зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
Bug 1323339 - Add U2FSoftToken Manager; r=baku r=jcj
Takes functionality from NSSU2FToken/NSSU2FTokenRemote classes, and moves it into a U2FSoftToken class. Leaves NSSU2FToken/NSSU2FTokenRemote classes intact so as not to break U2F API code (to be ported to async IPC in bug 1354330). MozReview-Commit-ID: El2MCcYUrtE
This commit is contained in:
Kyle Machulis
Родитель
4f61492d32
Коммит
00a81563a5
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@ -14,16 +14,570 @@
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#include "secerr.h"
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#include "WebCryptoCommon.h"
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#define PREF_U2F_NSSTOKEN_COUNTER "security.webauth.softtoken_counter"
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namespace mozilla {
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namespace dom {
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U2FSoftTokenManager::U2FSoftTokenManager(uint32_t aCounter) :
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mCounter(aCounter)
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{
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using namespace mozilla;
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using mozilla::dom::CreateECParamsForCurve;
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const nsCString U2FSoftTokenManager::mSecretNickname =
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NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("U2F_NSSTOKEN");
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const nsString U2FSoftTokenManager::mVersion =
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NS_LITERAL_STRING("U2F_V2");
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namespace {
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NS_NAMED_LITERAL_CSTRING(kAttestCertSubjectName, "CN=Firefox U2F Soft Token");
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// This U2F-compatible soft token uses FIDO U2F-compatible ECDSA keypairs
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// on the SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1 curve. When asked to Register, it will
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// generate and return a new keypair KP, where the private component is wrapped
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// using AES-KW with the 128-bit mWrappingKey to make an opaque "key handle".
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// In other words, Register yields { KP_pub, AES-KW(KP_priv, key=mWrappingKey) }
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//
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// The value mWrappingKey is long-lived; it is persisted as part of the NSS DB
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// for the current profile. The attestation certificates that are produced are
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// ephemeral to counteract profiling. They have little use for a soft-token
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// at any rate, but are required by the specification.
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const uint32_t kParamLen = 32;
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const uint32_t kPublicKeyLen = 65;
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const uint32_t kWrappedKeyBufLen = 256;
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const uint32_t kWrappingKeyByteLen = 128/8;
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const uint32_t kSaltByteLen = 64/8;
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const uint32_t kVersion1KeyHandleLen = 162;
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NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(kEcAlgorithm, WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P256);
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const PRTime kOneDay = PRTime(PR_USEC_PER_SEC)
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* PRTime(60) // sec
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* PRTime(60) // min
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* PRTime(24); // hours
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const PRTime kExpirationSlack = kOneDay; // Pre-date for clock skew
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const PRTime kExpirationLife = kOneDay;
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static mozilla::LazyLogModule gNSSTokenLog("webauth_u2f");
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enum SoftTokenHandle {
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Version1 = 0,
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};
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}
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U2FSoftTokenManager::U2FSoftTokenManager(uint32_t aCounter)
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: mInitialized(false),
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mCounter(aCounter)
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{}
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U2FSoftTokenManager::~U2FSoftTokenManager()
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{
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nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
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if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
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return;
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}
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destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference();
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shutdown(ShutdownCalledFrom::Object);
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}
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void
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U2FSoftTokenManager::virtualDestroyNSSReference()
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{
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destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference();
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}
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void
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U2FSoftTokenManager::destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference()
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{
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mWrappingKey = nullptr;
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}
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/**
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* Gets the first key with the given nickname from the given slot. Any other
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* keys found are not returned.
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* PK11_GetNextSymKey() should not be called on the returned key.
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*
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* @param aSlot Slot to search.
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* @param aNickname Nickname the key should have.
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* @return The first key found. nullptr if no key could be found.
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*/
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static UniquePK11SymKey
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GetSymKeyByNickname(const UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
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const nsCString& aNickname,
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const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock&)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(aSlot);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aSlot)) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("Searching for a symmetric key named %s", aNickname.get()));
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UniquePK11SymKey keyListHead(
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PK11_ListFixedKeysInSlot(aSlot.get(), const_cast<char*>(aNickname.get()),
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/* wincx */ nullptr));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyListHead)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Symmetric key not found."));
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return nullptr;
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}
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// Sanity check PK11_ListFixedKeysInSlot() only returns keys with the correct
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// nickname.
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MOZ_ASSERT(aNickname ==
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UniquePORTString(PK11_GetSymKeyNickname(keyListHead.get())).get());
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Symmetric key found!"));
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// Free any remaining keys in the key list.
