gecko-dev/security/certverifier/ExtendedValidation.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "hasht.h"
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/PodOperations.h"
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
#include "nsDependentString.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace psm {
struct EVInfo {
// See bug 1338873 about making these fields const.
const char* dottedOid;
const char*
oidName; // Set this to null to signal an invalid structure,
// (We can't have an empty list, so we'll use a dummy entry)
unsigned char sha256Fingerprint[SHA256_LENGTH];
const char* issuerBase64;
const char* serialBase64;
};
// HOWTO enable additional CA root certificates for EV:
//
// For each combination of "root certificate" and "policy OID",
// one entry must be added to the array named kEVInfos.
//
// We use the combination of "issuer name" and "serial number" to
// uniquely identify the certificate. In order to avoid problems
// because of encodings when comparing certificates, we don't
// use plain text representation, we rather use the original encoding
// as it can be found in the root certificate (in base64 format).
//
// We can use the NSS utility named "pp" to extract the encoding.
//
// Build standalone NSS including the NSS tools, then run
// pp -t certificate-identity -i the-cert-filename
//
// You will need the output from sections "Issuer", "Fingerprint (SHA-256)",
// "Issuer DER Base64" and "Serial DER Base64".
//
// The new section consists of the following components:
//
// - a comment that should contain the human readable issuer name
// of the certificate, as printed by the pp tool
// - the EV policy OID that is associated to the EV grant
// - a text description of the EV policy OID. The array can contain
// multiple entries with the same OID.
// Please make sure to use the identical OID text description for
// all entries with the same policy OID (use the text search
// feature of your text editor to find duplicates).
// When adding a new policy OID that is not yet contained in the array,
// please make sure that your new description is different from
// all the other descriptions (again use the text search feature
// to be sure).
// - the SHA-256 fingerprint
// - the "Issuer DER Base64" as printed by the pp tool.
// Remove all whitespaces. If you use multiple lines, make sure that
// only the final line will be followed by a comma.
// - the "Serial DER Base64" (as printed by pp)
//
// After adding an entry, test it locally against the test site that
// has been provided by the CA. Note that you must use a version of NSS
// where the root certificate has already been added and marked as trusted
// for issuing SSL server certificates (at least).
//
// If you are able to connect to the site without certificate errors,
// but you don't see the EV status indicator, then most likely the CA
// has a problem in their infrastructure. The most common problems are
// related to the CA's OCSP infrastructure, either they use an incorrect
// OCSP signing certificate, or OCSP for the intermediate certificates
// isn't working, or OCSP isn't working at all.
#ifdef DEBUG
static const size_t NUM_TEST_EV_ROOTS = 2;
#endif
static const struct EVInfo kEVInfos[] = {
// clang-format off
// IMPORTANT! When extending this list, if you add another entry that uses
// the same dottedOid as an existing entry, use the same oidName.
#ifdef DEBUG
// Debug EV certificates should all use the following OID:
// 1.3.6.1.4.1.13769.666.666.666.1.500.9.1.
// (multiple entries with the same OID is ok)
// If you add or remove debug EV certs you must also modify NUM_TEST_EV_ROOTS
// so that the correct number of certs are skipped as these debug EV certs
// are NOT part of the default trust store.
{
// This is the PSM xpcshell testing EV certificate. It can be generated
// using pycert.py and the following specification:
//
// issuer:evroot
// subject:evroot
// subjectKey:ev
// issuerKey:ev
// validity:20150101-20350101
// extension:basicConstraints:cA,
// extension:keyUsage:keyCertSign,cRLSign
//
// If this ever needs to change, re-generate the certificate and update the
// following entry with the new fingerprint, issuer, and serial number.
"1.3.6.1.4.1.13769.666.666.666.1.500.9.1",
"DEBUGtesting EV OID",
{ 0x70, 0xED, 0xCB, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x02, 0xC7, 0xC5, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0xD2, 0xD7,
0xC6, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x02, 0x19, 0x17, 0xF5, 0x48, 0x08, 0x9C, 0xB3,
0x8E, 0xEF, 0x9A, 0x1A, 0x4D, 0x7F, 0x82, 0x94 },
"MBExDzANBgNVBAMMBmV2cm9vdA==",
"IZSHsVgzcvhPgdfrgdMGlpSfMeg=",
},
{
// This is an RSA root with an inadequate key size. It is used to test that
// minimum key sizes are enforced when verifying for EV. It can be
// generated using pycert.py and the following specification:
//
// issuer:ev_root_rsa_2040
// subject:ev_root_rsa_2040
// issuerKey:evRSA2040
// subjectKey:evRSA2040
// validity:20150101-20350101
// extension:basicConstraints:cA,
// extension:keyUsage:cRLSign,keyCertSign
//
// If this ever needs to change, re-generate the certificate and update the
// following entry with the new fingerprint, issuer, and serial number.
"1.3.6.1.4.1.13769.666.666.666.1.500.9.1",
"DEBUGtesting EV OID",
{ 0x40, 0xAB, 0x5D, 0xA5, 0x89, 0x15, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0x82, 0x87, 0xB8, 0xA6,
0x9A, 0x84, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0x9D, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x4E, 0xE1, 0x23, 0xE3,
0xC6, 0x64, 0xE7, 0x50, 0xDC, 0x35, 0x8C, 0x68 },
"MBsxGTAXBgNVBAMMEGV2X3Jvb3RfcnNhXzIwNDA=",
"J7nCMgtzNcSPG7jAh3CWzlTGHQg=",
},
#endif
{
// CN=Cybertrust Global Root,O=Cybertrust, Inc
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6334.1.100.1",
"Cybertrust EV OID",
{ 0x96, 0x0A, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x63, 0x56, 0x75, 0x0C, 0x29,
0x65, 0xDD, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xDA, 0x0B, 0x9C, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x77,
0x71, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0xFB, 0x23, 0x49, 0xAB, 0x39, 0x3D, 0xA3 },
"MDsxGDAWBgNVBAoTD0N5YmVydHJ1c3QsIEluYzEfMB0GA1UEAxMWQ3liZXJ0cnVz"
"dCBHbG9iYWwgUm9vdA==",
"BAAAAAABD4WqLUg=",
},
{
// CN=SwissSign Gold CA - G2,O=SwissSign AG,C=CH
"2.16.756.1.89.1.2.1.1",
"SwissSign EV OID",
{ 0x62, 0xDD, 0x0B, 0xE9, 0xB9, 0xF5, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x3E, 0xA0, 0xF8,
0xE7, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x3B, 0x1E, 0xCA, 0x57, 0xEA, 0x55, 0xC8, 0x68,
0x8F, 0x64, 0x7C, 0x68, 0x81, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x35, 0x7B, 0x95 },
"MEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNIMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxTd2lzc1NpZ24gQUcxHzAdBgNVBAMT"
"FlN3aXNzU2lnbiBHb2xkIENBIC0gRzI=",
"ALtAHEP1Xk+w",
},
{
// CN=XRamp Global Certification Authority,O=XRamp Security Services Inc,OU=www.xrampsecurity.com,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114404.1.1.2.4.1",
"Trustwave EV OID",
{ 0xCE, 0xCD, 0xDC, 0x90, 0x50, 0x99, 0xD8, 0xDA, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xB1,
0xD2, 0x09, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xCB, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0xFB, 0x2C, 0x10,
0xC0, 0xFF, 0x0B, 0xCF, 0x0D, 0x32, 0x86, 0xFC, 0x1A, 0xA2 },
"MIGCMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEeMBwGA1UECxMVd3d3LnhyYW1wc2VjdXJpdHkuY29t"
