the references in our malicious submodule to
+	# avoid the client attempting to checkout any objects (which
+	# will be missing, and thus will cause the clone to fail before
+	# we can trigger the exploit).
+	git -C "$REPO" for-each-ref --format="delete %(refname)" >in &&
+	git -C "$REPO" update-ref --stdin <in &&
+	git -C "$REPO" update-server-info
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary file-inclusion' '
+	git clone malicious clone &&
+	test_must_fail git -C clone submodule update --init 2>err &&
+
+	test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret &&
+	# We would actually expect "transport .file. not allowed" here,
+	# but due to quirks of the URL detection in Git, we mis-parse
+	# the absolute path as a bogus URL and die before that step.
+	#
+	# This works for now, and if we ever fix the URL detection, it
+	# is OK to change this to detect the transport error.
+	grep "protocol .* is not supported" err
+'
+
+test_done