gecko-dev/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c

/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
 * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
 * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
 * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
 * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
 *
 * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
 * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
 * License.
 *
 * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
 *
 * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
 * Netscape Communications Corporation.
 * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
 * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Contributor(s):
 *   Dr Stephen Henson <stephen.henson@gemplus.com>
 *   Dr Vipul Gupta <vipul.gupta@sun.com>, and
 *   Douglas Stebila <douglas@stebila.ca>, Sun Microsystems Laboratories
 *
 * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
 * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
 * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
 * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
 * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
 * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
 * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
 * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
 * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
 * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
 * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
 *
 * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
/*
 * This file contains functions to manage asymetric keys, (public and
 * private keys).
 */
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#include "secmodi.h"
#include "secmodti.h"
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "pkcs11t.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secasn1.h" 
#include "secoid.h" 
#include "secerr.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
#include "sechash.h"

#include "secpkcs5.h"  
#include "ec.h"

static SECItem *
pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
    /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */
    SECItem *pubKeyIndex =  NULL;
    switch (pubKey->keyType) {
    case rsaKey:
      pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.rsa.modulus;
      break;
    case dsaKey:
      pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue;
      break;
    case dhKey:
      pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.dh.publicValue;
      break;      
    case ecKey:
      pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue;
      break;      
    default:
      return NULL;
    }
    PORT_Assert(pubKeyIndex != NULL);

    return PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(pubKeyIndex);
} 

/*
 * import a public key into the desired slot
 *
 * This function takes a public key structure and creates a public key in a 
 * given slot. If isToken is set, then a persistant public key is created.
 *
 * Note: it is possible for this function to return a handle for a key which
 * is persistant, even if isToken is not set.
 */
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, 
								PRBool isToken)
{
    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[11];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *signedattr = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;
    SECItem *ckaId = NULL;
    SECItem *pubValue = NULL;
    int signedcount = 0;
    int templateCount = 0;
    SECStatus rv;

    /* if we already have an object in the desired slot, use it */
    if (!isToken && pubKey->pkcs11Slot == slot) {
	return pubKey->pkcs11ID;
    }

    /* free the existing key */
    if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot != NULL) {
	PK11SlotInfo *oSlot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot;
	if (!PK11_IsPermObject(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,pubKey->pkcs11ID)) {
	    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(oSlot);
	    (void) PK11_GETTAB(oSlot)->C_DestroyObject(oSlot->session,
							pubKey->pkcs11ID);
	    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(oSlot);
	}
	PK11_FreeSlot(oSlot);
	pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
    }
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) ); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) ); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, isToken ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
						 sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
    if (isToken) {
	ckaId = pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(pubKey);
	if (ckaId == NULL) {
	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
	    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
	}
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ckaId->data, ckaId->len); attrs++;
    }

    /* now import the key */
    {
        switch (pubKey->keyType) {
        case rsaKey:
	    keyType = CKK_RSA;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT, &cktrue, 
						sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
 	    signedattr = attrs;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.data,
					 pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 
	     	pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.data,
				 pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.len); attrs++;
	    break;
        case dsaKey:
	    keyType = CKK_DSA;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
 	    signedattr = attrs;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,    pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.data,
				pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME,pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data,
				pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE,  pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.data,
					pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE,    pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.data, 
					pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.len); attrs++;
	    break;
	case fortezzaKey:
	    keyType = CKK_DSA;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
 	    signedattr = attrs;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.data,
				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME,
				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.data,
				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.len);attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE,  pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.data,
				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.data, 
				pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.len); attrs++;
            break;
        case dhKey:
	    keyType = CKK_DH;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
 	    signedattr = attrs;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,    pubKey->u.dh.prime.data,
				pubKey->u.dh.prime.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE,  pubKey->u.dh.base.data,
					pubKey->u.dh.base.len); attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE,    pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, 
					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); attrs++;
	    break;
        case ecKey:
	    keyType = CKK_EC;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
 	    signedattr = attrs;
	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, 
		          pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
		          pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); attrs++;
	    if (PR_GetEnv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
	    	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT, 
			  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
			  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); attrs++;
	    } else {
		pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
			&pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
			SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
		if (pubValue == NULL) {
		    if (ckaId) {
			SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId,PR_TRUE);
		    }
		    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
		}
	    	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT, 
			  pubValue->data, pubValue->len); attrs++;
	    }
	    break;
	default:
	    if (ckaId) {
		SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId,PR_TRUE);
	    }
	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
	    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
	}

	templateCount = attrs - theTemplate;
	signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
	PORT_Assert(templateCount <= (sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)));
	for (attrs=signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
		pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
	} 
        rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, theTemplate,
				 	templateCount, isToken, &objectID);
	if (ckaId) {
	    SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId,PR_TRUE);
	}
	if (pubValue) {
	    SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue,PR_TRUE);
	}
	if ( rv != SECSuccess) {
	    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
	}
    }

    pubKey->pkcs11ID = objectID;
    pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);

    return objectID;
}

/*
 * take an attribute and copy it into a secitem
 */
static CK_RV
pk11_Attr2SecItem(PRArenaPool *arena, const CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, SECItem *item) 
{
    item->data = NULL;

    (void)SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, item, attr->ulValueLen);
    if (item->data == NULL) {
	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
    } 
    PORT_Memcpy(item->data, attr->pValue, item->len);
    return CKR_OK;
}


/*
 * get a curve length from a set of ecParams.
 * 
 * We need this so we can reliably determine if the ecPoint passed to us
 * was encoded or not. With out this, for many curves, we would incorrectly
 * identify an unencoded curve as an encoded curve 1 in 65536 times, and for
 * a few we would make that same mistake 1 in 32768 times. These are bad 
 * numbers since they are rare enough to pass tests, but common enough to
 * be tripped over in the field. 
 *
 * This function will only work for curves we recognized as of March 2009.
 * The assumption is curves in use after March of 2009 would be supplied by
 * PKCS #11 modules that already pass the correct encoding to us.
 *
 * Point length = (Roundup(curveLenInBits/8)*2+1)
 */
static int
pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes(PRArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *ecParams)
{
   SECItem oid;
   SECOidTag tag;
   SECStatus rv;