"MSQwIgYDVQQKExtYUmFtcCBTZWN1cml0eSBTZXJ2aWNlcyBJbmMxLTArBgNVBAMT"
"JFhSYW1wIEdsb2JhbCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"UJRs7Bjq1ZxN1ZfvdY+grQ==",
},
{
// CN=SecureTrust CA,O=SecureTrust Corporation,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114404.1.1.2.4.1",
"Trustwave EV OID",
{ 0xF1, 0xC1, 0xB5, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xA2, 0x0D, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x0E, 0xC9,
0xF6, 0xBC, 0x24, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xD3, 0x67, 0xB5, 0x25, 0x57, 0x59,
0xB4, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0x61, 0xFC, 0xE9, 0xF7, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x73 },
"MEgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAwHgYDVQQKExdTZWN1cmVUcnVzdCBDb3Jwb3JhdGlv"
"bjEXMBUGA1UEAxMOU2VjdXJlVHJ1c3QgQ0E=",
"DPCOXAgWpa1Cf/DrJxhZ0A==",
},
{
// CN=Secure Global CA,O=SecureTrust Corporation,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114404.1.1.2.4.1",
"Trustwave EV OID",
{ 0x42, 0x00, 0xF5, 0x04, 0x3A, 0xC8, 0x59, 0x0E, 0xBB, 0x52, 0x7D,
0x20, 0x9E, 0xD1, 0x50, 0x30, 0x29, 0xFB, 0xCB, 0xD4, 0x1C, 0xA1,
0xB5, 0x06, 0xEC, 0x27, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0xDE, 0x7D, 0xAC, 0x69 },
"MEoxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAwHgYDVQQKExdTZWN1cmVUcnVzdCBDb3Jwb3JhdGlv"
"bjEZMBcGA1UEAxMQU2VjdXJlIEdsb2JhbCBDQQ==",
"B1YipOjUiolN9BPI8PjqpQ==",
},
{
// CN=COMODO ECC Certification Authority,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater Manchester,C=GB
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1",
"Comodo EV OID",
{ 0x17, 0x93, 0x92, 0x7A, 0x06, 0x14, 0x54, 0x97, 0x89, 0xAD, 0xCE,
0x2F, 0x8F, 0x34, 0xF7, 0xF0, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x0F, 0x3A, 0xE3, 0xA3,
0xB8, 0x4D, 0x21, 0xEC, 0x15, 0xDB, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xC7 },
"MIGFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEbMBkGA1UECBMSR3JlYXRlciBNYW5jaGVzdGVyMRAw"
"DgYDVQQHEwdTYWxmb3JkMRowGAYDVQQKExFDT01PRE8gQ0EgTGltaXRlZDErMCkG"
"A1UEAxMiQ09NT0RPIEVDQyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"H0evqmIAcFBUTAGem2OZKg==",
},
{
// CN=COMODO Certification Authority,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater Manchester,C=GB
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1",
"Comodo EV OID",
{ 0x0C, 0x2C, 0xD6, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x80, 0x6F, 0xA3, 0x99, 0xED, 0xE8,
0x09, 0x11, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x5B, 0xF8, 0x79, 0x89, 0xF0, 0x65, 0x18,
0xF9, 0x80, 0x8C, 0x86, 0x05, 0x03, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xAF, 0x66 },
"MIGBMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEbMBkGA1UECBMSR3JlYXRlciBNYW5jaGVzdGVyMRAw"
"DgYDVQQHEwdTYWxmb3JkMRowGAYDVQQKExFDT01PRE8gQ0EgTGltaXRlZDEnMCUG"
"A1UEAxMeQ09NT0RPIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5",
"ToEtioJl4AsC7j41AkblPQ==",
},
{
// CN=AddTrust External CA Root,OU=AddTrust External TTP Network,O=AddTrust AB,C=SE
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1",
"Comodo EV OID",
{ 0x68, 0x7F, 0xA4, 0x51, 0x38, 0x22, 0x78, 0xFF, 0xF0, 0xC8, 0xB1,
0x1F, 0x8D, 0x43, 0xD5, 0x76, 0x67, 0x1C, 0x6E, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0xEA,
0xB4, 0x13, 0xFB, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x65, 0xD0, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0xF2 },
"MG8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlNFMRQwEgYDVQQKEwtBZGRUcnVzdCBBQjEmMCQGA1UECxMd"
"QWRkVHJ1c3QgRXh0ZXJuYWwgVFRQIE5ldHdvcmsxIjAgBgNVBAMTGUFkZFRydXN0"
"IEV4dGVybmFsIENBIFJvb3Q=",
"AQ==",
},
{
// OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority,O=\"The Go Daddy Group, Inc.\",C=US
"2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.3",
"Go Daddy EV OID a",
{ 0xC3, 0x84, 0x6B, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x9E, 0x93, 0xCA, 0x64, 0x27, 0x4C,
0x0E, 0xC6, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xCC, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x4F, 0xFC, 0xAC, 0xD2,
0xD7, 0x40, 0x19, 0x35, 0x0E, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x54, 0x6A, 0xE4 },
"MGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSEwHwYDVQQKExhUaGUgR28gRGFkZHkgR3JvdXAsIElu"
"Yy4xMTAvBgNVBAsTKEdvIERhZGR5IENsYXNzIDIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRo"
"b3JpdHk=",
"AA==",
},
{
// CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2,O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.",L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.3",
"Go Daddy EV OID a",
{ 0x45, 0x14, 0x0B, 0x32, 0x47, 0xEB, 0x9C, 0xC8, 0xC5, 0xB4, 0xF0,
0xD7, 0xB5, 0x30, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x32, 0x92, 0x08, 0x9E, 0x6E, 0x5A,
0x63, 0xE2, 0x74, 0x9D, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0xA9, 0x19, 0x8E, 0xDA },
"MIGDMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UECBMHQXJpem9uYTETMBEGA1UEBxMKU2Nv"
"dHRzZGFsZTEaMBgGA1UEChMRR29EYWRkeS5jb20sIEluYy4xMTAvBgNVBAMTKEdv"
"IERhZGR5IFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5IC0gRzI=",
"AA==",
},
{
// OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority,O=\"Starfield Technologies, Inc.\",C=US
"2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.3",
"Go Daddy EV OID b",
{ 0x14, 0x65, 0xFA, 0x20, 0x53, 0x97, 0xB8, 0x76, 0xFA, 0xA6, 0xF0,
0xA9, 0x95, 0x8E, 0x55, 0x90, 0xE4, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x7F, 0xAA, 0x4F,
0xB7, 0xC2, 0xC8, 0x67, 0x75, 0x21, 0xFB, 0x5F, 0xB6, 0x58 },
"MGgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSUwIwYDVQQKExxTdGFyZmllbGQgVGVjaG5vbG9naWVz"
"LCBJbmMuMTIwMAYDVQQLEylTdGFyZmllbGQgQ2xhc3MgMiBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9u"
"IEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"AA==",
},
{
// CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2,O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.",L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.3",
"Go Daddy EV OID b",
{ 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xCB, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xD2, 0xF9, 0xE1, 0x02, 0x99, 0x3F,
0xBE, 0x21, 0x51, 0x52, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0xDD, 0x0C, 0xAB, 0xDE, 0x1C,
0x68, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x91, 0x54, 0xDB, 0xB7, 0xF5 },
"MIGPMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UECBMHQXJpem9uYTETMBEGA1UEBxMKU2Nv"
"dHRzZGFsZTElMCMGA1UEChMcU3RhcmZpZWxkIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcywgSW5jLjEy"
"MDAGA1UEAxMpU3RhcmZpZWxkIFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5IC0g"
"RzI=",
"AA==",
},
{
// CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114412.2.1",
"DigiCert EV OID",
{ 0x74, 0x31, 0xE5, 0xF4, 0xC3, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x46, 0x90, 0x77, 0x4F,
0x0B, 0x61, 0xE0, 0x54, 0x40, 0x88, 0x3B, 0xA9, 0xA0, 0x1E, 0xD0,
0x0B, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xD7, 0x80, 0x6E, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x18, 0xCF },
"MGwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxEaWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsT"
"EHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xKzApBgNVBAMTIkRpZ2lDZXJ0IEhpZ2ggQXNzdXJh"
"bmNlIEVWIFJvb3QgQ0E=",
"AqxcJmoLQJuPC3nyrkYldw==",
},
{
// CN=QuoVadis Root CA 2,O=QuoVadis Limited,C=BM
"1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.100.1.2",
"Quo Vadis EV OID",
{ 0x85, 0xA0, 0xDD, 0x7D, 0xD7, 0x20, 0xAD, 0xB7, 0xFF, 0x05, 0xF8,