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UniquePK11SymKey freeKey(PK11_GetNextSymKey(keyListHead.get()));
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while (freeKey) {
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freeKey = UniquePK11SymKey(PK11_GetNextSymKey(freeKey.get()));
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}
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return keyListHead;
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}
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static nsresult
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GenEcKeypair(const UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
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/*out*/ UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey& aPrivKey,
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/*out*/ UniqueSECKEYPublicKey& aPubKey,
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const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock&)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(aSlot);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aSlot)) {
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return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!arena)) {
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return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
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}
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// Set the curve parameters; keyParams belongs to the arena memory space
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SECItem* keyParams = CreateECParamsForCurve(kEcAlgorithm, arena.get());
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyParams)) {
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return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
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}
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// Generate a key pair
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
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SECKEYPublicKey* pubKeyRaw;
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aPrivKey = UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey(
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PK11_GenerateKeyPair(aSlot.get(), mechanism, keyParams, &pubKeyRaw,
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/* ephemeral */ false, false,
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/* wincx */ nullptr));
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aPubKey = UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(pubKeyRaw);
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pubKeyRaw = nullptr;
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aPrivKey.get() || !aPubKey.get())) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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// Check that the public key has the correct length
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if (NS_WARN_IF(aPubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len != kPublicKeyLen)) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsresult
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U2FSoftTokenManager::GetOrCreateWrappingKey(const UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
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const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock& locker)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(aSlot);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aSlot)) {
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return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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// Search for an existing wrapping key. If we find it,
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// store it for later and mark ourselves initialized.
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mWrappingKey = GetSymKeyByNickname(aSlot, mSecretNickname, locker);
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if (mWrappingKey) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("U2F Soft Token Key found."));
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mInitialized = true;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Info,
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("No keys found. Generating new U2F Soft Token wrapping key."));
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// We did not find an existing wrapping key, so we generate one in the
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// persistent database (e.g, Token).
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mWrappingKey = UniquePK11SymKey(
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PK11_TokenKeyGenWithFlags(aSlot.get(), CKM_AES_KEY_GEN,
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/* default params */ nullptr,
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kWrappingKeyByteLen,
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/* empty keyid */ nullptr,
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/* flags */ CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP,
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/* attributes */ PK11_ATTR_TOKEN |
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PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE,
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/* wincx */ nullptr));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!mWrappingKey)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to store wrapping key, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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SECStatus srv = PK11_SetSymKeyNickname(mWrappingKey.get(),
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mSecretNickname.get());
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if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to set nickname, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("Key stored, nickname set to %s.", mSecretNickname.get()));
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AbstractThread::MainThread()->Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
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[] () {
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MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
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Preferences::SetUint(PREF_U2F_NSSTOKEN_COUNTER, 0);
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}));
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static nsresult
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GetAttestationCertificate(const UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
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/*out*/ UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey& aAttestPrivKey,
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/*out*/ UniqueCERTCertificate& aAttestCert,
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const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock& locker)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(aSlot);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aSlot)) {
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return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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UniqueSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
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// Construct an ephemeral keypair for this Attestation Certificate
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nsresult rv = GenEcKeypair(aSlot, aAttestPrivKey, pubKey, locker);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv) || !aAttestPrivKey || !pubKey)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to gen keypair, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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// Construct the Attestation Certificate itself
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UniqueCERTName subjectName(CERT_AsciiToName(kAttestCertSubjectName.get()));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!subjectName)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to set subject name, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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UniqueCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki(
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SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubKey.get()));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!spki)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to set SPKI, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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UniqueCERTCertificateRequest certreq(
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CERT_CreateCertificateRequest(subjectName.get(), spki.get(), nullptr));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!certreq)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to gen CSR, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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PRTime now = PR_Now();
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PRTime notBefore = now - kExpirationSlack;
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PRTime notAfter = now + kExpirationLife;
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UniqueCERTValidity validity(CERT_CreateValidity(notBefore, notAfter));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!validity)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to gen validity, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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unsigned long serial;
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unsigned char* serialBytes =
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mozilla::BitwiseCast<unsigned char*, unsigned long*>(&serial);
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SECStatus srv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(aSlot.get(), serialBytes,
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sizeof(serial));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to gen serial, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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// Ensure that the most significant bit isn't set (which would
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// indicate a negative number, which isn't valid for serial
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// numbers).
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serialBytes[0] &= 0x7f;
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// Also ensure that the least significant bit on the most
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// significant byte is set (to prevent a leading zero byte,
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// which also wouldn't be valid).