   /* decode the OID tag */
   rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &oid,
		SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate), ecParams);
   if (rv != SECSuccess) {
	/* could be explict curves, allow them to work if the 
	 * PKCS #11 module support them. If we try to parse the
	 * explicit curve value in the future, we may return -1 here
	 * to indicate an invalid parameter if the explicit curve
	 * decode fails. */
	return 0;
   }

   tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid);
   switch (tag) {
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R2:
	return 29; /* curve len in bytes = 14 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R2:
	return 31; /* curve len in bytes = 15 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R2:
	return 33; /* curve len in bytes = 16 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R2:
	return 35; /* curve len in bytes = 17 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2:
	return 41; /* curve len in bytes = 20 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V2:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V3:
	return 43; /* curve len in bytes = 21 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB176V1:
	return 45; /* curve len in bytes = 22 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V2:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V3:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V2:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V3:
	return 49; /*curve len in bytes = 24 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2:
	return 51; /*curve len in bytes = 25 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB208W1:
	return 53; /*curve len in bytes = 26 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1:
	return 57; /*curve len in bytes = 28 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V2:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V3:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V1:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V2:
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V3:
	return 61; /*curve len in bytes = 30 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1:
	return 65; /*curve len in bytes = 32 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB272W1:
	return 69; /*curve len in bytes = 34 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1:
	return 73; /*curve len in bytes = 36 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB304W1:
	return 77; /*curve len in bytes = 38 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB359V1:
	return 91; /*curve len in bytes = 45 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB368W1:
	return 93; /*curve len in bytes = 46 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
	return 97; /*curve len in bytes = 48 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1:
	return 105; /*curve len in bytes = 52 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB431R1:
	return 109; /*curve len in bytes = 54 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
	return 133; /*curve len in bytes = 66 bytes */
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1:
    case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1:
	return 145; /*curve len in bytes = 72 bytes */
    /* unknown or unrecognized OIDs. return unknown length */
    default:
	break;
   }
   return 0;
}

/*
 * returns the decoded point. In some cases the point may already be decoded.
 * this function tries to detect those cases and return the point in 
 * publicKeyValue. In other cases it's DER encoded. In those cases the point
 * is first decoded and returned. Space for the point is allocated out of 
 * the passed in arena.
 */
static CK_RV
pk11_get_Decoded_ECPoint(PRArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *ecParams, 
	const CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecPoint, SECItem *publicKeyValue)
{
    SECItem encodedPublicValue;
    SECStatus rv;
    int keyLen;

    if (ecPoint->ulValueLen == 0) {
	return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
    }

    /*
     * The PKCS #11 spec requires ecPoints to be encoded as a DER OCTET String.
     * NSS has mistakenly passed unencoded values, and some PKCS #11 vendors
     * followed that mistake. Now we need to detect which encoding we were
     * passed in. The task is made more complicated by the fact the the
     * DER encoding byte (SEC_ASN_OCTET_STRING) is the same as the 
     * EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED byte (0x04), so we can't use that to
     * determine which curve we are using.
     */

    /* get the expected key length for the passed in curve.
     * pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes only returns valid values for curves
     * NSS has traditionally recognized. If the curve is not recognized,
     * it will return '0', and we have to figure out if the key was
     * encoded or not heuristically. If the ecParams are invalid, it
     * will return -1 for the keyLen.
     */
    keyLen = pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes(arena, ecParams);
    if (keyLen < 0) {
	return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
    }


    /* If the point is uncompressed and the lengths match, it
     * must be an unencoded point */
    if ((*((char *)ecPoint->pValue) == EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) 
	&& (ecPoint->ulValueLen == keyLen)) {
	    return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
    }

    /* now assume the key passed to us was encoded and decode it */
    if (*((char *)ecPoint->pValue) == SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
	/* OK, now let's try to decode it and see if it's valid */
	encodedPublicValue.data = ecPoint->pValue;
	encodedPublicValue.len = ecPoint->ulValueLen;
	rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, publicKeyValue,
		SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate), &encodedPublicValue);

	/* it coded correctly & we know the key length (and they match)
	 * then we are done, return the results. */
        if (keyLen && rv == SECSuccess && publicKeyValue->len == keyLen) {
	    return CKR_OK;
	}

	/* if we know the key length, one of the above tests should have
	 * succeded. If it doesn't the module gave us bad data */
	if (keyLen) {
	    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
	}
		

	/* We don't know the key length, so we don't know deterministically
	 * which encoding was used. We now will try to pick the most likely 
	 * form that's correct, with a preference for the encoded form if we
	 * can't determine for sure. We do this by checking the key we got
	 * back from SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem for defects. If no defects are
	 * found, we assume the encoded parameter was was passed to us.
	 * our defect tests include:
	 *   1) it didn't decode.
	 *   2) The decode key had an invalid length (must be odd).
	 *   3) The decoded key wasn't an UNCOMPRESSED key.
	 *   4) The decoded key didn't include the entire encoded block
	 *   except the DER encoding values. (fixing DER length to one
	 *   particular value).
	 */
	if ((rv != SECSuccess)
	    || ((publicKeyValue->len & 1) != 1)
	    || (publicKeyValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)
	    || (PORT_Memcmp(&encodedPublicValue.data[encodedPublicValue.len -
		 	    publicKeyValue->len], publicKeyValue->data, 
			    publicKeyValue->len) != 0)) {
	    /* The decoded public key was flawed, the original key must have
	     * already been in decoded form. Do a quick sanity check then 
	     * return the original key value.
	     */
	    if ((encodedPublicValue.len & 1) == 0) {
		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
	    }
	    return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
	}

	/* as best we can figure, the passed in key was encoded, and we've
	 * now decoded it. Note: there is a chance this could be wrong if the 
	 * following conditions hold:
	 *  1) The first byte or bytes of the X point looks like a valid length
	 * of precisely the right size (2*curveSize -1). this means for curves
	 * less than 512 bits (64 bytes), this will happen 1 in 256 times*.
	 * for curves between 512 and 1024, this will happen 1 in 65,536 times*
	 * for curves between 1024 and 256K this will happen 1 in 16 million*
	 *  2) The length of the 'DER length field' is odd 
	 * (making both the encoded and decode
	 * values an odd length. this is true of all curves less than 512,
	 * as well as curves between 1024 and 256K).
	 *  3) The X[length of the 'DER length field'] == 0x04, 1 in 256.
	 *
	 *  (* assuming all values are equally likely in the first byte, 
	 * This isn't true if the curve length is not a multiple of 8. In these
	 * cases, if the DER length is possible, it's more likely, 
	 * if it's not possible, then we have no false decodes).
	 * 
	 * For reference here are the odds for the various curves we currently
	 * have support for (and the only curves SSL will negotiate at this
	 * time). NOTE: None of the supported curves will show up here 
	 * because we return a valid length for all of these curves. 
	 * The only way to get here is to have some application (not SSL) 
	 * which supports some unknown curve and have some vendor supplied 
	 * PKCS #11 module support that curve. NOTE: in this case, one 
	 * presumes that that pkcs #11 module is likely to be using the 
	 * correct encodings.
	 *
	 * Prime Curves (GFp):
	 *   Bit	False	    Odds of 
	 *  Size	DER Len	 False Decode Positive
	 *  112 	27	   1 in 65536 
	 *  128 	31	   1 in 65536 
	 *  160 	39	   1 in 65536 
	 *  192 	47	   1 in 65536 
	 *  224 	55	   1 in 65536 
	 *  239 	59	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
	 *  256 	63	   1 in 65536 
	 *  521 	129,131	     0        (decoded value would be even)
	 *
	 * Binary curves (GF2m).
	 *   Bit	False	    Odds of 
	 *  Size	DER Len	 False Decode Positive
	 *  131 	33	     0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
	 *  163 	41	     0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
	 *  176 	43	   1 in 65536 
	 *  191 	47	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
	 *  193 	49	     0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
	 *  208 	51	   1 in 65536 
	 *  233 	59	     0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
	 *  239 	59	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
	 *  272 	67	   1 in 65536 
	 *  283 	71	     0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
	 *  304 	75	   1 in 65536 
	 *  359 	89	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
	 *  368 	91	   1 in 65536 
	 *  409 	103	     0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
	 *  431 	107	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
	 *  571 	129,143	     0        (decoded value would be even)
	 *
	 */

	return CKR_OK;
    }

    /* In theory, we should handle the case where the curve == 0 and
     * the first byte is EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED, (which would be
     * handled by doing a santity check on the key length and returning
     * pk11_Attr2SecItem() to copy the ecPoint to the publicKeyValue).
     *
     * This test is unnecessary, however, due to the fact that 
     * EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED == SEC_ASIN1_OCTET_STRING, that case is
     * handled in the above if. That means if we get here, the initial
     * byte of our ecPoint value was invalid, so we can safely return.
     * invalid attribute.
     */
	