0x3D, 0x54, 0x2B, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0xFF, 0x45, 0x28, 0xF7, 0xD6,
0x77, 0xB1, 0x83, 0x89, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xC4, 0x9E, 0x86 },
"MEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJNMRkwFwYDVQQKExBRdW9WYWRpcyBMaW1pdGVkMRswGQYD"
"VQQDExJRdW9WYWRpcyBSb290IENBIDI=",
"BQk=",
},
{
// CN=Network Solutions Certificate Authority,O=Network Solutions L.L.C.,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.782.1.2.1.8.1",
"Network Solutions EV OID",
{ 0x15, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0x00, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x7A, 0xF3, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x4C,
0x07, 0x2B, 0x10, 0x11, 0xA0, 0x77, 0xBD, 0x77, 0xC0, 0x97, 0xF4,
0x01, 0x64, 0xB2, 0xF8, 0x59, 0x8A, 0xBD, 0x83, 0x86, 0x0C },
"MGIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSEwHwYDVQQKExhOZXR3b3JrIFNvbHV0aW9ucyBMLkwu"
"Qy4xMDAuBgNVBAMTJ05ldHdvcmsgU29sdXRpb25zIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhv"
"cml0eQ==",
"V8szb8JcFuZHFhfjkDFo4A==",
},
{
// CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority,OU="(c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.",OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference,O="Entrust, Inc.",C=US
"2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2",
"Entrust EV OID",
{ 0x73, 0xC1, 0x76, 0x43, 0x4F, 0x1B, 0xC6, 0xD5, 0xAD, 0xF4, 0x5B,
0x0E, 0x76, 0xE7, 0x27, 0x28, 0x7C, 0x8D, 0xE5, 0x76, 0x16, 0xC1,
0xE6, 0xE6, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7D, 0x8E, 0x4C },
"MIGwMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEWMBQGA1UEChMNRW50cnVzdCwgSW5jLjE5MDcGA1UE"
"CxMwd3d3LmVudHJ1c3QubmV0L0NQUyBpcyBpbmNvcnBvcmF0ZWQgYnkgcmVmZXJl"
"bmNlMR8wHQYDVQQLExYoYykgMjAwNiBFbnRydXN0LCBJbmMuMS0wKwYDVQQDEyRF"
"bnRydXN0IFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHk=",
"RWtQVA==",
},
{
// CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x10, 0x40, 0xE4, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xC7, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xE3,
0x81, 0xD3, 0x1E, 0xF2, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x48, 0xB6, 0x68, 0x5C, 0x96,
0xE7, 0xCE, 0xF3, 0xC1, 0xDF, 0x6C, 0xD4, 0x33, 0x1C, 0x99 },
"MFcxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMRkwFwYDVQQKExBHbG9iYWxTaWduIG52LXNhMRAwDgYD"
"VQQLEwdSb290IENBMRswGQYDVQQDExJHbG9iYWxTaWduIFJvb3QgQ0E=",
"BAAAAAABFUtaw5Q=",
},
{
// CN=GlobalSign,O=GlobalSign,OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R3
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0xCB, 0xB5, 0x22, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xF1, 0x27, 0xAD, 0x6A, 0x01, 0x13,
0x86, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x10, 0x2E, 0x7D, 0x07, 0x59, 0xAF,
0x63, 0x5A, 0x7C, 0xF4, 0x72, 0x0D, 0xC9, 0x63, 0xC5, 0x3B },
"MEwxIDAeBgNVBAsTF0dsb2JhbFNpZ24gUm9vdCBDQSAtIFIzMRMwEQYDVQQKEwpH"
"bG9iYWxTaWduMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpHbG9iYWxTaWdu",
"BAAAAAABIVhTCKI=",
},
{
// CN=Buypass Class 3 Root CA,O=Buypass AS-983163327,C=NO
"2.16.578.1.26.1.3.3",
"Buypass EV OID",
{ 0xED, 0xF7, 0xEB, 0xBC, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x4D, 0x38, 0x7B,
0x7D, 0x40, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xED, 0xB4, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4C,
0x29, 0xB4, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x5B, 0x93, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xB2, 0x4D },
"ME4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5PMR0wGwYDVQQKDBRCdXlwYXNzIEFTLTk4MzE2MzMyNzEg"
"MB4GA1UEAwwXQnV5cGFzcyBDbGFzcyAzIFJvb3QgQ0E=",
"Ag==",
},
{
// CN=Chambers of Commerce Root - 2008,O=AC Camerfirma S.A.,serialNumber=A82743287,L=Madrid (see current address at www.camerfirma.com/address),C=EU
"1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.14.2.1.2",
"Camerfirma EV OID a",
{ 0x06, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xC4, 0x91, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x32, 0xF3, 0x08,
0x9B, 0x85, 0x42, 0xE9, 0x46, 0x17, 0xD8, 0x93, 0xD7, 0xFE, 0x94,
0x4E, 0x10, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xE2, 0x9D, 0x96, 0x93, 0xC0 },
"MIGuMQswCQYDVQQGEwJFVTFDMEEGA1UEBxM6TWFkcmlkIChzZWUgY3VycmVudCBh"
"ZGRyZXNzIGF0IHd3dy5jYW1lcmZpcm1hLmNvbS9hZGRyZXNzKTESMBAGA1UEBRMJ"
"QTgyNzQzMjg3MRswGQYDVQQKExJBQyBDYW1lcmZpcm1hIFMuQS4xKTAnBgNVBAMT"
"IENoYW1iZXJzIG9mIENvbW1lcmNlIFJvb3QgLSAyMDA4",
"AKPaQn6ksa7a",
},
{
// CN=AffirmTrust Commercial,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.1",
"AffirmTrust EV OID a",
{ 0x03, 0x76, 0xAB, 0x1D, 0x54, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x80, 0x3C, 0xE4, 0xB2,
0xE2, 0x01, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x7E, 0xEF, 0x7B, 0x57, 0xB6, 0x36, 0xE8,
0xA9, 0x3C, 0x9B, 0x8D, 0x48, 0x60, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0x5F, 0xA7 },
"MEQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtBZmZpcm1UcnVzdDEfMB0GA1UEAwwW"
"QWZmaXJtVHJ1c3QgQ29tbWVyY2lhbA==",
"d3cGJyapsXw=",
},
{
// CN=AffirmTrust Networking,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.2",
"AffirmTrust EV OID b",
{ 0x0A, 0x81, 0xEC, 0x5A, 0x92, 0x97, 0x77, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x90, 0x4A,
0xF3, 0x8D, 0x5D, 0x50, 0x9F, 0x66, 0xB5, 0xE2, 0xC5, 0x8F, 0xCD,
0xB5, 0x31, 0x05, 0x8B, 0x0E, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0x1B },
"MEQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtBZmZpcm1UcnVzdDEfMB0GA1UEAwwW"
"QWZmaXJtVHJ1c3QgTmV0d29ya2luZw==",
"fE8EORzUmS0=",
},
{
// CN=AffirmTrust Premium,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.3",
"AffirmTrust EV OID c",
{ 0x70, 0xA7, 0x3F, 0x7F, 0x37, 0x6B, 0x60, 0x07, 0x42, 0x48, 0x90,
0x45, 0x34, 0xB1, 0x14, 0x82, 0xD5, 0xBF, 0x0E, 0x69, 0x8E, 0xCC,
0x49, 0x8D, 0xF5, 0x25, 0x77, 0xEB, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x9A },
"MEExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtBZmZpcm1UcnVzdDEcMBoGA1UEAwwT"
"QWZmaXJtVHJ1c3QgUHJlbWl1bQ==",
"bYwURrGmCu4=",
},
{
// CN=AffirmTrust Premium ECC,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.4",
"AffirmTrust EV OID d",
{ 0xBD, 0x71, 0xFD, 0xF6, 0xDA, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xCF, 0x62, 0xD1, 0x64,
0x7A, 0xDD, 0x25, 0x81, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x79, 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x39, 0x7E,
0xB4, 0xEC, 0xBA, 0x9C, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x88, 0x82, 0x14, 0x23 },
"MEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtBZmZpcm1UcnVzdDEgMB4GA1UEAwwX"
"QWZmaXJtVHJ1c3QgUHJlbWl1bSBFQ0M=",
"dJclisc/elQ=",
},
{
// CN=Certum Trusted Network CA,OU=Certum Certification Authority,O=Unizeto Technologies S.A.,C=PL
"1.2.616.1.113527.2.5.1.1",
"Certum EV OID",
{ 0x5C, 0x58, 0x46, 0x8D, 0x55, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x74, 0x39,
0x82, 0xD2, 0xB5, 0x00, 0x10, 0xB6, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x37, 0x4A, 0xCF,
0x83, 0xA7, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x2D, 0xB7, 0x68, 0xC4, 0x40, 0x8E },
"MH4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlBMMSIwIAYDVQQKExlVbml6ZXRvIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcyBT"
"LkEuMScwJQYDVQQLEx5DZXJ0dW0gQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkxIjAg"
"BgNVBAMTGUNlcnR1bSBUcnVzdGVkIE5ldHdvcmsgQ0E=",
"BETA",
},
{
// CN=Certum Trusted Network CA 2,OU=Certum Certification Authority,O=Unizeto Technologies S.A.,C=PL