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serialBytes[0] |= 0x01;
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aAttestCert = UniqueCERTCertificate(
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CERT_CreateCertificate(serial, subjectName.get(), validity.get(),
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certreq.get()));
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aAttestCert)) {
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
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("Failed to gen certificate, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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PLArenaPool* arena = aAttestCert->arena;
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srv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &aAttestCert->signature,
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SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE,
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/* wincx */ nullptr);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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// Set version to X509v3.
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*(aAttestCert->version.data) = SEC_CERTIFICATE_VERSION_3;
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aAttestCert->version.len = 1;
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SECItem innerDER = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &innerDER, aAttestCert.get(),
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SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_CertificateTemplate)))) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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SECItem* signedCert = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECItem);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!signedCert)) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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srv = SEC_DerSignData(arena, signedCert, innerDER.data, innerDER.len,
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aAttestPrivKey.get(),
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SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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aAttestCert->derCert = *signedCert;
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("U2F Soft Token attestation certificate generated."));
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Set up the context for the soft U2F Token. This is called by NSS
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// initialization.
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nsresult
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U2FSoftTokenManager::Init()
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{
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// If we've already initialized, just return.
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if (mInitialized) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
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if (NS_WARN_IF(isAlreadyShutDown())) {
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return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
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}
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UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
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MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
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// Search for an existing wrapping key, or create one.
|
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nsresult rv = GetOrCreateWrappingKey(slot, locker);
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if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
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return rv;
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}
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|
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mInitialized = true;
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("U2F Soft Token initialized."));
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Convert a Private Key object into an opaque key handle, using AES Key Wrap
|
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// with the long-lived aPersistentKey mixed with aAppParam to convert aPrivKey.
|
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// The key handle's format is version || saltLen || salt || wrappedPrivateKey
|
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static UniqueSECItem
|
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KeyHandleFromPrivateKey(const UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
|
||||
const UniquePK11SymKey& aPersistentKey,
|
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uint8_t* aAppParam, uint32_t aAppParamLen,
|
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const UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey& aPrivKey,
|
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const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock&)
|
||||
{
|
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MOZ_ASSERT(aSlot);
|
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MOZ_ASSERT(aPersistentKey);
|
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MOZ_ASSERT(aAppParam);
|
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MOZ_ASSERT(aPrivKey);
|
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if (NS_WARN_IF(!aSlot || !aPersistentKey || !aPrivKey || !aAppParam)) {
|
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return nullptr;
|
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}
|
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// Generate a random salt
|
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uint8_t saltParam[kSaltByteLen];
|
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SECStatus srv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(aSlot.get(), saltParam,
|
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sizeof(saltParam));
|
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if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
|
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MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
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("Failed to generate a salt, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
|
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return nullptr;
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}
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|
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// Prepare the HKDF (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869)
|
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CK_NSS_HKDFParams hkdfParams = { true, saltParam, sizeof(saltParam),
|
||||
true, aAppParam, aAppParamLen };
|
||||
SECItem kdfParams = { siBuffer, (unsigned char*)&hkdfParams,
|
||||
sizeof(hkdfParams) };
|
||||
|
||||
// Derive a wrapping key from aPersistentKey, the salt, and the aAppParam.
|
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// CKM_AES_KEY_GEN and CKA_WRAP are key type and usage attributes of the
|
||||
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
|
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UniquePK11SymKey wrapKey(PK11_Derive(aPersistentKey.get(), CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256,
|
||||
&kdfParams, CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKA_WRAP,
|
||||
kWrappingKeyByteLen));
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!wrapKey.get())) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
||||
("Failed to derive a wrapping key, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
UniqueSECItem wrappedKey(::SECITEM_AllocItem(/* default arena */ nullptr,
|
||||
/* no buffer */ nullptr,
|
||||
kWrappedKeyBufLen));
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!wrappedKey)) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning, ("Failed to allocate memory"));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
UniqueSECItem param(PK11_ParamFromIV(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD,
|
||||
/* default IV */ nullptr ));
|
||||
|
||||
srv = PK11_WrapPrivKey(aSlot.get(), wrapKey.get(), aPrivKey.get(),
|
||||
CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, param.get(), wrappedKey.get(),
|
||||
/* wincx */ nullptr);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
||||
("Failed to wrap U2F key, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concatenate the salt and the wrapped Private Key together
|
||||
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer keyHandleBuf;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyHandleBuf.SetCapacity(wrappedKey.get()->len + sizeof(saltParam) + 2,
|
||||
mozilla::fallible))) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning, ("Failed to allocate memory"));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// It's OK to ignore the return values here because we're writing into
|
||||
// pre-allocated space
|
||||
keyHandleBuf.AppendElement(SoftTokenHandle::Version1, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
keyHandleBuf.AppendElement(sizeof(saltParam), mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
keyHandleBuf.AppendElements(saltParam, sizeof(saltParam), mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
keyHandleBuf.AppendSECItem(wrappedKey.get());
|
||||
|
||||
UniqueSECItem keyHandle(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyHandle)) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning, ("Failed to allocate memory"));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyHandleBuf.ToSECItem(/* default arena */ nullptr, keyHandle.get()))) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning, ("Failed to allocate memory"));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return keyHandle;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Convert an opaque key handle aKeyHandle back into a Private Key object, using
|
||||
// the long-lived aPersistentKey mixed with aAppParam and the AES Key Wrap
|
||||
// algorithm.