    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
}

/*
 * extract a public key from a slot and id
 */
SECKEYPublicKey *
PK11_ExtractPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,KeyType keyType,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id)
{
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
    PRArenaPool *arena;
    PRArenaPool *tmp_arena;
    SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
    int templateCount = 0;
    CK_KEY_TYPE pk11KeyType;
    CK_RV crv;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[8];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs= template;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus,*exponent,*base,*prime,*subprime,*value;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecparams;

    /* if we didn't know the key type, get it */
    if (keyType== nullKey) {

        pk11KeyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,id,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
	if (pk11KeyType ==  CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
	    return NULL;
	}
	switch (pk11KeyType) {
	case CKK_RSA:
	    keyType = rsaKey;
	    break;
	case CKK_DSA:
	    keyType = dsaKey;
	    break;
	case CKK_DH:
	    keyType = dhKey;
	    break;
	case CKK_EC:
	    keyType = ecKey;
	    break;
	default:
	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
	    return NULL;
	}
    }


    /* now we need to create space for the public key */
    arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
    if (arena == NULL) return NULL;
    tmp_arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
    if (tmp_arena == NULL) {
	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
	return NULL;
    }


    pubKey = (SECKEYPublicKey *) 
			PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
    if (pubKey == NULL) {
	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
	PORT_FreeArena (tmp_arena, PR_FALSE);
	return NULL;
    }

    pubKey->arena = arena;
    pubKey->keyType = keyType;
    pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
    pubKey->pkcs11ID = id;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, 
						sizeof(keyClass)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &pk11KeyType, 
						sizeof(pk11KeyType) ); attrs++;
    switch (pubKey->keyType) {
    case rsaKey:
	modulus = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	exponent = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0); attrs++; 

	templateCount = attrs - template;
	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;

	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_RSA)) {
	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
	    break;
	} 
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,modulus,&pubKey->u.rsa.modulus);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,exponent,&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	break;
    case dsaKey:
	prime = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	subprime = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	base = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	value = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	templateCount = attrs - template;
	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;

	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DSA)) {
	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
	    break;
	} 
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,prime,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,subprime,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,base,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.base);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,value,&pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	break;
    case dhKey:
	prime = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	base = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	value =attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	templateCount = attrs - template;
	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;

	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DH)) {
	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
	    break;
	} 
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,prime,&pubKey->u.dh.prime);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,base,&pubKey->u.dh.base);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,value,&pubKey->u.dh.publicValue);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	break;
    case ecKey:
	pubKey->u.ec.size = 0;
	ecparams = attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	value =attrs;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT, NULL, 0); attrs++; 
	templateCount = attrs - template;
	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;

	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_EC)) {
	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
	    break;
	} 

	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,ecparams,
	                        &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
	crv = pk11_get_Decoded_ECPoint(arena,
		 &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, value, 
		 &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue);
	break;
    case fortezzaKey:
    case nullKey:
    default:
	crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
	break;
    }

    PORT_FreeArena(tmp_arena,PR_FALSE);

    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	return NULL;
    }

    return pubKey;
}

/*
 * Build a Private Key structure from raw PKCS #11 information.
 */
SECKEYPrivateKey *
PK11_MakePrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, KeyType keyType, 
			PRBool isTemp, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID, void *wincx)
{
    PRArenaPool *arena;
    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
    PRBool isPrivate;
    SECStatus rv;

    /* don't know? look it up */
    if (keyType == nullKey) {
	CK_KEY_TYPE pk11Type = CKK_RSA;

	pk11Type = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,privID,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
	isTemp = (PRBool)!PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,privID,CKA_TOKEN);
	switch (pk11Type) {
	case CKK_RSA: keyType = rsaKey; break;
	case CKK_DSA: keyType = dsaKey; break;
	case CKK_DH: keyType = dhKey; break;
	case CKK_KEA: keyType = fortezzaKey; break;
	case CKK_EC: keyType = ecKey; break;
	default:
		break;
	}
    }

    /* if the key is private, make sure we are authenticated to the
     * token before we try to use it */
    isPrivate = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,privID,CKA_PRIVATE);
    if (isPrivate) {
	rv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return NULL;
 	}
    }

    /* now we need to create space for the private key */
    arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
    if (arena == NULL) return NULL;

    privKey = (SECKEYPrivateKey *) 
			PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPrivateKey));
    if (privKey == NULL) {
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
	return NULL;
    }

    privKey->arena = arena;
    privKey->keyType = keyType;
    privKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
    privKey->pkcs11ID = privID;
    privKey->pkcs11IsTemp = isTemp;
    privKey->wincx = wincx;

    return privKey;
}


PK11SlotInfo *
PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *key)
{
    PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot;
    slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
    return slot;
}

/*
 * Get the modulus length for raw parsing
 */
int
PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(SECKEYPrivateKey *key)
{
    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate = { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 };
    PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot;
    CK_RV crv;
    int length;

    switch (key->keyType) {
    case rsaKey:
	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(NULL, slot, key->pkcs11ID, &theTemplate, 1);
	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	    PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	    return -1;
	}
	length = theTemplate.ulValueLen;
	if ( *(unsigned char *)theTemplate.pValue == 0) {
	    length--;
	}
	if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL)
	    PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue);
	return (int) length;
	
    case fortezzaKey:
    case dsaKey:
    case dhKey:
    default:
	break;
    }
    if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL)
	PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue);
    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY );
    return -1;
}