"1.2.616.1.113527.2.5.1.1",
"Certum EV OID",
{ 0xB6, 0x76, 0xF2, 0xED, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xD3, 0x6C, 0xB0,
0xF6, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x60, 0x39, 0x61, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x62, 0x65,
0xBA, 0x01, 0x3A, 0x2F, 0x03, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xD0, 0xB8, 0x04 },
"MIGAMQswCQYDVQQGEwJQTDEiMCAGA1UEChMZVW5pemV0byBUZWNobm9sb2dpZXMg"
"Uy5BLjEnMCUGA1UECxMeQ2VydHVtIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSQw"
"IgYDVQQDExtDZXJ0dW0gVHJ1c3RlZCBOZXR3b3JrIENBIDI=",
"IdbQSk8lD8kyN/yqXhKN6Q==",
},
{
// CN=Izenpe.com,O=IZENPE S.A.,C=ES
"1.3.6.1.4.1.14777.6.1.1",
"Izenpe EV OID 1",
{ 0x25, 0x30, 0xCC, 0x8E, 0x98, 0x32, 0x15, 0x02, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x6F,
0x9B, 0x1F, 0xBA, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x45,
0x48, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x4F, 0x36, 0x3B, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0x53, 0x1F },
"MDgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkVTMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtJWkVOUEUgUy5BLjETMBEGA1UEAwwK"
"SXplbnBlLmNvbQ==",
"ALC3WhZIX7/hy/WL1xnmfQ==",
},
{
// CN=Izenpe.com,O=IZENPE S.A.,C=ES
"1.3.6.1.4.1.14777.6.1.2",
"Izenpe EV OID 2",
{ 0x25, 0x30, 0xCC, 0x8E, 0x98, 0x32, 0x15, 0x02, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x6F,
0x9B, 0x1F, 0xBA, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x45,
0x48, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x4F, 0x36, 0x3B, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0x53, 0x1F },
"MDgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkVTMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtJWkVOUEUgUy5BLjETMBEGA1UEAwwK"
"SXplbnBlLmNvbQ==",
"ALC3WhZIX7/hy/WL1xnmfQ==",
},
{
// CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3,OU=T-Systems Trust Center,O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH,C=DE
"1.3.6.1.4.1.7879.13.24.1",
"T-Systems EV OID",
{ 0xFD, 0x73, 0xDA, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0x64, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0xEF,
0x0C, 0xCD, 0xDA, 0x96, 0x71, 0x0B, 0x9C, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x5E, 0xCA,
0x7E, 0x31, 0x70, 0x7A, 0xF3, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x52, 0x2B, 0xBD },
"MIGCMQswCQYDVQQGEwJERTErMCkGA1UECgwiVC1TeXN0ZW1zIEVudGVycHJpc2Ug"
"U2VydmljZXMgR21iSDEfMB0GA1UECwwWVC1TeXN0ZW1zIFRydXN0IENlbnRlcjEl"
"MCMGA1UEAwwcVC1UZWxlU2VjIEdsb2JhbFJvb3QgQ2xhc3MgMw==",
"AQ==",
},
{
// CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority,OU=Root CA,O=TAIWAN-CA,C=TW
"1.3.6.1.4.1.40869.1.1.22.3",
"TWCA EV OID",
{ 0xBF, 0xD8, 0x8F, 0xE1, 0x10, 0x1C, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x3E, 0x80, 0x1B,
0xF8, 0xBE, 0x56, 0x35, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xBA, 0xD1, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0xBD,
0x51, 0x5E, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6D, 0x5B, 0x87, 0x11, 0xAC, 0x44 },
"MF8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlRXMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlUQUlXQU4tQ0ExEDAOBgNVBAsMB1Jv"
"b3QgQ0ExKjAoBgNVBAMMIVRXQ0EgUm9vdCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0"
"eQ==",
"AQ==",
},
{
// CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 EV 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
"1.3.6.1.4.1.4788.2.202.1",
"D-TRUST EV OID",
{ 0xEE, 0xC5, 0x49, 0x6B, 0x98, 0x8C, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x25, 0xB9, 0x34,
0x09, 0x2E, 0xEC, 0x29, 0x08, 0xBE, 0xD0, 0xB0, 0xF3, 0x16, 0xC2,
0xD4, 0x73, 0x0C, 0x84, 0xEA, 0xF1, 0xF3, 0xD3, 0x48, 0x81 },
"MFAxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkRFMRUwEwYDVQQKDAxELVRydXN0IEdtYkgxKjAoBgNVBAMM"
"IUQtVFJVU1QgUm9vdCBDbGFzcyAzIENBIDIgRVYgMjAwOQ==",
"CYP0",
},
{
// CN = Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068, C = ES
"1.3.6.1.4.1.13177.10.1.3.10",
"Firmaprofesional EV OID",
{ 0x04, 0x04, 0x80, 0x28, 0xBF, 0x1F, 0x28, 0x64, 0xD4, 0x8F, 0x9A,
0xD4, 0xD8, 0x32, 0x94, 0x36, 0x6A, 0x82, 0x88, 0x56, 0x55, 0x3F,
0x3B, 0x14, 0x30, 0x3F, 0x90, 0x14, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x40, 0xEF },
"MFExCzAJBgNVBAYTAkVTMUIwQAYDVQQDDDlBdXRvcmlkYWQgZGUgQ2VydGlmaWNh"
"Y2lvbiBGaXJtYXByb2Zlc2lvbmFsIENJRiBBNjI2MzQwNjg=",
"U+w77vuySF8=",
},
{
// CN = TWCA Global Root CA, OU = Root CA, O = TAIWAN-CA, C = TW
"1.3.6.1.4.1.40869.1.1.22.3",
"TWCA EV OID",
{ 0x59, 0x76, 0x90, 0x07, 0xF7, 0x68, 0x5D, 0x0F, 0xCD, 0x50, 0x87,
0x2F, 0x9F, 0x95, 0xD5, 0x75, 0x5A, 0x5B, 0x2B, 0x45, 0x7D, 0x81,
0xF3, 0x69, 0x2B, 0x61, 0x0A, 0x98, 0x67, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0x1B },
"MFExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlRXMRIwEAYDVQQKEwlUQUlXQU4tQ0ExEDAOBgNVBAsTB1Jv"
"b3QgQ0ExHDAaBgNVBAMTE1RXQ0EgR2xvYmFsIFJvb3QgQ0E=",
"DL4=",
},
{
// CN = E-Tugra Certification Authority, OU = E-Tugra Sertifikasyon Merkezi, O = E-Tuğra EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş., L = Ankara, C = TR
"2.16.792.3.0.4.1.1.4",
"ETugra EV OID",
{ 0xB0, 0xBF, 0xD5, 0x2B, 0xB0, 0xD7, 0xD9, 0xBD, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x5D,
0x4D, 0xC1, 0x3D, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xC0, 0x2C, 0x54, 0x2F, 0x37, 0x83,
0x65, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x39, 0x11, 0xF5, 0x5E, 0x55, 0xF2, 0x3C },
"MIGyMQswCQYDVQQGEwJUUjEPMA0GA1UEBwwGQW5rYXJhMUAwPgYDVQQKDDdFLVR1"
"xJ9yYSBFQkcgQmlsacWfaW0gVGVrbm9sb2ppbGVyaSB2ZSBIaXptZXRsZXJpIEEu"
"xZ4uMSYwJAYDVQQLDB1FLVR1Z3JhIFNlcnRpZmlrYXN5b24gTWVya2V6aTEoMCYG"
"A1UEAwwfRS1UdWdyYSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"amg+nFGby1M=",
},
{
// CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
"1.3.159.1.17.1",
"Actalis EV OID",
{ 0x55, 0x92, 0x60, 0x84, 0xEC, 0x96, 0x3A, 0x64, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x2A,
0xBE, 0x01, 0xCE, 0x0B, 0xA8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xBC, 0xC7,
0xAA, 0xB5, 0xAF, 0xC1, 0x55, 0xB3, 0x7F, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x66 },
"MGsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAklUMQ4wDAYDVQQHDAVNaWxhbjEjMCEGA1UECgwaQWN0YWxp"
"cyBTLnAuQS4vMDMzNTg1MjA5NjcxJzAlBgNVBAMMHkFjdGFsaXMgQXV0aGVudGlj"
"YXRpb24gUm9vdCBDQQ==",
"VwoRl0LE48w=",
},
{
// CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G2,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114412.2.1",
"DigiCert EV OID",
{ 0x7D, 0x05, 0xEB, 0xB6, 0x82, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x51, 0xEE,
0x09, 0x4E, 0xEB, 0xFE, 0xFA, 0x79, 0x53, 0xA1, 0x14, 0xED, 0xB2,
0xF4, 0x49, 0x49, 0x45, 0x2F, 0xAB, 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x85 },
"MGUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxEaWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsT"
"EHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xJDAiBgNVBAMTG0RpZ2lDZXJ0IEFzc3VyZWQgSUQg"
"Um9vdCBHMg==",
"C5McOtY5Z+pnI7/Dr5r0Sw==",
},
{
// CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G3,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114412.2.1",
"DigiCert EV OID",
{ 0x7E, 0x37, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x4C, 0x47, 0x09, 0x0C, 0xAB, 0x36, 0x55,
0x1B, 0xA6, 0xF4, 0x5D, 0xB8, 0x40, 0x68, 0x0F, 0xBA, 0x16, 0x6A,
0x95, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x43, 0x05, 0x3F, 0xC2 },
"MGUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxEaWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsT"
"EHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xJDAiBgNVBAMTG0RpZ2lDZXJ0IEFzc3VyZWQgSUQg"
"Um9vdCBHMw==",
"C6Fa+h3foLVJRK/NJKBs7A==",
},
{
// CN=DigiCert Global Root G2,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114412.2.1",
"DigiCert EV OID",
{ 0xCB, 0x3C, 0xCB, 0xB7, 0x60, 0x31, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x13, 0x8F, 0x8D,
0xD3, 0x9A, 0x23, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0x47, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x5E, 0x43, 0xC1,
0x14, 0x4C, 0xEA, 0x27, 0xD4, 0x6A, 0x5A, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0x5F },
"MGExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxEaWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsT"
"EHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xIDAeBgNVBAMTF0RpZ2lDZXJ0IEdsb2JhbCBSb290"
"IEcy",
"Azrx5qcRqaC7KGSxHQn65Q==",
},
{
// CN=DigiCert Global Root G3,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114412.2.1",
"DigiCert EV OID",
{ 0x31, 0xAD, 0x66, 0x48, 0xF8, 0x10, 0x41, 0x38, 0xC7, 0x38, 0xF3,
0x9E, 0xA4, 0x32, 0x01, 0x33, 0x39, 0x3E, 0x3A, 0x18, 0xCC, 0x02,
0x29, 0x6E, 0xF9, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xC9, 0xEF, 0x67, 0x31, 0xD0 },
"MGExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxEaWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsT"
"EHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xIDAeBgNVBAMTF0RpZ2lDZXJ0IEdsb2JhbCBSb290"
"IEcz",
"BVVWvPJepDU1w6QP1atFcg==",
},
{
// CN=DigiCert Trusted Root G4,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
"2.16.840.1.114412.2.1",
"DigiCert EV OID",
{ 0x55, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xF1, 0xA7, 0xAF, 0x9E, 0x6C, 0xE6, 0x72,
0x01, 0x7F, 0x4F, 0x12, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x72, 0x40, 0xC7, 0x8E, 0x76,
0x1A, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xD1, 0xD9, 0xD2, 0x0A, 0xC8, 0x99, 0x88 },
"MGIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxEaWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsT"
"EHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xITAfBgNVBAMTGERpZ2lDZXJ0IFRydXN0ZWQgUm9v"
"dCBHNA==",
"BZsbV56OITLiOQe9p3d1XA==",
},
{
// CN=QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3,O=QuoVadis Limited,C=BM
"1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.2.100.1.2",
"QuoVadis EV OID",
{ 0x8F, 0xE4, 0xFB, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x67, 0xDB, 0x0B,
0xEB, 0xB2, 0x3E, 0x37, 0xC7, 0x1B, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xDC, 0xBC, 0xDD,
0x24, 0x0E, 0xA0, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0x58, 0xB4, 0x7E, 0x18, 0x40 },
"MEgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJNMRkwFwYDVQQKExBRdW9WYWRpcyBMaW1pdGVkMR4wHAYD"
"VQQDExVRdW9WYWRpcyBSb290IENBIDIgRzM=",
"RFc0JFuBiZs18s64KztbpybwdSg=",
},
{
// CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater Manchester,C=GB
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1",
"Comodo EV OID",
{ 0x52, 0xF0, 0xE1, 0xC4, 0xE5, 0x8E, 0xC6, 0x29, 0x29, 0x1B, 0x60,
0x31, 0x7F, 0x07, 0x46, 0x71, 0xB8, 0x5D, 0x7E, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x5B,
0x07, 0x27, 0x34, 0x63, 0x53, 0x4B, 0x32, 0xB4, 0x02, 0x34 },
"MIGFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEbMBkGA1UECBMSR3JlYXRlciBNYW5jaGVzdGVyMRAw"
"DgYDVQQHEwdTYWxmb3JkMRowGAYDVQQKExFDT01PRE8gQ0EgTGltaXRlZDErMCkG"
"A1UEAxMiQ09NT0RPIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"TKr5yttjb+Af907YWwOGnQ==",
},
{
// CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority,O=The USERTRUST Network,L=Jersey City,ST=New Jersey,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1",
"Comodo EV OID",
{ 0xE7, 0x93, 0xC9, 0xB0, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x13, 0xE2, 0x1C, 0x31,
0x22, 0x8A, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x81, 0x19, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x74, 0x9C, 0x89,
0x89, 0x64, 0xB1, 0x74, 0x6D, 0x46, 0xC3, 0xD4, 0xCB, 0xD2 },
"MIGIMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKTmV3IEplcnNleTEUMBIGA1UEBxML"
"SmVyc2V5IENpdHkxHjAcBgNVBAoTFVRoZSBVU0VSVFJVU1QgTmV0d29yazEuMCwG"
"A1UEAxMlVVNFUlRydXN0IFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"Af1tMPyjylGoG7xkDjUDLQ==",
},
{
// CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority,O=The USERTRUST Network,L=Jersey City,ST=New Jersey,C=US
"1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1",
"Comodo EV OID",
{ 0x4F, 0xF4, 0x60, 0xD5, 0x4B, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xDA, 0xBF, 0xBC, 0xFC,
0x57, 0x12, 0xE0, 0x40, 0x0D, 0x2B, 0xED, 0x3F, 0xBC, 0x4D, 0x4F,
0xBD, 0xAA, 0x86, 0xE0, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xD2, 0xA9, 0xAD, 0x7A },
"MIGIMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKTmV3IEplcnNleTEUMBIGA1UEBxML"
"SmVyc2V5IENpdHkxHjAcBgNVBAoTFVRoZSBVU0VSVFJVU1QgTmV0d29yazEuMCwG"
"A1UEAxMlVVNFUlRydXN0IEVDQyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQ==",
"XIuZxVqUxdJxVt7NiYDMJg==",
},
{
// CN=GlobalSign,O=GlobalSign,OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x17, 0x9F, 0xBC, 0x14, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0xD0, 0x0F, 0xD2, 0x4E, 0xA1,
0x34, 0x58, 0xCC, 0x43, 0xBF, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x9C, 0x81, 0x82, 0xD7,
0x83, 0xA5, 0x13, 0xF6, 0xEB, 0xEC, 0x10, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x24 },
"MFAxJDAiBgNVBAsTG0dsb2JhbFNpZ24gRUNDIFJvb3QgQ0EgLSBSNTETMBEGA1UE"
"ChMKR2xvYmFsU2lnbjETMBEGA1UEAxMKR2xvYmFsU2lnbg==",
"YFlJ4CYuu1X5CneKcflK2Gw=",
},
{
// CN=GlobalSign,O=GlobalSign,OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x2C, 0xAB, 0xEA, 0xFE, 0x37, 0xD0, 0x6C, 0xA2, 0x2A, 0xBA, 0x73,
0x91, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x25, 0x98, 0x29, 0x52, 0xC4, 0x53, 0x64,
0x73, 0x49, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x3A, 0xB5, 0xAD, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0x69 },
"MEwxIDAeBgNVBAsTF0dsb2JhbFNpZ24gUm9vdCBDQSAtIFI2MRMwEQYDVQQKEwpH"
"bG9iYWxTaWduMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpHbG9iYWxTaWdu",
"Rea7A4Mzw4VlSOb/RVE=",
},
{
// CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048),OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited,OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.),O=Entrust.net
"2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2",
"Entrust EV OID",
{ 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x71, 0x72, 0xE0, 0x1C, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xBF, 0x62, 0x58,
0x0D, 0x89, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0xD4, 0xF8, 0x73, 0x80,
0x1E, 0x0C, 0x10, 0xB9, 0xC8, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x1E, 0xB1, 0x77 },
"MIG0MRQwEgYDVQQKEwtFbnRydXN0Lm5ldDFAMD4GA1UECxQ3d3d3LmVudHJ1c3Qu"
"bmV0L0NQU18yMDQ4IGluY29ycC4gYnkgcmVmLiAobGltaXRzIGxpYWIuKTElMCMG"
"A1UECxMcKGMpIDE5OTkgRW50cnVzdC5uZXQgTGltaXRlZDEzMDEGA1UEAxMqRW50"
"cnVzdC5uZXQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgKDIwNDgp",
"OGPe+A==",
},
{
// CN=Staat der Nederlanden EV Root CA,O=Staat der Nederlanden,C=NL
"2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.7",
"Staat der Nederlanden EV OID",
{ 0x4D, 0x24, 0x91, 0x41, 0x4C, 0xFE, 0x95, 0x67, 0x46, 0xEC, 0x4C,
0xEF, 0xA6, 0xCF, 0x6F, 0x72, 0xE2, 0x8A, 0x13, 0x29, 0x43, 0x2F,
0x9D, 0x8A, 0x90, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0xCB, 0x5D, 0xAD, 0xC1, 0x5A },
"MFgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMR4wHAYDVQQKDBVTdGFhdCBkZXIgTmVkZXJsYW5kZW4x"
"KTAnBgNVBAMMIFN0YWF0IGRlciBOZWRlcmxhbmRlbiBFViBSb290IENB",
"AJiWjQ==",
},
{
// CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2,OU="(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only",OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms,O="Entrust, Inc.",C=US
"2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2",
"Entrust EV OID",
{ 0x43, 0xDF, 0x57, 0x74, 0xB0, 0x3E, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x5F, 0xE4, 0x0D,
0x93, 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xBB, 0x2E, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x73, 0x8C,
0x4E, 0x6D, 0x38, 0x41, 0x10, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0xA7, 0xF3, 0x39 },
"MIG+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEWMBQGA1UEChMNRW50cnVzdCwgSW5jLjEoMCYGA1UE"
"CxMfU2VlIHd3dy5lbnRydXN0Lm5ldC9sZWdhbC10ZXJtczE5MDcGA1UECxMwKGMp"
"IDIwMDkgRW50cnVzdCwgSW5jLiAtIGZvciBhdXRob3JpemVkIHVzZSBvbmx5MTIw"
"MAYDVQQDEylFbnRydXN0IFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgLSBH"
"Mg==",
"SlOMKA==",
},
{
// CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1,OU="(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only",OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms,O="Entrust, Inc.",C=US
"2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2",
"Entrust EV OID",
{ 0x02, 0xED, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x45, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x56,
0x67, 0x91, 0x70, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x51, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xF0, 0xB2,
0xAB, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x8E, 0xB0, 0x70, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0xDF, 0xF5 },
"MIG/MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEWMBQGA1UEChMNRW50cnVzdCwgSW5jLjEoMCYGA1UE"
"CxMfU2VlIHd3dy5lbnRydXN0Lm5ldC9sZWdhbC10ZXJtczE5MDcGA1UECxMwKGMp"
"IDIwMTIgRW50cnVzdCwgSW5jLiAtIGZvciBhdXRob3JpemVkIHVzZSBvbmx5MTMw"
"MQYDVQQDEypFbnRydXN0IFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgLSBF"
"QzE=",
"AKaLeSkAAAAAUNCR+Q==",
},
{
// CN=CFCA EV ROOT,O=China Financial Certification Authority,C=CN
"2.16.156.112554.3",
"CFCA EV OID",
{ 0x5C, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0x1D, 0x5E, 0x45, 0x54, 0x7A, 0x04,
0xE6, 0x87, 0x3E, 0x64, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x53, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0xCC,
0x2E, 0xF8, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x55, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0xFD, 0x70, 0xFD },
"MFYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNOMTAwLgYDVQQKDCdDaGluYSBGaW5hbmNpYWwgQ2VydGlm"
"aWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkxFTATBgNVBAMMDENGQ0EgRVYgUk9PVA==",
"GErM1g==",
},
{
// OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
"1.2.392.200091.100.721.1",
"SECOM EV OID",
{ 0x51, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0xEC, 0xB8, 0x10, 0xD4, 0xCD, 0xE5, 0xDD, 0x85,
0x39, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x60, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xB7, 0x36,
0xD2, 0xB5, 0x21, 0x48, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0x7A, 0x0E, 0xBE, 0xF6 },
"MF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkpQMSUwIwYDVQQKExxTRUNPTSBUcnVzdCBTeXN0ZW1zIENP"
"LixMVEQuMScwJQYDVQQLEx5TZWN1cml0eSBDb21tdW5pY2F0aW9uIFJvb3RDQTI=",
"AA==",
},
{
// CN=OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA,OU=OISTE Foundation Endorsed,O=WISeKey,C=CH
"2.16.756.5.14.7.4.8",
"WISeKey EV OID",
{ 0x6B, 0x9C, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xAD, 0x65,
0xCD, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x21, 0x49, 0xE5, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x84,
0x5E, 0x7B, 0xD1, 0xED, 0x01, 0x9F, 0x27, 0xB8, 0x6B, 0xD6 },
"MG0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNIMRAwDgYDVQQKEwdXSVNlS2V5MSIwIAYDVQQLExlPSVNU"
"RSBGb3VuZGF0aW9uIEVuZG9yc2VkMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9PSVNURSBXSVNlS2V5IEds"
"b2JhbCBSb290IEdCIENB",
"drEgUnTwhYdGs/gjGvbCwA==",
},
{
// CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x8E, 0xCD, 0xE6, 0x88, 0x4F, 0x3D, 0x87, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x5B, 0xA3,
0x1A, 0xC3, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x3D, 0x70, 0x16, 0xDE, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xCC,
0x90, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0xCB, 0x97, 0xC6, 0xAE, 0x98, 0x19, 0x6E },
"MDkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZBbWF6b24xGTAXBgNVBAMTEEFtYXpv"
"biBSb290IENBIDE=",
"Bmyfz5m/jAo54vB4ikPmljZbyg==",
},
{
// CN=Amazon Root CA 2,O=Amazon,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x1B, 0xA5, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0x8C, 0x65, 0x40, 0x1A, 0x82, 0x96, 0x01,
0x18, 0xF8, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x4F, 0x62, 0x30, 0x4D, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xC4,
0x71, 0x3A, 0x19, 0xC3, 0x9C, 0x01, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x6D, 0xB4 },
"MDkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZBbWF6b24xGTAXBgNVBAMTEEFtYXpv"
"biBSb290IENBIDI=",
"Bmyf0pY1hp8KD+WGePhbJruKNw==",
},
{
// CN=Amazon Root CA 3,O=Amazon,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x18, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0xFE, 0x7B, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x60, 0xB2, 0xE3, 0x47,
0xB8, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xCB, 0x31, 0xD0, 0x2E, 0xBB, 0x3A, 0xDA,
0x27, 0x15, 0x69, 0xF5, 0x03, 0x43, 0xB4, 0x6D, 0xB3, 0xA4 },
"MDkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZBbWF6b24xGTAXBgNVBAMTEEFtYXpv"
"biBSb290IENBIDM=",
"Bmyf1XSXNmY/Owua2eiedgPySg==",
},
{
// CN=Amazon Root CA 4,O=Amazon,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0xE3, 0x5D, 0x28, 0x41, 0x9E, 0xD0, 0x20, 0x25, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0x90,
0x38, 0xCD, 0x62, 0x39, 0x62, 0x45, 0x8D, 0xA5, 0xC6, 0x95, 0xFB,
0xDE, 0xA3, 0xC2, 0x2B, 0x0B, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x89, 0x70, 0x92 },
"MDkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQ8wDQYDVQQKEwZBbWF6b24xGTAXBgNVBAMTEEFtYXpv"
"biBSb290IENBIDQ=",
"Bmyf18G7EEwpQ+Vxe3ssyBrBDg==",
},
{
// CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2,O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.",L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x56, 0x8D, 0x69, 0x05, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0x87, 0x08, 0xA4, 0xB3, 0x02,
0x51, 0x90, 0xED, 0xCF, 0xED, 0xB1, 0x97, 0x4A, 0x60, 0x6A, 0x13,
0xC6, 0xE5, 0x29, 0x0F, 0xCB, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0x3E, 0xDA, 0xB5 },
"MIGYMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UECBMHQXJpem9uYTETMBEGA1UEBxMKU2Nv"
"dHRzZGFsZTElMCMGA1UEChMcU3RhcmZpZWxkIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcywgSW5jLjE7"
"MDkGA1UEAxMyU3RhcmZpZWxkIFNlcnZpY2VzIFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0"
"aG9yaXR5IC0gRzI=",
"AA==",
},
{
// CN=LuxTrust Global Root 2,O=LuxTrust S.A.,C=LU
"1.3.171.1.1.10.5.2",
"LuxTrust EV OID",
{ 0x54, 0x45, 0x5F, 0x71, 0x29, 0xC2, 0x0B, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x18,
0xF9, 0x97, 0x16, 0x8F, 0x24, 0xC5, 0x8F, 0xC5, 0x02, 0x3B, 0xF5,
0xDA, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0xD8, 0x90, 0x2E, 0xD5 },
"MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkxVMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1MdXhUcnVzdCBTLkEuMR8wHQYDVQQD"
"DBZMdXhUcnVzdCBHbG9iYWwgUm9vdCAy",
"Cn6m30tEntpqJIWe5rgV0xZ/u7E=",
},
{
// CN=GDCA TrustAUTH R5 ROOT,O="GUANG DONG CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY CO.,LTD.",C=CN
"1.2.156.112559.1.1.6.1",
"GDCA EV OID",
{ 0xBF, 0xFF, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x44, 0x33, 0x48, 0x7D, 0x6A, 0x8A, 0xA6,
0x0C, 0x1A, 0x29, 0x76, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xC2, 0xBB, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x42,
0x0F, 0x71, 0x3A, 0x13, 0xB9, 0x92, 0x89, 0x1D, 0x38, 0x93 },
"MGIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNOMTIwMAYDVQQKDClHVUFORyBET05HIENFUlRJRklDQVRF"
"IEFVVEhPUklUWSBDTy4sTFRELjEfMB0GA1UEAwwWR0RDQSBUcnVzdEFVVEggUjUg"
"Uk9PVA==",
"fQmX/vBH6no=",
},
{
// CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC,O=SSL Corporation,L=Houston,ST=Texas,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x22, 0xA2, 0xC1, 0xF7, 0xBD, 0xED, 0x70, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0x01,
0xB5, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x88, 0x0F, 0xE9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xDE,
0x2A, 0x4A, 0x44, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x87, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xC8 },
"MH8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQ4wDAYDVQQIDAVUZXhhczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHSG91c3Rv"
"bjEYMBYGA1UECgwPU1NMIENvcnBvcmF0aW9uMTQwMgYDVQQDDCtTU0wuY29tIEVW"
"IFJvb3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgRUND",
"LCmcWxbtBZU=",
},
{
// CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority RSA R2,O=SSL Corporation,L=Houston,ST=Texas,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x2E, 0x7B, 0xF1, 0x6C, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x85, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0xE2, 0xAA,
0x86, 0x96, 0x75, 0x07, 0x61, 0xB0, 0xAE, 0x39, 0xBE, 0x3B, 0x2F,
0xE9, 0xD0, 0xCC, 0x6D, 0x4E, 0xF7, 0x34, 0x91, 0x42, 0x5C },
"MIGCMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEOMAwGA1UECAwFVGV4YXMxEDAOBgNVBAcMB0hvdXN0"
"b24xGDAWBgNVBAoMD1NTTCBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbjE3MDUGA1UEAwwuU1NMLmNvbSBF"
"ViBSb290IENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5IFJTQSBSMg==",
"VrYpzTS8ePY=",
},
{
// CN=UCA Extended Validation Root,O=UniTrust,C=CN
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0xD4, 0x3A, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x54, 0x73, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x84, 0xFC,
0x06, 0xD7, 0xD8, 0xCB, 0x70, 0xEE, 0x5C, 0x28, 0xE7, 0x73, 0xFB,
0x29, 0x4E, 0xB4, 0x1E, 0xE7, 0x17, 0x22, 0x92, 0x4D, 0x24 },
"MEcxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNOMREwDwYDVQQKDAhVbmlUcnVzdDElMCMGA1UEAwwcVUNB"
"IEV4dGVuZGVkIFZhbGlkYXRpb24gUm9vdA==",
"T9Irj/VkyDOeTzRYZiNwYA==",
},
{
// CN=Hongkong Post Root CA 3,O=Hongkong Post,L=Hong Kong,ST=Hong Kong,C=HK
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x5A, 0x2F, 0xC0, 0x3F, 0x0C, 0x83, 0xB0, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xFA, 0x40,
0x60, 0x4B, 0x09, 0x88, 0x44, 0x6C, 0x76, 0x36, 0x18, 0x3D, 0xF9,
0x84, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x10, 0x1A, 0x44, 0x7F, 0xB8, 0xEF, 0xD6 },
"MG8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkhLMRIwEAYDVQQIEwlIb25nIEtvbmcxEjAQBgNVBAcTCUhv"
"bmcgS29uZzEWMBQGA1UEChMNSG9uZ2tvbmcgUG9zdDEgMB4GA1UEAxMXSG9uZ2tv"
"bmcgUG9zdCBSb290IENBIDM=",
"CBZfikyl7ADJk0DfxMauI7gcWqQ=",
},
{
// CN=emSign Root CA - G1,O=eMudhra Technologies Limited,OU=emSign PKI,C=IN
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x40, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x03, 0x46, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0x1D, 0x55,
0x5A, 0x4E, 0x9C, 0xCE, 0x62, 0xC7, 0xF9, 0x63, 0x46, 0x03, 0xEE,
0x40, 0x66, 0x15, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xC8, 0xC8, 0xD0, 0x03, 0x67 },
"MGcxCzAJBgNVBAYTAklOMRMwEQYDVQQLEwplbVNpZ24gUEtJMSUwIwYDVQQKExxl"
"TXVkaHJhIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcyBMaW1pdGVkMRwwGgYDVQQDExNlbVNpZ24gUm9v"
"dCBDQSAtIEcx",
"MfXkYgxsWO3W2A==",
},
{
// CN=emSign ECC Root CA - G3,O=eMudhra Technologies Limited,OU=emSign PKI,C=IN
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x86, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xBA, 0x08, 0x9C, 0x4A, 0x8D, 0x3B, 0xBE, 0x27,
0x34, 0xC6, 0x12, 0xBA, 0x34, 0x1D, 0x81, 0x3E, 0x04, 0x3C, 0xF9,
0xE8, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xCD, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x6B, 0xBE, 0x6B },
"MGsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAklOMRMwEQYDVQQLEwplbVNpZ24gUEtJMSUwIwYDVQQKExxl"
"TXVkaHJhIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcyBMaW1pdGVkMSAwHgYDVQQDExdlbVNpZ24gRUND"
"IFJvb3QgQ0EgLSBHMw==",
"PPYHqWhwDtqLhA==",
},
{
// CN=emSign Root CA - C1,O=eMudhra Inc,OU=emSign PKI,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0x12, 0x56, 0x09, 0xAA, 0x30, 0x1D, 0xA0, 0xA2, 0x49, 0xB9, 0x7A,
0x82, 0x39, 0xCB, 0x6A, 0x34, 0x21, 0x6F, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xAC, 0x9F,
0x39, 0x54, 0xB1, 0x42, 0x92, 0xF2, 0xE8, 0xC8, 0x60, 0x8F },
"MFYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQLEwplbVNpZ24gUEtJMRQwEgYDVQQKEwtl"
"TXVkaHJhIEluYzEcMBoGA1UEAxMTZW1TaWduIFJvb3QgQ0EgLSBDMQ==",
"AK7PALrEzzL4Q7I=",
},
{
// CN=emSign ECC Root CA - C3,O=eMudhra Inc,OU=emSign PKI,C=US
"2.23.140.1.1",
"CA/Browser Forum EV OID",
{ 0xBC, 0x4D, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x15, 0x18, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x3E, 0x1D,
0x8C, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x72, 0x6A, 0x79, 0x5D, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x3C, 0xA5,
0xF1, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x1D, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xDC, 0x0D, 0x7E, 0xB3 },
"MFoxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQLEwplbVNpZ24gUEtJMRQwEgYDVQQKEwtl"
"TXVkaHJhIEluYzEgMB4GA1UEAxMXZW1TaWduIEVDQyBSb290IENBIC0gQzM=",
"e3G2gla4EnycqA==",
},
// clang-format on
};
static SECOidTag sEVInfoOIDTags[ArrayLength(kEVInfos)];
static_assert(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN == 0,
"We depend on zero-initialized globals being interpreted as "
"SEC_OID_UNKNOWN.");
static_assert(
ArrayLength(sEVInfoOIDTags) == ArrayLength(kEVInfos),
"These arrays are used in parallel and must have the same length.");
static SECOidTag RegisterOID(const SECItem& oidItem, const char* oidName) {
SECOidData od;
od.oid.len = oidItem.len;
od.oid.data = oidItem.data;
od.offset = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
od.desc = oidName;
od.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
od.supportedExtension = INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION;
return SECOID_AddEntry(&od);
}
static SECOidTag sCABForumEVOIDTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
static bool isEVPolicy(SECOidTag policyOIDTag) {
if (policyOIDTag != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN && policyOIDTag == sCABForumEVOIDTag) {
return true;
}
for (const SECOidTag& oidTag : sEVInfoOIDTags) {
if (policyOIDTag == oidTag) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
const mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId& policy) {
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
if (!cert) {
return false;
}
unsigned char fingerprint[SHA256_LENGTH];