|
||||
static UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey
|
||||
PrivateKeyFromKeyHandle(const UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
|
||||
const UniquePK11SymKey& aPersistentKey,
|
||||
uint8_t* aKeyHandle, uint32_t aKeyHandleLen,
|
||||
uint8_t* aAppParam, uint32_t aAppParamLen,
|
||||
const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock&)
|
||||
{
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(aSlot);
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(aPersistentKey);
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(aKeyHandle);
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(aAppParam);
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(aAppParamLen == SHA256_LENGTH);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!aSlot || !aPersistentKey || !aKeyHandle || !aAppParam ||
|
||||
aAppParamLen != SHA256_LENGTH)) {
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// As we only support one key format ourselves (right now), fail early if
|
||||
// we aren't that length
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(aKeyHandleLen != kVersion1KeyHandleLen)) {
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(aKeyHandle[0] != SoftTokenHandle::Version1)) {
|
||||
// Unrecognized version
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t saltLen = aKeyHandle[1];
|
||||
uint8_t* saltPtr = aKeyHandle + 2;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(saltLen != kSaltByteLen)) {
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Prepare the HKDF (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869)
|
||||
CK_NSS_HKDFParams hkdfParams = { true, saltPtr, saltLen,
|
||||
true, aAppParam, aAppParamLen };
|
||||
SECItem kdfParams = { siBuffer, (unsigned char*)&hkdfParams,
|
||||
sizeof(hkdfParams) };
|
||||
|
||||
// Derive a wrapping key from aPersistentKey, the salt, and the aAppParam.
|
||||
// CKM_AES_KEY_GEN and CKA_WRAP are key type and usage attributes of the
|
||||
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
|
||||
UniquePK11SymKey wrapKey(PK11_Derive(aPersistentKey.get(), CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256,
|
||||
&kdfParams, CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKA_WRAP,
|
||||
kWrappingKeyByteLen));
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!wrapKey.get())) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
||||
("Failed to derive a wrapping key, NSS error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t wrappedLen = aKeyHandleLen - saltLen - 2;
|
||||
uint8_t* wrappedPtr = aKeyHandle + saltLen + 2;
|
||||
|
||||
ScopedAutoSECItem wrappedKeyItem(wrappedLen);
|
||||
memcpy(wrappedKeyItem.data, wrappedPtr, wrappedKeyItem.len);
|
||||
|
||||
ScopedAutoSECItem pubKey(kPublicKeyLen);
|
||||
|
||||
UniqueSECItem param(PK11_ParamFromIV(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD,
|
||||
/* default IV */ nullptr ));
|
||||
|
||||
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usages[] = { CKA_SIGN };
|
||||
int usageCount = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey unwrappedKey(
|
||||
PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(aSlot.get(), wrapKey.get(), CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD,
|
||||
param.get(), &wrappedKeyItem,
|
||||
/* no nickname */ nullptr,
|
||||
/* discard pubkey */ &pubKey,
|
||||
/* not permanent */ false,
|
||||
/* non-exportable */ true,
|
||||
CKK_EC, usages, usageCount,
|
||||
/* wincx */ nullptr));
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!unwrappedKey)) {
|
||||
// Not our key.
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
||||
("Could not unwrap key handle, NSS Error #%d", PORT_GetError()));
|
||||
return nullptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return unwrappedKey;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Return whether the provided version is supported by this token.
|
||||
bool
|
||||
U2FSoftTokenManager::IsCompatibleVersion(const nsAString& aVersion)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return mVersion == aVersion;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IsRegistered determines if the provided key handle is usable by this token.