/*
 * take a private key in one pkcs11 module and load it into another:
 *  NOTE: the source private key is a rare animal... it can't be sensitive.
 *  This is used to do a key gen using one pkcs11 module and storing the
 *  result into another.
 */
static SECKEYPrivateKey *
pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, 
		SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags) 
{
    CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = {
        /* class must be first */
	{ CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
	/* RSA - the attributes below will be replaced for other 
	 *       key types.
	 */
	{ CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_SIGN, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_UNWRAP, NULL, 0 },
	/* reserve space for the attributes that may be
	 * specified in attrFlags */
	{ CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_PRIVATE, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_EXTRACTABLE, NULL, 0 },
#define NUM_RESERVED_ATTRS 5    /* number of reserved attributes above */
    };
    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = NULL, *ap;
    const int templateSize = sizeof(privTemplate)/sizeof(privTemplate[0]);
    PRArenaPool *arena;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
    int i, count = 0;
    int extra_count = 0;
    CK_RV crv;
    SECStatus rv;
    PRBool token = ((attrFlags & PK11_ATTR_TOKEN) != 0);

    if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return NULL;
    }

    for (i=0; i < templateSize; i++) {
	if (privTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS) {
	    attrs= &privTemplate[i];
	    count = i;
	    break;
	}
    }
    PORT_Assert(attrs != NULL);
    if (attrs == NULL) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
	return NULL;
    }

    ap = attrs;

    switch (privKey->keyType) {
    case rsaKey:
	count = templateSize - NUM_RESERVED_ATTRS;
	extra_count = count - (attrs - privTemplate);
	break;
    case dsaKey:
	ap->type = CKA_PRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_SUBPRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_BASE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_SIGN; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	break;
    case dhKey:
	ap->type = CKA_PRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_BASE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_DERIVE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	break;
    case ecKey:
	ap->type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_DERIVE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	ap->type = CKA_SIGN; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
	break;
     default:
	count = 0;
	extra_count = 0;
	break;
     }

     if (count == 0) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
	return NULL;
     }

     arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (arena == NULL) return NULL;
     /*
      * read out the old attributes.
      */
     crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID,
		privTemplate,count);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
	return NULL;
     }

     /* Set token, private, modifiable, sensitive, and extractable */
     count += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, &privTemplate[count],
					&cktrue, &ckfalse);

     /* Not everyone can handle zero padded key values, give
      * them the raw data as unsigned */
     for (ap=attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
	pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
     }

     /* now Store the puppies */
     rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, privTemplate, 
						count, token, &objectID);
     PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
	return NULL;
     }

     /* try loading the public key */
     if (pubKey) {
	PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, token);
	if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot) {
	    PK11_FreeSlot(pubKey->pkcs11Slot);
	    pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
	    pubKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
	}
     }

     /* build new key structure */
     return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, privKey->keyType, !token, 
						objectID, privKey->wincx);
}

static SECKEYPrivateKey *
pk11_loadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, 
		SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive) 
{
    PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
    if (token) {
	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
    } else {
	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_SESSION | PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC);
    }
    if (sensitive) {
	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE;
    } else {
	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE;
    }
    return pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(slot, privKey, pubKey, attrFlags);
}

/*
 * export this for PSM
 */
SECKEYPrivateKey *
PK11_LoadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, 
		SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive) 
{
    return pk11_loadPrivKey(slot,privKey,pubKey,token,sensitive);
}


/*
 * Use the token to generate a key pair.
 */
SECKEYPrivateKey *
PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, 
   void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, 
   CK_FLAGS opFlags, CK_FLAGS opFlagsMask, void *wincx)
{
    /* we have to use these native types because when we call PKCS 11 modules
     * we have to make sure that we are using the correct sizes for all the
     * parameters. */
    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_ULONG modulusBits;
    CK_BYTE publicExponent[4];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = {
	{ CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_PRIVATE,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_UNWRAP,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_SIGN,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_DECRYPT,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_EXTRACTABLE, NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
    };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPubTemplate[] = {
	{ CKA_MODULUS_BITS, NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
    };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE dsaPubTemplate[] = {
	{ CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
    };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE dhPubTemplate[] = {
      { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 }, 
      { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 }, 
      { CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
    };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE ecPubTemplate[] = {
      { CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0 }, 
      { CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
      { CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
    };
    SECKEYECParams * ecParams;

    /*CK_ULONG key_size = 0;*/
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *pubTemplate;
    int privCount = 0;
    int pubCount = 0;
    PK11RSAGenParams *rsaParams;
    SECKEYPQGParams *dsaParams;
    SECKEYDHParams * dhParams;
    CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
    CK_MECHANISM test_mech;
    CK_MECHANISM test_mech2;
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session_handle;
    CK_RV crv;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID,pubID;
    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
    KeyType keyType;
    PRBool restore;
    int peCount,i;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *privattrs;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate;
    CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass;
    SECItem *cka_id;
    PRBool haslock = PR_FALSE;
    PRBool pubIsToken = PR_FALSE;
    PRBool token = ((attrFlags & PK11_ATTR_TOKEN) != 0);
    /* subset of attrFlags applicable to the public key */
    PK11AttrFlags pubKeyAttrFlags = attrFlags &
	(PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_SESSION
	| PK11_ATTR_MODIFIABLE | PK11_ATTR_UNMODIFIABLE);

    if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
	PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS );
	return NULL;
    }

    if (!param) {
        PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS );
        return NULL;
    }

    /*
     * The opFlags and opFlagMask parameters allow us to control the
     * settings of the key usage attributes (CKA_ENCRYPT and friends).
     * opFlagMask is set to one if the flag is specified in opFlags and 
     *  zero if it is to take on a default value calculated by 
     *  PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags.
     * opFlags specifies the actual value of the flag 1 or 0. 
     *   Bits not corresponding to one bits in opFlagMask should be zero.
     */

    /* if we are trying to turn on a flag, it better be in the mask */
    PORT_Assert ((opFlags & ~opFlagsMask) == 0);
    opFlags &= opFlagsMask;

    PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
    if (slot == NULL) {
	PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
	return NULL;
    }

    /* if our slot really doesn't do this mechanism, Generate the key
     * in our internal token and write it out */
    if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,type)) {
	PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();

	/* don't loop forever looking for a slot */
	if (slot == int_slot) {
	    PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot);
	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
	    return NULL;
	}

	/* if there isn't a suitable slot, then we can't do the keygen */
	if (int_slot == NULL) {
	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE );
	    return NULL;
	}

	/* generate the temporary key to load */
	privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(int_slot,type, param, pubKey, PR_FALSE, 
							PR_FALSE, wincx);
	PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot);

	/* if successful, load the temp key into the new token */
	if (privKey != NULL) {
	    SECKEYPrivateKey *newPrivKey = pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(slot,
						privKey,*pubKey,attrFlags);
	    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
	    if (newPrivKey == NULL) {
		SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey);
		*pubKey = NULL;
	    }
	    return newPrivKey;
	}
	return NULL;
   }


    mechanism.mechanism = type;
    mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
    mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
    test_mech.pParameter = NULL;
    test_mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
    test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
    test_mech2.pParameter = NULL;
    test_mech2.ulParameterLen = 0;

    /* set up the private key template */
    privattrs = privTemplate;
    privattrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, privattrs,
						&cktrue, &ckfalse);

    /* set up the mechanism specific info */
    switch (type) {
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
    case CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
	rsaParams = (PK11RSAGenParams *)param;
	if (rsaParams->pe == 0) {
	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	    return NULL;
	}
	modulusBits = rsaParams->keySizeInBits;
	peCount = 0;