SECStatus srv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, fingerprint, cert->derCert.data,
AssertedCast<int32_t>(cert->derCert.len));
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return false;
}
const SECOidData* cabforumOIDData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(sCABForumEVOIDTag);
for (size_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(kEVInfos); ++i) {
const EVInfo& entry = kEVInfos[i];
// This check ensures that only the specific roots we approve for EV get
// that status, and not certs (roots or otherwise) that happen to have an
// OID that's already been approved for EV.
if (!ArrayEqual(fingerprint, entry.sha256Fingerprint)) {
continue;
}
if (cabforumOIDData && cabforumOIDData->oid.len == policy.numBytes &&
ArrayEqual(cabforumOIDData->oid.data, policy.bytes, policy.numBytes)) {
return true;
}
const SECOidData* oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(sEVInfoOIDTags[i]);
if (oidData && oidData->oid.len == policy.numBytes &&
ArrayEqual(oidData->oid.data, policy.bytes, policy.numBytes)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
nsresult LoadExtendedValidationInfo() {
static const char* sCABForumOIDString = "2.23.140.1.1";
static const char* sCABForumOIDDescription = "CA/Browser Forum EV OID";
ScopedAutoSECItem cabforumOIDItem;
if (SEC_StringToOID(nullptr, &cabforumOIDItem, sCABForumOIDString, 0) !=
SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
sCABForumEVOIDTag = RegisterOID(cabforumOIDItem, sCABForumOIDDescription);
if (sCABForumEVOIDTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(kEVInfos); ++i) {
const EVInfo& entry = kEVInfos[i];
SECStatus srv;
#ifdef DEBUG
// This section of code double-checks that we calculated the correct
// certificate hash given the issuer and serial number and that it is
// actually present in our loaded root certificates module. It is
// unnecessary to check this in non-debug builds since we will safely fall
// back to DV if the EV information is incorrect.
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
nsAutoCString derIssuer;
nsresult rv =
Base64Decode(nsDependentCString(entry.issuerBase64), derIssuer);
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "Could not base64-decode built-in EV issuer");
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
nsAutoCString serialNumber;
rv = Base64Decode(nsDependentCString(entry.serialBase64), serialNumber);
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "Could not base64-decode built-in EV serial");
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
CERTIssuerAndSN ias;
Bug 1338897 - Avoid using NSS Base64 functions in PSM. r=keeler The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones. They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS. The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones: 1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error if these characters are encountered. 2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64 characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this. For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise: 1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest and Signature values before decoding. 2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to decode. 3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely. For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in the header to decode. 4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF behaviour. 5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace stripping to maintain backwards compatibility. 6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this. MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
2017-03-17 18:31:40 +03:00
ias.derIssuer.data =
BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, const char*>(derIssuer.get());
ias.derIssuer.len = derIssuer.Length();
ias.serialNumber.data =
BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, const char*>(serialNumber.get());
ias.serialNumber.len = serialNumber.Length();
ias.serialNumber.type = siUnsignedInteger;
UniqueCERTCertificate cert(CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(nullptr, &ias));
// If an entry is missing in the NSS root database, it may be because the
// root database is out of sync with what we expect (e.g. a different
// version of system NSS is installed).
if (!cert) {
// The entries for the debug EV roots are at indices 0 through
// NUM_TEST_EV_ROOTS - 1. Since they're not built-in, they probably
// haven't been loaded yet.
MOZ_ASSERT(i < NUM_TEST_EV_ROOTS, "Could not find built-in EV root");
} else {
unsigned char certFingerprint[SHA256_LENGTH];
srv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, certFingerprint, cert->derCert.data,
AssertedCast<int32_t>(cert->derCert.len));
MOZ_ASSERT(srv == SECSuccess, "Could not hash EV root");
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
bool same = ArrayEqual(certFingerprint, entry.sha256Fingerprint);
MOZ_ASSERT(same, "EV root fingerprint mismatch");
if (!same) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
}
#endif
// This is the code that actually enables these roots for EV.
ScopedAutoSECItem evOIDItem;
srv = SEC_StringToOID(nullptr, &evOIDItem, entry.dottedOid, 0);
MOZ_ASSERT(srv == SECSuccess, "SEC_StringToOID failed");
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
sEVInfoOIDTags[i] = RegisterOID(evOIDItem, entry.oidName);
if (sEVInfoOIDTags[i] == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Helper function for GetFirstEVPolicy(): returns the first suitable policy
// from the given list of policies.
bool GetFirstEVPolicyFromPolicyList(
const UniqueCERTCertificatePolicies& policies,
/*out*/ mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId& policy,
/*out*/ SECOidTag& policyOidTag) {
for (size_t i = 0; policies->policyInfos[i]; i++) {
const CERTPolicyInfo* policyInfo = policies->policyInfos[i];
SECOidTag policyInfoOID = policyInfo->oid;
if (policyInfoOID == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || !isEVPolicy(policyInfoOID)) {
continue;
}
const SECOidData* oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(policyInfoOID);
MOZ_ASSERT(oidData);
MOZ_ASSERT(oidData->oid.data);
MOZ_ASSERT(oidData->oid.len > 0);
MOZ_ASSERT(oidData->oid.len <= mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId::MAX_BYTES);
if (!oidData || !oidData->oid.data || oidData->oid.len == 0 ||
oidData->oid.len > mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId::MAX_BYTES) {
continue;
}
policy.numBytes = AssertedCast<uint16_t>(oidData->oid.len);
PodCopy(policy.bytes, oidData->oid.data, policy.numBytes);
policyOidTag = policyInfoOID;
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool GetFirstEVPolicy(CERTCertificate& cert,
/*out*/ mozilla::pkix::CertPolicyId& policy,
/*out*/ SECOidTag& policyOidTag) {
if (!cert.extensions) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; cert.extensions[i]; i++) {
const CERTCertExtension* extension = cert.extensions[i];
if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&extension->id) !=
SEC_OID_X509_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES) {
continue;
}
UniqueCERTCertificatePolicies policies(
CERT_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(&extension->value));
if (!policies) {
continue;
}
if (GetFirstEVPolicyFromPolicyList(policies, policy, policyOidTag)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
} // namespace psm
} // namespace mozilla