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,7 +586,29 @@ U2FSoftTokenManager::IsRegistered(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aKeyHandle,
|
|||
nsTArray<uint8_t>& aAppParam,
|
||||
bool& aResult)
|
||||
{
|
||||
aResult = false;
|
||||
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(isAlreadyShutDown())) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!mInitialized) {
|
||||
nsresult rv = Init();
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
||||
|
||||
// Decode the key handle
|
||||
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey privKey = PrivateKeyFromKeyHandle(slot, mWrappingKey,
|
||||
aKeyHandle.Elements(),
|
||||
aKeyHandle.Length(),
|
||||
aAppParam.Elements(),
|
||||
aAppParam.Length(),
|
||||
locker);
|
||||
aResult = privKey.get() != nullptr;
|
||||
return NS_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -61,6 +637,93 @@ U2FSoftTokenManager::Register(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aApplication,
|
|||
/* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aRegistration,
|
||||
/* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aSignature)
|
||||
{
|
||||
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(isAlreadyShutDown())) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!mInitialized) {
|
||||
nsresult rv = Init();
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We should already have a wrapping key
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(mWrappingKey);
|
||||
|
||||
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
||||
|
||||
// Construct a one-time-use Attestation Certificate
|
||||
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey attestPrivKey;
|
||||
UniqueCERTCertificate attestCert;
|
||||
nsresult rv = GetAttestationCertificate(slot, attestPrivKey, attestCert,
|
||||
locker);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(attestCert);
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(attestPrivKey);
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate a new keypair; the private will be wrapped into a Key Handle
|
||||
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
|
||||
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
|
||||
rv = GenEcKeypair(slot, privKey, pubKey, locker);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The key handle will be the result of keywrap(privKey, key=mWrappingKey)
|
||||
UniqueSECItem keyHandleItem = KeyHandleFromPrivateKey(slot, mWrappingKey,
|
||||
aApplication.Elements(),
|
||||
aApplication.Length(),
|
||||
privKey, locker);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyHandleItem.get())) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sign the challenge using the Attestation privkey (from attestCert)
|
||||
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer signedDataBuf;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signedDataBuf.SetCapacity(1 + aApplication.Length() + aChallenge.Length() +
|
||||
keyHandleItem->len + kPublicKeyLen,
|
||||
mozilla::fallible))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// // It's OK to ignore the return values here because we're writing into
|
||||
// // pre-allocated space
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendElements(aApplication, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendElements(aChallenge, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendSECItem(keyHandleItem.get());
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendSECItem(pubKey->u.ec.publicValue);
|
||||
|
||||
ScopedAutoSECItem signatureItem;
|
||||
SECStatus srv = SEC_SignData(&signatureItem, signedDataBuf.Elements(),
|
||||
signedDataBuf.Length(), attestPrivKey.get(),
|
||||
SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
||||
("Signature failure: %d", PORT_GetError()));
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Serialize the registration data
|
||||
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer registrationBuf;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!registrationBuf.SetCapacity(1 + kPublicKeyLen + 1 + keyHandleItem->len +
|
||||
attestCert.get()->derCert.len +
|
||||
signatureItem.len, mozilla::fallible))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
registrationBuf.AppendElement(0x05, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
registrationBuf.AppendSECItem(pubKey->u.ec.publicValue);
|
||||
registrationBuf.AppendElement(keyHandleItem->len, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
registrationBuf.AppendSECItem(keyHandleItem.get());
|
||||
registrationBuf.AppendSECItem(attestCert.get()->derCert);
|
||||
registrationBuf.AppendSECItem(signatureItem);
|
||||
aRegistration = registrationBuf;
|
||||
|
||||
return NS_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -86,6 +749,109 @@ U2FSoftTokenManager::Sign(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aApplication,
|
|||
nsTArray<uint8_t>& aKeyHandle,
|
||||
nsTArray<uint8_t>& aSignature)
|
||||
{
|
||||
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(isAlreadyShutDown())) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(mInitialized);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!mInitialized)) {
|
||||
nsresult rv = Init();
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(mWrappingKey);
|
||||
|
||||
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
|
||||