	/* convert pe to a PKCS #11 string */
	for (i=0; i < 4; i++) {
	    if (peCount || (rsaParams->pe & 
				((unsigned long)0xff000000L >> (i*8)))) {
		publicExponent[peCount] = 
				(CK_BYTE)((rsaParams->pe >> (3-i)*8) & 0xff);
		peCount++;
	    }
	}
	PORT_Assert(peCount != 0);
	attrs = rsaPubTemplate;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, 
				&modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits)); attrs++;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 
				publicExponent, peCount);attrs++;
	pubTemplate = rsaPubTemplate;
	keyType = rsaKey;
	test_mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
	break;
    case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
	dsaParams = (SECKEYPQGParams *)param;
	attrs = dsaPubTemplate;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dsaParams->prime.data,
				dsaParams->prime.len); attrs++;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, dsaParams->subPrime.data,
					dsaParams->subPrime.len); attrs++;
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dsaParams->base.data,
						dsaParams->base.len); attrs++;
	pubTemplate = dsaPubTemplate;
	keyType = dsaKey;
	test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
	break;
    case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        dhParams = (SECKEYDHParams *)param;
        attrs = dhPubTemplate;
        PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dhParams->prime.data,
                      dhParams->prime.len);   attrs++;
        PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dhParams->base.data,
                      dhParams->base.len);    attrs++;
        pubTemplate = dhPubTemplate;
        keyType = dhKey;
        test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
	break;
    case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        ecParams = (SECKEYECParams *)param;
        attrs = ecPubTemplate;
        PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams->data, 
	              ecParams->len);   attrs++;
        pubTemplate = ecPubTemplate;
        keyType = ecKey;
	/*
	 * ECC supports 2 different mechanism types (unlike RSA, which
	 * supports different usages with the same mechanism).
	 * We may need to query both mechanism types and or the results
	 * together -- but we only do that if either the user has
	 * requested both usages, or not specified any usages.
	 */
	if ((opFlags & (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DERIVE)) == (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DERIVE)) {
	    /* We've explicitly turned on both flags, use both mechanism */
	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
	    test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
	} else if (opFlags & CKF_SIGN) {
	    /* just do signing */
	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
	} else if (opFlags & CKF_DERIVE) {
	    /* just do ECDH */
	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
	} else {
	    /* neither was specified default to both */
	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
	    test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
	}
        break;
    default:
	PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
	return NULL;
    }

    /* now query the slot to find out how "good" a key we can generate */
    if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,
				test_mech.mechanism,&mechanism_info);
    /*
     * EC keys are used in multiple different types of mechanism, if we
     * are using dual use keys, we need to query the second mechanism
     * as well.
     */
    if (test_mech2.mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info2;
	CK_RV crv2;

	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	    /* the first failed, make sure there is no trash in the
	     * mechanism flags when we or it below */
	    mechanism_info.flags = 0;
	}
	crv2 = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,
				test_mech2.mechanism, &mechanism_info2);
	if (crv2 == CKR_OK) {
	    crv = CKR_OK; /* succeed if either mechnaism info succeeds */
	    /* combine the 2 sets of mechnanism flags */
	    mechanism_info.flags |= mechanism_info2.flags;
	}
    }
    if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
    if ((crv != CKR_OK) || (mechanism_info.flags == 0)) {
	/* must be old module... guess what it should be... */
	switch (test_mech.mechanism) {
	case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
	    mechanism_info.flags = (CKF_SIGN | CKF_DECRYPT | 
		CKF_WRAP | CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER | CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_WRAP);
	    break;
	case CKM_DSA:
	    mechanism_info.flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
	    break;
	case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
	    mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE;
	    break;
	case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
	    mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE;
	    if (test_mech2.mechanism == CKM_ECDSA) {
		mechanism_info.flags |= CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
	    }
	    break;
	case CKM_ECDSA:
	    mechanism_info.flags =  CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
	    break;
	default:
	    break;
	}
    }
    /* now adjust our flags according to the user's key usage passed to us */
    mechanism_info.flags = (mechanism_info.flags & (~opFlagsMask)) | opFlags;
    /* set the public key attributes */
    attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(pubKeyAttrFlags, attrs,
						&cktrue, &ckfalse);
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_WRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
    /* set the private key attributes */
    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DERIVE, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_UNWRAP, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_UNWRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_SIGN, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_SIGN ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DECRYPT, 
		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;

    if (token) {
	session_handle = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
	haslock = PK11_RWSessionHasLock(slot,session_handle);
	restore = PR_TRUE;
    } else {
	session_handle = slot->session;
	if (session_handle != CK_INVALID_SESSION)
	    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
	restore = PR_FALSE;
	haslock = PR_TRUE;
    }

    if (session_handle == CK_INVALID_SESSION) {
    	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
	return NULL;
    }
    privCount = privattrs - privTemplate;
    pubCount = attrs - pubTemplate;
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GenerateKeyPair(session_handle, &mechanism,
	pubTemplate,pubCount,privTemplate,privCount,&pubID,&privID);

    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	if (restore)  {
	    PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle);
	} else PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	return NULL;
    }
    /* This locking code is dangerous and needs to be more thought
     * out... the real problem is that we're holding the mutex open this long
     */
    if (haslock) { PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); }

    /* swap around the ID's for older PKCS #11 modules */
    keyClass = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,pubID,CKA_CLASS);
    if (keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) {
	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE tmp = pubID;
	pubID = privID;
	privID = tmp;
    }

    *pubKey = PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot, keyType, pubID);
    if (*pubKey == NULL) {
	if (restore)  {
	    /* we may have to restore the mutex so it get's exited properly
	     * in RestoreROSession */
            if (haslock)  PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); 
	    PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle);
	} 
	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,pubID);
	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID);
	return NULL;
    }

    /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */
    cka_id = pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(*pubKey);
    pubIsToken = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,pubID, CKA_TOKEN);

    PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_ID, cka_id->data, cka_id->len);

    if (haslock) { PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); }
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, privID,
		&setTemplate, 1);
   
    if (crv == CKR_OK && pubIsToken) {
    	crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, pubID,
		&setTemplate, 1);
    }


    if (restore) {
	PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle);
    } else {
	PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
    }
    SECITEM_FreeItem(cka_id,PR_TRUE);


    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,pubID);
	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID);
	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	*pubKey = NULL;
	return NULL;
    }

    privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,keyType,!token,privID,wincx);
    if (privKey == NULL) {
	SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey);
	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID);
	*pubKey = NULL;
	return NULL;
    }

    return privKey;
}

SECKEYPrivateKey *
PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, 
   void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
{
    return PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(slot,type,param,pubKey,attrFlags,
					   0, 0, wincx);
}

/*
 * Use the token to generate a key pair.
 */
SECKEYPrivateKey *
PK11_GenerateKeyPair(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, 
   void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PRBool token, 
					PRBool sensitive, void *wincx)
{
    PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;

    if (token) {
	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_TOKEN;
    } else {
	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_SESSION;
    }
    if (sensitive) {
	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
    } else {
	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC);
    }
    return PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(slot, type, param, pubKey,
						attrFlags, wincx);
}

/* build a public KEA key from the public value */
SECKEYPublicKey *
PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(unsigned char *keyData,int length)
{
    SECKEYPublicKey *pubk;
    SECItem pkData;
    SECStatus rv;
    PRArenaPool *arena;

    pkData.data = keyData;
    pkData.len = length;

    arena = PORT_NewArena (DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
    if (arena == NULL)
	return NULL;

    pubk = (SECKEYPublicKey *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
    if (pubk == NULL) {
	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
	return NULL;
    }

    pubk->arena = arena;
    pubk->pkcs11Slot = 0;
    pubk->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
    pubk->keyType = fortezzaKey;
    rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.fortezza.KEAKey, &pkData);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
	return NULL;
    }
    return pubk;
}

/*
 * NOTE: This function doesn't return a SECKEYPrivateKey struct to represent
 * the new private key object.  If it were to create a session object that
 * could later be looked up by its nickname, it would leak a SECKEYPrivateKey.
 * So isPerm must be true.
 */
SECStatus 
PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
			SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem,
			SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm,
			PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType, 
			unsigned int keyUsage, void *wincx)
{
    if (!isPerm) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    return PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(slot, epki,
		pwitem, nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate, keyType,
		keyUsage, NULL, wincx);
}

SECStatus
PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
			SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem,
			SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm,
			PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType,
			unsigned int keyUsage, SECKEYPrivateKey **privk,
			void *wincx)
{
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pbeMechType;
    SECItem *crypto_param = NULL;
    PK11SymKey *key = NULL;
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL;
    PRBool faulty3DES = PR_FALSE;
    int usageCount = 0;
    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE *usage = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE rsaUsage[] = {
		 CKA_UNWRAP, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_SIGN, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dsaUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dhUsage[] = { CKA_DERIVE };
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE ecUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN, CKA_DERIVE };
    if((epki == NULL) || (pwitem == NULL))
	return SECFailure;

    pbeMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_FindOIDTag(
					&epki->algorithm.algorithm));

    switch (keyType) {
    default:
    case rsaKey:
	key_type = CKK_RSA;
	switch  (keyUsage & (KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
	case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:
	    usage = rsaUsage;
	    usageCount = 2;
	    break;
	case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
	    usage = &rsaUsage[2];
	    usageCount = 2;
	    break;
	case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
	case 0: /* default to everything */
	    usage = rsaUsage;
	    usageCount = 4;
	    break;
	}
        break;
    case dhKey:
	key_type = CKK_DH;
	usage = dhUsage;
	usageCount = sizeof(dhUsage)/sizeof(dhUsage[0]);
	break;
    case dsaKey:
	key_type = CKK_DSA;
	usage = dsaUsage;
	usageCount = sizeof(dsaUsage)/sizeof(dsaUsage[0]);
	break;
    case ecKey:
	key_type = CKK_EC;
	switch  (keyUsage & (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
	case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
	    usage = ecUsage;
	    usageCount = 1;
	    break;
	case KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:
	    usage = &ecUsage[1];
	    usageCount = 1;
	    break;
	case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:
	default: /* default to everything */
	    usage = ecUsage;
	    usageCount = 2;
	    break;
	}
	break;	
    }

try_faulty_3des:

    key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, &epki->algorithm, pwitem, faulty3DES, wincx);
    if (key == NULL) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto done;
    }
    cryptoMechType = pk11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(&epki->algorithm,
					 &crypto_param, pwitem, faulty3DES);
    if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto done;
    }


    cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMechType);

    PORT_Assert(usage != NULL);
    PORT_Assert(usageCount != 0);
    privKey = PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(slot, key, cryptoMechType, 
				 crypto_param, &epki->encryptedData, 
				 nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate,
				 key_type, usage, usageCount, wincx);
    if(privKey) {
	if (privk) {
	    *privk = privKey;
	} else {
	    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
	}
	privKey = NULL;
	rv = SECSuccess;
	goto done;
    }

    /* if we are unable to import the key and the pbeMechType is 
     * CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC, then it is possible that
     * the encrypted blob was created with a buggy key generation method
     * which is described in the PKCS 12 implementation notes.  So we
     * need to try importing via that method.
     */ 
    if((pbeMechType == CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC) && (!faulty3DES)) {
	/* clean up after ourselves before redoing the key generation. */

	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
	key = NULL;

	if(crypto_param) {
	    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
	    crypto_param = NULL;
	}

	faulty3DES = PR_TRUE;
	goto try_faulty_3des;
    }

    /* key import really did fail */
    rv = SECFailure;

done:
    if(crypto_param != NULL) {
	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
    }

    if(key != NULL) {
    	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
    }

    return rv;
}

SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *
PK11_ExportPrivateKeyInfo(CERTCertificate *cert, void *wincx)
{
    return NULL;
}

SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo * 
PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfo(
   PK11SlotInfo     *slot,      /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
   SECOidTag         algTag,    /* encrypt key with this algorithm */
   SECItem          *pwitem,    /* password for PBE encryption */
   SECKEYPrivateKey *pk,        /* encrypt this private key */
   int               iteration, /* interations for PBE alg */
   void             *wincx)     /* context for password callback ? */
{
    SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki      = NULL;
    PRArenaPool                   *arena     = NULL;
    SECAlgorithmID                *algid;
    SECOidTag			  pbeAlgTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
    SECItem                       *crypto_param = NULL;
    PK11SymKey                    *key       = NULL;
    SECKEYPrivateKey		  *tmpPK = NULL;
    SECStatus                      rv        = SECSuccess;
    CK_RV                          crv;
    CK_ULONG                       encBufLen;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE              pbeMechType;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE              cryptoMechType;
    CK_MECHANISM                   cryptoMech;

    if (!pwitem || !pk) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return NULL;
    }

    algid = sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(algTag, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
				&pbeAlgTag, 0, NULL, iteration);
    if (algid == NULL) {
	return NULL;
    }

    arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
    if (arena)
	epki = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo);
    if(epki == NULL) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }
    epki->arena = arena;


    /* if we didn't specify a slot, use the slot the private key was in */
    if (!slot) {
	slot = pk->pkcs11Slot;
    }

    /* if we specified a different slot, and the private key slot can do the
     * pbe key gen, generate the key in the private key slot so we don't have 
     * to move it later */
    pbeMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(pbeAlgTag);
    if (slot != pk->pkcs11Slot) {
	if (PK11_DoesMechanism(pk->pkcs11Slot,pbeMechType)) {
	    slot = pk->pkcs11Slot;
	}
    }
    key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, pwitem, PR_FALSE, wincx);
    if (key == NULL) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }

    cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &crypto_param, pwitem);
    if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }

    cryptoMech.mechanism = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMechType);
    cryptoMech.pParameter = crypto_param ? crypto_param->data : NULL;
    cryptoMech.ulParameterLen = crypto_param ? crypto_param->len : 0;