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF((aChallenge.Length() != kParamLen) || (aApplication.Length() != kParamLen))) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
||||
("Parameter lengths are wrong! challenge=%d app=%d expected=%d",
|
||||
(uint32_t)aChallenge.Length(), (uint32_t)aApplication.Length(), kParamLen));
|
||||
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decode the key handle
|
||||
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey privKey = PrivateKeyFromKeyHandle(slot, mWrappingKey,
|
||||
aKeyHandle.Elements(),
|
||||
aKeyHandle.Length(),
|
||||
aApplication.Elements(),
|
||||
aApplication.Length(),
|
||||
locker);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!privKey.get())) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning, ("Couldn't get the priv key!"));
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Increment the counter and turn it into a SECItem
|
||||
mCounter += 1;
|
||||
ScopedAutoSECItem counterItem(4);
|
||||
counterItem.data[0] = (mCounter >> 24) & 0xFF;
|
||||
counterItem.data[1] = (mCounter >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
||||
counterItem.data[2] = (mCounter >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
||||
counterItem.data[3] = (mCounter >> 0) & 0xFF;
|
||||
uint32_t counter = mCounter;
|
||||
AbstractThread::MainThread()->Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
|
||||
[counter] () {
|
||||
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
|
||||
Preferences::SetUint(PREF_U2F_NSSTOKEN_COUNTER, counter);
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the signature
|
||||
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer signedDataBuf;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signedDataBuf.SetCapacity(1 + 4 + (2 * kParamLen), mozilla::fallible))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// It's OK to ignore the return values here because we're writing into
|
||||
// pre-allocated space
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendElements(aApplication.Elements(), aApplication.Length(),
|
||||
mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendElement(0x01, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendSECItem(counterItem);
|
||||
signedDataBuf.AppendElements(aChallenge.Elements(), aChallenge.Length(),
|
||||
mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
|
||||
if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
|
||||
nsAutoCString base64;
|
||||
nsresult rv = Base64URLEncode(signedDataBuf.Length(), signedDataBuf.Elements(),
|
||||
Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Omit, base64);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
||||
("U2F Token signing bytes (base64): %s", base64.get()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ScopedAutoSECItem signatureItem;
|
||||
SECStatus srv = SEC_SignData(&signatureItem, signedDataBuf.Elements(),
|
||||
signedDataBuf.Length(), privKey.get(),
|
||||
SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE);
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(srv != SECSuccess)) {
|
||||
MOZ_LOG(gNSSTokenLog, LogLevel::Warning,
|
||||
("Signature failure: %d", PORT_GetError()));
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assemble the signature data into a buffer for return
|
||||
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer signatureBuf;
|
||||
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signatureBuf.SetCapacity(1 + counterItem.len + signatureItem.len,
|
||||
mozilla::fallible))) {
|
||||
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// It's OK to ignore the return values here because we're writing into
|
||||
// pre-allocated space
|
||||
signatureBuf.AppendElement(0x01, mozilla::fallible);
|
||||
signatureBuf.AppendSECItem(counterItem);
|
||||
signatureBuf.AppendSECItem(signatureItem);
|
||||
|
||||
aSignature = signatureBuf;
|
||||
return NS_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -19,10 +19,11 @@
|
|||
namespace mozilla {
|
||||
namespace dom {
|
||||
|
||||
class U2FSoftTokenManager final : public U2FTokenTransport
|
||||
class U2FSoftTokenManager final : public U2FTokenTransport,
|
||||
public nsNSSShutDownObject
|
||||
{
|
||||
public:
|
||||
U2FSoftTokenManager(uint32_t aCounter);
|
||||
explicit U2FSoftTokenManager(uint32_t aCounter);
|
||||
virtual nsresult Register(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aApplication,
|
||||
nsTArray<uint8_t>& aChallenge,
|
||||
/* out */ nsTArray<uint8_t>& aRegistration,
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,8 +35,24 @@ public:
|
|||
nsresult IsRegistered(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aKeyHandle,
|
||||
nsTArray<uint8_t>& aAppParam,
|
||||
bool& aResult);
|
||||
|
||||
// For nsNSSShutDownObject
|
||||
virtual void virtualDestroyNSSReference() override;
|
||||
void destructorSafeDestroyNSSReference();
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
~U2FSoftTokenManager();
|
||||
nsresult Init();
|
||||
bool IsCompatibleVersion(const nsAString& aVersion);
|
||||
|
||||
bool mInitialized;
|
||||
mozilla::UniquePK11SymKey mWrappingKey;
|
||||
|
||||
static const nsCString mSecretNickname;
|
||||
static const nsString mVersion;
|
||||
|
||||
nsresult GetOrCreateWrappingKey(const mozilla::UniquePK11SlotInfo& aSlot,
|
||||
const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock&);
|
||||
uint32_t mCounter;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Загрузка…
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