    /* If the key isn't in the private key slot, move it */
    if (key->slot != pk->pkcs11Slot) {
	PK11SymKey *newkey = pk11_CopyToSlot(pk->pkcs11Slot,
						key->type, CKA_WRAP, key);
	if (newkey == NULL) {
            /* couldn't import the wrapping key, try exporting the
             * private key */
	    tmpPK = pk11_loadPrivKey(key->slot, pk, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
	    if (tmpPK == NULL) {
		rv = SECFailure;
		goto loser;
	    }
	    pk = tmpPK;
	} else {
	    /* free the old key and use the new key */
	    PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
	    key = newkey;
	}
    }
    	
    /* we are extracting an encrypted privateKey structure.
     * which needs to be freed along with the buffer into which it is
     * returned.  eventually, we should retrieve an encrypted key using
     * pkcs8/pkcs5.
     */
    encBufLen = 0;
    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session, 
    		&cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID, NULL, 
		&encBufLen); 
    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }
    epki->encryptedData.data = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, encBufLen);
    if (!epki->encryptedData.data) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }
    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session, 
    		&cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID, 
		epki->encryptedData.data, &encBufLen); 
    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
    epki->encryptedData.len = (unsigned int) encBufLen;
    if(crv != CKR_OK) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }

    if(!epki->encryptedData.len) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto loser;
    }

    rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(arena, &epki->algorithm, algid);

loser:
    if(crypto_param != NULL) {
	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
	crypto_param = NULL;
    }

    if(key != NULL) {
    	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
    }
    if (tmpPK != NULL) {
	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(tmpPK);
    }
    SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);

    if(rv == SECFailure) {
	if(arena != NULL) {
	    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
	}
	epki = NULL;
    }

    return epki;
}

SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo * 
PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(
   PK11SlotInfo    *slot,      /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
   SECOidTag        algTag,    /* encrypt key with this algorithm */
   SECItem         *pwitem,    /* password for PBE encryption */
   CERTCertificate *cert,      /* wrap priv key for this user cert */
   int              iteration, /* interations for PBE alg */
   void            *wincx)     /* context for password callback ? */
{
    SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL;
    SECKEYPrivateKey              *pk   = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, wincx);
    if (pk != NULL) {
	epki = PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfo(slot, algTag, pwitem, pk, 
	                                       iteration, wincx);
	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(pk);
    }
    return epki;
}

SECItem*
PK11_DEREncodePublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
{
    return SECKEY_EncodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubk);
}

char *
PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
{
    return PK11_GetObjectNickname(privKey->pkcs11Slot,privKey->pkcs11ID);
}

char *
PK11_GetPublicKeyNickname(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
    return PK11_GetObjectNickname(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,pubKey->pkcs11ID);
}

SECStatus
PK11_SetPrivateKeyNickname(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const char *nickname)
{
    return PK11_SetObjectNickname(privKey->pkcs11Slot,
					privKey->pkcs11ID,nickname);
}

SECStatus
PK11_SetPublicKeyNickname(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const char *nickname)
{
    return PK11_SetObjectNickname(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,
					pubKey->pkcs11ID,nickname);
}

SECKEYPQGParams *
PK11_GetPQGParamsFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
{
    CK_ATTRIBUTE pTemplate[] = {
	{ CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
    };
    int pTemplateLen = sizeof(pTemplate)/sizeof(pTemplate[0]);
    PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
    SECKEYPQGParams *params;
    CK_RV crv;


    arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
    if (arena == NULL) {
	goto loser;
    }
    params=(SECKEYPQGParams *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,sizeof(SECKEYPQGParams));
    if (params == NULL) {
	goto loser;
    }

    crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID, 
						pTemplate, pTemplateLen);
    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
        PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	goto loser;
    }

    params->arena = arena;
    params->prime.data = pTemplate[0].pValue;
    params->prime.len = pTemplate[0].ulValueLen;
    params->subPrime.data = pTemplate[1].pValue;
    params->subPrime.len = pTemplate[1].ulValueLen;
    params->base.data = pTemplate[2].pValue;
    params->base.len = pTemplate[2].ulValueLen;

    return params;

loser:
    if (arena != NULL) {
	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
    }
    return NULL;
}

SECKEYPrivateKey*
PK11_CopyTokenPrivKeyToSessionPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *destSlot,
				      SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
{
    CK_RV             crv;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  newKeyID;

    static const CK_BBOOL     ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
    static const CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1] = { 
       { CKA_TOKEN, (CK_BBOOL *)&ckfalse, sizeof ckfalse }
    };

    if (destSlot && destSlot != privKey->pkcs11Slot) {
	SECKEYPrivateKey *newKey =
	       pk11_loadPrivKey(destSlot, 
				privKey, 
			        NULL,     /* pubKey    */
			        PR_FALSE, /* token     */
			        PR_FALSE);/* sensitive */
	if (newKey)
	    return newKey;
    }
    destSlot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
    PK11_Authenticate(destSlot, PR_TRUE, privKey->wincx);
    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(destSlot);
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(destSlot)->C_CopyObject(	destSlot->session, 
						privKey->pkcs11ID,
						(CK_ATTRIBUTE *)template, 
						1, &newKeyID);
    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(destSlot);

    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
	return NULL;
    }

    return PK11_MakePrivKey(destSlot, privKey->keyType, PR_TRUE /*isTemp*/, 
			    newKeyID, privKey->wincx);
}

SECKEYPrivateKey*
PK11_ConvertSessionPrivKeyToTokenPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, void* wincx)
{
    PK11SlotInfo* slot = privk->pkcs11Slot;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template;
    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_RV crv;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID;
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;

    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++;

    PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
    rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
    if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_SESSION) {
    	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
	return NULL;
    }
    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CopyObject(rwsession, privk->pkcs11ID,
        template, 1, &newKeyID);
    PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);

    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
        PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
        return NULL;
    }

    return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey /*KeyType*/, PR_FALSE /*isTemp*/,
        newKeyID, NULL /*wincx*/);
}

/*
 * destroy a private key if there are no matching certs.
 * this function also frees the privKey structure.
 */
SECStatus
PK11_DeleteTokenPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, PRBool force)
{
    CERTCertificate *cert=PK11_GetCertFromPrivateKey(privKey);
    SECStatus rv = SECWouldBlock;

    if (!cert || force) {
	/* now, then it's safe for the key to go away */
	rv = PK11_DestroyTokenObject(privKey->pkcs11Slot,privKey->pkcs11ID);
    }
    if (cert) {
	CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
    }
    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
    return rv;
}

/*
 * destroy a private key if there are no matching certs.
 * this function also frees the privKey structure.
 */
SECStatus
PK11_DeleteTokenPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
    /* now, then it's safe for the key to go away */
    if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot == NULL) {
	return SECFailure;
    }
    PK11_DestroyTokenObject(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,pubKey->pkcs11ID);
    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
    return SECSuccess;
}

/*
 * key call back structure.
 */
typedef struct pk11KeyCallbackStr {
	SECStatus (* callback)(SECKEYPrivateKey *,void *);
	void *callbackArg;
	void *wincx;
} pk11KeyCallback;

/*
 * callback to map Object Handles to Private Keys;
 */
SECStatus
pk11_DoKeys(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle, void *arg)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
    pk11KeyCallback *keycb = (pk11KeyCallback *) arg;
    if (!arg) {
        return SECFailure;
    }

    privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,nullKey,PR_TRUE,keyHandle,keycb->wincx);

    if (privKey == NULL) {
	return SECFailure;
    }

    if (keycb->callback) {
	rv = (*keycb->callback)(privKey,keycb->callbackArg);
    }

    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);	    
    return rv;
}

/***********************************************************************
 * PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot
 *
 * Traverses all the private keys on a slot.
 *
 * INPUTS
 *      slot
 *          The PKCS #11 slot whose private keys you want to traverse.
 *      callback
 *          A callback function that will be called for each key.
 *      arg
 *          An argument that will be passed to the callback function.
 */
SECStatus
PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot( PK11SlotInfo *slot,
    SECStatus(* callback)(SECKEYPrivateKey*, void*), void *arg)
{
    pk11KeyCallback perKeyCB;
    pk11TraverseSlot perObjectCB;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS privkClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
    CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[2];
    int templateSize = 2;

    theTemplate[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
    theTemplate[0].pValue = &privkClass;
    theTemplate[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(privkClass);
    theTemplate[1].type = CKA_TOKEN;
    theTemplate[1].pValue = &ckTrue;
    theTemplate[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(ckTrue);

    if(slot==NULL) {
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    perObjectCB.callback = pk11_DoKeys;
    perObjectCB.callbackArg = &perKeyCB;
    perObjectCB.findTemplate = theTemplate;
    perObjectCB.templateCount = templateSize;
    perKeyCB.callback = callback;
    perKeyCB.callbackArg = arg;
    perKeyCB.wincx = NULL;

    return PK11_TraverseSlot(slot, &perObjectCB);
}

/*
 * return the private key with the given ID
 */
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
pk11_FindPrivateKeyFromCertID(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyID)
{
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS privKey = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[] = {
	{ CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
	{ CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 },
    };
    /* if you change the array, change the variable below as well */
    int tsize = sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(theTemplate[0]);
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;

    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len ); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &privKey, sizeof(privKey));

    return pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot,theTemplate,tsize);
} 


SECKEYPrivateKey *
PK11_FindKeyByKeyID(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyID, void *wincx)
{
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle;
    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;

    keyHandle = pk11_FindPrivateKeyFromCertID(slot, keyID);
    if (keyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { 
	return NULL;
    }
    privKey =  PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey, PR_TRUE, keyHandle, wincx);
    return privKey;
}

/*
 * Generate a CKA_ID from the relevant public key data. The CKA_ID is generated
 * from the pubKeyData by SHA1_Hashing it to produce a smaller CKA_ID (to make
 * smart cards happy.
 */
SECItem *
PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(SECItem *pubKeyData) 
{
    PK11Context *context;
    SECItem *certCKA_ID;
    SECStatus rv;

    if (pubKeyData->len <= SHA1_LENGTH) {
	/* probably an already hashed value. The strongest known public
	 * key values <= 160 bits would be less than 40 bit symetric in
	 * strength. Don't hash them, just return the value. There are
	 * none at the time of this writing supported by previous versions
	 * of NSS, so change is binary compatible safe */
	return SECITEM_DupItem(pubKeyData);
    }

    context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
    if (context == NULL) {
	return NULL;
    }

    rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
    	rv = PK11_DigestOp(context,pubKeyData->data,pubKeyData->len);
    }
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
	PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
	return NULL;
    }

    certCKA_ID = (SECItem *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SECItem));
    if (certCKA_ID == NULL) {
	PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
	return NULL;
    }

    certCKA_ID->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
    certCKA_ID->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(certCKA_ID->len);
    if (certCKA_ID->data == NULL) {
	PORT_Free(certCKA_ID);
	PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
        return NULL;
    }

    rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context,certCKA_ID->data,&certCKA_ID->len,
								SHA1_LENGTH);
    PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    	SECITEM_FreeItem(certCKA_ID,PR_TRUE);
	return NULL;
    }

    return certCKA_ID;
}

/* Looking for PK11_GetKeyIDFromPrivateKey?
 * Call PK11_GetLowLevelKeyIDForPrivateKey instead.
 */


SECItem *
PK11_GetLowLevelKeyIDForPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
{
    return pk11_GetLowLevelKeyFromHandle(privKey->pkcs11Slot,privKey->pkcs11ID);
}

static SECStatus
privateKeyListCallback(SECKEYPrivateKey *key, void *arg)
{
    SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list = (SECKEYPrivateKeyList*)arg;
    return SECKEY_AddPrivateKeyToListTail(list, SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(key));
}

SECKEYPrivateKeyList*
PK11_ListPrivateKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot)
{
    SECStatus status;
    SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;

    keys = SECKEY_NewPrivateKeyList();
    if(keys == NULL) return NULL;

    status = PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot(slot, privateKeyListCallback,
		(void*)keys);

    if( status != SECSuccess ) {
	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(keys);
	keys = NULL;
    }

    return keys;
}

SECKEYPublicKeyList*
PK11_ListPublicKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname)
{
    CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
    CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
    int tsize = 0;
    int objCount = 0;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
    SECKEYPublicKeyList *keys;
    int i,len;


    attrs = findTemp;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue)); attrs++;
    if (nickname) {
	len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len); attrs++;
    }
    tsize = attrs - findTemp;
    PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));

    key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot,findTemp,tsize,&objCount);
    if (key_ids == NULL) {
	return NULL;
    }
    keys = SECKEY_NewPublicKeyList();
    if (keys == NULL) {
	PORT_Free(key_ids);
	return NULL;
    }

    for (i=0; i < objCount ; i++) {
	SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = 
				PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot,nullKey,key_ids[i]);
	if (pubKey) {
	    SECKEY_AddPublicKeyToListTail(keys, pubKey);
	}
   }

   PORT_Free(key_ids);
   return keys;
}

SECKEYPrivateKeyList*
PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx)
{
    CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
    CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
    int tsize = 0;
    int objCount = 0;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
    SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;
    int i,len;


    attrs = findTemp;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass)); attrs++;
    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue)); attrs++;
    if (nickname) {
	len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len); attrs++;
    }
    tsize = attrs - findTemp;
    PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));

    key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot,findTemp,tsize,&objCount);
    if (key_ids == NULL) {
	return NULL;
    }
    keys = SECKEY_NewPrivateKeyList();
    if (keys == NULL) {
	PORT_Free(key_ids);
	return NULL;
    }

    for (i=0; i < objCount ; i++) {
	SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = 
		PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,nullKey,PR_TRUE,key_ids[i],wincx);
	SECKEY_AddPrivateKeyToListTail(keys, privKey);
   }

   PORT_Free(key_ids);
   return keys;
}